Terrorism, Inc

by Colin P Clarke

  For a long time, Syria was a major supporter (in many ways) but now this is changing drastically. The relationship has changed since the beginning of the Arab Spring. In February 2012 Hamas cut ties with Damascus, which caused tensions between Hamas and Iran.52 Still, by distancing itself from Assad, Hamas gained the support of anti-Syrian regimes in Turkey and Qatar. When Morsi and the Brotherhood won elections in Egypt, Hamas was enthralled by the potential support now possible from Cairo. However, these hopes were dampened with the July 2013 coup by the Egyptian military and subsequent rule of General Sisi.

  WHAT HAMAS ACHIEVED WITH THESE FUNDS

  Since it burst on the scene in 1987, Hamas has evolved from an unknown offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood into a politico-military force in Gaza and the West Bank. In 2002, the group’s operating budget was estimated at around $30 million (40 percent from donors in Arab nations; 20 percent from Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza; 10 percent from Iran; 10–15 percent from donors in the United States; and 15–20 percent from donors in other countries).53 More recently, estimates place Hamas’s per year financial support at $100 million, with speculation that approximately 80 percent of its revenue went to its social services empire while the remaining 20 percent was earmarked for Izz al-Din al-Qassam.54 With this generous operating budget, Hamas has grown its organization into a lethal hybrid group capable of attacking Israel kinetically, while also boasting robust levels of popular support amongst Palestinians and Muslims throughout the Middle East. Hamas’s war chest should also allow the group to weather the perturbations pulsing throughout the region four years after the advent of the Arab Spring, which is responsible for nascent alliances and a shifting balance of power. With greater resources to rely upon, Hamas is well positioned to follow the path of Hezbollah in Lebanon, cementing its status as a popular and organized political bulwark while also continuing to remain the vanguard of Palestinian militarism directed toward Israel.

  Operational Capabilities

  As Hamas has demonstrated through its lethal use of suicide bombing as an asymmetric tactic, the group is continuously seeking to innovate and devise deadlier methods of attacking its adversaries. And although the group is now synonymous with suicide attacks, according to Byman, “Hamas’ military wing, once largely in the business of suicide bombings and cheap mortar attacks, morphed into a regular military force with thousands of troops under arms and more advanced weapons systems.”55 When Hamas demonstrates that it is able to deploy new technology efficiently, this helps the group internally and externally. Internally, the group wins favor among Palestinians for its competence compared with other groups. Externally, it is likely to attract further external assistance. From a public relations, financial, and logistical standpoint, Hamas leaders are wary of drawing the ire of the international community, or of alienating Palestinians, which is partially why the group confines its attacks to Israel, instead of striking out abroad.56

  Weapons

  As the First Intifada drew to a close in 1993, the situation for Hamas was dire—its military wing had a mere twenty machine guns in its arsenal.57 It was around this time that the group adopted the use of suicide attacks, partially in response to a paucity of weaponry and designed to derail the Oslo talks. The popularity of suicide terrorism by Hamas was also motivated by the Hebron massacre of 1994 when Baruch Goldstein, an Israeli terrorist, shot and killed 28 Muslims at the Ibrahimi Mosque. In addition to the early to mid-1990s, the other main wave of Hamas suicide attacks took place during the Second Intifada, which lasted from September 2000 through December 2005. In March 2002, IDF officials claimed that Hamas tried to include cyanide in its suicide attacks.58

  Suicide attacks have gained an appeal among Palestinian terrorist groups for three reasons, in particular. First, just as in Lebanon and Sri Lanka, a culture of martyrdom has been established, which glorifies suicide bombers as heroes. Second, suicide attackers only need to plan an infiltration of enemy territory, not an exfiltration. Third, suicide attacks eliminate the risks of capture and interrogation (although suicide attackers rarely have top-level information), evidenced by the fact that leading members of groups rarely, if ever, “martyr themselves” in this way.

