The World Crisis

by Winston S. Churchill

  From the 26th onwards therefore two new separate battles began, and raged simultaneously some 30 miles apart, reacting continually one upon the other. The scale of the conflict was trebled and the whole Austrian front was in action.

  THE BATTLE OF KOMAROV

  In the North each antagonist brought an entire new Army into action. The battle of Krasnik continued, and upon its right the battle of Komarov began. The opening was remarkable. As Plehve’s Fifth Army, in pursuance of the Grand Duke’s orders, swung right-handed like a door on its hinges to strike Dankl upon his right and rear, he exposed his own flank to the Fourth Austrian Army, which under Auffenberg was now coming up on Dankl’s right. Auffenberg believed that only three Russian divisions were in front of him and that the enemy’s main body was at least a day behind. Plehve was not aware that any strong Austrian force was marching upon him. Auffenberg decided upon an immediate attack, and set his three corps (VI, IX and II) in line in touch with Dankl, his centre directed upon Komarov, and his left on Zamosć.

  Auffenberg’s advancing divisions clashed almost immediately with the left flank guards of Plehve’s army on its westward march. The Austrian cavalry divisions soon came in contact with the Russian Vth Corps marching westwards towards the river Huczwa. Fighting dismounted, they compelled the Russians to deploy; but, as is always the case, the cavalry carbines were no match for the infantry rifles, and before noon the horsemen had had enough and withdrew from the field. One after another Auffenberg’s corps collided with the Russian troops marching across their front, forcing them to turn and fight under quite unforeseen conditions. West of the Tomaszov-Zamosć high-road four Austrian divisions in a strong mass caught the Russian XXVth Corps in the act of wheeling, and after heavy fighting in the woods south and south-west of Zamosć, forced them back to the walls of the town. By the evening of the 26th the two flanks of the Austrian Fourth Army were thus 5 to 10 miles in front of its centre and Auffenberg indulged hopes of surrounding the enemy, whom he still rated at only three or four divisions. Plehve, equally misinformed, ordered his four corps to continue the westward wheel against Dankl. Confused fighting and a series of disconnected clashes marked the 27th. Each side found their enemy far stronger at every point than was expected. The Austrians’ attack was prejudiced by the misfortune or misconduct of its cavalry. Before dawn a Russian Cossack detachment broke into the bivouacs of the 10th Austrian Cavalry Division at Uhnov, unguarded by outposts, and raised a panic from which the Division was only rallied after a flight of 10 miles. The 6th Austrian Cavalry Division in the contagion of the alarm also fell back 6 miles, towards Narol. The Austrians’ VIth Corps advancing across the Huczwa to begin their closing-in movement north-westwards counted on these same cavalry to protect their right flank. They were now attacked from this quarter by Russian troops in strong force, and could make no further progress. After long fighting in the centre, the Austrian IInd Corps carried Zamosć village and the high ground about it.

  In spite of the heavy Austrian attack upon his left General Plehve felt strong enough to persevere on the 28th in his original intention of marching westward against Dankl’s right; and Auffenberg, cheered by the capture of Zamosć, pursued his enveloping operation. But now on Auffenberg’s extreme right the three divisions of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand had reached the battlefield. They had been delayed throughout the 27th by an order and a counter-order the significance of which will presently appear. They were on the 28th about to come into action on the right of the VIth Corps and with what it was hoped would be overwhelming strength complete the envelopment. Meanwhile the whole of the rest of both Austrian armies engaged the Russians on their front.

