Terrorism, Inc
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Recruitment efforts can vary from one-on-one meetings, where motivation and qualifications are assessed and potential recruits selected, to more informal gatherings which can take place at private homes or religious summer camps.117 Moreover, recruitment can take the form of a formalized process, as in targeting Saudi recruits for Iraq, Jemmah Islamiyah efforts in Southeast Asia, LTTE campaigns in Tamil schools, and PKK outreach at cultural centers.118 Other recruitment efforts are less formal and include the personal indoctrination of friends, which is a common tactic of groups like the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC).119 Clan or tribal connections are another common form of recruitment into insurgent groups and many groups use social services to attract new members into their ranks.120
Low levels of popular support do not necessarily doom an insurgency to failure. On the contrary, groups can continue to wage a successful insurgency even with just a modicum of support, although the minority must be considered an “active minority” for the insurgents to sustain momentum. In many cases, earnest recruitment by the insurgents is unnecessary. Brutal, coercion-driven strategies can help swell insurgent ranks, negating the need for the insurgents to actively recruit. In the early 1970s in Northern Ireland, widespread reports of the British using torture against PIRA prisoners was an effective insurgent recruiting tool in and of itself.121
Media, Public Relations, Propaganda, and Publicity
In the battle for hearts and minds, insurgents are aware that media and public relations efforts are important tools in winning the battle of perception. Information operations (IO) have become central to irregular warfare. Counterinsurgents have public affairs officers, strategic communication specialists, and entire units devoted to psychological operations (PSYOP). In the twenty-first century, social media, the Internet, and communication technology are shaping the battlefield in ways previously not possible. Publicity allows insurgents to promote their ideology, galvanize supporters, and disseminate their message to a wide audience. The PIRA had its own newspaper, An Phoblacht, which it used to reach not only Republicans in Northern Ireland, but also supporters comprised of the Irish diaspora spread throughout parts of North America, Europe, and Australia. In general, insurgents target three primary audiences through their public relations campaigns: their own members and constituents, supporters outside the group, and enemy forces.
Political support is not limited to the insurgency itself. External sponsors can provide insurgents with a range of political support. This support can be diverse and includes: access to a state’s diplomatic apparatus, vocal support for recognition in the international arena, persuading NGOs and charities to provide support to the group directly, and even denying support to the government opposing the insurgents.122 In both Kosovo and Sudan, American backing of insurgent groups not only tipped the scales militarily, but also went a long way to helping these nations acquire legitimacy at the United Nations. In Libya, NATO support to the rebels has been an important part of the post-Gadhafi era, although the outcome in that country is very much uncertain, especially as Western attention has been focused on countering the threat of ISIS. Propaganda, though often considered a pejorative term and associated with deception and falsehood, can be an important tool in influencing a target population. In an era of social media, the Internet, and satellite television, an effective propaganda campaign is an extremely valuable weapon at the disposal of both the insurgents and the counterinsurgents.
COUNTERING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM, INSURGENCY, AND IRREGULAR WARFARE
When it comes to countering the financing of terrorism, insurgency and irregular warfare, rather than break the evolution of this problem set into several distinct time periods, it is perhaps best to think in terms of the before and after—pre- and post-9/11. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. government sought to undertake tactical actions aimed at disrupting individual nodes in the terrorist financial network as well as to implement a range of strategic initiatives with the ultimate goal of transforming the environment in which these militants operated.123 To be sure, there has been much progress to date, especially with respect to stymieing Al-Qaida’s efforts to raise, store, transfer, and spend money. However, new and more odious threats loom on the horizon, as demonstrated by the rapid rise of ISIS in the summer of 2014, the continuing rampage of Boko Haram throughout Nigeria, and the revival of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen. Continued efforts to counter the financing of terrorism, insurgency and irregular warfare are the sine qua non of a comprehensive strategy to meet the growing challenge of transnational terrorism and the threat posed by Salafist jihadists and other violent non-state actors.
Pre-9/11 Efforts
One of the first efforts to combat the financing of terrorism, even though it was initially considered legislation to deal with money laundering, came in the form of the 1970 Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), also known as the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act. The BSA required banks to maintain an audit trail of large transactions and to provide law enforcement authorities with access to sensitive information.124 In 1977, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) presented the president with the ability to block U.S. imports from and exports to any entity designated under this law, with assistance from the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). Still, it was not until 1985 that financial institutions were required to submit suspicious activity requests (SARs) at the impetus of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. The next year, in 1986, money laundering was designated as a federal crime under the Money Laundering Control Act. In 1989, the Financial Action Task Force was established at the G7 Summit in Paris as a response to growing concern over instances of money laundering in the international financial system.125
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the United States ascended to its role as the world’s lone superpower, although this did nothing to insulate Washington from the threat posed by global terrorism. If anything, as the world’s sole hegemon, the United States became an even more attractive target of a range of non-state actors, including Al-Qaida (even though it was the United States that helped the Afghan mujahedin drive out the Soviets in the 1980s). Nevertheless, the lion’s share of attention focused on anti-money laundering rather than combating the financing of terrorism. Indeed, the 1992 Annunzio-Wylie Act strengthened the sanctions for BSA violations and established a Bank Secrecy Act Advisory Group. Three years later, in 1995, the financial intelligence units (FIUs) of 20 separate countries established the Egmont Group, an organization designed to foster cooperation among states in the areas of information exchange, training and the sharing of expertise in the fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism.