  Izzadhin al-Qassam, Hamas’s military wing, has demonstrated an impressive level of proficiency in constructing bombs and IEDs, although both Kamal Ismail Hafez Kahisl and Muhi a-din Sharif, prominent Hamas members, were killed while preparing homemade explosives.59 Electrical components and chemical supplies (ammonium nitrate, acetone, and nitrogen glycerin) needed to make a shrapnel-studded suicide vest cost approximately $150.60 Some leading Hamas members, including Yihye Ayash, a Hamas bomb maker known as “the Engineer,” have been responsible for constructing suicide vests at various points in the group’s history.

  In addition to shootings, grenade, and bomb attacks, Hamas militants are notorious for their use of Qassam rockets. During the 2012 conflagration between Hamas and Israel, the Israelis destroyed nearly all of Hamas’s long-range rockets.61 That Hamas was able to restock its supply to fight the Israelis again, two years later, indicates that Iranian support was generous during the interregnum. The sophistication of Hamas’s rockets vary, with some of the more crude versions of the Qassam able to be built on a relatively modest budget (although you usually get what you pay for; inaccurate and malfunctioning). After Israel’s assassination of Adnan al-Ghoul, the original architect of the Qassam rocket, Hamas sympathizers like Spanish engineer Marwan Ismail Dahman offered technical assistance to the group in order to redesign an enhanced rocket.62

  Intelligence

  Building a skilled and effective intelligence apparatus takes time and requires extensive resources. For Hamas, the sense of urgency is exacerbated by the range of adversaries arrayed against the group. The intelligence requirements for dealing with Israel are much different from the challenges associated with Fatah or Salafist groups in Gaza. Furthermore, Hamas’s extensive reliance on suicide bombings requires intensive intelligence capabilities to plot and conduct these attacks successfully.63 As with almost any group that relies heavily on suicide bombing, Hamas needs to remain acutely aware of public perception, particularly among its domestic constituency. While Hamas is not going to conduct surveys or polling, part of its intelligence apparatus is responsible for gauging the general mood of the Palestinian public, since Hamas must be responsive to its support base.

  Hamas dedicates a portion of its budget to intelligence collection, specifically, to bribing officials in an attempt to penetrate the various intelligence agencies of the PA, the General and Preventive Intelligence services.64 A Hamas special unit, named Jehaz Aman, is responsible for investigating both new recruits as well as any potential collaborators, thus mitigating either Palestinian or Israeli attempts to infiltrate or subvert the organization.65 During the mid-1990s, when infighting between Hamas and Fatah approached a fever pitch, Hamas relied on its intelligence apparatus to identify and target suspected collaborators, which fed into a cycle of tit-for-tat revenge killings in Gaza.66

  Hamas also directs some of its intelligence activities to monitoring the more recent rise of Salafist groups in Gaza, such as Jund Ansar Allah, a group that criticizes Hamas for its engagement in politics, agreeing to a cease-fire with Israel and its actions designed to prevent other militant factions from launching attacks against Israel from Gaza.67 Like Al-Qaida and the Islamic State, many Salafist groups in Gaza are vehemently opposed to any form of elections and as these groups gain popularity, they threaten Hamas’s ability to control Gaza as well as its legitimacy in the eyes of the most hard-line Islamists. The tentacles of the group’s intelligence apparatus reach beyond the West Bank and Gaza. During their time in Jordan, Hamas operatives were accused of collecting intelligence on Jordanian officials.68 In the United States, Hamas has engaged in low-level intelligence gathering, including preoperational surveillance of potential targets, which could be used for “off-the-shelf contingency planning.”69

  Sanctuary, Safe Hav
en, and Operational Space

  As an organization, Hamas has led a peripatetic existence since its founding in the late 1980s. Hamas command has been headquartered abroad at various points throughout the organization’s history, including in London, England, and Springfield, Virginia, alternatively, in the early 1990s.70 In 1995, along with Islamic Jihad, Hamas relocated its operational headquarters to Damascus, while maintaining its political office in Amman during this time.71 At other points, the group was offered sanctuary in Sudan by Hassan al-Turabi, the former Islamist political leader, who offered safe haven to Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaida.