  August 28 began with an Austrian disaster. The right flank division (15th) of the VIth Corps, still unprotected by the cavalry, had been ordered to fall back during the night to the south side of the Huczwa to join in later with the advance of the Archduke Joseph’s division when they came up level with it. The 15th Division in recrossing the swampy valley shortly after midnight marched into and through the outpost line of the Russian Vth Corps which had penetrated thus far. The Russians waited till the mass of the division was crowded upon the long stretch of banked-up road across the swamp. A devastating fire was then opened upon it from all sides. The division was at once thrown into utter confusion. Its Commander committed suicide, and after suffering four or five thousand casualties the remnants of the division escaped westwards leaving 4,000 prisoners and 20 guns in Russian hands. In the alarm consequent upon the annihilation of this division, the 27th Austrian Division on the left at once deployed facing east. The panic spread during the darkness to the 26th Division of the IXth Corps in the centre. Thus the whole attack of Auffenberg’s centre and right was deranged and delayed till late in the afternoon.

  But meanwhile the Archduke’s three divisions were moving up to the Solokija river, and their advance from so threatening an angle became effective. During the morning they took the 61st Division of Plehve’s left Corps (XVIIth) by surprise in flank and rear while it was still marching westwards. It fled in disorder across country to the north, leaving many prisoners and 40 guns in the Archduke’s hands. His centre was however arrested by heavy Russian artillery fire shortly after crossing the river, and his left, crossing at Uhnov, hurrying forward without waiting for its guns, was brought to a standstill by Russian infantry. General Auffenberg now threw in a division he had held in reserve, which, crossing the Solokija west of Uhnov after fighting lasting into the night, forced the left flank guard of the Russian Vth Corps back on to the main body about Laszczov.

  General Auffenberg’s encircling movement was now reaching its climax. The XVIIth, Vth and XIXth Russian Corps were in the net which he was striving to draw around the Laszczov-Tomaszov-Zamosć battle zone. The whole of both Austrian armies renewed the battle on the 29th. The Archduke’s divisions swung left-handed westward towards the Huczwa stream, the XVIIth and VIth Corps pinned the enemy between that stream and Tomaszov. The IXth Corps continued its attack upon Komarov while the IInd Corps bent eastwards from Zamosć towards the north of Dub. Meanwhile Dankl pressed forward against Ewarth.

  Thus far the Austrian plans in the north had prospered.

  ‘One cannot be certain,’ says the Russian official history, written under the Soviet, ‘whether what was intended was a general offensive, or a sort of attaque brusquée endeavouring to make up by rapidity for a marked numerical inferiority. This impetuosity and this idea of a sudden violent thrust disconcerted our Fourth and Fifth Armies whose movement was slow and long-drawn out, and which were in no way prepared for an encounter battle.’31

  Leaving this struggle to approach its climax, we must now turn to the Lemberg front.

  CHAPTER XI

  THE BATTLE OF LEMBERG

  THE BATTLES OF THE GNILA-LIPA

  The battle of the Gnila-Lipa has two phases. The first began on the 26th. The three Austrian corps (XIIth, IIIrd and XIth) advanced in high hopes to the Zlota-Lipa expecting to crush the heads of inferior Russian forces. But the Russians were not only vastly superior; they were moving forward very slowly with the utmost precaution. They were expecting at any moment to come in contact with the main force of the Austrian army, and the heads of all their columns were therefore substantially deployed. The Austrian attacks all miscarried. Under the influence of the doctrine that the offensive was the only form of war, the Austrian divisions were launched to the attack, frequently disconnected from each other and without artillery preparation. Everywhere they were repulsed. Not only defeat, but panic overtook a large portion of the Third Army. The Russian front, growing stronger every hour, overlapped as well as outweighed the Austrian line. The shock of collision was all in favour of the heavier Russian attacks. By nightfall the whole of the Third Army was in retreat. Two whole divisions, indeed, were driven in such disorder and terror from the field that they only rallied in Lemberg, 25 miles from the scene of the battle. Masses of routed Austrian troops streamed into Lemberg throughout the nigh
t. The next morning it was clear to A.O.K. that their Third Army had sustained a brutal and shattering blow. At the same time all reports now carried to headquarters the news of enormous Russian columns far exceeding any forces dreamed of in this quarter coming up abreast of the Zlota-Lipa throughout its entire length. At 8 a.m. on the morning of the 27th Conrad ordered the retirement of the whole Third Army to a line close in front of Lemberg. He also ordered Auffenberg, now just becoming deeply involved in the battle of Komarov, to return the three divisions of the Archduke Joseph in motion towards his right flank. Both these measures were justified by the facts. However, less discouraging reports from the Third Army led Conrad to sanction their remaining on the line of the Gnila-Lipa, and at Auffenberg’s insistence he permitted the Archduke Joseph to continue his march on the flank of the northern battle.