Following the 1998 Al-Qaida attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania former terrorism czar Richard Clarke established a National Security Council (NSC)-led interagency group to focus on the financing of terrorism.126 In 1999, French-led efforts at the United Nations resulted in the adoption of the UN Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Financing. Despite the growing threat from international terrorism, know-your-customer (KYC) requirements proposed by Treasury and federal regulators met resistance from both the banking industry and influential elements of the U.S. Congress. Even as the United States continued to struggle with making progress against CFT, the international community forged ahead. In 2000, the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime was adopted, as was UNSCR 1333 which sought to contain the Taliban in Afghanistan while the Financial Action Task Force produced “Name & Shame” list of Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories (NCCTs). In March 2000, Treasury was nominated as the new home for the Financial Assets Tracking Center although according to Clunan, this center never “fully functioned” at Treasury (it was taken over by the CIA in late 2002 and renamed the Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Group, or FTATG).127
Post-9/11 Efforts
Following the Al-Qaida attacks
of September 11, 2001, the Bush administration signed Executive Order 13224, which was specifically designed to “starve the terrorists of funding” by blocking property and prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threat to commit, or support terrorism.128 For good measure, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1373, which called on all UN member states to criminalize the use or collection of funds intended, or known to be intended, for terrorism, in addition to freezing funds and assets; prohibiting aid or provision to terrorists; refraining from providing any support; and denying safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts.129 The USA PATRIOT Act expanded the ability of law enforcement and the intelligence community to access and share financial information regarding terrorist investigations.130 Shortly after 9/11, the FBI established an interagency Financial Review Group which became known as the Terrorist Financing Operations Section (TFOS), while the U.S. Customs Service established Operation Green Quest and the Department of Justice allocated more resources to combating the financing of terrorism as well.
In October 2001, the Financial Action Task Force expanded its purview beyond money laundering to include the financing of terrorism and offered nine special recommendations to deal with issues including, but not limited to: alternative remittances, wire transfers, NPOs, cash couriers and the freezing and confiscating of terrorist assets.131 Other post 9/11 developments include the provision of technical assistance toward compliance by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, as well as greater involvement in CFT by the Egmont Group. Accordingly, most international cooperation has been kinetic, focused on the capturing and eliminating of terrorist financiers, rather than in special designations and bolstering the implementation of the CFT regime.132 While helpful, focusing solely on kinetic efforts at the expense of a more comprehensive approach is myopic and only serves to fuel the debate between those who favor the “freeze and seize approach” and those who find greater utility in “following the money” to develop a more robust intelligence picture of individual terrorist and insurgent networks.
While there was a definite need to devote more resources to CFT following the 9/11 attacks, inevitably, bureaucratic battles soon arose over jurisdiction. The creation of new agencies, like the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), contributed to the stovepiping of information and the protection of “rice bowls” within different departments of government, precisely the kind of issues that the bureaucratic reorganization was intended to ameliorate. Still, despite occasional infighting, there has been considerable progress achieved on elevating the importance of combating the financing of terrorism. Since 2003–2004, there has been a marked increase in the appreciation for financial intelligence (FININT).133 Put another way, in a post 9/11 world, the Treasury Department, which created the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI) and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, now has a seat at the table with “the big boys of national security”—the CIA, the NSA, the FBI and the Defense and State departments.134
CHAPTER 2
The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA): “The Troubles” in Northern Ireland
BACKGROUND
The Provisional Irish Republican Army emerged from the struggles of the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland in the late 1960s.1 Original in many ways, the group was also the continuation of a militant Irish Republican movement that traced its legacy back to the 1790s, when Theobald Wolfe Tone and the United Irishmen formed a “brotherhood of affection, a communion of rites and union of power among Irishmen of every religious persuasion.”2 The Provisionals, or “Provos” as they were referred to, waged a 30-year long insurgency against the security forces of Northern Ireland, while also clashing directly with Protestant paramilitaries during spasms of sectarian conflict. To grow the organization over time, the PIRA relied on both the gray and dark economy.