  Throughout the 1990s, many Hamas militants that operated from the West Bank and Gaza were jailed by the Israelis. As a result, the “external” leadership of the group sought refuge in places like Kuwait, Amman, Damascus, and the United States where they could “organize, recruit and raise money without Israel disrupting their efforts,” according to Byman.72 The Syrian sanctuary, in particular, provided Hamas with the operational space necessary to conduct training and planning. In early 2003, Hamas militants in Syria provided training to a pair of British Muslims of Pakistani origin who conducted a suicide attack at a popular bar frequented by Westerners in Tel Aviv.73

  To be sure, much is in flux as a result of the Arab Spring and the ongoing civil war in Syria. Following the loss of its sanctuary in Damascus, Hamas also faces new pressure from the Egyptians. The new Sisi government in Egypt has tightened security along the Gaza border, shut down many of Hamas’s tunnels (flooding some of them with sewage) and even harassed Gazan fisherman that stray into Egyptian waters. This loss of sanctuary has provided Hamas with a serious logistical challenge, especially considering how critical these tunnels have been for smuggling goods (including weapons) and infiltrating fighters into Israel.74

  Training

  Following the First Intifada, the Israelis deported 415 Hamas members to southern Lebanon, a curious move due to the proximity these members would be in with relation to Hezbollah. Overcoming the Sunni–Shia divide, Hezbollah trained the exiled Hamas members in a range of military tactics, a move that significantly strengthened Hamas’s overall military capabilities when these militants returned to Gaza and the West Bank in 1993.75 The Al-Aqsa Intifada, or the Second Intifada, commenced in September 2000 seemingly in response to then Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount.76 During the next five years, training and technology exchange between Hezbollah and Palestinian groups would follow three general patterns, including direct person-to-person instruction (tacit knowledge transfer), physical technology exchanges, and even attempts by Hezbollah members to assume a modicum of operational control over the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, although this final point remains a matter of dispute in the literature.77 While reports on whether or not Hezbollah attempted to seize operational control of specific Palestinian militant groups are contradictory, what is not up for debate is the value added to both Hezbollah and Palestinian militants as a result of Hezbollah fighters training the Palestinians in a host of guerilla warfare practices. Hezbollah not only receives training from Iran but in a case of “training the trainers” it teaches various Palestinian militant groups how to utilize the same techniques for which it once sought guidance.

  An indirect benefit of the training provided to Hezbollah by the IRGC has been Hezbollah’s ability and willingness to train Palestinian militant groups that also fall within Iran’s sphere of influence. It is truly a “win all” situation because Iran furthers its interests by strengthening another enemy of Israel; the Palestinian groups become more adept at numerous terrorist techniques; and Hezbollah militants are able to practice their trade and hone their own skills without actually having to engage in conflict. Palestinian militants have trained at Hezbollah-run military training camps, which operate along three month cycles and include instructions on small arms, explosives, intelligence, and countersurveillance.78 Hezbollah’s support to Palestinian terrorist organizations extends beyond Hamas to include PIJ and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade and spans the gamut from the provision of logistical assistance to training in suicide tactics.79

  Organizational Capabilities

  While operational capabilities signal a terrorist’s group’s ability to plan and conduct attacks, organizational capabilities are more indicative of the group’s level of cohesion. In turn, a group’s cohesion can be a major factor contributing to longevity and the ability to achieve long-term objectives. Once a group like Hamas decides that it wants to make the transition from a militant group to a hybrid entity that maintains an armed wing but also participates in the electoral process, this can be a significant strain on the group’s operating budget. As such, once Hamas decided that politics would form part of its approach to seizing power, it was forced to dedicate more resources to the group’s political leadership, ideological platform, human resources-type efforts, and media relations.

