The World Crisis

by Winston S. Churchill

  He now exerted all his influence at Vienna. The Emperor’s military Cabinet intervened. Berchtold on Potiorek’s side invoked diplomacy and the prestige of the Monarchy in the Balkans. Despite the appeals of the Archduke Frederick, Conrad and the Austrian Headquarters were overruled by the Emperor, and Potiorek was placed in independent command of ‘All the Army Corps engaged against Serbia and Montenegro.’ He was to lead them to further disasters. It was not until August 30 that Conrad was able to disentangle the missing IVth Corps.

  The Austrian entry into the field illustrates once again the commonest of all the great military errors. It is the error most easy to perceive in theory and most difficult to avoid in action. There are two enemies and two theatres: the task of the Commander is to choose in which he will prevail. To choose either, is to suffer grievously in the neglected theatre. To choose both, is to lose in both. The Commander has for his guides the most honoured principles of war and the most homely maxims of life. ‘First things first!’ ‘Being before well-being!’ ‘What you do, do well!’ ‘Always be strongest at the point of attack!’ It is the application of these simple rules to the facts that constitutes the difficulty and the torment. A score of good reasons can be given not only for either course, but also for the compromises which ruin them. But the path to safety nearly always lies in rejecting the compromises. We have seen how Conrad was led astray by forces and reasons which seemed to him irresistible. We shall presently see Moltke and his successor Falkenhayn succumbing under the same pressures. We shall also watch their effects upon Lord Kitchener and the British War Committee.

  Until Conrad pressed the button which set Plan B in motion, he had the choice of two sound operations. The first was to neglect Serbia and concentrate every man and gun (apart from troops needed to prevent or even merely to delay the Serbian invasion of Austria) upon his long-weighed offensive against Russia. The second was to crush Serbia, invading from every side at once in overwhelming force, and thus probably bring Bulgaria and Turkey, if not indeed Roumania, at once into the field as allies. But this entailed standing on the defensive in Galicia. He must retire, fighting delaying actions for as long and as far as might be necessary, yielding mile by mile the soil of the Monarchy till Serbia had been annihilated. Of these two plans, the former was the more magnificent; but the latter offered great prizes. Moreover a delaying strategy by Austria at the beginning of the war consorted naturally with the Schlieffen Plan. The Germans hoped to be victorious in the West within six weeks from mobilization, and would then return to the East with ample power. If Conrad could keep alive and unbeaten against Russia for that period, he had every right to count on strong German aid; and with this aid, even if the Russians had crossed the Carpathians, all could quickly have been regained. Meanwhile he would have settled with Serbia and perhaps have gained Turkey and Bulgaria.

  From the moment that he had given the order which irrevocably sent his Second Army to the Danube and kept it out of the opening battles in Galicia, only this latter alternative was rightly open to him. It was his paramount duty to make the Second Army fight somewhere at the crucial moment. It could no longer reach Galicia in time to fight there. It must therefore fight in the station into which it had got, and win a decision there. It followed that Conrad must renounce his offensive against Russia, about which already he had so many misgivings, and adopt dilatory tactics till the Franco-German issue was declared. But in fact he did neither. He fooled away the power of the Second Army in both theatres. It left Potiorek before it could win him a victory. It returned to Conrad in time to take part in his defeat.

  CHAPTER IX

  THE ASSEMBLY OF THE EASTERN ARMIES

  The Austrian plan for a war against Russia contemplated the assembly of their forces in the Galician plain behind the San and Dniester rivers, and in front of the Carpathians. This was well suited for an immediate advance into Russian territory, but threatened many dangers in the event of defeat. The Austrian line of retreat lay either south and south-west through the passes of the eastern Carpathians or westward through Przemysl and Cracow into Bohemia, or possibly into German Silesia through the narrow corridor between Russian Poland and the western Carpathians, called ‘The Moravian Gate.’

