Beaten Down By Blood

by Michele Bomford

  On 21 March 1918, General Erich Ludendorff, commander of the German armies, launched Operation Michael, the Kaiserschlacht or ‘Kaiser’s Battle’ which was meant to end the First World War. By 5 April, the Germans had advanced 40 miles from their fortified defensive positions — known to the Allies as the Hindenburg Line — to which they had withdrawn a year before. Hubert Gough’s British Fifth Army, which had borne the brunt of the main thrust, retreated in confusion and disorder, although some units and many individuals or small groups fought tenaciously and held their ground until the last possible moment, slowing the German juggernaut. As a consequence, from the first day, the offensive did not proceed as planned and objectives were not taken as intended.

  Reinforcements began to arrive to bolster the British forces and stem the tide. Among them, on 27 March, were the first of the Australians, Monash’s 3rd Division, for whom this was their first time ‘down on the Somme’.1 They were followed quickly by the 4th, 5th and 2nd divisions. The Australian divisions were committed separately, attached to British formations and interspersed with British and New Zealand units on a thinly held line from Hébuterne north of Albert to Hangard, south of Villers-Bretonneux, in front of the rail and communications centre of Amiens, a vital strategic point in the Franco-British logistic system.

  British historian Lyn Macdonald writes that the appearance of the Australians ‘had done wonders for the morale of the battle-worn troops’ and it was believed that they would hold their sections of the line strongly. Even here, in this dire situation, their laconic approach would become notorious. One British soldier, with whom they shared their food, recorded how they managed to acquire ‘a quantity of dainties’, including tea, sugar and ‘jars of delicious extract of malt, which they spread thick as treacle on their bread’. On another occasion, men from the 4th Division gave a ‘good feed’ to an old French couple who emerged, having hidden for days in the cellar of their ruined house near Dernancourt, when they realised the troops successfully defending their home were Australian.2

  The Western Front 1918.

  The Germans shelled Amiens with long-range guns but were never able to capture the city. In a last-ditch attempt to do so on 24 April, they took Villers-Bretonneux, whose surrounding high ground overlooked Amiens, only to have the Australians win it back again in a gallant action on that significant date, 25 April.

  On 26 March, the French General Ferdinand Foch was appointed to coordinate Allied strategy on the Western Front, an appointment which would have a significant impact on the future conduct of the war. Operation Michael, the key campaign of the German Spring Offensive, had petered out by 5 April, Ludendorff’s stretched and poorly supplied armies having failed to take their constantly changing and frequently blurred objectives and failing also to divide the French and British armies. On 9 April, Ludendorff turned his attention to the Lys sector further north, launching Operation Georgette in an attempt to break through and capture the channel ports. Again, he was thwarted, the 1st Australian Division playing a part in the defence of the critical strategic logistic centre of Hazebrouck.

  Germany’s last throw of the dice came in July, against the French on the Marne, and was equally unsuccessful. The whole complexion and momentum of the war was altered by the French operation — ordered by Foch — from 18 July to 3 August. Not only were the Germans prevented from taking their objectives, but the French freed 200 villages, captured 3330 machine-guns and 800 guns and mortars and took 29,000 prisoners. Despite enormous French casualties, the victory had important ramifications for Allied morale. Some historians regard this Second Battle of the Marne as so significant that they claim it as the critical turning point of the war.3

  Commander-in-Chief Sir Douglas Haig commented dramatically that the men of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) had had their ‘backs to the wall’ — but they did not break.4 Ludendorff’s flawed military method and operations, the tenacity of the resistance, the arrival of reserves — including the Australians — and the high morale of the British enabled them to weather the storm. Gary Sheffield believes that ‘in terms of sheer scale these battles rate as the greatest British defensive victories in history, for victories they were.’5

  From March to August 1918, the Germans launched no fewer than five offensives against the Allies. These fruitless operations eroded their manpower to such an extent that they lost the initiative and were never able to regain it. With the losses at Verdun and the Somme in 1916 and Third Ypres in 1917, the army had been drained of its best fighting troops and there was little hope of replenishment; it was no longer the formidable force it had been in 1916 and 1917. Ludendorff ’s mismanagement of this campaign ensured that Germany lost its window of opportunity to win the First World War.