  Actually the Third Army was outnumbered by nearly three to one. Along the Gnila-Lipa the Russians employed 292 battalions, 162 squadrons and 750 guns against 115 Austrian battalions, 91 squadrons and 376 guns. But it must be remembered that General Ivanov presumed that he was about to meet the main strength of the Austrian army, and that hitherto he had only encountered their leading forces. He thought he had their weight in front of his left wing. In a country with few roads like Galicia the movements of these great armies involved columns of 25 and 30 miles long on every practicable route. Thus the rear half of the army was at any given moment two days’ march from the fighting-line. So far the Russians had conquered with their heavy advance guards alone. Now they must prepare for battle on the greatest scale. They therefore halted for two days to allow their columns to close up and deploy. In these two days the Austrian Third Army managed to get into a fighting posture along the Gnila-Lipa.

  It is said that if the Russians had swept down on the 28th and 29th, they could with their great superiority have routed finally the Austrian Third Army. The Grand Duke, preoccupied with the position of Plehve’s army in the battle of Komarov, and judging more accurately than Ivanov the strength of the Austrians in front of Lemberg, ordered Ivanov to cancel his orders for the halt for deployment, and to press on at once with his troops towards Lemberg and the enemy. These orders had to be obeyed. Nevertheless it was more than forty-eight hours before the Russians were again in movement. The Grand Duke was both right and wrong. But the Commander-in-Chief of the south-west front and his powerful staff had no intention of being hurried into a disaster. They bowed, and they delayed until their arrangements were complete. This brings us to the second battle of the Gnila-Lipa or second battle of Lemberg as it is sometimes called, which opened on August 30.

  When the Russian advance was resumed it was irresistible. From daylight on the 30th Brusilov’s artillery bombarded the Austrian position, and at about 10 a.m. the Russian infantry in overpowering strength assaulted and broke the whole front of the XIIth Austrian corps. The disordered and panic-stricken troops attempted vainly to reform after a retreat of 7 miles; but a Russian cavalry division threw them again into flight. Similar scenes were enacted along the whole front. All the roads leading back to Lemberg became a seething mass of terror-stricken troops, guns, wagons and vehicles of every kind, intermingled with the fugitive inhabitants. By nightfall the Austrian Third Army seemed in dissolution. It had fled from the field in rout and ruin and had only been halted after 18 miles. Now and henceforward the mere cry ‘Kosaken kommen,’ ‘the Cossacks are coming,’ was sufficient to throw regiments and brigades into confusion. All these harsh and insulting phrases are drawn from the Austrian official history.

  We now leave for a moment these battlefields drenched with blood upon which for a week seven armies together comprising at least two million men have been in deadly grapple, for agonies no less intense in Conrad’s bleak headquarters at Przemysl. Since the morning of the 26th two great battles had been thundering beyond the northern and eastern horizons. As Conrad’s hopes in the north brightened steadily his anxieties from the east mounted to a monstrous scale. The fiery commander was torn between the opposite stresses of the two fields, the promise of victory and the threat of ruin. The first shock of the defeat of the Third Army on the 26th had led him on the 27th to suspend the northward movement of the Archduke Joseph’s three divisions. But later reports had shown that Brudermann had managed to reform along the Gnila-Lipa and that the Russians were not pursuing. So Conrad had allowed the Archduke to proceed and he was soon crucially involved in the battle of Komarov. Meanwhile the bad condition of the Third Army and the enormous masses of Russians now plainly closing up for a decisive onslaught were obvious. Ruzski and Brusilov were already within a day’s march of Lemberg and within three days’ march of the communications of both the Austrian armies fighting in the north. Conrad was like a man about to seize a prize behind a dyke which was about to burst. On the 28th he again demanded the return of the Archduke’s divisions; but Auffenberg, who now saw what he hoped was a decisive victory within his grasp, argued stubbornly, and again in the end Conrad yielded. The truant Second Army was now assembling in strength to the southward. Conrad decided to increase his hazards. Eight of the ten days between the twentieth and thirtieth days of Russian mobilization during which he had counted on winning a great victory, had gone. The Russian armies were now reaching their full establishment and the weight of numbers became daily more adverse to the Austrians. To Bolfras he wrote for the Emperor’s eye a letter so full of interest and self-revelation that it may be allowed to interrupt the military narrative.

