The Walls Have Ears

by Helen Fry

  In this period, Trent Park dealt with survivors from nine U-boats:48 U-651, U-138, U-556, U-570, U-501, U-111, U-95, U-433 and U-574. The volume of intelligence was extensive; it included information on the movements and exploits of the U-boat fleets, with prisoner estimates of U-boats in operation varying from twenty-five to fifty. As the Admiralty tried to gauge an accurate number, references were made to various U-boats that had been sunk by Britain. A former wireless transmissions operator said that sixty U-boats had been lost. MI9 considered his conversations to be reliable because he had been passing messages between Kondors and U-boats and was considered well-informed. Another U-boat prisoner captured on 27 August 1941 revealed that Germany had forty U-boats in operation with another twenty undergoing repair. He placed the total number of U-boats at 200, with the vast majority being used for training purposes.49

  The secret operators overheard a new development revealing that Italian submarines, stationed at their base at Bordeaux in the south of France, were to be replaced by German U-boats. This enabled the Admiralty to track the whereabouts and movement of U-boats. It was also said that new U-boat pens were being built at Lorient and St Nazaire.50 Confirmation of these bases could only come from prisoners’ conversations because the bases were so well hidden that they could not be seen from aerial photography by RAF reconnaissance missions. The bugged conversations therefore identified clearly where these sites were so the RAF could bomb them with greater precision. Indiscriminate bombing of such sites was not only a costly waste of resources, but carried the risk of the air crew being shot down in enemy territory or killed.

  By the end of 1941, it was known from conversations that Germany had U-boat bases in Italy and a U-boat flotilla in Greece. A construction company in Hamburg was turning out one new U-boat a week, each fitted with new wireless-controlled torpedoes.51 Large and medium tonnage mine-laying U-boats were in production as well as small U-boats, similar to E-boats. The Admiralty was particularly eager to understand how U-boats were refuelling without returning to their base. Prisoner conversations revealed that German ships were supplying underwater and surface raiders with food, munitions and fuel.

  Towards the end of 1941, the prisoners talked about a German merchant ship moored at Vigo on the north-western coast of Spain, to which U-boats could fasten at night and take on fuel and other supplies. This seemingly trivial piece of intelligence was important for the Allies because it provided knowledge of how Germany was refuelling its U-boats when they were on active missions far from their main base.

  A prisoner who had once served on Raider 16 provided details of tactics and armament of German raiders which operated from a base on the island of Kerguelen in the Antartic. A captain of a German supply vessel spoke about raiders located in the vicinity of Panama in the south Atlantic. From this information, the Admiralty was able to focus on areas off the coast of South America. A surviving wireless operator from the Pinguin, the most successful German commercial raider of the war, known as Raider F at the Admiralty, talked at great length with his cellmate about German naval wireless transmissions and codes.

  AIR INTELLIGENCE

  New information emerged from the crew of a Kondor (naval patrol vessel) about the re-training of Luftwaffe pilots for attacks by aircraft with torpedoes. Other prisoners discussed how Germany was having difficulty attacking Atlantic convoys because of protection by British aircraft, the use of the balloon barrages and improved anti-aircraft barrages. British intelligence learned from their captives that Germany had suffered substantial air force losses on the Eastern Front, usually as a result of low-level flying attacks. By the end of the year, German aircraft losses were so heavy that their planes were withdrawn from action on the Eastern Front. The urgent question now was to establish how and where Germany would redeploy their remaining aircraft – would there be another Battle of Britain in the skies over England?

  German air force prisoners at this period, although relatively small in number at a total of ninety-seven, were from specialised units such as the Kondor, night fighter and torpedo and mine-laying units.52 They gave away details of operational flight areas over Britain, and how the airspace over the country was divided between various German night fighter patrols. This enabled the Air Ministry to understand the Luftwaffe’s fighting strategy, find ways to counter it and prepare to defend that area. One prisoner gave away the code used for German W/T communications between the night fighter aircraft and the home station, thus enabling Britain to decode those messages and pre-empt Germany’s attacks. He also revealed how British W/T messages had been intercepted53 thus alerting the Air Ministry to the fact that Germany was able to decode some of its messages and the codes needed to be changed. German pilots who had flown in operations over the Eastern Front spoke about a small anti-personnel bomb used in low-level attacks, and some conversations also described another bomb, fitted with a photo-electric cell to correct deviations from the desired target during its fall.