  Having stemmed the flow, it was now time for the Allies to turn the tide. How this might be achieved was demonstrated in a small-scale operation designed by Lieutenant General John Monash, who had taken over from Sir William Birdwood as commander of the Australian Corps on 30 May 1918. The Battle of Hamel was fought on 4 July by around 5500 Australian troops and 1000 Americans. Its purpose was to eradicate the salient jutting into the Australian front, thereby straightening the line either side of the Somme River and preventing German observation of the Allied positions on both banks. This would improve the Australian position north of Villers-Bretonneux and in front of Amiens. Significantly, this meticulously planned set-piece battle used infantry, advancing under a creeping barrage, 326 field guns and howitzers and 302 heavy artillery pieces, with even more guns in support on the flanks, and tanks and aircraft working together in almost perfect synergy. It was all over in 93 minutes at a cost of around 1000 casualties.

  Hamel became the dress rehearsal for the much larger and more significant operation of 8–11 August. Known as the Battle of Amiens, British, Australian, Canadian and French troops advanced nine miles along a ten-mile front on the first day and took all their objectives. As at Hamel, the Germans were taken completely by surprise as all the elements comprising the Allied ‘weapons system’ were hurled against them in the haze of a foggy morning. While the Germans suffered a crushing military defeat, the ramifications of Amiens were much more far-reaching, completely demoralising Ludendorff for whom 8 August ‘was the black day of the German Army in the history of this war’.6 He now no longer believed that Germany could win the war and realised that the fight would have to end. In Sheffield’s words, Haig had achieved ‘the glittering prize: psychological dominance over the enemy commander’, making Amiens for this historian ‘a watershed battle, the turning point of the war’.7

  In what became known as the ‘Hundred Days’ from Amiens to the Armistice, Allied strategy, now coordinated by Foch, focused on maintaining constant pressure on the Germans in order to retain the initiative and throw them off balance. The thrust of the assault changed from sector to sector, the Germans withdrawing troops from one part of the line to strengthen resistance in another which was under attack, only to find that the Allies would then switch the point of attack and take the weakened position, thus advancing their line gradually and preventing the Germans establishing a firm defensive front.

  The great bend of the river.

  The piano tinkled behind them

  As the summer of 1918 slipped into autumn, Allied high command realised that only another eight or nine weeks of campaigning weather remained. On 20 August, the French attacked from the Aisne River to the Oise, driving the Germans back over seven miles in two days. By 28 August they had captured Noyon and the French First Army occupied the area from the north of that village to Rouy-le-Grand and along the western bank of the Somme to Epenancourt, about 4000 yards south of St Christ. The point of attack had been switched on 21 August, when the British Third Army launched an offensive north of the Ancre River and drove east to cut the Amiens–Arras railway line. Another switch on 22 August saw III Corps of the Fourth Army take Albert and the high ground beyond, straightening the Allied line. In yet another switch, the Third Army res
umed its attack in the direction of Bapaume on 23 August, the town finally occupied by the New Zealanders on 29 August.

  In conjunction with these operations, Rawlinson directed Monash to prepare an attack on the front of the Australian Corps, setting his own objectives. Planning began on 19 August, with the rested 1st Division to deliver the main thrust, supported by the British 32nd Division, now attached to the Australian Corps and also fresh, on its right to capture Herleville. The objective was the high ground east of the large valley running from that village, past Chuignes, to the Bray bend of the Somme River. The 3rd Division would capture Bray itself.

