The battle for Moscow set another pattern in Hitler’s behavior as a military leader. When things went wrong, as they did on the outskirts of the Soviet capital, it was always his underlings who were to blame, never him. In this, as in his total disregard for the sacrifices he was demanding of his troops, Hitler and Stalin were very much alike. But it was Hitler’s decision to postpone the push on Moscow, over the objections of many of those who served him, that allowed the weather to play the part it did. An earlier drive would have given the German forces the chance to seize the Soviet capital before the arrival of the autumn rains that bogged them down and the icy winter that was often as deadly as enemy fire.
The delay proved costly in another way as well. It provided Stalin with the time he needed to reassure himself that the Japanese weren’t about to invade from the east. This allowed him to make the key decision to send in the Siberian troops to defend Moscow. During Eden’s visit in December 1941, the Soviet leader told the British foreign secretary, “The bringing in of fresh reinforcements was the cause of the recent successes.”
However much Hitler had bailed him out by making enormous mistakes, Stalin emerged from the battle for Moscow convinced that he had engineered this first Soviet victory, and that had an immediate impact on his behavior. Summoned to the Kremlin for a talk with his boss, Khrushchev was stunned by what he saw. “I found myself confronted with a new man. He was much changed from the way he’d been at the very beginning of the war,” Khrushchev wrote. “He had pulled himself together, straightened up, and was acting like a real soldier. He had begun to think of himself as a great military strategist, which made it harder than ever to argue with him. He exhibited all the strong-willed determination of a heroic leader.”
Khrushchev couldn’t resist throwing in a barb that made his own feelings clear. “But I knew what sort of hero he was,” he concluded. “I’d seen him when he was paralyzed by his fear of Hitler, like a rabbit in front of a boa constrictor. And my opinion of him hadn’t changed in the meantime.” Nonetheless, a big victory always makes a leader look better, and there was no doubt that the outcome of the battle for Moscow cheered Stalin’s people and his allies.
Churchill’s words summed up the reaction at the time. “All the anti-Nazi nations, great and small, rejoiced to see the first failure of a German Blitzkrieg,” he wrote. “The threat of invasion to our Island was removed so long as the German armies were engaged in a life-and-death struggle in the East.” But he added cautiously, “How long that struggle might last no one could tell.”
What would have happened if the battle for Moscow had gone the other way? The standard Soviet line was that the war would have continued and that it would only have been a matter of time before the Germans were driven back—in other words, the outcome of the conflict was never in doubt. But as Stalin had confided to Harriman, Moscow was the nerve center, and a German victory there would have dealt a huge blow to his efforts to mobilize the country to defeat Hitler’s forces. For the German invaders, this would also have served as a huge psychological boost, proof that Hitler had been right once again when he invaded the Soviet Union.
R. H. S. Stolfi, who taught Modern European History at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, argued in his book Hitler’s Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted that Hitler’s decision to divert his forces to the Ukraine in August cost the Germans the war. If the German leader had listened to the advice of Guderian and the other generals who wanted to capitalize on the swift victories in June and July, Stolfi maintained, his troops would have taken over the Soviet capital by the end of August.
“The arrival of Army Group Center at and beyond Moscow on roughly 28 August 1941 in the communications center of European Russia would have disintegrated the resulting isolated Leningrad and Ukrainian fronts,” Stolfi wrote. And he insisted this would have meant the defeat of the Soviet Union by October 1941, which in turn would have produced a cataclysmic ripple effect. “By the magnitude of the victory and its timing, the Germans would have also won the war in Europe,” he concluded.
It’s impossible to prove or disprove that thesis. Many historians are more inclined to agree with Soviet assertions that Stalin’s regime would have kept fighting no matter how far east it was pushed and that it would eventually have mobilized the resources and the men to push the Germans back. After all, it had successfully evacuated much of its war production to the east, and soon those factories would outpace their German counterparts in churning out the weaponry and supplies that were needed on the battlefields. But even if this had proved true, the war on the Eastern front would have taken much longer than it did. And this would have meant that World War II would have been a much longer, even more harrowing conflict than it actually was.
