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Handbook of Psychology of Investigative Interviewing: Current Developments and Future Directions

Page 43

by Ray Bull, Tim Valentine, Dr Tom Williamson


  Steblay , N. M. ( 1997 ). Social infl uence in eyewitness recall: A meta - analytic review of

  line - up instruction effects . Law & Human Behavior , 21 , 283 – 297 .

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  Handbook of Psychology of Investigative Interviewing

  Stretch , V. & Wixted , J. T. ( 1998 ). On the difference between strength - based and

  frequency - based mirror effects in recognition memory . Journal of Experimental

  Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition , 24 , 1379 – 1396 .

  Technical Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence

  (

  1999 ).

  Eyewitness evidence: A

  guide for law enforcement . Washington, DC : US Department of Justice, Offi ce of

  Justice Programs .

  Wells , G. L. ( 1988 ). Eyewitness identifi cation: A system handbook . Toronto : Carswell

  Legal Publications .

  Wells , G. L. & Bradfi eld , A. L. ( 1998 ). ‘ Good, you identifi ed the suspect ’ : Feedback

  to eyewitnesses distorts their reports of the witnessing experience

  .

  Journal of

  Applied Psychology , 83 , 360 – 376 .

  Wells , G. L. & Bradfi eld , A. L. ( 1999 ). Distortions in eyewitnesses ’ recollections: Can

  the postidentifi cation - feedback effect be moderated?

  Psychological Science ,

  10 ,

  138 – 144 .

  Wells , G. L. & Lindsay , R. C. L. ( 1980 ). On estimating the diagnosticity of eyewitness

  nonidentifi cations . Psychological Bulletin , 88 , 776 – 784 .

  Wells , G. L. & Luus , E. ( 1990 ). Police line - ups as experiments: Social methodology

  as a framework for properly - conducted line - ups . Personality and Social Psychology

  Bulletin , 16 , 106 – 117 .

  Wells , G. L. & Olson , E. A. ( 2002 ). Eyewitness identifi cation: Information gain from

  incriminating and exonerating behaviors

  .

  Journal of Experimental Psychology:

  Applied , 8 , 155 – 167 .

  Wells , G. L. , Olson , E. A. & Charman , S. D. ( 2003 ). Distorted retrospective eyewit-

  ness reports as functions of feedback and delay . Journal of Experimental Psychology:

  Applied , 9 , 42 – 52 .

  Wells , G. L. , Memon , A. & Penrod , S. D. ( 2006 ). Eyewitness evidence: Improving

  its probative value . Psychological Science in the Public Interest , 7 , 45 – 75 .

  Chapter Thirteen

  Recent Developments in Eyewitness

  Identifi cation Procedures in the

  United Kingdom

  Tim Valentine

  Goldsmiths, University of London

  Carwyn Hughes

  Sussex Police

  and

  Rod Munro

  Devon and Cornwall Police

  Introduction

  In the initial stages of an investigation, the potential of eyewitness identifi ca-

  tion may be assessed from an interview with a witness. An initial interview will

  often involve taking a description of the perpetrator. In the absence of physical

  forensic evidence such as a DNA profi le, investigators may rely on an eyewit-

  ness to provide the necessary identifi cation. The interaction between the

  eyewitness and the police is critical to the reliability of identifi cation

  evidence.

  The frailty of eyewitness identifi cation has long been recognized. In

  response to public concern about the reliability of eyewitness identifi cation

  following several wrongful convictions in the early 1970s, the British govern-

  ment established an enquiry into eyewitness identifi cation chaired by Lord

  Handbook of Psychology of Investigative Interviewing: Current Developments and Future Directions

  Edited by Ray Bull, Tim Valentine and Tom Williamson

  © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

  222

  Handbook of Psychology of Investigative Interviewing

  Devlin. More recently, over 230 people wrongfully convicted in the USA have

  been exonerated by DNA evidence that was not available at their original trial.

  Investigation of the causes of these wrongful convictions has shown that

  mistaken identifi cation was a cause in three - quarters of the cases (Innocence

  Project, n.d. ).

  Devlin r evisited

  Devlin (1976) reported an analysis of the outcome of all cases from England

  and Wales which involved disputed identifi cation in 1973. From an analysis of

  2,116 live line - ups (known as identity parades in the UK), Devlin noted that

  the police suspect was identifi ed in 45% of line - ups; no identifi cation was made

  for 46% of line - ups; and a volunteer was identifi ed in 9% of line - ups. Thus a

  known mistaken identifi cation (of a volunteer) was made in almost one in ten

  line - ups.

  Eyewitness identifi cation is a very powerful form of evidence. Devlin (1976)

  reported that 90% of suspects who were identifi ed in a line - up were prosecuted,

  and 82% of these prosecutions resulted in a conviction. In contrast, only 9%

  of those not identifi ed were prosecuted on the basis of other evidence, and

  86% of these cases resulted in conviction. Devlin reported separately cases

  involving disputed identifi cation in which the only evidence consisted of iden-

  tifi cation by one or more eyewitnesses. Seventy - four per cent of such cases

  resulted in a conviction.

