Take for example Wang Yang-ming’s doctrine of innate knowledge of the good (liang-chih). From the point of view of its concrete meaning, the content of what is called innate knowledge is the same as feudal morality and nothing new. The fact is that feudal morality at his time had become a dogma and not very effective. Wang therefore provided feudal morality with a new foundation. According to him, feudal morality was not imposed from the outside but something evolved from man’s innate knowledge itself. . . .
Such a premise seems to advocate the emancipation of the individual, but the actual effect is that he is even more strongly bound by feudal morality. However, although this appraisal rests on a solid foundation, it concerns only one side of the matter, for aside from the concrete meaning of the premise, there is also its abstract meaning. . . . According to its abstract meaning, “Every one can become (sages) Yao and Shun,”9 “People filling the street were all sages,”10 and “All people are equal.”11 That is to say, in their original nature all men are equal. . . . From this point of view, the philosophy of the school of Lu Hsiang-shan (Lu Chiu-yüan, 1139-1193) and Wang should not be simply denied in its entirety, (pp. 273-277)
[Later Fung added:]
(1)--What we have to continue is essentially the materialistic thought in the history of Chinese philosophy, the type of thought that is for the people, scientific, and progressive. I did not particularly mention this because I thought it was a matter of course. That shows that I believed in continuing anything abstract, regardless of whether it was idealistic or materialistic.
(2)--According to my article, premises in the history of philosophy have both abstract and concrete meanings, as if they were arrayed in parallel before us, so that there seems to be a finished, concrete thing that we can take up and continue at any time without reconstructing it. . . .
(3)--In my second statement I substituted general and special meanings for abstract and concrete meanings. My defect indicated above still remains.
What I said in my article is incomplete and my presentation of the problem is also incorrect, (p. 284)
Yang Cheng-tien:
There are three points in Mr. Fung’s theory that are worth discussing:
(1)--Philosophy as a form of social consciousness surely has its own special characteristics in the development of thought and the process of continuation, but it also has a universal principle which is unalterable, namely, that of partisanship. Instead of focusing his attention on the continuation of the materialistic tradition and proceeding from an analysis of the concrete substance of philosophical theories, Mr. Fung set aside the opposition and struggle of the two major camps in the history of philosophy and generally started with philosophical premises, reduced the problem of continuing the philosophical heritage to that of understanding the meanings of those premises. He thereby eliminated the historical content and class characteristics of philosophical thought and unconsciously separated the history of philosophy from Marxism in both objective and scope.
(2)--Mr. Fung subjectively wishes to employ the Marxian method of thought to solve the problem of the continuation of philosophical heritage, but the fact is that his method and Marxism have nothing in common. When dialectical materialism is used as a weapon in methodology, its principles and categories are intensely and organically united as one and will not allow any split or isolation. “Content and form” is merely one of the many categories in the system of dialectical materialism. “Abstractness and concreteness” is also merely one form of expression of the “generality and particularity” of things. To exaggerate abstractness and concreteness or form and content to the point of absolute contrasts, and to think that this method and these categories apply to all and embrace all, and even to use them as the only standard in determining the value of philosophical heritage, is unreasonable according to formal logic. . . .
(3)--The process of historical development of Chinese philosophy itself shows that it is based on the principle of partisanship and the use [of the heritage] for reconstruction. In Chinese history the expression of the partisan spirit of philosophers has been extremely clear, although the expression was not necessarily completely conscious. For example, the T’ai-hsüan ching (Classic of the Supremely Profound Principle)12 written by Yang Hsiung (53 b.c.–a.d. 18), a materialist of the Han dynasty (206 b.c.–a.d. 220) was slandered and rejected by Liu Hsin (c.46 b.c.–a.d. 23), an idealistic thinker who was a representative of the benefits of the ruling class. . . . But in his Lun-heng (Balanced Inquiries) Wang Ch’ung (27–100 a.d.?) praised him. . . . These historical facts and their direction of the continuation of thought show that there were already opposite camps and it was not a matter of accident, (pp. 325-327)
3. Guidance for Future Developments
Hsiao Sha-fu:
Classical writers on Marxism have shown us in detail the principles and methods for the study and continuation of philosophical heritage. Moreover, they have set examples by practicing those principles and methods themselves and have produced norms and standards for us. The profound studies and classical criticism of European philosophy by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin are forever models in our study. The philosophical writings of comrade Mao Tse-tung and his comrades-in-arms especially are most glorious examples showing us how to continue our philosophical heritage and to unify Marxian philosophy and the Chinese people’s good traditions of thought. For example, to the problems of the relation between knowledge and conduct, the good or evil nature of man, of ethical ideals, of methods of cultivation and the like, about which inquiries and controversies have been carried on for a long time in the history of Chinese philosophy, they have given us the Marxian final conclusion and answer in such works as On Practice,13 [Liu Shao-ch’i’s] On the Cultivation of Communist Party Members,14 and other writings. In his “On Contradictions”15 Mao reconstructed and elaborated on the basis of the science of Marxian dialectics such dialectical ideas long discussed by [Chinese] philosophers throughout the ages as “When a thing reaches the limit in one direction, it will turn back to the other direction,”16 “Opposition leads to mutual completion,”17 and “If yin and yang do not exist, the one (the Great Ultimate) cannot be revealed. If the one cannot be revealed, then the function of the two forces will cease.”18 In this way he has enriched science of Marxian dialectics.