  Bugged conversations showed that losses sustained by the German air force had begun to affect morale amongst pilots. They realised the difficulties in attacking Allied shipping and complained to each other that air attacks on Britain were now ‘tantamount to a death sentence’. But the majority of naval prisoners continued to show an absolute loyalty to Hitler. Even the defeat of German troops in Russia did not dampen their spirits, although they now expressed doubt whether Germany could win the war solely by an Atlantic blockade. Such a shift in opinion showed that Germany was probably not yet in a position to gain naval supremacy. Altogether, at this time prisoners’ comments gave a significant indication to British intelligence that Germany was losing its grip on any chance of air and naval supremacy.

  CONCENTRATION CAMPS

  Since its inception, the M Room had picked up periodic references to the Nazi concentration camps and egregious crimes against humanity.54 One important testimony came in 1941 from a ‘turned’ prisoner whom MI9 used as a stool-pigeon, soliciting comments from fellow prisoners in the cells. His name has never been disclosed, but he was a survivor of Belsen concentration camp where he had been incarcerated for his political views.55 It was from him in 1941 that MI9 got some of its first-hand, eye-witness accounts. Germany was experiencing a shortage of good mechanics and so, although an inmate, he had been taken on as a member of staff to carry out repairs to the commandant’s house. He was finally released and conscripted into the German forces, then captured by the British.

  Naval interrogator Donald Welbourn wrote of this prisoner in his unpublished memoirs:

  He was the first person to tell us about the Beast of Belsen, and of the lampshades made from tattooed human skin. The Foreign Office did not want to believe our reports. All this information came out very quickly, together with the fact that this prisoner wanted to do everything in his power to make sure that the Nazis did not win the war.56

  At the Wannsee Conference the following January, Hitler and leading members of the Third Reich ratified the Final Solution to escalate the programme of annihilating Europe’s Jews. In late December 1941, the secret listeners had recorded a conversation between a German infantry soldier and an artillery soldier about Bergen Belsen concentration camp. These prisoners had been captured in Operation Archery, the British Combined Operations raid on the Norwegian island of Vågsøy.

  The infantry solider, codenamed MI19, told M130: ‘There’s a POW camp near Hameln. I should say that, without exaggeration, there were at least fifty thousand POWs there – what a camp!’ M130 replied:

  ‘At Bergen?’

  ‘Yes, Bergen in Germany, near Fallingbostel … You wouldn’t believe what the camp was like! There was a high barbed wire fence, then the ground sloped down, and then there was another fence which was 2 metres high; there was one 1.25 metres high, and then another 1.5 metres high. They were all 1.5 to 3 metres and the spaces between them were filled with coils of barbed wire so nobody could get through. At each corner there was quite a high tower with machine guns and huge
searchlights on all sides … the ones in Bergen can move about freely. There were a few sentries marching around the camp – it was a poor sort of camp.’

  The subject of war crimes was raised in Kendrick’s six-monthly survey at the end of 1941 where he wrote: ‘A few prisoners have had some experience of, or heard about, the situation in Poland. Several spoke of crimes committed against the Poles.’57 Intelligence officer and secret listener, Jan Weber, recalled:

  I remember listening to two fighter pilots, both sons of senior Luftwaffe commanders. One, [Hubert] von Greim, told his cellmate of an experience when he was going on leave from the Eastern Front. He spent a night with an extermination unit who invited him to watch the killing of Jews the following morning. His comment: ‘it was unpleasant’.58

  References to concentration camps would become more detailed within a year, and in 1942, would include an eye-witness account of the Warsaw Ghetto.59