Funds were used for a variety of purposes including the purchase of sophisticated weaponry, operations and logistics, and to develop the group’s political wing, Sinn Fein. James Adams concludes that the Provos became involved in organized crime to provide the estimated $7 million per year they needed to pay full-time insurgents and support a growing political base.3 In contrast to other parts of the PIRA, the “Finance Department” consisted of very few individuals. Financial operations, specifically the management and use of funds, were entrusted to a small cadre within the organization.4 To disrupt the PIRA’s funding stream, the British government relied on an extensive counterintelligence network while also targeting the group’s leadership for kill, capture, and imprisonment. The cooperation of authorities in the Republic of Ireland (ROI) and the United States was also essential in hampering the group’s financial network.
HOW THE PIRA FUNDED ITS ACTIVITIES
The Provisional Irish Republican Army, like other insurgent groups, relied on a combination of gray and dark activities to meet the financial requirements necessary to manage a successful insurgent organization. While finance does not necessarily inhibit an insurgent group from waging war against the state, it does limit “the extent and sophistication of a terrorist organization’s activities.”5
For the PIRA, funding was such a critical resource because of the group’s wide range of activities and responsibilities. From the start, insurgent leaders understood that fighting an adversary as formidable and well-resourced as the British military required substantive resources for the insurgency to have even a remote chance of success. This, in turn, necessitated a vast array of weaponry and the maintenance of a complex organizational infrastructure—both expensive to acquire and sustain. PIRA operating costs resulted from a number of critical group functions, including: paying the salaries of its members; acquiring weapons and munitions; planning and preparation for operations; sustaining the families of PIRA prisoners and members killed in action; and supporting the growth and maturation of its political wing, Sinn Fein.
What is known of PIRA fund-raising is that it was organized, task specialized and person-centered with funds earmarked to sustain the group’s operational and organizational capabilities. As a rule, PIRA funding activities did not make its members personally wealthy and fund-raising efforts relied on influential networks in both the gray and dark worlds. Moreover, PIRA funding operations were opportunistic, adaptive, entrepreneurial, and sensitive to an array of both internal and external forces.6
Gray Economy
For the Provos, the gray economy consisted of diaspora support, charities, various types of fraud, money earned from legal businesses, and money laundering. From the late-1960s until the mid-1980s, financial support from the United States flowed largely unabated, with the Irish-American diaspora and numerous charities, chief among them the Irish Northern Aid Committee (NORAID), playing an indispensable role.7 The FBI and British intelligence estimated that NORAID declared only approximately one-quarter to one-fifth of the funds it raised. Undeclared funds were siphoned off to purchase arms, or sent to Dublin and Belfast covertly. Intelligence and law enforcement agencies always regarded NORAID and the PIRA as symbiotic organizations.8
Diaspora Support
Diaspora communities can be an external supplier of weapons and other military-related resources through long established foreign networks. The PIRA had its own newspaper, An Phoblacht, which it used to reach not only Republicans in Northern Ireland, but also supporters comprising of the Irish diaspora spread throughout parts of North America, Europe, and Australia. “The enormous Irish-American population has always felt a strong sentimental attachment to ‘the old country’ and this has been translated into a steady stream of cash and guns to the IRA, ‘critical enablers of the group’s longevity.’ ”9
Both the United States and the Republic of Ireland were popular destinations for insurgents, but the United States in particular, served as a safe haven for Republican terrorists, especially those on the run. According to Daniel Byman, “The diaspora [also] acted as a safe haven for IRA fugitives. The Iris
h Northern Aid Committee (NORAID) helped IRA operatives find new identities and jobs in the United States, enabling them to escape justice in Northern Ireland.”10 Some PIRA insurgents fled to America and assumed a new life, where they blended in with the other Irish immigrants in working-class populations through New York City—including Queens, Manhattan, and the Bronx, where many worked as bartenders or in the construction industry. Insurgents would spend anywhere from days to years hiding outside of Northern Ireland, sneaking back into the country to execute attacks or deliver weapons before disappearing once again. One of the main efforts of the diaspora was work done through NORAID.
Charities
Besides serving as a physical safe haven for fugitives, the United States was also a place where PIRA sympathizers and affiliates were given free rein to fund-raise. “The IRA’s ability to enjoy a haven in the United States and to raise money was bolstered by U.S. laws governing the rights of those engaged in political activity, even if such activity involved violence,” notes Byman.11 NORAID was founded in the Bronx in 1970 (based at 273 East 194th Street) by Michael Flannery and over the course of the conflict managed to raise between $3 and $5 million for “the cause,” by soliciting donations from the Irish diaspora and Irish-American activists in major cities throughout the country, including New York, Chicago, Boston, and Albany.12 NORAID attempted to erect a façade of plausible deniability, consistently suggesting that there was no link whatsoever to the PIRA’s military activities. On the contrary, the organization claimed that it was merely a charity established to provide financial assistance to the families of PIRA members who were “suffering hardship as a result of sectarian strife.”13