The direction given by the Party is the direction of our efforts and the compass for our work. (p. 436)
Ai Ssu-ch’i:
How do we understand the problem of philosophical heritage? I think we can use as reference Chairman Mao’s viewpoint in his On New Democracy concerning the continuation of cultural heritage. He pointed out that the attitude of Marxists-Leninists toward the cultural heritage of the past is to select its quintessence and to throw away its dregs.19 What is its quintessence? It is that part of the heritage that is democratic, scientific, and for the masses. What are the dregs? They are what is anti-democratic, anti-scientific, and anti-people or aristocratic. The culture we want to build up is that which is nationalistic, democratic, scientific, and for the masses. Therefore what we want to continue is that in the old culture which is democratic, scientific, and for the masses and we must throw away what is anti-democratic, anti-scientific, and anti-people. This should be the general attitude of Marxists-Leninists toward cultural heritage. This is a universal principle. In handling the history of Chinese philosophy we should also pay attention to this principle. . . . We must follow the principle enunciated by Chairman Mao. (p. 438)
▪ ▪ ▪--APPENDIX--▪ ▪ ▪
ON TRANSLATING CERTAIN CHINESE PHILOSOPHICAL TERMS
No two translators of Chinese terms will ever agree entirely on their translations. Since each Chinese character has several meanings, different emphases by different translators are inevitable. Some terms are so complicated in their meanings, like yin (dark, negative, passive, or female principle, force, or element) and its opposite, yang, that they have to be transliterated. Others call for interpretation rather than a literal tr
anslation. The title Ta-hsüeh chang-chü, for example, literally means punctuation and redivision of the Great Learning. But the work is actually a commentary containing some of Chu Hsi’s (1130-1200) most important sayings. Therefore “Commentary” tells a better story than a literal rendering. Again, i-shu means a transmitted work. But transmission suggests a line of transmission which is totally absent from the term, which simply denotes a work which we still have today. Therefore it should be rendered as “surviving work” or “preserved work.”
Some have to be translated variously. For example, wen means pattern, literature, signs, ornament, culture, and many more, and cannot be rendered in the same way. Likewise, tzu-jan means spontaneity, nature, to follow nature, etc. The word ch’ü generally means to take, but in Buddhism it means to cling to or to apprehend. Shu refers to number, truth, principle, the course of things, one’s lot, repeatedly, etc. None of these can be rendered consistently. It is because Duyvendak failed to appreciate the correct idea of shu in the Hsün Tzu that he considered Hu Shih’s translation of it as truth to be wrong.1
Without saying, in the choice of alternative renderings, one must choose the one intended by the writer or specific to the particular philosophical system. The title Ts’ui-yen, for example, can mean either “collected sayings” or “pure words.” While the former is more general, it is clear from the preface of the book that the latter is intended. Again, p’ing-teng ordinarily means equality, but in Buddhism it expresses a much more refined idea, namely, sameness and absence of differentiation. T’ung, of course, is the word for penetration, but in Buddhism it has the special meaning of being free und unrestricted.
In a number of cases, the translation is difficult and controversial. While personal choice is in order, there should be adequate reasons behind it. The following sets forth the reasons for my own choice which I hope are sufficient:
Chi, “subtle, incipient, activating force.” Graham expresses the sense of the term most correctly in the phrases “inward spring of movement” and “incipient movement not yet visible outside.”2 Both Bodde’s “motive force”3 and Carsun Chang’s “state of subtlety”4 are correct but incomplete. See above, ch. 28, comment on sec. 2, ch. 3.