The reality of the German defeat hit the invaders hard, particularly those troops who had almost made it to the Soviet capital. CBS correspondent Larry Lesueur described his trip on the Leningrad Highway leading out of the city in December 1941. “This was the high water mark of the German advance. We were about twenty-five miles from the city limits of Moscow,” he wrote. “The German failure must have been the greatest disappointment for an invading army in history.”
With the benefit of hindsight, many of the Germans conceded as much. Richard Wernicke, the Stuka pilot who had participated in dive-bombing raids over Moscow, declared, “After Moscow, we were absolutely without any hope, and we felt that this was a great catastrophe.” By that he meant the entire war, not just the one battle.
While it was indisputably a huge defeat for the Germans, a more contentious question is how big a victory Moscow was for the Soviet side. “The battle for Moscow allowed Stalin to fight another day, but it was not the turning point of the war, as is so often asserted,” British historian Richard Overy has argued. “Moscow was a first, faltering step, a brief success almost squandered by Stalin’s own military ineptitude.”
The Red Army losses of almost two million soldiers during the battle for Moscow represented, to a considerable extent, the price of that ineptitude. And, yes, the next big battles—Stalingrad, Kursk—would prove to be more decisive victories, more clear-cut turning points. But Moscow was the first turning point, even if Overy is right about the shakiness of that victory. In retrospect, Hitler’s failure to reach Moscow did signal the beginning of his end, but only the very beginning.
And for all his mistakes and all his brutality, Stalin deserved credit for one key decision that helped produce that outcome, no matter how much Hitler contributed to it as well. Magomed-Ganifa Shaidayev, who served as a political officer in a unit that fought on the northern approaches to Moscow, voiced the view of many veterans and civilians who lived through those chaotic days in October 1941 when the capital looked as though it was about to fall. “If Stalin had decided to leave Moscow during the panic, if the leader of the country had left the capital, this could have led to the destruction of the city,” he said. “The fact that he stayed in Moscow with his people inspired us and saved the capital.”
But Stalin and his successors haven’t wanted to dwell on that moment or much else about the battle for Moscow, preferring instead to talk about the subsequent battles, which don’t provide so many reminders of what went wrong in the early period of the war. Nor have they wanted to dwell on the staggering scale of Soviet losses. There’s no way around the fact that Stalin was responsible for most of the mistakes that produced those huge casualty counts. Moscow was the first Soviet victory in World War II, but just barely. And it was the deadliest by far.
The battle for Moscow demonstrated that the Soviet people were far less united and determined in the early days of the war than official propaganda proclaimed. While that wasn’t so surprising when it came to areas such as the Ukraine and the Baltic states, Moscow was another story. Even to explain Stalin’s most laudable display of leadership, his decision not to abandon the capital, would require an honest discussion of conditions there at the time—the panic, the looting, the strikes,
the brief but complete breakdown of law and order. All that is completely at odds with the standard image of Stalin’s Soviet Union and its propaganda line about the unflinching unity and heroism of its people at their moment of greatest peril. So Soviet history books have generally whitewashed what happened, moving on quickly to the later victories, which don’t require nearly as much tap-dancing around inconvenient truths.
The irony is that this whitewashing has done a huge disservice to the genuine heroes of a pivotal confrontation and contributed to a popular version of the war in which the battle for Moscow plays only a minor role, with many of the key events shrouded in an artificial mist. Today the battle for Moscow should take its proper place, front and center, in all accounts of the conflict between two monstrous political systems. Moscow’s defenders paid a horrific price, but they changed the course of history not just for their own country but also for everyone locked in the struggle against Hitler’s Germany. They deserved better from their leaders then, and they deserve better from all those who recall that struggle now.
Notes
INTRODUCTION
“This defeat”: Fabian von Schlabrendorff, The Secret War Against Hitler, 131.
the totals: Moscow battle statistics on troop levels and losses from Moskovskaya bitva v khronike faktov i sobytii, 474.
battle for Stalingrad: Ibid., 468.
battle of Gallipoli: Most sources put the number at about 500,000 or slightly higher. A BBC report dated February 28, 2002, for example, put Turkish losses at 300,000 and Allied losses at 214,000 (“The Battle for Gallipoli: February 1915–January 1916”).
battle of the Somme: R. R. Palmer and Joel Colton, A History of the Modern World, 681.
