Russian Sideshow

by Robert L Willett

  May summed up his venture: “Well, we ended up in a swamp, knee-deep in water. We found no positions. When the artillery opened up, we were in front of their barrage. The whole thing was a debacle of the worst kind.”16

  While these two columns were facing their soggy trails, a deadlier fate lay ahead for the French and Americans ordered to storm the Bolo camp, moving straight down the tracks. The artillery barrage failed to dislodge the Reds, so it was up to the attackers to rout them out of their defensive works. The French led off, taking the bridge and the first trench line; then, supported by the heavy American weapons, but without the supporting flank attacks, their momentum slowed. Gradually, the heavy Bolo fire drove them from the trenches, back to the bridge.

  The flanking party of Company M had returned to the railroad by then, having been lost, found, then lost again, and finally rescued by two stalwart north-Michigan woodsmen, who managed to find the return path.17 They were tired, soaking wet, hungry, and disgusted. The rough, sketchy map that Colonel Sutherland furnished Captain Moore made no mention of a lake or of the depth and current of a stream or swamp. Still, when the men were asked to charge up the tracks to the bridge where the French and Americans were in trouble, fifty-eight volunteers stepped forward. Although they were exhausted, the thought of their friends and bunkmates in trouble enabled them to forget their own condition.

  The Bolsheviks in a counterattack tried to take the bridge, but the combined Allied force with their automatic weapons and mortars intimidated them enough that they concentrated only on artillery fire to keep the Allies pinned down. As the day wore on, the bridge stayed in the hands of the weary, dirty, American and French soldiers. However, Colonel Sutherland, convinced that the bridge would fall to the Communists, ordered his artillery to fire on the bridge. The shells landed in the midst of Company M, taking a heavy toll: nine were wounded, two mortally. Pvt. Schliomi Dyment died at the bridge and Pvt. Matthew Niemi died en route to the hospital. Privates Drews, Jarrain, Karapuz, Yasas, and Smaglich were severely wounded, as was Lt. James Donovan. Several others were slightly wounded and one man wandered in a daze, the first victim of shell shock.18 It was a bitter fact that these early casualties were from friendly fire.

  The Americans were unsure whether the friendly fire was a mistake or a reckless order. This was further questioned when an American soldier in Sutherland’s headquarters reported, “When Col. Sutherland was informed that his artillery was getting his own troops, he first asked on one telephone for another quart of whisky and later called up his artillery officer and ordered the deadly fire to lengthen range.”19 That brief, deadly barrage was another wedge in the American-British relationship.

  As this action was taking place, the unpopular Maj. Charles Young was relieved of command and summoned to Archangel to command the Second Battalion, and Maj. J. Brooks Nichols became commander of Third Battalion. Major Nichols decided to keep the bridge at Verst 458. Colonel Sutherland ordered the troops to withdraw, but Nichols, knowing the price that had been paid for that ground, stayed in spite of Sutherland’s orders. Cpl. Cleo M. Coburn kept a terse diary: “Sept 29—At 6 bells, started artillery fire, and started attack at 6:25. Under enemy artillery fire for two hours. Several Americans wounded, 7 French killed. Stopped fighting with the Bolsheviks, retreated about five versts.”20

  The Bolos never did press their attack on the bridge, and the Americans counted their losses. From September 28 to October 2, two had been killed, fourteen wounded, and five were missing. Of the five missing, two were from Machine Gun Company, Pvt. Simon Kieffer and Pvt. Arthur Frank; three were from Headquarters Company, Cpl. William R. Babinger, Cpl. Perry C. Scott, and Pvt. James Carter. The bodies of these five were never found; they were later declared killed in action. One of the medics, Godfrey Anderson, wrote in his diary, “Cpl. Babinger and Cpl. Scott were killed as well as Privates Center [Carter] and Couch. At least we have to believe that they were killed for their bodies were not found.”21

  Private Couch did turn up later, but not the others. Babinger, whose brother was in the same Headquarters Company, wrote a letter home which was published in the Detroit News: “Do not worry unnecessarily about brother Bill, we will bring him back with us Providence allowing although the poor kid and two of his ‘buddies’ who were also severely wounded in the same battle September 29 are still missing.”22 When Cpl. Joseph Babinger returned to his home in Detroit, he returned alone. Brother Bill was never found.