  Since, in making his war plan against Russia, Conrad had resolved upon a forestalling attack, his mishandling of the opening movements becomes all the more blameworthy. Plan R had counted upon four Austrian armies to support his offensive, in which case his superiority to the Russians between the twentieth and the thirtieth days would have been substantial. But Plan B had tripped up Plan R, and only three armies, and at the best a bare equality, were available to sustain a most ambitious scheme of war.

  It was perhaps with some compunction that Moltke acquainted Conrad on August 2 with his general dispositions. He certainly endeavoured to state in the most favourable terms the German contribution to the Eastern Front. General von Prittwitz, the Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth German Army in East Prussia, was ordered to contain as strong forces of the Russians as possible, so as to keep them away from the Austrian Army and lighten its task in the first fighting.’ ‘Should the Russians undertake a premature offensive against East Prussia with forces greatly superior to the [German] Army of the East, an Austro-Hungarian victory will thereby be facilitated, and the more so, the earlier the A-H. army enters upon its advance towards Russia. Should no such premature and greatly superior Russian offensive against Germany north of the Vistula take place, the Army of the East will advance in the direction which brings greatest relief to the A-H. Army.’ In addition a German Landwehr corps formed from the fortress garrisons was assembling opposite Chenstokhov under General von Woyrsch. This Corps would invade Russia on the twelfth day of mobilization (August 13) marching in the direction of Radom, and ‘keep in mind tactical co-operation with the Austrian left.’ ‘The Austrian Army,’ concluded Moltke, ‘can consequently count with certainty upon a tactical support of its offensive against Russia by the whole of the German forces assembling in the East. The earlier and more continuous the advance towards Russia, the greater will be the combined success.’

  Conrad, on the other hand, continued to count on and urge the fulfilment of what he believed Moltke had promised in the pre-war conversations, namely that the Germans, simultaneously with his drive to the north, would make a downward stroke in strong force from East Prussia southward and south-eastward towards this same area between Warsaw and Brest-Litovsk which he was attacking from the opposite quarter. Again and again he repeats in his telegrams and letters to Moltke and Prittwitz the name of Syedlets. He announced to Moltke on August 3 his intention to take the offensive with his left-wing armies eastward and northward on August 20; but he added: ‘It is in any event desired that the offensive of the 4½ Corps under General von Prittwitz should take place in the direction of Syedlets.’ Conrad also was forming from his garrisons in the neighbourhood of Cracow under General Kummer an improvised force called an ‘Army Group.’ It consisted of a cavalry division, cyclists, and 44 infantry battalions with artillery. These would press on without halting into Russia, ‘shoulder to shoulder with the German Corps.’ This operation of Woyrsch and Kummer was of course intended to be no more than a raid into Russian territory in an area where it was believed to be almost entirely undefended. It would create a diversion while the regular forces were assembling. It could not seriously influence events. About Conrad’s request for the southward advance of the 4½ German Corps from East Prussia to Syedlets, Moltke maintained a complete silence. His orders to Prittwitz commanding the Eighth German Army, the sole defence of the eastern frontiers of Germany, were that he should not advance into Russia unless the Russians stood on the defensive. But this was not imparted to his Ally. On other matters the German Chief of the Staff was voluble, and his letters may serve us as a chronicle of events which only indirectly concern this account.

  Moltke to Conrad.

  August 5, 1914

  ‘The assurance of Your Excellency that Austria-Hun
gary will carry through in sure fidelity to her alliance the struggle which has been begun, confirms me on a point on which I never had any doubt. I did not need it, my dear comrade, and I would rather doubt my God than the fidelity which we have established between us. The struggle will be a severe one for us, since England, too, has ranged herself on the side of the murderers and of the Russian knout. We hope, with God’s help, to carry it through, even so. Our advance in Belgium certainly is brutal, but for us it is a matter of life and death and whoever stands in our way must take the consequences.