  August 27.

  ‘In the gravest moment of my life I am in receipt of your much-appreciated letter of the 24th and 25th. I hasten to answer it, but wish only to add that, as I write, the general battle is proceeding, which will decide the fate of the Monarchy….

  ‘There is not much to say about our successes compared with those of the Germans, mainly because the German victories have been gained at our expense; for of the hundred divisions which Germany is forming she has given only nine regular and three landwehr divisions to the Eastern theatre, and sent all the others to the West. Thus the enormous weight of the Russian Army is thrown upon us, and moreover we have the war against Serbia and Montenegro to conduct. In this we lack the assistance of Roumania, which was always counted upon for the war against Russia, and in addition Italy’s defection has led to Germany sending five promised reserve divisions not to the East, but to the West.

  ‘With the policy which has led to this result I have nothing to do (kann ich nichts). Foreseeing the events which have now arisen, I advised a course of action in 1909, and again in 1912, but in vain. It is a malicious freak of Fate that it is I who now have to bear the consequences of that neglect.

  ‘The enclosed copy of a report by Potiorek gives an authentic picture of the failure in Serbia. That a complete infantry division should simply scatter, and abandon its guns and material, was the less to be expected as our troops otherwise are everywhere fighting just as gallantly as the Germans, who are engaged not against Russians, but only against Frenchmen.’1

  After this striking exposure of his standard of values, Conrad continues.

  ‘The transfer of the IVth Corps to the north is an urgent necessity, the more so when it is realized that Russia, besides her first-line divisions, will from now on bring her reserve divisions also into the field. Our troops are to-day already engaged with these. It was thus high time for us to take the offensive, for we should otherwise be opposed by a crushing superiority, and so must set the dice rolling before the IVth Corps are here. And moreover, the enemy advancing from all sides has left us no more time for delay.

  ‘The offensive which began with the victorious battle at Krasnik on the 23rd, 24th and 25th August has to-day led to the general battle. The troops are suffering heavy losses, especially from the superior Russian artillery. What the outcome of this battle of giants will be lies in the hand of Fate, we have here the conviction of having fulfilled our obligations to the best of our knowledge and conscience; that must suffice us.

  ‘T
hank you for your kind inquiry after my sons…. Whether they are still alive, I do not know….’32

  Both sets of pressures upon Conrad now increased. The shattering defeat of his Third Army on the 30th was matched by the hope and prospect that Auffenberg was about to surround Plehve and gain a tremendous victory. The ordeal shows us the measure of Conrad’s force of will. He resolved to secure for Auffenberg two more days in which to conquer, and to endure for that space the hourly increasing peril from the East. This was his greatest decision. Nor did it fail. The Russians advanced but slowly and with every precaution. They took two days to traverse the 18 miles which the Austrians had yielded so hurriedly on the 30th. It was not till September 1 that they came into contact with the new Austrian front before Lemberg. Formed of the fragments of routed divisions and of exhausted, nerve-broken troops in much confusion, it was only a shadow. Nevertheless it seemed from the enemy’s side a line of battle in position. The two days which Auffenberg had demanded had been accorded him. Let us see what use he was able to make of them.