The Emperor’s New Road: China and the Project of the Century

by Jonathan E. Hillman

  10. “PEACE Cable,” interview with Xiaohua Sun, Capacity, December–January 2019, 60, https://edition.pagesuite-professional.co.uk/html5/reader/production/default.aspx?pubname=&edid=bbc7ec88-c0e4-4ce6-b30b-95513cc7091c.

  11. “Report: Kenya Risks Losing Port of Mombasa to China,” Maritime Executive, December 20, 2018, https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/kenya-risks-losing-port-of-mombasa-to-china.

  12. Charles Miller, The Lunatic Express: The Magnificent Saga of the Railway’s Journey into Africa (London: Head of Zeus, 2017).

  13. Su Zhou, “Number of Chinese Immigrants in Africa Rapidly Increasing,” China Daily, January 14, 2017, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2017-01/14/content_27952426.htm; Brendon J. Cannon, “Is China Undermining Its Own Success in Africa?,” Diplomat, February 8, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/is-china-undermining-its-own-success-in-africa/.

  14. Geoff Hill, “Chinese Military Taking ‘Irresponsible Actions’ toward U.S. Forces in Djibouti, Intel Chief Says,” Washington Times, June 16, 2019, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/jun/16/china-us-military-clash-over-djibouti-airspace/; Paul Sonne, “U.S. Accuses China of Directing Blinding Lasers at American Military Aircraft in Djibouti,” Washington Post, May 4, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2018/05/03/u-s-accuses-china-of-directing-blinding-lasers-at-american-military-aircraft-in-djibouti/?utm_term=.750dcff99870.

  15. Michael R. Gordon, “Russian Lasers Reported Aimed at U.S. Planes,” New York Times, October 3, 1987, https://www.nytimes.com/1987/10/03/world/russian-lasers-reported-aimed-at-us-planes.html.

  16. Neil Melvin, “The Foreign Military Presence in the Horn of Africa Region,” SIPRI, April 2019, 4, https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-04/sipribp1904.pdf.

  17. Mahamoud Ali Youssouf, quoted in Max Bearak, “In Strategic Djibouti, a Microcosm of China’s Growing Foothold in Africa,” Washington Post, December 30, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/in-strategic-djibouti-a-microcosm-of-chinas-growing-foothold-in-africa/2019/12/29/a6e664ea-beab-11e9-a8b0-7ed8a0d5dc5d_story.html.

  18. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, The Djibouti City–Addis Ababa Transit and Transport Corridor: Turning Diagnostics into Action (Geneva: United Nations, 2018), 20, https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/aldc2018d6_en.pdf.

  19. China Merchants Holdings, “Acquisition of 23.5% Interests in Joint Venture in Djibouti,” December 30, 2012, http://www3.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2012/1230/ltn20121230025.pdf.

  20. FactWire, “The First ‘One Belt, One Road’ Project Was on the Hong Kong Court: The China Merchants Port Was Accused of Ignoring the Franchise” (in Chinese), FactWire, February 10, 2019, https://www.factwire.org/single-post/2019/02/10/Legal-battle-for-control-of-Djibouti-ports-comes-to-Hong-Kong.

  21. Author interview, April 29, 2019.

  22. John R. Bolton, “Remarks on the Trump Administration’s New Africa Strategy,” White House, December 13, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-national-security-advisor-ambassador-john-r-bolton-trump-administrations-new-africa-strategy/.

  23. “Djibouti Inaugurates Africa’s Largest Free Trade Zone,” Maritime Executive, July 5, 2018, https://maritime-executive.com/article/djibouti-inaugurates-africa-s-largest-free-trade-zone.

  24. DP World, “What We Do: Berbera-Somaliland,” accessed February 4, 2020, https://www.dpworld.com/what-we-do/our-locations/Middle-East-Africa/Berbera/somaliland.

  25. TeleGeography, “Submarine Cable Map,” Primetrica Inc., accessed February 4, 2020, https://www.submarinecablemap.com/#/landing-point/djibouti-city-djibouti.

  26. Bolton, “Remarks on the Trump Administration’s New Africa Strategy.” These principles were put forth by Zhou Enlai during his 1963–1964 visit to Africa.

  27. Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, Djibouti and the Horn of Africa (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968), 206.

  28. Alberto Sbacchi, Legacy of Bitterness: Ethiopia and Fascist Italy, 1935–1941 (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea, 1997); Suez Canal Authority, Government of Egypt, “Canal History: Historical Outline,” accessed February 4, 2020, https://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/English/About/SuezCanal/Pages/CanalHistory.aspx.

  29. John Irish, “Macron Warns of Chinese Risk to African Sovereignty,” Reu-ters, March 11, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-djibouti-france/macron-warns-of-chinese-risk-to-african-sovereignty-idUSKBN1QS2QP.