  Devlin (1976) made the following recommendation:

  We do however wish to ensure that in ordinary cases prosecutions are not

  brought on eyewitness evidence only and that, if brought, they will fail. We think

  that they ought to fail, since in our opinion it is only in exceptional cases that

  identifi cation evidence is by itself suffi ciently reliable to exclude a reasonable

  doubt about guilt. (para. 8.4 , p. 150 )

  It is instructive to compare this recommendation with a Court of

  Appeal judgment made almost 30 years later (

  R v Mitchell ,

  2005 ). The

  judgment concerned the issue of whether corroboration is required to

  convict on the basis of the opinion of a single expert, who concluded that his

  analysis of CCTV imagery provided very strong support for the contention

  that the appellant was the person in the CCTV image. Lord Justice Tuckey

  stated:

  as a matter of principle it is open to the jury to convict on the evidence of an

  expert qualifi ed in facial mapping … There is no need for some independent

  support for such evidence … Were it otherwise it would not be possible to

  convict a defendant on the identifi cation evidence of a single witness and we all

  know that this often happens. (para. 11)

  Recent Developments in Eyewitness Identifi cation Procedures

  223

  Notwithstanding Devlin

  ’ s recommendation, in 2005 convictions on the

  evidence of a single eyewitness occur ‘ often ’ .

  Legal s afeguards

  A direct outcome of the Devlin inquiry was a landmark ruling in the Appeal

  Court in London ( R v Turnbull , 1976 ) which established the principles a trial

  judge must use to caution the jury of the special need for caution in cases of

  disputed eyewitness identifi cation.

  The Turnbull g uidelines

  English case law is based on the premise that a distinction can be drawn

  between good and poor eyewitness identifi cation evidence. When identity is

  disputed, a trial judge
must advise the jury to consider carefully the circum-

  stances of an identifi cation. The requirements for a ‘ Turnbull warning ’ are

  summarized in the acronym ADVOKATE. The jury must be advised to con-

  sider the following: A mount of time for which the perpetrator was in view.

  D istance of the witness from the perpetrator. V isibility of the perpetrator. How

  good was the lighting?

  O bstruction to the witness

  ’ view?

  K nown to the

  witness? Has the witness seen the suspect before? How often? A ny reason to

  remember? If only seen occasionally before, did the witness have any reason

  to remember the suspect? T ime delay between the incident and the formal

  identifi cation procedure. E rror. Is there any material discrepancy between the

  description given to the police at the time of the incident and the appearance

  of the suspect?

  The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984

  The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) established a code of

  practice (known as Code D) which governs the conduct of identifi cation pro-

  cedures in England and Wales. The current code came into effect in 2008 and

  covers a wide range of circumstances of which the major provisions are as

  follows. If identifi cation is disputed, a video identifi cation procedure contain-

  ing moving images must be offered unless it is not practicable or a

  ‘ live ’

  identifi cation procedure is more suitable. Line - ups should consist of a minimum

  of eight foils and one suspect. The foils should, ‘ so far as possible resemble

  the suspect in age, general appearance and position in life ’ . Witnesses must be

  advised that the person they saw may not be present and must view the entire

  line - up at least twice. They are instructed that if they cannot make a positive

  identifi cation, they should say so. The person who runs the procedure should

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  Handbook of Psychology of Investigative Interviewing

  not be involved in the investigation. The suspect has the right for his or her

  legal representative to be present when the witness views the line - up. The

  suspect ’ s representative may make reasonable objections to the procedure (e.g.

  the selection of foils). If the objections cannot be resolved (e.g., by substitut-

  ing a different foil) the reason for the objection must be recorded, together

  with a reason why it could not be resolved. If the witness has previously been

  shown photographs, details of the photographs shown should be recorded.

  Anything the witness says should be written down before he or she leaves the

  identifi cation room.

  Is PACE w orking?

  There have been a number of studies of live line - ups conducted by the police

  under the PACE guidelines (Slater, 1994 ; Wright & McDaid, 1996 ; Valentine,

  Pickering, & Darling, 2003 ). In all three studies approximately 40% of wit-

  nesses identifi ed the suspect, approximately 40% of witnesses did not make

  any identifi cation and approximately 20% of witness identifi ed a foil. With

  fi eld data such as these it is impossible to know how many line - ups contained

  the actual perpetrator. However, we do know that at least 20% of witnesses

  made a mistaken identifi cation of an innocent person. It is interesting to note

  that the rate of mistaken identifi cation in these studies is higher than the rate

  noted by Devlin (20% vs. 9% respectively). At fi rst sight this is a cause for

  concern. However, it could be argued that the increased rate in identifi cation

  of foils refl ects fairer construction of line - ups. Using foils that resemble the

  suspect may make it more likely that a witness will make a mistaken identifi ca-

  tion. Nevertheless, the data show that the instruction that ‘ the person seen

  may or may not be present ’ did not inhibit many unreliable witnesses from

  making an identifi cation.

