Handbook of Psychology of Investigative Interviewing: Current Developments and Future Directions
Page 17
transcript shows an admission, and then later admissions that should have been
denials ( ibid .: 181).
A total of 30 terrorist cases from the CTC at New Scotland Yard qualifi ed
for this study. Each case was studied in relation to the case details and the
custody record checked for medical observations or indications of psychologi-
cal vulnerability. The interview tapes were cross - referenced with the relevant
transcripts and then divided into interview sessions for analysis. An interview
session was defi ned as any period of continuous interviewing (i.e., with no
breaks in excess of 60 minutes). In previous studies cases were often analysed
according to the individual time of each tape, but this failed to capture the
full extent and practicalities involved in the police interview. For example, it
is not unusual to allow consultations with legal advisers to take place, or short
adjournments for exhibits and refreshments. A total of 187 interview sessions
were analysed. Thus with an appreciation of all relevant allegations and some
knowledge of the individual suspect ’ s detention experience, the author was in
a position to begin to analyse each case.
Interview t actics and q uestionnaire d istribution
The author has analysed many hundreds of police interviews and has developed
a robust methodology for understanding and interpreting what takes place
within this particular interaction. Essentially, the nature and type of tactics
employed by the police can be captured within a specially designed coding
frame predicated on a three dimensional typology: Delivery – Maximization
– Manipulation (Pearse, 1997 ; see also Pearse, 2006 . This extends the meth-
odology to help understand the tactics employed at the Abu Ghraib and
Guantanamo Bay detention centres).
Delivery is very much an overlapping category which is present throughout
the process and is designed to capture
‘ what ’ type of questions are asked
(closed, leading, open etc.); ‘ how ’ they are put (hushed, lowered tones, or
The Investigation of Terrorist Offences in the United Kingdom
79
harsh and aggressive) as well as any relevant contextual features (i.e. ‘ where ’
the questioning takes place – the custodial environment). It captures all the
contextual features. Maximization is ‘ a hard - sell ’ technique in which the inter-
rogator tries to scare and intimidate the suspect into confessing by making
claims (false or otherwise) about evidence and exaggerating the seriousness
and/or magnitude of the charges (Pearse, 2006 : 76). This includes any tactic
designed to increase a suspect ’ s internal anxiety. Finally, manipulation relates
to the more subtle and insidious form of questioning that attacks a suspect ’ s
perception of the crime or the consequences of his or her actions and will
include manipulating details, or signifi cant others, fl attery, making unrealistic
promises, as well as attacking a suspect ’ s self - esteem or stature.
A total of 50 (71%) questionnaires were returned by CT offi cers out of 70
randomly distributed within the branch. The respondents were offered the
traditional range of formats to answer questions, including ‘ yes ’ or ‘ no ’ , or
‘ not selected ’ . Unfortunately, on occasions some respondents failed to make
any selection. This has been recorded for statistical purposes as ‘ not selected ’
and will inevitably impact on the total responses per question and statistical
fi ndings. Many months of delay were experienced throughout the period of
this research in accessing materials or personnel whenever a major case or
investigation was under way. In a small number of cases (fi ve) an isolated
audio - tape could not be found, but in each instance the relevant transcript was
available. To date three custody records cannot be located.
Findings and c ommentary
One of the fi rst issues to arise from the face - to - face interviews with serving
CT offi cers was the predicament that they were placed in when called upon
to make an early arrest. The offi cers were asked:
There is a suggestion that the strategic decision to arrests suspects prematurely
(often to save life) impacts to the detriment of the detention and interviewing
process. For example, by immediately imposing time pressure and without
recourse to available and suffi cient evidence, e.g. surveillance, forensic, computer
access, fi nancial and international inquiries. To what extent do you agree with
this?
Forty - one offi cers (82%) ‘ agreed ’ or ‘ strongly agreed ’ with this proposition
(Table 5.1 ).