  The next two weeks saw limited patrolling and almost continuous Bolshevik artillery fire. The battalion had no casualties and even managed some rest. Companies I and M took turns relieving the French in the forward positions, most days living under gray skies and a cold rain. Their rest was short-lived, however; orders came to try again to advance toward Plesetskaya. General Poole was in the process of being relieved, but his final effort against the Bolos would begin October 14, the day he sailed off to England.

  On October 13, in another nasty rain, two platoons of Company M with two French platoons and the American Machine Gun Company set off toward their objective, a Red armored train. As they entered woods on their way to Verst 457 and the Red train, they came under artillery fire from the train. There were no casualties as they passed a sleepless night in the woods waiting for H hour, 5:00 A.M. But again the plan rapidly fell apart. The lead platoon moved too far in front, so their surprise attack was spoiled. The attack was made from the woods, across an open field, into heavy, but fortunately inaccurate, fire.

  After the brief skirmish, the Bolo train escaped, but with heavy casualties. The Americans suffered one fatality, Company M’s Pvt. Walter Merrick. Four others were wounded and sent back to Archangel.23 Later in the day Americans hit forward positions of the Bolos at Verst 457 and drove them south. During the day, they were reasonably successful, gaining ground to Verst 455 and killing many of the Red infantry, but they still failed in their objective, the armored train. As the day ended, Company I was still pushing the Soviets down the tracks, clearing the area all the way to Verst 445, and the enemy “was on the run.”24 Company I, led by Capt. Horatio Winslow, suffered another fatality that day. Pvt. Frank S. McLaughlin of Sandusky, Michigan, was killed by more friendly fire as they pushed their way south, and four more were wounded by the British armored train artillery. Cpl. Cleo Coburn noted, “Chased enemy all day. Heavy artillery fire. Spent night at front. Frank McLaughlin killed by English shrapnel.”25

  The battalion was now down to little more than a full company. Company K and half of L were still off to the east, in Seletskoye on the north bank of the Emtsa River; Company L had a platoon in Isaaka Gorka, near Archangel; Companies M and I had suffered several casualties and the sick had been evacuated. Those who were left led a new attack on Plesetskaya on October 17. There was no flanking, just a simple straight-down-the-tracks charge, straight at the enemy. The tracks were bordered by heavy woods; any units sent into them might suffer the fate of Company M in their first attack, finding themselves lost and disoriented. The charge was a huge success: nine Bolsheviks dead, no Americans hit, and a chance to dig in a good defensive perimeter.

  A few American replacements from France showed up at that time, part of the 510 men sent from the other regiments of the Eighty-fifth Division.26 A French company in Archangel had been expected to join the Americans on the front lines, but, having heard rumors of a western front armistice, they considered that their war was over, too. Their commander, Major Alabernarde, shamed them for deserting their American comrades, and the poilus came smiling into the newly fortified area at Verst 445.27 But they were never again quite the aggressive fighters that they had been; slowly, confidence in them waned, and in the spring, they were pulled off the line and sent back to France.

  On October 20, the first snow fell, and the men began building log huts for shelter, which would be badly needed when the temperature dropped to between 40 and 60 degrees below zero, weather that would plague the regiment throughout the winter.

  The
clearing at Verst 445, with woods on either side and swampy, water-filled lands beyond, was to mark the end of the Allied penetration on the railroad front. It was still three hundred miles from Vologda, Poole’s ambitious target. The men from Companies I and M, plus the reluctant French and one section of American machine gunners, dug in for the winter, building wooden blockhouses with the help of the 310th Engineers, digging, or blasting, through the permafrost soil for their primitive trenches. The need for blockhouses, built above the ground, was strong, since the frozen ground and high water table made digging deep trenches and dugouts almost impossible. There the engineers proved invaluable. The Reds made sporadic efforts to move them back, mostly with heavy and demoralizing artillery, but no infantry assaults. In time, the British armored train with its artillery pieces came up within range and provided some protection. On November 3, Pvt. George Albers of Company I was captured while he was on a remote observation post. (He was released, in good condition, in Stockholm on April 25, 1919.)