  30. Office of African and Latin American Analysis, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Djibouti: Gouled under Pressure (Washington, DC: Directorate of Intelligence, 1986), 2, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP88T00768R000200240001-8.pdf.

  31. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, “UNCTAD FDI/TNC Database: Djibouti,” accessed February 4, 2020, https://unctad.org/Sections/dite_fdistat/docs/webdiaeia2014d3_DJI.pdf.

  32. “China to Sign $3.3 Bln Loan for Addis-Djibouti Railway Project,” Ethiopia First, April 29, 2013, https://web.archive.org/web/20130503190450/http://www.ethiopiafirst.info/etnews/index.php/component/k2/item/222-china-to-sign-$-33-bln-loan-for-addis-djibouti-railway-project.html; Istvan Tarrosy and Zoltán Vörös, “China and Ethiopia, Part 2: The Addis Ababa–Djibouti Railway,” Diplomat, February 22, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/china-and-ethiopia-part-2-the-addis-ababa-djibouti-railway/.

  33. “Camel Trains Are Holding Up Ethiopia’s New Railway Line,” Economist, February 10, 2018, https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2018/02/10/camel-trains-are-holding-up-ethiopias-new-railway-line.

  34. Thompson and Adloff, Djibouti and the Horn of Africa, 205–206.

  35. Téwodros W. Workneh, “The Politics of Telecommunications and Development in Ethiopia” (PhD diss., University of Oregon, 2014), 148–151.

  36. Raymond Jonas, The Battle of Adwa: African Victory in the Age of Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015).

  37. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Djibouti City–Addis Ababa Transit and Transport Corridor.

  38. Robert Peet Skinner, Abyssinia of To-Day: An Account of the First Mission Sent by the American Government to the Court of the King of Kings, 1903–1904 (New York: Longmans, Green, 1906), 86–90, https://archive.org/stream/abyssiniaoftoday00skinrich/abyssiniaoftoday00skinrich_djvu.txt.

  39. Amanda Kay McVety, “Pursuing Progress: Point Four in Ethiopia,” Diplomatic History 32, no. 3 (June 2008), 371–403, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24915879.

  40. Lemmu Baissa, “United States Military Assistance to Ethiopia, 1953–1974: A Reappraisal of a Difficult Patron-Client Relationship,” Northeast African Studies 11, no. 3 (1989): 51–70, https://www.jstor.org/stable/43660384.

  41. “Revolution and Military Government,” in Ethiopia: A Country Study, rev. ed., ed. Harold D. Nelson and Irving Kaplan (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1993), accessed February 4, 2020, http://memory.loc.gov/frd/etsave/et_01_07.html.

  42. Office of African and Latin American Analysis, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Ethiopia: The Impact of Soviet Military Assistance (Washington, DC: Directorate of National Intelligence, January 1983), https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000496797.pdf.

  43. Minor agreements preceded Zemin’s visit, including technical, economic, and trade agreements, but their impact was limited. China also provided a $15 million loan in 1988, for a national stadium and ring road.

  44. Zeng Aiping and Shu Zhan, “Origin, Achievements, and Prospects of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation,” China International Studies, no. 72 (September–October 2018): 88–108, https://www.focac.org/eng/lhyj_1/yjcg/P020181026382446204313.pdf.

  45. Yun Sun, “China’s 2018 Financial Commitments to Africa: Adjustment and Recalibration,” Africa in Focus (blog), Brookings Institution, September 5, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2018/09/05/chinas-2018-financial-commitments-to-africa-adjustment-and-recalibration/.

  46. Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo, “Ghana Aiming to Replicate China’s Success Story,” Presidency: Repub
lic of Ghana, September 4, 2018, http://presidency.gov.gh/index.php/briefing-room/news-style-2/809-ghana-aiming-to-replicate-china-s-success-story-president-akufo-addo.

  47. Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 114.

  48. Irene Yuan Sun, The Next Factory of the World: How Chinese Investment Is Reshaping Africa (Boston: Harvard Business Press, 2017).

  49. Howard W. French, China’s Second Continent: How a Million Migrants Are Building a New Empire in Africa (New York: Knopf, 2014), 42.

  50. Ernst and Young, “Turning Tides: EY Attractiveness Program, Africa,” October 2018, https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-Africa-Attractiveness-2018/$FILE/ey-Africa-Attractiveness-2018.pdf.

  51. Tan Jian, “Remarks at ‘China-Africa: People-to-People Exchange for Mutual Learning’ Seminar by Chinese Ambassador Tan Jian” (speech at “China-Africa: People-to-People Exchange for Mutual Learning” seminar, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, February 2, 2018), http://et.china-embassy.org/eng/zagx/t1534986.htm.