El Alamein: Moskovskaya bitva v khronike faktov i sobytii, 468.
“The object of operations”: H. R. Trevor-Roper, ed., Hitler’s War Directives: 1939–1945, 150.
“To Moscow”: Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader, 195.
“In a few weeks”: Alan Bullock, Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives, 799.
“It was the lowest point”: Alexander Werth, Russia at War: 1941–1945, 221.
“lose nothing, except”: Simon Sebag Montefiore, Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar, 609.
“the greatest battle in”: Richard Overy, The Dictators: Hitler’s Germany, Stalin’s Russia, 493.
1: “HITLER WILL NOT ATTACK US IN 1941”
“Undeserved and severe beatings”: Bullock, 4. Other biographical details 1–4.
“His contempt for”: Dmitri Volkogonov, Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy, 155.
“Don’t waste time”: Ibid., 156.
“Groaning are”: Isaac Deutscher, Stalin, 40–41.
“spent nearly seven years”: Ibid., 97.
“This creature softened”: Montefiore, 29.
marriage to Nadezhda Alliluyeva: Ibid., 86–87.
a Walther pistol: In Nadezhda’s case, Volkogonov, 154. (But in Montefiore, 101, the pistol is described as a Mauser.) In Geli’s case, Ronald Hayman, Hitler + Geli, 160.
“Comrade Stalin”: Lars T. Lih, Oleg V. Naumov, and Oleg V. Khlevniuk, eds., Stalin’s Letters to Molotov 1925–1936, Appendix, 241–242.
“Hitler responds”: Otto Strasser, Hitler and I, 62.
Stalin only wrote: Robert Service, Stalin, 361.
“As I am watching”: Valentin M. Berezhkov, At Stalin’s Side, 117.
“leader of the party” and rest of Mekhlis quote: Volkogonov, 241.
“Stalin struck me”: Hans von Herwarth with S. Frederick Starr, Against Two Evils, 54.
“Hitler, what a”: Overy, The Dictators, 53.
“After the victory”: Berezhkov, 57.
Ronald Freisler: Schlabrendorff, 318.
“Shoot the mad dogs!”: Deutscher, 373.
“Never forget”: Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, 660–661.
He also had read and “His promises”: Volkogonov, 352.
“I know how much”: Bullock, 676.
“The Soviet Union could not”: Ronald Seth, Operation Barbarossa, 9–10.
“Of course, we are”: Volkogonov, 385.
“Hitler wants to”: Jerrold L. Schecter with Vyacheslav V. Luchkov, eds., Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes, 46.
the German-Soviet Agreement and “laid the solid foundations”: Werth, 81.
“A short blow at Poland” to “a struggle for ‘democracy’”: Ibid., 84.
“shamefully conducted war” and “He was confident”: Anastas Mikoyan, Tak bylo, 385.
“Most of our troops”: Schecter, 55.
Winter War: Montefiore, 330.
“The Germans could see”: Schecter, 55.
“The Red Army was”: Montefiore, 330.
“He was racing”: Schecter, 54.
“to beat our brains in”: Strobe Talbott, ed., Khrushchev Remembers, 166.
“Everything I undertake”: Bullock, 697.
“Britain’s hope lies,” “With Russia smashed” and “Decision”: Charles Burdick and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, eds., The Halder War Diary, 244–245.
“I will not”: Albert Axell, Marshal Zhukov, 76.
According to General Henning von Tresckow: Schlabrendorff, 134–135.
“to beat England”: Alexander Dallin, German Rule in Russia 1941–1945, 17.
“Ribbentrop was a”: Leon Goldensohn, Nuremberg Interviews, 445.
The origin: Dallin, 15.
“The German Armed Forces”: Trevor-Roper, 93–94.
“with the intention”: Ibid., 96–97.
“For three years”: Hitler, 196.
“visibly at”: Overy, The Dictators, 490.
“Since Russia”: Bullock, 774.
“We have only”: Ibid., 759.
“Russia will collapse”: Axell, 63.
“fourteen days of”: Overy, The Dictators, 490.
“Führer, we are”: William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, 1070.