  The First Battalion 310th Engineers consisted of three companies, A, B, and C. While many were at work in Archangel, other units were far afield, building blockhouses, repairing railroad, constructing (and destroying) bridges, and generally trying to make life easier for the infantry. One platoon of the 310th, under 1st Lt. William Giffels, served with the Railroad Force and performed remarkable work throughout the campaign. They strengthened the front-line positions with blockhouses, barbed wire, and trenches. At the same time, using some Russian labor, they built the permanent buildings in Obozerskaya. They built barracks, latrines, warehouses, repair shops, mess halls, wash-houses, stables, and other installations. They were an outstanding group of talented, hard-working young men.

  The most serious Red attack came on November 4, when they struck with strength against the forward positions of I Company, who were ready for them. The Americans were helped by the accurate fire of the White Russian artillery, and, again, the Reds lost heavily, but the attack also cost the life of Pvt. Leo Ellis of I Company.28 Against the well-entrenched defenders, the Soviets struck, were repulsed, then retreated, and throughout the 1918–1919 winter, they seemed content to let the artillery do their fighting, as action slowed.

  On December 6, Company M lost another man when British airplanes mistakenly bombed the trench line, killing Pvt. Floyd Sickles. “[W]e picked up our popular company barber, Floyd Sickles, in a blanket and buried him in the bomb crater.” The same bomb left Private Lachacke disabled for life with a foot injury.29 So far, Company M had lost seven men: two killed by the Bolsheviks, three by friendly fire, and two by disease. Shortly afterwards, on December 18, two platoons of M Company were selected to leave the railroad front and journey east to Pinega, 150 miles from Archangel. Their place was taken by two platoons of Company C.30

  What had been an offensive posture of the Allies turned into a defensive position on the railroad front. The new commander, General Ironside, had orders to halt offensive operations and set up winter defenses. The British Headquarters War Diary on October 16 noted their own explanation for the change in strategy: “Offensive operations on the railway abandoned owing to attitude of French and American troops.”31

  One of Ironside’s first visits to the fronts, while he waited for Poole’s departure, was to Obozerskaya. Poole had left him virtually no maps, no copies of orders, and little information on the location of troops, so he determined to find out. As a result of his trip, he suggested to Poole, who was still commanding, that the railroad and Dvina fronts be separated and placed under separate commanders. He also requested permission to replace British colonel Sutherland on the railroad front because of his inept handling of the move toward Plesetskaya. Colonel Stewart was suggested for the railroad front, while Finlayson, also British, was to keep command of the Dvina. Ironside approached Stewart with his new assignment and was surprised when Stewart petulantly refused. Ironside reported, “He then refused, saying it would be exceeding his instructions if he left Archangel, and although I pressed him hard he would not change his mind.”32 So French colonel Lucas replaced Sutherland on November 3.33

  Ironside’s first impression of American soldiers was not the best, as he viewed the railroad troops and talked to Stewart. But he conceded that they would be valuable as their experience grew. Ironside had served in France and was used to the heavy bombardments on the western front. When he saw a group of Americans near Obozerskaya being held at the ready while a few Red artillery shells fell some distance off, the general cautioned the American captain that his men would need rest. The captain was astounded; “What! Rest in the midst of this hellish bombardment!” Ironside was also confused sometimes by American speech. When he dressed down an American officer, the officer held out his hand and said, “General, I’m with you.” Ironside wrote in 1953, “To this day I am not quite certain whether he meant to say that he agreed with me, or merely had heard what I said.”34

  Life on the railroad became more bearable as winter set in. There was occasional shellfire, but troops frequently were quartered in railway cars, which had heat and other conveniences. Later, the YMCA came down with movies, snacks, and books, and relief stretches in Archangel broke the monotony.