  52. Aaron Maasho, “Ethiopia Loosens Throttle on Many Key Sectors, but Privatization Still Far Off,” Reuters, June 6, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-privatisation/ethiopia-loosens-throttle-on-many-key-sectors-but-privatization-still-far-off-idUSKCN1J21QV.

  53. Quoted in Dereje Feyissa, “Aid Negotiation: The Uneasy ‘Partnership’ between EPRDF and the Donors,” Journal of Eastern African Studies 5 (2011): 795.

  54. Lishan Adam, Risks and Opportunities of Late Telecom Privatization: The Case of Ethio Telecom (Cape Town: Research ICT Africa, 2019), 8, https://researchictafrica.net/wp/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/2019_After-Access-Steps-and-issues-in-the-privatisation-of-the-telecommunication-sector-in-Ethiopia.pdf.

  55. Katrina Manson, “Ethiopia’s Leader Aims to Maintain Tight Rein on Key Businesses,” Financial Times, May 27, 2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c0985378-c5ef-11e2-99d1-00144feab7de.html.

  56. Meles Zenawi, “FT Interview: Meles Zenawi, Ethiopian Prime Minister,” interview by William Wallis, Financial Times, February 6, 2007, https://www.ft.com/content/4db917b4-b5bd-11db-9eea-0000779e2340.

  57. Téwodros W. Workneh, “State Monopoly of Telecommunications in Ethiopia: Origins, Debates, and the Way Forward,” Review of African Political Economy 45, no. 158 (2018): 592–608.

  58. Mesfin Belachew, “Investment in Broadband Infrastructure in Ethiopia” (paper presented at UN-OHRLLS Regional Meeting for African LDCs, Dakar, Senegal, March 15, 2017), http://unohrlls.org/custom-content/uploads/2017/03/Presentation-on-BB-in-Ethiopia.pdf; International Telecommunications Union, “Country ICT DATA (Until 2018): Fixed-Telephone Subscriptions,” accessed December 20, 2019, https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/stat/default.aspx.

  59. Janelle Plummer, Diagnosing Corruption in Ethiopia (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2012), 356, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/13091/699430PUB0Publ067869B09780821395318.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

  60. Zhao Lili, “Contributing to the Development of Ethiopia with Wisdom and Strength,” ZTE, https://www.zte.com.cn/global/about/magazine/zte-technologies/2009/6/en_414/172517.

  61. Lili.

  62. The mobile penetration rate is the number of SIM cards or mobile devices divided by the total population and can exceed 100 percent.

  63. Adam, Risks and Opportunities of Late Telecom Privatization, 5–6.

  64. Ewan Sutherland, “China and Africa: Alternative Telecommunications Policies and Practices,” African Journal of Information and Communication 17 (2016): 181–182.

  65. Tokunbo Ojo, “Political Economy of Huawei’s Market Strategies in the Nigerian Telecommunication Market,” International Communication Gazette 79, no. 3 (2017): 327.

  66. Benjamin Tsui, “Do Huawei’s Training Programs and Centers Transfer Skills to Africa?” (Policy Brief no. 14, China Africa Research Initiative, Washington, DC, 2016), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5652847de4b033f56d2bdc29/t/578e94e83e00be65954feb3f/1468962026573/Tsui+brief+v.5.pdf; Alemayehu Geda and Atenafu G. Meskel, “Impact of China-Africa Investment Relations: The Case of Ethiopia” (Policy Brief no. 11, Africa Economic Research Consortium, Nairobi, July 2013), https://aercafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/CA_11_GedaMeskel.pdf.

  67. Tom Gardner, “Ethiotel Strives for Better Signal,” Africa Report, May 3, 2018, https://www.theafricareport.com/667/ethiotel-strives-for-better-signal/.

  68. Felix Horne and Cynthia Wong, “They Know Everything We Do: Telecom and Internet Surveillance in Ethiopia,” Human Rights Watch, March 25, 2014, https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/03/25/they-know-everything-we-do/telecom-and-internet-surveillance-ethiopia#.

  69. Téwodros W. Workneh, “Chinese Multinationals in the Ethiopian Telecom Sector,” Communication, Culture & Critique 9, no. 2 (February 2016): 138, https://academic.oup.com/ccc/article/9/1/126/3979314.

  70. Michael Kovrig, “China Expands Its Peace and Security Footprint in Africa,” International Crisis Group, October 24, 2018, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/north-east-asia/china/china-expands-its-peace-and-security-footprint-africa.

  71. Joan Tilouine and Ghalia Kadiri, “In Addis Ababa, the Seat of the African Union Spied On by Beijing” (in French), Le Monde, January 27, 2018, https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2018/01/26/a-addis-abeba-le-siege-de-l-union-africaine-espionne-par-les-chinois_5247521_3212.html.

  72. World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Regional IDA Grant in the Amount of SDR 16.5 Million (US$25 Million Equivalent) to the African Union Commission for the Support for Capacity Development of the African Union Commission and Other African Union Organs Project (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2014), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/205721468194353464/pdf/816180PAD0P126010Box385177B00OUO090.pdf.