  ‘We must tackle France in the open field; we cannot involve ourselves in a prolonged war of position before her barricaded Eastern frontier, for the decision must be obtained as quickly as possible. To that end we require Liége and the direct route through Belgium. I am sorry that blood should flow, but Belgium has rudely rebuffed all our most far-reaching assurances. The news from Russia sounds favourable. On our front in the East they have retired in confusion behind the Narev; they are, it seems, evacuating the whole of Russian Poland.

  ‘This war, which sets almost the whole of Europe alight, will probably cost us our fleet, but the decision will be reached on land. The spirit of our people is excellent. Every man knows that the existence of Germany is at stake and all are ready to give their utmost for the Fatherland. The troops can hardly find accommodation for the mass of volunteers. The entire country—men, women and children—is ready to act. There is an angry bitterness against faithless Russia; our mobilization is developing like clockwork. Not a single hitch has so far occurred. Once the assembly has been successfully completed, the struggle which will decide the course of world history for the next hundred years can begin. It is an inward joy to me to be able to take part with you in this struggle.

  ‘With God, my comrade!’

  The chief of the German staff added three postscripts: first, that Italy’s felony would be revenged in history: secondly, that Roumania would probably be friendly to the Central Empires: and thirdly, that Turkey very likely would declare war against Russia within the next few days.

  He concluded in a strong vein.

  ‘Assemble your whole force against Russia. Even Italy cannot be such a dirty dog as to fall upon your rear. Let the Bulgarians loose against Serbia and leave the pack of them to tear each other to pieces. There must now only be one objective—Russia. Thrust the knout-carriers into the marshes of the Pripyat and drown them there.’24

  It was easier said than done. Indeed, Moltke’s next letter, written on the 9th, offered little but verbal encouragement to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, now plunged out of its depth in the deluge.

  Moltke to Conrad.

  August 9, 1914

  ‘Any action by Italy against Austria at this difficult time—against her allies hitherto—after having taken upon herself to break faith, appears to me so horrifying that so far I cannot believe in it. If this felony, which will be the culminating point of rascality, really takes place, then, in my view, there is nothing for it except for Austria forthwith to close the jaw of the hungry beast of prey [i.e. to cede territory as a bribe for peace]….

  ‘The point is to wage war successfully against Russia and to defer everything else for a later arrangement.’ …

  Then follows a bleak notification.

  ‘Dear friend, we ourselves here are in so difficult a situation with four enemies against us that we cannot spare anyone, willingly though we would do so. We have already gone to our utmost limit and we have already fallen back on our Landsturm. We must have a decision in the West; that is a question of life for us. You know yourself how willingly I would help; it cannot be done.’ …

  The end of this letter—rather an excited screed for the directing mind of the Schlieffen plan—is narrative.

  ‘We have to-day taken the first Russian battery from a cavalry brigade. The Russians attack most stupidly and are shot down everywhere. Everywhere are small, scattered attacks by cavalry brigades and small detachments of infantry. We already have over five hundred prisoners, who are glad to get something to eat. The Belgians are quite negligible, incapable of attack. They had five brigades in Liége, which was strongly entrenched, and our six peace brigades stormed it with nothing but the resources of the field army. Four to five thousand prisoners! The forts on the Northern front alone have not yet surrendered, but from to-morrow onwards they will be under fire from the rear. The crossings of the Maas are in our hands intact. Our cavalry is pushing on towards Brussels and Antwerp. The fight has cost us some blood—not overmuch—and it has paid us. We are now waiting for the English.

  ‘With God, dear friend! A thousand thanks for the heavy artillery—may I be able to reciprocate!’25

  Conrad now addressed himself to Prittwitz direct.

  Conrad to Prittwitz.

  (Telegram.)

  August 14

  ‘Offensive of our left wing towards Lublin and Cholm will start on August 22.

  ‘The general situation indicates that an offensive by German Eastern army in direction of Syedlets is of decisive importance and it is urgent that Syedlets be reached as quickly as possible. I request information by return as to intention of H.Q. German army of the East.’26

  Captain Fleischmann (Austrian liaison with Prittwitz) to Conrad.

  (Telegram.)