  Despite Ironside’s decree halting offensive actions after October, in late December he directed Colonel Lucas to structure an attack to the south to find better winter quarters. Lucas ordered the Onega, Railroad, and Seletskoye units to take the rail city of Emtsa, some thirty miles south of Obozerskaya.

  Again, the objectives for the attack were unrealistic. In September the Railroad Force’s attempt to take Emtsa and Plesetskaya had met with disaster, when flanking units became disoriented and floundered in swamps and bogs. Lucas’s plan was to have the Onega Force move toward the railroad, capture the town of Turchesova, move to support the flank of the Railroad Force, and finish at a bridge twelve kilometers south of Plesetskaya. The Seletskoye Force, split into a right wing under Major Donoghue and a left wing under another British officer, Colonel Haselden (of Force B fame), was to take Kodish, then Avda, Kochmas, and Plesetskaya. The three forces would then join up and be in control of Plesetskaya.35

  The Railroad Force concentrated its forces south of Obozerskaya in preparation for the move on December 30. One of the early movements was to be made by a unit of French-led Russians who had been specially trained on snowshoes. These troops, the Coureurs de Bois, were to skirt the railroad through heavy forest, move south, and strike Emtsa from the east, then move with other forces toward Plesetskaya. Russians, French, and Americans, supported by machine gun companies, trench mortars, and the Allied armored train, were to move out on December 30, take Emtsa, and move through Plesetskaya on December 31. They never came close.

  First, the snowshoes supplied to the Coureurs de Bois were not to their liking, and they made little progress in the heavy snows of December. Second, the Seletskoye Force reached Kodish, but advanced no further. Third, the Onega column could not take Turchesova. The campaign was methodically planned, with intricate timetables covering each unit. Originally scheduled to begin December 30, it was delayed one day, until December 31, because of problems getting troops into position. With his own troops floundering and the two flanking forces stymied, Lucas called off the battle plan late on December 31.36 According to Ironside, Lucas bore much of the responsibility for the failure:

  I found out that he had not been out to see his left column commander, who was to have carried out the most important part of the operations, but had arranged everything by letter and telephone. This was a gross piece of disobedience, and I told him so, as I had given him a direct order to arrange the plan on the spot.37

  Lucas sent out one patrol, a dozen men, who advanced fewer than five hundred yards, found nothing, and returned. By January 2, the Onega Force was back in Chekuevo, the Railroad Force was still at Verst 445, and the Seletskoye units once again had evacuated Kodish.

  Lucas himself had done little to make his presence known to the forces under his contr
ol, much to General Ironside’s disgust.38 When Lucas called off his offensive, he failed to notify Companies E and K on the Seletskoye front, so they continued their attempts to take Kodish. The American troops led, expecting support from Russian troops who failed in their flank attack; British machine gunners never followed their orders; their commander was caught up in the holiday spirit and overcome with other spirits.39 The Americans, by themselves, had taken the town.

  Not only was the effort thwarted by Allied ineptness, but the Bolsheviks were now showing some decided improvements in their effectiveness. “In this whole action we have found that the bolsheviks are now well organized and offer stubborn resistance. Their artillery fire has greatly improved in quality and often their guns outrange ours and they do not spare ammunition.”40 However, as cold weather came on, interest waned in offensive action, and winter became the enemy.

  By mid February, the railroad front was static; the troops were still the French, parts of the American Third Battalion, and the British armored artillery train. Because the Allies were tied to the railroad, the support forces and the fighting units stretched out from Verst 466, nearest Archangel, to the front lines at Versts 444 and 445. The units had developed a series of fortifications and improvements from Obozerskaya down to Verst 445. Verst 466, just north of Obozerskaya, was considered a reserve area, and served as a training site to keep troops occupied when they were off the front line. Housing was provided in railway cars that were lined and insulated and furnished with stoves and bunks. The cars also transported the units to and from the front and, occasionally, to Archangel. The support troops lived in barracks and warehouses, so there was little need for blockhouses or dugouts. The area was miles from the front, and any attack during the winter would be through the unfriendly terrain of swamps, deep snow, and heavy forest.