  WOMEN AND INTELLIGENCE AT TRENT PARK

  At this stage of the war, there was only a handful of ATS women trying to cope with the volume of intelligence reports, typing up the recordings of bugged conversations. That would soon improve when Kendrick organised an increase in the complement of female ATS officers at his sites. On 22 January 1942, Catherine Townshend (whose later married name was Jestin) was asked to report to the War Office. She was a gifted linguist who was serving in the FANYs, the female auxiliary volunteer Corps, and had had roles as a batman, orderly and staff car driver. At the Metropole Building, Major John Back of MI9 impressed on her the need for strict security and ‘I was told to proceed next day by underground train from my home in South Kensington to Cockfosters station; a car would meet me at the appointed time to take me to a most secret intelligence installation.’60 Catherine was given a brief outline of her future duties. She wrote to her mother: ‘I wish I could tell you about my work. I can only say that it sounds exciting and interesting.’ She went on to write:

  In sombre mood, I commuted every day by underground to Cockfosters as instructed … I was met by car and driven to Trent Park. I was advised at once under the Official Secrets Act never to divulge our location or talk about our work.61

  Her first day at Trent Park was noted in a brief diary entry of 23 January: ‘First day at Cockfosters Camp, Barnet. Interview with Col. Kendrick. Signing papers. Seems most interesting work.’62

  Townshend’s work gave her an insight into just how much value enemy POWs were to the interrogators:

  Each prisoner was questioned at length on German strategy, Hitler’s domination of almost all of Europe, and the possible invasion of the British Isles. More important were subjects such as radar, scientific research, codes, spies, and troop movements. POWs were not maltreated, but were comfortably housed and fed according to rank. Tiny microphones were hidden in inconspicuous places where every word could be heard.63

  She went on to write:

  J.F. Doust at the Post Office Research Department developed tiny and sensitive microphones; he was far ahead of the Germans in this field of engineering. Soldiers in every army were warned that if captured they must beware of microphones in prison cells, but Doust’s inventions were seldom, if ever, discovered by the enemy. On one occasion, after an extensive examination of the walls, floor and furniture of his room at Trent Park, a senior prisoner was heard to say to his cellmate: ‘There are no microphones here.’ But for safety’s sake the two men decided that they could converse more freely if they leant far out of the window. Little did they suspect that in addition to a minute microphone attached to the ceiling light fixture, another was hidden in the outside wall beneath the window sill, and that their faintest whispers, even in the open air, were being recorded for subsequent typing and distribution to all branches of Intelligence.64

  Townshend’s typing proved far too slow for interrogator Marsh, so she was moved across to the map room at Trent Park where she was responsible for ‘charting the enemy’s army divisions on land and his ships at sea.’65 Her work led to the day-to-day plotting of key German battleships, the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau, and in March 1942, she would plot the British Commando raid at St Nazaire. Her privately published memoirs also provide a unique snapshot into life for the female staff:

  During our lunch hour, on fine spring days, six of us women walked across the fields of daffodils to a rifle range in the park where a corporal guardsman taught us how to shoot … We were amused to see, when censoring a prisoner’s letter to his headquarters in Berlin, that he had observed us from his window and written: ‘Churchill is training women to fight’.66

  Working in key administrative and organisational roles were Dawn Rockingham-Gill (later Mrs Doble), and J/Commander Elizabeth Angas who spoke French and German. Angas went on to serve most of the war with CSDIC Mediterranean, gaining some knowledge of the situation in Greece.67 Captain L. Landsberg had knowledge of German and Afrikaans, and carried out the translation of X reports (bugged conversations). She was responsible for the whole of the main Italian series of transcripts coming out of the CSDIC posts in the Mediterranean.68 J/Commander K.H. Phillips was at ease with French, German and Portuguese, had excellent secretarial qualifications, and became personal assistant to the commander in chief of CSDIC Mediterranean. She ‘knew the work of CSDIC thoroughly’.69