“regrettable blunder”: Ibid., 1071.
“The beginning of”: Ibid., 1081.
“This postponement”: Ibid.
“a Slavic-Tartar”: Dallin, 9.
“One day that”: Sergo Beria, Beria, My Father, 49.
“He struts”: Ibid., 51.
“I rather liked”: Goldensohn, 186.
“He reminded me”: Ibid., 448.
“England, despite”: Deutscher, 441.
“If that’s so”: Montefiore, 340.
“So while”: Schecter, 55.
Dergachev: David E. Murphy, What Stalin Knew, 63.
Ariets and Major General Vasily Tupikov: Ibid., 64–66.
Bucharest quoted: Ibid., 73–75.
Soviet military attaché in Budapest: Ibid., 79.
“Rumors and documents”: Donald Rayfield, Stalin and his Hangmen, 394.
Prague station and Stalin’s note: Murphy, 81.
“the Germans could”: Ibid., 84–87.
“a little shit”: Ibid.
Starshina and “sent back”: Ibid., 101.
“Stalin’s attitude to” and “grind them”: Stepan Mikoyan, Memoirs of Military Test-Flying and Life with the Kremlin’s Elite, 102.
Steinhardt and Churchill: Murphy, 262.
“They’re playing us”: Montefiore, 349.
“until the spring of 1941”: Berezhkov, 150.
“Stalin, concerned”: Ibid., 181.
German planes and “In case of violations”: Murphy, 165–166.
lame explanation: Ibid., 167–170.
“so long as”: Ibid.
“I’m not sure”: Montefiore, 352.
“We must remain” and “We will remain”: Deutscher, 453.
When he reassured: Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, 306.
“I honestly believe”: Seth, 36.
Goebbels asserted: Louis P. Lochner, ed., The Goebbels Diaries: 1942–1943, 87.
“Stalin is about”: Ulam, 311.
“To argue that”: Schecter, 49.
“I do not know”: Petro G. Grigorenko, Memoirs,
46–47.
Isaac Deutscher: Deutscher, 439.
“Germany is observing”: Volkogonov, 391.
“to dull the”: Ibid.
“Is the German Army”: Ivo Banac, ed., The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 159–160.
calling up of five hundred thousand reservists: Montefiore, 352.
30 percent of and “Fulfillment of the plan”: Volkogonov, 375–376.
Havas reported, “one must do,” Stalin reacted, and “We see nothing”: Murphy, 24–27.
“My people”: Montefiore, 356.
German deserters: Ibid., 357–358.
2: “LOOK HOW SMART WE ARE NOW”
General Georgy Mikushev: V. Ananko, A. Domank, and N. Romanichev, Za kazhduiu piad, 15–34. Romanichev and Boris Nevzorov provided additional details of Mikushev’s experiences in interviews for this book.
“to not respond”: Murphy, 214.
Hans von Herwarth: Hans von Herwarth with S. Frederick Starr, Against Two Evils, 197–198.
“Moscow has surrendered”: Werth, 164.
the Germans destroyed: Volkogonov, 408.
Major General I. I. Kopets: Constantine Pleshakov, Stalin’s Folly, 126–127.
450 miles: Deutscher, 465.
letter home: Biulleten’ Assotsiatsii istorikov vtoroy mirovoi voyny, issue 8, 2003, 21–25.
Yuri Druzhnikov: Yuri Druzhnikov, who teaches Russian Literature at the University of California at Davis, recounted his family history in an interview. He also included some of these experiences, only slightly altered, in his novel Passport to Yesterday.
“It’s going to”: Anastas Mikoyan, 378.
“Hitler surely”: Service, 410.
a meeting with Molotov: M. M. Gorinov and others, eds. Moskva Voennaia, 1941–1945: Memuary i arkhivnye dokumenty, 26.
“the German government has declared war”: Service, 411.
“Ribbentrop deceived us”: Georgii Kumanev, Riadom so Stalinym: Otkrovennyye svidetel’stva, 24.
3.05 million men: Bullock, 790.
The Germans divided: Overy, Russia’s War, 84–85.
“When the showdown”: Werth, 155.
“Comrade Boldin”: Ibid., 159–160.
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