  The operation became known as the Battle of Chuignes and was fought on 23 August. It is a little-known action, but extremely important to any understanding of the context of the Battle of Mont St Quentin-Péronne, to be fought just a week later. Despite Monash’s assertion that plans, once made, should not be changed, the plan for Chuignes was changed twice, the second time on the eve of battle when Monash realised that the Australians would have to take the important feature of Froissy Beacon, a towering hill near the Somme Canal. Historian Peter Pedersen is puzzled by Monash’s failure to include this in the original plan, as he typically read the ground well, even if from a map rather than personal reconnaissance.8

  In other respects the battle, at least in its first phase, was a replica of Hamel. It was a set-piece action incorporating support from the air with 36 tanks to support the infantry as well as several older models to carry ammunition and supplies to the troops. Fifteen field artillery brigades would provide a tremendous opening barrage and the fire plan included smokescreens and creeping barrages. All three brigades of the 1st Division and units of the 32nd were involved, with the 14th Brigade in reserve. Infantry firepower was boosted by substantial numbers of Lewis guns and rifle grenades. Monash achieved complete surprise by leaving the 14th and 15th Brigades of the 5th Division in the line until just before zero hour — 4.45 am — even though they were not expected to participate in the attack.

  Once the infantry had taken the first objective, it exploited in two phases. The Australians were expecting resistance as the Germans had established a temporary defensive line along the position. However, the enemy believed its own propaganda which declared that the front was held by exhausted troops. Instead, the first class 21st Division found itself facing ‘great strong figures with dash and enterprise’ who did ‘not give the impression of a worn out division’.9 The fighting was heavy, particularly for Froissy Beacon, but the 1st Division carried all before it. At one stage a halt was called for 15 minutes in a wood, and a soldier from the 7th Battalion played a piano found in a hut in a glade. Its tinkling sounds followed the advancing infantry onto the plateau.10 Some men captured a German aid post where the two doctors then treated Australian wounded alongside their own. When the 11th Battalion came into the attack on Froissy Beacon, it suffered only two casualties.

  The attack was a complete success, exceeding even Monash’s expectations. Chuignes was captured and the Australians moved to within 400 yards of Cappy, which fell when the advance resumed on 26 August. The 3rd Division took Bray in the early morning of 24 August. Bean describes the battle as ‘one of the hardest blows ever struck by Australian troops’.11 On 23 August, at a cost of 1000 casualties, over 2000 prisoners were taken, representing 25% of the total for the British Third and Fourth armies on 23 August. The Germans also suffered heavy casualties as the Australians went in with their bayonets, ensuring ‘the slaughter of the enemy in the tangled valleys’.12 Two Victoria Crosses (VC) were won at Chuignes by Lieutenants William Joynt and Lawrence McCarthy.

  The greatest trophy of the battle was a 15-inch naval gun which had been used to bombard Amiens and was later presented to that city. It was considered too costly to bring back to Australia after it was ‘blown into many hundreds of fragments’ late in September.13 In its intact state it created much interest among the troops — following Mont St Quentin-Péronne, Cleve Potter of the 21st Battalion went across from Cappy to see it and declared it ‘one of the most wonderful bits of machinery I have ever seen.’14

  The Battle of Chuignes was part of the wider Allied advance which provided the catalyst for the Battle of Mont St Quentin-Péronne. To continue the momentum of the advance, on 26 August the British First Army, spearheaded by the Canadian Corps, launched an offensive at Arras, recapturing all the ground along the south bank of the Scarpe River that had been lost during Operation Michael. The offensive brought the Canadians face-to-face with the imposing defences of the Hindenburg Line.

  In ten days of fighting from 20 to 30 August, the Allies advanced over seven miles on a 70-mile frontage, forcing the Germans to withdraw behind the ‘line of the Somme’. This line was formed by the part of the river upstream (south) from Péronne and then continued north through the wide and deep, but incomplete and in parts dry, Canal du Nord. Both the river and canal were military obstacles which, with the high ground to the east of them, could prevent further Allied progress if the Germans managed to use them to establish strong defensive positions.15 From the German perspective, this was their ‘winter line’ and Ludendorff ordered that it be held at all costs.