In criminal arrests the ethos underpinning PACE was to provide police with
suffi cient powers to gather evidence prior to arrest and so reduce the period
of detention. By contrast, there is often a need to arrest terrorist suspects early
in order to protect the public and save lives. Such action may be based on
sensitive intelligence and often before there has been time to gather suffi cient
evidence that would allow the prosecution to consider there was a likelihood
80
Handbook of Psychology of Investigative Interviewing
Table 5.1: Impact of early arrest on interview process
Frequency
Percentage
Cumulative
N = 50
Strongly disagree
5
10%
10%
Disagree
4
8%
18%
Agree
23
46%
64%
Strongly agree
18
36%
100%
of conviction (see the letter from Assistant Commissioner Andy Hayman to
the Home Secretary, Rt. Hon. Charles Clarke, http://www.homeoffi ce.gov.
uk/Terrorism/Terrorismandthelaw).
In this study such ‘ public safety ’ arrests precipitated a series of sterile and
non - productive rounds of antecedent interviews, often preceded by vague
disclosure notices, in turn prompting ‘ no comment ’ advice from resolute legal
advisers: a cyclical impasse generating palpable levels of frustration and effec-
tively undermining any opportunity for the offi cers to manage events, a situ-
ation best captured by one of the CT offi cers who, when placed in this
dilemma, made the plea: ‘ Unless we get evidence soon, we may as well start
telling jokes ’ (data obtained during debriefi ng sessions).
It was noticeable that over a third of all interview sessions (37%) took place
within the fi rst two days of detention, with a majority dominated by anteced-
ent inquiries. Gareth Peirce, solicitor, in her evidence to the Home Affairs
Select Committee (Terrorism Detention Powers, Fourth Report of Session
2005 – 06, Vol. II, p. ev 13), was of the opinion that 90% of interviews follow
this pattern. The same activity also limits the opportunity to utilize the fi ndings
of relevant psychological studies that have identifi ed the importance of the
suspect ’ s perception of events and in particular the nature, or their perception
of the nature, of the evidence against them. According to the offi cers, the
frequency of p
ublic safety arrests often places them in an untenable position
and a negative mantra has evolved: why bother interviewing, [we have nothing
to put to them and] the suspect is not going to say anything? One offi cer
described the situation as similar to ‘ being stacked in a holding pattern over
Heathrow – waiting for information, waiting for evidence to continue ’ .
In psychological terms, if we adopt the offi cers ’ perspective, they are already
under pressure – required to interview international terrorist suspects in a very
accountable environment – and they feel further exposed in public safety cases
by the absence of credible evidence to allow a meaningful dialogue to take
place. This heightened state of dependency and a negative frame of mind serve
as a fertile combination to create an enduring self fulfi lling prophecy.
Table 5.2 provides details of the extent of the use of various tactics by police
offi cers during the 187 interview sessions. The most immediate fi nding is the
limited use of many of the categories. ‘ Use of evidence ’ (95%) was the most
popular tactic and covered the production of exhibits, photographs and other
The Investigation of Terrorist Offences in the United Kingdom
81
Table 5.2: Extent of use of police interviewing tactics
Use
Never Used
Infrequent
Average
Frequent
Very
N = 187
Use
Use
Use
Frequent
Tactics
Use
Open question
0
3
75
104
5
(1.5%)
(40%)
(56%)
(2.5%)
Closed question
4
54
105
21
3
(2%)
(29%)
(56%)
(11%)
(2%)
Leading question
84
73
27
2
1
(45%)
(39%)
(14.5%)
(1%)
(0.5%)
Repeat question
159
20
8
0
0
(85%)
(11%)
(4%)
Multiple question
165
14
7
1
0
(88%)
(7.5%)
(4%)
(.5%)
Multiple offi cers
175
7
5
0
0
(94%)
(3.5%)
(2.5%)
Challenges
56
42
63
19
7
(30%)
(22.5%)
(34%)
(10%)
(3.5%)
Improper tactics
184
3
0
0
0
(98%)
(2%)
Manipulative
150
17
19
1
0
tactics
(80.5%)
(9%)
(10%)
(.5%)
Minimization
170
12
5
0
0
(91%)
(6.5%)
(2.5%)
Maximization
123
18
39
7
0
(66%)
(9.5%)
(21%)
(3.5%)
Use of evidence
10
23
51
63
40
(5%)
(12%)
(27%)
(34%)
(22%)
materials, but it tended to occur in a rather sterile and perfunctory atmos-
phere. The limited use of ‘ challenges ’ is indicative of the polite and non -
confrontational nature of these interactions, even though the use of silence by
important suspects was prevalent. Given previous research from 1999 it was
also surprising to fi nd such limited use of maximization tactics (emphasizing
the serious nature of offence), minimization (reducing suspect ’ s perception of
consequences) or manipulation (use of themes, fl attery) (Pearse & Gudjonsson,
1999 ).