  August 15. 10 a.m.

  ‘At the moment enemy is entering E. Prussia from Kovno, Olita and south thereof. A blow is about to be struck against this move which should succeed in the next few days. Only after that can operations be begun in direction of Syedlets. German Eastern Army is already drawing important forces upon itself and believes that it is thereby freeing the way for the Austrian offensive.’27

  This news was anathema to Conrad. He regarded the German advance towards Kovno as an ‘eccentric’ (i.e. divergent) operation useless for his purposes and wrong in itself.

  Conrad to Prittwitz.

  August 15, 1914

  … ‘Only by co-operation can success against Russia be achieved.

  ‘On August 14 I communicated through Captain Fleischmann… I renewed the request… for the offensive… in the direction of Syedlets.

  ‘An exchange of views is desired to explain to your Excellency why I ascribe to the advance of the German Army of the East against Syedlets a decisive importance for the general success.’ …

  And after a lengthy exposition

  ‘It thus appears to me that the task of warding off a Russian advance against Berlin and thus protecting the rear of the main German forces fighting against France, while at the same time co-operating with the A-H. Armies in the defeat of the common enemy, can only be carried out reliably by handing over the defence of East Prussia against Russian invasion to Reserve divisions and Landwehr, supported by the fortresses, while at the same time the main forces of the army under your Excellency’s command begin the offensive in the general direction of Syedlets.

  ‘I gather from Captain Fleischmann’s report of August 14 that your Excellency (contrary to the above view) is now (striking against the invader towards Kovno—Olita) and will not begin the operations against Syedlets… until after (that stroke).’28

  In a romantic mood he suggested at least the advance of two or three divisions a hundred miles into the hostile territory crowded with Russian troops of unknown strength. The Germans in East Prussia, who were expecting to be attacked from two directions, by nearly two and a half times their numbers, had neither will nor means for such adventures.

  According to his Spartan code, Conrad made his headquarters at Przemysl in a barrack-room with straw as his bed and an oil lamp for light. He had need to mortify the flesh. His Second Army could only arrive in the decisive theatre ten days late and after the main shock of battle, upon which Conrad counted so much, had already clashed. The German help from the north was plainly not forthcoming. Thus two all-important factors in his combination had already disappeared. Should he in these circumstances persist in his offensive? Still resolute for the offe
nsive, he nevertheless left Vienna without deciding finally upon its direction. His left-wing army would not be ready to move before the 21st; perhaps the Germans would have beaten the Russians in the north by then and would be able to send him aid or at least make a helpful diversion. At any rate, Conrad decided to keep his option open for a while. On August 18 he told General Auffenberg, who commanded the Fourth Army, to be prepared to strike either N., N.E., or E.

  Before leaving Vienna he had despatched the greater part of the Austro-Hungarian cavalry north, north-east and east to reconnoitre the whole of the frontier from the Dniester to the Vistula on the general line Mohilev—Lutsk—Lublin. This ambitious programme was far beyond the capacity of his ten cavalry divisions. The width of the frontier to be searched was 250 miles (the distance from London to the Scottish border) and its depth was over 90 miles. The time available was only four days. It had been expected that the Russians, according to their custom, would herald their advance by clouds of Cossack cavalry. Ivanov, however, had no cavalry screen. He preferred to use his cavalry to bridge the gaps between his four armies as they closed in westward from their 300-mile front. In consequence the Austrian horsemen found little or nothing before them until here and there they came up against covering parties of Russian infantry whose fire, drawn by the bright reds and blues of their peace-time uniforms, caused heavy local losses and speedy retirements. The results of the Austrian cavalry reconnaissance were worthless. The Austrian saddle, owing to its excessive padding, proved unserviceable for such long marches in August weather. So many of the horses had sore backs that a number of regiments returned on foot leading their steeds. Entire divisions could not move for a week. The Austrian aeroplanes, nominally 42, most of which were soon unserviceable although matched by equally infantile Russian aviation, procured no news of any value.