  73. Huawei, “Desktop Cloud Draws Praise in Africa,” July 25, 2013, https://e.huawei.com/en/case-studies/global/older/hw_201214.

  74. Danielle Cave, a researcher at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, was among the first to make these connections. See Cave, “The African Union Headquarters Hack and Australia’s 5G Network,” The Strategist (Australian Strategic Policy Institute), July 13, 2018, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-african-union-headquarters-hack-and-australias-5g-network/; African Union, “AUC Signs MoU with Huawei for Partnership on ICT,” February 3, 2015, https://au.int/en/newsevents/29758/auc-signs-mou-huawei-partnership-ict.

  75. Deng Yingying, “China’s National Innovation System (NIS) in the Making: Case Studies of Three Indigenous Chinese Companies” (master’s thesis, University of Massachusetts–Lowell, 2003), 11, 45–46.

  76. Christopher Balding and Donald C. Clarke, “Who Owns Huawei?,” SSRN, April 17, 2019, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3372669.

  77. Reuters, “China Rejects Claim It Bugged Headquarters It Built for African Union,” Guardian, January 29, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/30/china-african-union-headquarters-bugging-spying.

  78. Cave, “African Union Headquarters Hack.”

  79. Chinedum Uwaegbulam, “West Africa: New Ecowas Abuja Headquarters Project Throws Up Consultancy Jobs,” AllAfrica, March 11, 2019, https://allafrica.com/stories/201903110079.html.

  80. Jonathan E. Hillman, Influence and Infrastructure: The Strategic Stakes of Foreign Projects (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019), 14, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/190123_Hillman_InfluenceandInfrastructure_WEB_v3.pdf.

  81. Elaine Sciolino, “The Bugged Embassy Case: What Went Wrong,” New York Times, November 15, 1988, https://www.nytimes.com/1988/11/15/world/the-bugged-embassy-case-what-went-wrong.html.

  82. Sutherland, “China and Africa,” 184.

  83. Hua Jingyi, “Huawei ZTE Won the Bid for Kenya Optical Cable Backbone Construction Project” (in Chinese), OFweek, September 4, 2007, https://fiber.ofweek.com/2007-09/ART-210007-8110-10671001.html.

  84. James A. Lewis, “5G: The Impact on National Security, Intellectua
l Property, and Competition” (testimony before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Washington, DC, May 14, 2019), 7, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/congressional_testimony/190514_Jim_Lewis_Testimony.pdf.

  85. GSM Association, “Case Study: RuralStar Huawei Safaricom,” January 10, 2019, https://www.gsma.com/futurenetworks/wiki/ruralstar-huawei-safaricom-case-study/#87b0f37ea57dc3bb8bf3db501600eb3e.

  86. Lauder Institute, Lauder Global Business Insight Report 2009: First-Hand Perspectives on the Global Economy (Philadelphia: Lauder Institute, Knowledge@Wharton, 2009), https://docplayer.net/23954919-Lauder-global-business-insight-report-2009.html; Christine Chang, Amy Cheng, Susan Kim, Johanna Kuhn-Osius, Jesús Reyes, and Daniel Turgel, “Huawei Technologies: A Chinese Trail Blazer in Africa,” Knowledge@Wharton, April 20, 2009, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/huawei-technologies-a-chinese-trail-blazer-in-africa/.

  87. Lauder Institute, Lauder Global Business Insight Report 2009.

  88. Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, vol. 4 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1961), 157.

  89. Okuttah Mark, “Safaricom Hands Over CCTV System to Police This Week,” Business Daily Africa, November 22, 2015, https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Corporate-News/Safaricom-hands-over-CCTV-system-to-police-this-week/539550-2967242-slf222z/index.html.

  90. Donal Power, “Global Smart Cities Market to Reach a Whopping $3.5 Trillion by 2026,” ReadWrite, January 7, 2017, https://readwrite.com/2017/01/07/smart-cities-market-will-grow-3-5-trillion-worldwide-2026-cl4/.

  91. Huawei, “Safe City: Kenya,” April 10, 2018, https://e.huawei.com/en/videos/global/2018/201804101038.

  92. Matthew Dalton, “Telecom Deal by China’s ZTE, Huawei in Ethiopia Faces Criticism,” Wall Street Journal, January 6, 2014, https://www.wsj.com/articles/telecom-deal-by-china8217s-zte-huawei-in-ethiopia-faces-criticism-1389064617.

  93. “Bone and Structure of Sh45 Billion Safarigate Scandal,” Nairobi Law Monthly¸ March 10, 2016, http://nairobilawmonthly.com/index.php/2016/03/10/bone-and-structure-of-sh45-billion-safarigate-scandal/.