  WAAF officer, Elizabeth Bruegger (née Rees-Mogg) worked in Air Intelligence as Felkin’s assistant.70 Her role was to categorise the intelligence coming out of the M Room and decide who needed to see it. It was a hugely responsible job, and any failure to send it to the right commanders or branches of military intelligence could have real consequences. It required a wide understanding of what was significant, especially the technological material, and sound judgement. She was one of the few women who were privy to such an array of top secret intelligence material. Important figures came from Bletchley Park for regular meetings, one of whom was a liaison officer called Hans Vischer.71 Bruegger confirmed that the sharing of classified intelligence between CSDIC and Bletchley only occurred at the highest level. She also recalled clandestine wartime missions involving courageous men of the Dutch Resistance Movement who risked their lives to row the English Channel at night bearing crucial information about German battle positions and military manoeuvres.

  ‘Their reports were brought post-haste by bikers and couriers to Kendrick’s centre and used by MI9,’ she said.72 On a few occasions, a dispatch rider took a report straight to Churchill.73

  NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

  During the first six months of 1942, Trent Park dealt with a total of 122 POWs from 6 U-boats and 2 E-boats, including prisoners taken during the raids by the Small-scale Raiding Forces into parts of Norway. The intelligence gained from these particular prisoners provided details on the German Order of Battle and new naval construction work.74 It came from prisoners taken during the Vågsøy Raid on German positions in Norway on 27 December 1941 and a second raid on the Lofoten islands in January 1942.75 Twenty-six German army prisoners were taken during the Vågsøy Raid and two from the Bruneval Raid in northern France in February 1942.76 In this same period, the number of German air force personnel totalled twenty-seven, some of whom had also been captured in the Bruneval Raid. With the exception of two officers, they were all ordinary ranks. Although the number of POWs could be deemed relatively small, the secret listeners generated 936 reports from them.77 Such a volume of bugged conversations is unusual in that (apart from the German generals later) so many transcripts were not usually generated pro rata. The intelligence gleaned from these particular bugged conversations, and its significance, is outlined below.

  The secret listeners picked up details that the new German battleship Tirpitz was ready for action and that damage had been successfully inflicted by the Allies on warships Gneisenau, Scharnhorst and Prinz Eugen. The most detailed reports in the first months of 1942 came from E-boat crews speaking about German ships under construction, especially a new kind of E-boat that could travel half-submerged; information also came forth on the
operations of E-boats in the Channel, Baltic and Mediterranean. E-boat tactics in torpedo attacks and mine-laying were also described. British intelligence learned that new E-boat shelters were being built at St Nazaire and other French ports. Other prisoners spoke about the difficulties of recruiting new officers to serve on U-boats, largely due to conditions in the German navy. They spoke about a major new programme of U-boat construction at a number of locations in Germany. Some sites were already known, others were new.

  Prisoners claimed that U-boats were being constructed at Blohm & Voss, Hamburg, at a rate of three a fortnight. Other places of construction included the ports of Danzig, Kiel, Wilhelmshaven, Rostock, Lübeck and Flensburg.78 The concern for Allied commanders was whether Germany’s new construction programme was keeping up with U-boat losses which would only intensify the Battle of the Atlantic. Through the Special Reports, British intelligence gained knowledge of the extent of U-boat losses which the Admiralty could not otherwise have obtained. Losses were placed at as many as forty-seven by one prisoner and sixty-five by another.

  An overall picture of U-boat tactics and areas of operation in the Arctic, Azores and the Mediterranean was emerging, as well as how U-boats were being restocked with new supplies from a German supply ship based at Vigo.79 The most significant strategic discovery came from details of a major change in U-boat tactics. It was revealed that the protection of British convoys had become so highly successful that U-boat crews were undergoing a period of re-training in preparation for mass attacks.80 Without the bugging operation, the British navy would have been less prepared for the new ‘wolfpacks’ whereby Germany planned to attack British supply convoys with between twenty and thirty U-boats en masse.