  Archival data collected by the police from 1,776 identity parades showed

  that the suspect was identifi ed in 48% of cases, but did not distinguish non -

  identifi cations from identifi cation of a foil (Pike, Brace

  & Kyman,

  2002 ).

  An archival analysis of 58 live line - ups conducted in US criminal cases found

  that the suspect was identifi ed in 50% of cases, a foil was identifi ed in 24% of

  cases and the witness was unable to make an identifi cation or rejected the

  line - up in 26% of cases (Behrman & Davey, 2001 ). It should be noted that

  in the USA there is no minimum number of foils, although use of fi ve is

  common.

  Devlin (1976) did not identify any fl aw in the procedure of the identity

  parade that substantially increases the risk of error. Instead, it was argued that

  the only way to reduce the risk of wrongful conviction was to increase the

  burden of proof. Devlin noted that this would make it more diffi cult to

  convict the guilty as well as the innocent and he recommended that this course

  should be followed with restraint. At the time when the Devlin Report was

  published the modern era of research on eyewitness testimony had barely

  Recent Developments in Eyewitness Identifi cation Procedures

  225

  begun. Devlin had the foresight to hear evidence from psychologists and is to

  be commended for appreciating the contribution that psychological science

  had to make.

  Theoretical i ssues in e yewitness i dentifi cation

  Relative and a bsolute j udgements

  A persistent problem in understanding eyewitness identifi cation is to explain

  why a sizeable minority of witnesses make mistaken identifi cations, despite

  appropriate warnings that the perpetrator may not be present in the line - up.

  Wells (1993) demonstrated that at least part of the problem may be attribut-

  able to witnesses who make a relative judgement rather than an absolute judge-

  ment. When confronted with a line - up a witness may only identify a person if

  their resemblance to the culprit exceeds some criterion of recollection (an

  absolute judgement). Alternatively, a witness may examine all the members of

  a line - up and identify the person who most closely resembles the perpetrator

  (a relative judgement). Wells (1993) and Clark & Davey (2005) have shown

  that a proportion of witnesses, who would be able to identify the culprit

  if present in a line - up, make a mistaken identifi cation of a foil when asked

  to make an identifi cation from a line - up that does not include the culprit

  even when the option not to identify anybody is explicitly available. These

  data suggest that relative identifi cation decisions are a cause of mistaken

  identifi cations.

  Sequential vs. s imultaneous p resentation

  A method of sequential line - up presentation was developed to prevent wit-

  nesses from making a relative judgement. In a sequential presentation, photo-

  graphs of faces are presented one at a time (Lindsay & Wells, 1985 ). The

  witness is not told how many faces will be presented, but must decide as each

  face is presented whether or not it is the culprit before the next face is pre-

  sented. The line - up administrator should not know the identity of the suspect.

  Furthermore, witnesses must not be allowed a second choice or to see a
gain

  a face previously presented (Lindsay, Lea & Fulford, 1991 ).

  Sequential presentation has been found to reduce the number of mistaken

  identifi cations from culprit - absent line - ups, but it also reduces the number of

  correct identifi cations from culprit - present line - ups (Steblay, Dysart, Fulero

  & Lindsay, 2001 ). Meissner, Tredoux, Parker & Maclin (2005) found that

  sequential line - ups induce a more conservative response criterion, but do not

  affect discrimination accuracy. In short, both the guilty and the innocent are

  less likely to be identifi ed from a sequential line - up. Use of sequential line - ups

  instructions in the context of video identifi cation is discussed below.

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  Handbook of Psychology of Investigative Interviewing

  Recollection and f amiliarity

  It would be benefi cial to have a better understanding of the conditions that

  encourage use of a relative judgement. One possibility is that witnesses may

  be prone to using relative judgements when the recognition task is diffi cult.

  Valentine, Darling & Memon (2007) found that witnesses were more likely

  to report using relative judgements when they saw culprit - absent line - ups than

  when they saw a culprit - present line - up. If a witness is able to recollect seeing

  a culprit at the crime scene, she or he can rely on an absolute decision.

  However, in the absence of recognizing the culprit, the witness may be

  tempted to rely on a feeling of familiarity (e.g. ‘ number 2 seems familiar ’ ).

  Witnesses may be more likely to rely on a relative judgement when responding

  on the basis of familiarity alone, i.e., the witness may identify the person who

  feels most familiar. A feeling of subjective familiarity can arise from the per-

  ceived typicality of a face or similarity to previously seen faces, other than the

  culprit (Bartlett, Hurry & Thorley, 1984 ; Valentine, 1991 ).

  The distinction between recollection and familiarity has been made in theo-

  retical models of recognition memory (e.g. Mandler, 1980 , Jacoby & Dallas,

  1981 ; see Yonelinas, 2002 , for a review). A similar distinction has been char-

  acterized as that between remembering and (just) knowing that a stimulus has

  been seen before (Tulving, 1985 ). There is empirical evidence that the distinc-

  tion captures distinct ways of remembering (see Gardiner

  & Richardson

 

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