Ch’i, “concrete thing.” This is a technical philosophical term that should not be understood in its popular meanings of an instrument, an implement, or a vessel, or be distorted to mean matter, substance, or material entity. Philosophically it means a concrete or definite object in contrast to Tao which has neither spatial restriction nor physical form. It also includes systems and institutions, or any thing or affair that has a concrete form.
Ch’i, “material force.” Every student of Chinese thought knows that ch’i as opposed to li (principle) means both energy and matter, a distinction not made in Chinese philosophy. Both “matter” and “ether” are inadequate. Dubs’ “matter-energy”5 is essentially sound but awkward and lacks an adjective form. Unless one prefers transliteration, “material force” seems to be the best. In many cases, especially before the Neo-Confucian doctrine of li developed, ch’i denotes the psychophysiological power associated with blood and breath. As such it is translated as “vital force” or “vital power,” and in the case of hao-jen chih ch’i as “strong, moving power.” Such are the cases in Mencius, 2A:2.
Chin-ssu, “reflections on things at hand.” The term chin-ssu refers to Analects, 19:6, in which Confucius said that what one thinks about should be matters near at hand, that is, matters of immediate application. Chin also refers to the self, as in Analects, 6:28, “To judge of others by what is near to ourselves.” Bruce incorrectly translated it as “modern thought”6 and he has been followed by others, such as Alfred Forke.7 In a footnote Bruce cited for his support a saying by Chu Hsi to the effect that his Chin-ssu lu (Records of Reflections on Things at Hand) contains sayings of recent people and is therefore more to the point. This saying is quoted in the Chu Tzu nien-p’u (Chronological Biography of Chu Hsi) in the beginning of ch. 2, pt. 1. But in this saying Chu Hsi was not explaining the title of the Chin-ssu lu but was characterizing its contents. Evidently Bruce misunderstood the saying. The meaning of the title is quite clear from the comments of Lü Tsu-ch’ien (1137-1181), co-compiler with Chu Hsi, in the same paragraph of the Nien-p’u.8 Waley’s “thinks for himself about what he has heard”9 is entirely unjustified. Likewise, Needham’s “systematic thought”10 is unsatisfactory. Carsun Chang’s “reflective thought”11 and Vincent Yu-chung Shih’s “intimate thinking”12 are interpretations. Legge’s “reflecting with selfapplication”13 expresses well the meaning of self-application but not the idea of nearness. I have struggled hard to choose from “thoughts for immediate application,” “reflections for immediate application,” and “reflections on things at hand,” but finally settled on the latter because it implies, at least, the idea of application also.
Ching, “seriousness.” In ancient Confucianism the word ching is often interchangeable with kung and means reverence but in Neo-Confucianism the two words are sharply different. As Ch’en Ch’un (1153-1217) has pointed out, kung has to do with one’s appearance and expression in respect for others while ching has to do with one’s effort; the former is external and the latter internal.14 The main difference is that reverence implies an object whereas ching is a state of mind. This seems to be similar to the Buddhist calmness of mind and has probably led Carsun Chang to translate it as “attentiveness” and “concentration,”15 and Graham to render it as “composure.”16 But the Neo-Confucianists emphasized making an effort in handling affairs, an effort not stressed by the Zen Buddhists. As Ch’en Ch’un said, in ancient Classics the word only denotes composure but the Neo-Confucianists stress making effort in handling affairs. Chai Ch’u’s “prudence” comes close to the Neo-Confucian meaning17 but Bruce’s translation of “seriousness” is the best.18
Chung-shu, “conscientiousness and altruism.” This is open to many possible translations but the central meaning must not be lost. As the Confucian pupil Tseng Tzu said, it is the one thread of the Confucian doctrine.19 In essence, chung means the full development of one’s originally good mind and shu means the extension of that mind to others. In other words, it is the Confucian golden rule, or jen (humanity), with chung referring to the self and shu referring to others. Any translation must involve these two aspects.20
Fa. The word fa covers a wide range of meanings, such as law, punishment, custom, duty, discipline, method, technique, and model, and has to be translated variously. In the Legalist School, it involves the three concepts of law, statecraft, and power. In Buddhism, it means Buddhism itself, the Law preached by the Buddha, Reality, Truth. As a philosophical term, however, it is the Chinese rendering of dharma, which means “that which is held to.” It connotes all things, with or without form, real or imaginary, the material or principle of an entity, something that holds onto its nature as a particular thing. In this connection it is a most difficult term to translate. The nearest English term to it is “element of existence,” taking unreal dharmas as having a negative existence. It is best left untranslated except when it means the Law of the Buddha.21
Hsiang, “character.” As a technical Buddhist term, hsiang (lakshaṇa in Sanskrit) is related to hsing (svabhāva, nature) as characteristic is to nature or phenomenon to noumenon, although in some connections, such as shih-hsiang (true state), it means nature itself. Essentially the self-nature is hsing whereas what can be described is hsiang. Of course in ordinary usage it means a sign, feature, appearance, form, etc.