  After 23 August, the Germans in front of the Australian Corps abandoned any hope of retaining the country west of the Somme, most of which (from Chuignes east) comprised the devastated battlefields of 1916 and 1917, and were forced ‘precipitately’ to evacuate ‘the great bend of the river’. Monash felt that if his corps had to ‘mark time’ as directed by Haig and Rawlinson on 25 August, the advantages gained by Chuignes would be lost and the Germans would be provided an opportunity to form a strong defensive line on the eastern bank of the Somme, allowing them to stabilise their front, halt the Allied advance and better prepare the Hindenburg Line defences some 12 miles to the rear. They could then play for time and force the Allies to fight hard to take these positions, increasing casualties and dragging out the war.

  It was thus essential to retain the initiative already seized by pursuing the Germans aggressively and relentlessly, maintaining contact and destroying their fighting capability as they were continually forced to withdraw. This underpinned Allied strategy and, consistent with this, Monash, believing that his force still retained a ‘reserve of striking power’ and a duty to keep touch with the enemy, first conceived the idea for the capture of Mont St Quentin and Péronne that, along with the advances further north, would leave the Germans no option but to withdraw to the Hindenburg Line.16 It was this strategy that would bring the war to a successful conclusion for the Allies in 1918.

  A patrol from the 9th Battalion searching dugouts near Cappy, 25 August 1918. The Germans had been seen here just minutes before. (AWM EO2992)

  CHAPTER 2:

  INVINCIBLE CITY

  From early times, Mont St Quentin and Péronne had been inextricably linked, regarded as one and the same place — the Mont des Cygnes, or Mount of Swans. Gradually this term came to refer to just the Mont, while the town, as it grew, became known as Cygnopolis, the City of Swans. Certainly there may have been swans on the river earlier in the city’s history — as there are today — but it is also difficult to escape the ancient symbolism that this bird represented: loyalty, faith, persistence, an ability to change and transform, a ‘heroic’ heart and soul, a sense of ‘spirit’. These features characterised the city and its inhabitants and, viewed against the backdrop of the area’s long history, elicit some understanding of the impact of the war on the French people of this area. This adds yet another dimension to the story of the Battle of Mont St Quentin-Péronne in 1918.

  Péronne was no stranger to war and destruction. It was regarded as an important military position from at least the 8th century, with the first ramparts constructed around the city in the 9th century, perhaps in response to the rampaging fury of the Normans.

  By the early 16th century the decidedly French province of Picardy had been created. It formed the French frontier with the Holy Roman Empire and was,
in David Potter’s words, ‘the kingdom’s first line of defence’, playing an ‘increasingly central role in military strategy’. Consequently, the province was ‘the most consistently fought over region of France’, with the triangle between Amiens, Péronne and Arras the most frequently devastated by scorched earth policies. Péronne was important as a French border fortress and it supported a strong military garrison. Cultivation was often seriously disrupted and landowners suffered heavy losses. The Somme crossings were as important at this time as they were to become in the Great War.

  The government of Péronne controlled, politically and culturally, a wide area, with 426 parishes falling under its jurisdiction. Despite years when harvests were poor and plague threatened, the city embarked on a substantial building program. The church of Saint-Jean which features, in a ruined state, on so many First World War postcards and in a number of photographs, was built at this time. The Town Hall was also built in the first half of the 16th century. Economically, Péronne had become the market for the grain grown in the region and was an important trading centre.1

  The siege of Péronne in 1536 was undoubtedly one of the most significant events in the city’s history. The armies of the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V surrounded Péronne with two siege engines and 16 cannons in an attempt to knock out the windmills which powered industry in the city and also to capture the castle. They launched relentless assaults on the city, but were forced back time and time again. Marie Fourré showed the spirit of the women of Péronne by pushing an assaulting Spaniard from the ramparts. In one four-hour period, 1500 cannonballs smashed the walls of the biggest tower between the castle and the Bretagne gate and, following the end of the siege, the fortifications had to be rebuilt. Over 1600 Imperial soldiers ‘died under the steel and the fire of the besieged’. Francis I, the French king, praised the people of Péronne for their bravery and the magnificent defence of the city, which held out against the Imperial army. He granted the city the motto Urbs Nescia Vinci — the invincible city — and so the siege passed into legend.2