Such data are responsible for the summary that, in this study, interviews
with terrorist suspects can best be described as ‘ Polite, non - threatening and
often non - productive ’ .
Little use was made of the special warning procedure (sections 34 – 37 of
the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994; see Table 5.3 ). There were
only three cases identifi ed and they had no impact in the interview. No evi-
dential use was made in the two cases that progressed to trial. Twenty - nine
offi cers (58%) reported making use of the special warning procedure in previ-
82
Handbook of Psychology of Investigative Interviewing
Table 5.3: Use and impact of a special warning ( SW )
Use of SW
Frequency
Impact of SW in Interview
Impact of SW in Court
N = 187
Yes
3 (2%)
0
0
No
184 (98%)
3
2 *
* One case acquitted.
ous terrorist cases, but 24 (83%) claimed that it had no impact, and only one
offi cer was aware of an example where an adverse inference was introduced at
trial. It is of some concern that CT offi cers have very little faith in the probity
of these valuable provisions.
This raises an interesting methodological question: how many warnings
should have been given? Unfortunately, this is not a straightforward issue. In
the fi rst place the dataset is a biased selection – it contains only cases where
people spoke and is therefore not representative. Secondly, if the suspect elects
not to speak at the beginning of the interview but later does, can you assume
that a SW should have been used immediately? It is obviously a question of
judgement and one would need to be in possession of all the relevant facts
and be alive to the many issues and context at that time. Perhaps a more pro-
ductive approach would be to examine when a SW could and or should have
been applied. With this criterion there was one case where a SW should have
been given and a further three cases where one could have been applied.
What is more worrying is the offi cers ’ lack of faith in these provisions and
it needs to be established whether there is any substance to their claim that
adverse inferences are simply not used to their full potential by the prosecu-
tion. A recent Home Offi ce review of this area called for improved training
and the need for greater awareness throughout the prosecution process, but
no solid research was undertaken to determine the extent of the problem
(personal communication from the Home Offi ce working party). The percep-
tion exists that the loss of an indi
vidual ’ s right not to incriminate him - or
herself was seen by the judiciary as an unacceptable erosion of individual
freedom. Lord Carlile in his evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee
(14 February 2006) was dismissive of the value of the SW provision, which he
labelled ‘ a fl eabite ’ when set against the inherent danger of a client actually
answering a police offi cer ’ s questions in interview.
Discussion
The fi ndings of this study (only briefl y described here) indicate that the police
interviewing of suspects in terrorist cases can best be described as polite, non -
threatening and often non - productive. This research does not support the
The Investigation of Terrorist Offences in the United Kingdom
83
fi ndings from the 1997 research in this fi eld in relation to the type and nature
of interview tactics used by police in England and Wales in serious criminal
cases.
In order to make sense of these fi ndings we need to examine not only the
many contextual issues associated with this interaction but also, within the
confi nes of police detention, the actual climate in which such interactions take
place.
Contextual i ssues
There is clearly a multilayered dimension to the contextual issues relevant to
the investigation of terrorist offences and it will only be possible in this chapter
to outline briefl y some of the many political, legal, psychological and organi-
zational issues involved.
The UK prime minister ’ s declaration that ‘ the rules of the game are chang-
ing ’ succinctly captures the declared intent and extent of the reform process
that the government is prepared to consider in order to defeat the threat posed
by terrorist activity to this country (Tony Blair, cited by John Piennar at
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news/bbc.co.uk/1/
hi/uk-politics/47 ). Blair ’ s reference to the ‘ rules of the game ’ is an unambigu-
ous statement to give notice of the government
’ s intention to review the
balance between civil liberties and security and to bring about the necessary
changes to ensure the protection of the very democracy that protects our
liberty.
Further terrorist legislation has been announced that will usher in additional
(and some retrospective) powers designed to create a more resolute environ-
ment against extremist elements and those engaged in preaching or justifying
hatred and violence. The option to detain a person without charge for up to
28 days is likely to have a direct impact on the nature and dynamics of future
police suspect interactions. It is perplexing that the period to detain terrorist