Hsing-erh-shang, “what exists before physical form [and is therefore without it],” hsing-erh-hsia, “what exists after physical form [and is therefore with it].” These phrases first appeared in the Book of Changes, “Appended Remarks,” pt. 1, ch. 12.22 K’ung Yung-ta (574-648) said in his commentary, “Physical form is established according to the Way. Therefore there is first the Way and then physical form and the Way exists before physical form. . . . Physical form is in objects, not in th
e Way. As there is physical form, there can be objects and functions.” The relationship, then, is one of both sequence and attribute. Thus Legge’s and Duyvendak’s rendering of “antecedent” and “subsequent to the material form,” Wilhelm’s and Bodde’s “what is above form” and “what is within form,” Bruce’s “the corporeal” and “the incorporeal,” etc. are all correct only in one of these two aspects.23 Boodberg is correct in believing that erh has the meaning of transition, but it is not a verb as he suggested, and hsing-erh-shang does not mean, as he thought, “what is shaped and transcends.”24 Rather it means “what is without shape and transcends.” The meaning of sequence is important. Without it Chu Hsi’s discussion of the terms cannot be understood.25 In ordinary usage, however, hsing-erh-shang simply means before and hsing-erh-hsia simply means after. The Daikanwa jiten (Great Chinese-Japanese Dictionary) is correct in simply defining these phrases as “with form” and “without form.”26
Hsing-ming, “actuality and name.” The term is generally understood to mean the relation between name and actuality, which was a major topic of debate among ancient scholars. As Creel has pointed out, most translators have mistranslated hsing to mean punishment.27 It is interchangeable with HSING, meaning form or body.28 Creel maintains that hsing-ming means performance and title, especially in connection with the selection and appraisal of government officials, but he has not provided any etymological basis or any clear-cut collateral evidence to show that hsing means to perform. The most important passage bearing on the term HSING-ming is found in the Yin Wen Tzu, to which Creel has not referred. The book begins by saying, “The Great Way (Tao) has no HSING and what are called material objects have ming.” Here HSING clearly means form and ming means name, and cannot be understood as performance and title. Creel also does not accept the traditional equation of hsing-ming or HSING-ming with ming-shih (name and actuality), but the Yin Wen Tzu definitely says that name is to examine form29 also to examine shih (reality). Creel said that HSING (form or appearance) is opposed to shih (reality),30 evidently forgetting that HSING also means body. He does not accept the interchange of hsing with HSING and thinks that scholars and copyists have simply confused them.31 Where they are used interchangeably, as in the Han Fei Tzu, he arbitrarily chose the former to suit his thesis. In order to be consistent, he had to interpret hsing in the term hsing-cheng (government) in the Mo Tzu as a verb, to perform or to administer.32 This would destroy the parallelism in such sentences as “the wealth of the country, the size of the population, and the order of government,”33 and make the phrase wei (act) hsing-cheng to mean to do the administering of government, a most extraordinary construction in Chinese for which there is no parallel. A title is of course one of many kinds of names, and performance (what one has actually done) is one form of actuality. But hsing is not a verb and the ancient interchange of hsing and HSING and the common equation of hsing-ming with HSING-ming are not mistakes, as Creel maintains. Chu Hsi condemned strategists, calculators, and hsing-ming alike because they used tricks and were opportunists. Hsing-ming does not seem to fit the description of rulers who demanded performance according to titles.34 And Chu Hsi said they were based on Taoism rather than Legalism with which Creel has associated hsing-ming.35 Chu Hsi was of course thinking of Lao Tzu, ch. 36, where it is said, “In order to grasp, it is first necessary to give,” a technique used by strategists, calculators, and debaters alike and for which Confucianists have strongly condemned them as immoral.
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