  Leadership

  In the early 1970s, Sheik Ahmed Yassin founded the al-Mujama al-Islamiya (the Islamic Center) which functioned as an umbrella organization for myriad religious outfits in Gaza. Almost 20 years later, Yassin founded Hamas, along with Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi and Mahmoud Zhahar. In the West Bank, Hamas’s early leadership cadre consisted of Dr. Adnan Muswadda, Nagy Soubha, Sheikh Mohammad Fouad Abu Ziad, and Sheikh Jamil Hammami.80 Yassin assumed the role of organizing new recruits in Gaza into operational cells, with no more than three cell members in a typical cell, while also occupying a chief role in the financing of Hamas terrorist attacks.81 When Yassin and Rantissi were assassinated by the Israelis in 2004, Khaled Meshall, head of the organization’s political bureau (the deputy head of the political bureau is Mousa Abu Marzouq), took on an even greater leadership role within Hamas. Meshall has a long history with Hamas, as he relocated to Jordan in 1990 and headed up the group’s international fund-raising portfolio. He led what was known as Kuwaidia, or the Kuwaiti group, which played a prominent role within Hamas’s political bureau. In 1997, the Israelis conducted a failed assassination attempt against him.

  The Hamas organization lacks transparency in its structure, although it is well known that the group contains a majlis-e-shura (governing or consultative council) and a Politburo.82 Hamas boasts political and military wings led by both internal and external officials.83 Many of the group’s leaders hold advanced degrees in technical and professional fields and furthermore, “their ability to influence the opinion of lower ranking Hamas members appears to be fairly high.”84 One of these leaders is Ismael Haniyeh, a senior political leader of Hamas who was elected prime minister of Gaza following the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections. His position has been contested since June 2007, during the height of the Hamas-Fatah internecine conflict.

  Mohammed Deif is the commander of the Ezzedine al-Qassam Brigades since 2002. In reality, according to Levitt, “there is no meaningful distinction between the group’s political, social and terrorist leadership.”85 When speaking of how much autonomy Hamas cells have when it comes to conducting operations or striking targets of opportunity, Levitt relates the assessment of Israeli intelligence officials who believe that within Hamas, “there are no rogue operations, but cells do push the boundaries,” though Levitt’s own assessment is that it is not uncommon for Hamas cells to operate on their own, or at least independent from sister cells and some leaders.86

  Ideology

  As mentioned earlier in the chapter, Hamas has political and ideological linkages with the Muslim Brotherhood as well as “shared ideological roots” with both the Egyptian Islamic Group (al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya)87 and Egyptian Islamic Jihad,88 a group which once claimed Al-Qaida’s current leader Ayman al-Zawahiri among its members. Since its inception, Hamas has maintained a hard-line toward Israel while representing the rejectionist strand of Palestinian politics.

  Hamas focuses on the importance of traditional Islamic values and has called for the elimination of Israel and the establishment of an Islamic state in Palestine. It considers the c
onflict with Israel an existential struggle, rather than a mere dispute over borders.89 According to Meir Litvak, in the Hamas Charter of 1987, Hamas makes clear that its purpose is to elevate the concept of “Jihad of the Sword” into its efforts to mobilize Palestinians behind its politico-military efforts.90 The group, which blends Palestinian nationalism with religious ideology and believes that both offensive and defensive jihad are duties of Hamas fighters, does not reserve its scorn for Israel along. In April 2003, Rantissi published an article titled “Why Shouldn’t We Attack the United States?” to which be argued that striking the United States was a moral, national, and religious duty.91

  The group’s decision to sit for elections, always a controversial decision point for an insurgent or terrorist group was highly controversial. Organizing for elections costs money and in the eyes of some members, diverts precious resources from the overarching goal—attacking Israel. Many of the group’s leaders remain skeptical of the efficacy of diplomacy and the peace process.92 Still, there have been some benefits. Similar to the PIRA, Hamas has made gains from its intransigence at certain points throughout the conflict, painting negotiations as a fraud and arguing that only through violence (what the PIRA dubbed “armed struggle”) could Palestinian land be liberated. In 2015, Hamas has reached in a phase where both violence and political participation are part of its platform. This evolution could be regarded as a display of pragmatism.