Randal Marlin

by Propaganda

  You either swallow the ideology whole, or you ignore piecemeal attempts to criticize

  the system because the terms of criticism do not mesh with its ideologically loaded

  terms. Talking an economist’s language, with its tacit translation of words such as “bet-

  ter” or “beneficial” into “richer” or “greater prosperity,” etc., makes it difficult to figure in such things as cultural identity, integrity, social conscience, equality, etc.

  Truth in the largest sense, Habermas thinks, will be linked with the intention to

  promote the good and true life. If we want to evaluate the truth of an utterance in this

  largest sense, we must make sure that all types of validity claims are satisfied. Instead of

  the notion of the simple truth, of correspondence between what is said about the way

  things are and the way things are in fact, he prefers to talk about discursive justification.

  Truth should be seen as “warranted assertability,” meaning that when we enter into a

  discourse at all times and in any place a consensus can be realized under conditions that

  identify it as a justified consensus. Therefore, we should pay attention to such things as

  whether relevant voices are being heard or whether constraints are placed on the speech

  situation so that only one particular viewpoint gets adequately expressed. Ideally, every-

  one should have the same chance to criticize and question, and there should be unlim-

  ited discussion free from any constraints of domination. Without that, truth claims are

  not fully legitimate, because they have not been adequately tested before potentially

  contrary observations. On Habermas’s view, “truth” cannot be analyzed independently

  CHAPTER 4: ETHICS AnD PRoPAgAnDA 167

  BV-Propaganda-Interior-04.indd 167

  9/5/13 4:52 PM

  of “freedom” and “justice.” He does not say that a speech act is true only under these circumstances, but the ideal speech situation should be treated as a critical standard against

  which every actually realized consensus can be called into question and tested.

  Habermas’s view brings out what appears morally objectionable about many

  forms of propaganda. Propaganda is often felt to be a constraint. In virtually all forms

  there is no genuine dialogue. Typically, the slogans of the propagandist are ubiqui-

  tous. Symbols, pictures, and the like insinuate without necessarily stating. These com-

  munications are very far from the ideal speech situation. The propagandist’s message

  lacks some important conditions for warranted assertability. Habermas’s theory is

  well-suited to furthering democracy, because it ultimately favours development of

  autonomy for everybody.

  However, familiar Platonic objections can be raised. Truth about how to pilot a

  ship may need to be acted upon by a knowledgeable captain before a consensus can

  be expected to be achieved among an ignorant crew. With scientific knowledge, the

  truth may lie for a time with an expert few, rather than with the untutored many. A

  view presented under conditions of constraint on the audience may still be true, even

  though the mode of presentation (perhaps involving unwillingness to give equal time

  to popular and accepted theories, for example) might discredit the communicator in

  the light of Habermas’s test for legitimacy. A view might still be true, even though held

  illegitimately according to the test.

  Thus, there may be situations where one might reasonably require constraints on

  free expression, although acceptance of this fact could open the door to great abuses.

  Take, for example, the illegal pursuit of war against another country. Discussion might

  be silenced on the ground that the country is now at war, prejudging in that way the

  whole question of whether the country should be at war, a question very worthy of

  debate. Habermas provides us with a valuable linkage between the public discourse of

  governing officials and the question of the legitimacy of such government, assessed in

  the light of the transparency or opaqueness of their discourse and of the opportunity

  for rebuttal.

  Richard Whately

  As the author of numerous editions of books on logic and rhetoric early in the nine-

  teenth century, Richard Whately made important contributions to the ethics of rhet-

  oric, notably concerning influences on the emotions.60 He recognizes that in most

  people’s minds the appeal to emotions is considered a dishonest device to manipulate

  them into accepting what they would not accept by reason alone. However, like David

  Hume, Whately takes the view that reason alone does not provide the galvanizing

  force to get people to act. The intellectual recognition that some acts need to be car-

  ried out is not the same as a strong impetus to carry them out, any more than the

  conviction of a man blind from birth that a given coat is of a certain colour gives him

  168 PROPAGANDA AND THE ETHICS OF PERSUASION

  BV-Propaganda-Interior-04.indd 168

  9/5/13 4:52 PM

  the experience of that colour. You need emotions to persuade people to do things.

  Granted, orators do sometimes influence the will with improper appeals, but they

  also can misuse reason that way. Whately says it seems “commonly taken for granted

  that whenever the feelings are excited they are of course over-excited.” But, he says, the

  reverse is at least as often the case. That is, people are often dispassionate and disinter-

  ested when they should be moved to action:

  The more generous feelings, such as Compassion, Gratitude, Devotion, nay, even

  rational and rightly directed Self-Love, Hope, and Fear, are oftener defective than

  excessive; and that, even in the estimation of the parties themselves, if they are well-

  principled, judicious, reflective, and candid men.

  He is surely right in his claim that appeals to emotions are not necessarily wrong

  and may well be justified in a majority of cases. Along the way, he provides useful

  insights into the question of how to influence the emotions. The peculiar thing about

  the emotions is that they are not under our direct control. We cannot suddenly feel

  angry or fearful at will, any more than we can successfully will our hearts directly to

  beat faster. But we can control our emotions indirectly. If we want to make our hearts

  beat faster, we can climb stairs or run. Likewise, if we want to feel angry, we can think

  about some conspicuous injustices or stupidities resulting in the deaths of worthy

  individuals, perhaps from unnecessary contamination of the water supply. If we want

  to feel calm and benevolent, we might reflect on the lives of people who have borne

  suffering and injustice heroically, such as many of the saints. In Whately’s words:

  So again, if a man of sense wishes to al ay in himself any emotion, that of resentment

  for instance, though it is not under the direct control of the Will, he deliberately

  sets himself to reflect on the softening circumstances; such as the provocations the

  other party may suppose himself to have received; perhaps, his ignorance, or weak-

  ness, or disordered state of health:—he endeavours to imagine himself in the place

  of the offending party;—and above all, if he is a sincere Christian, he meditates on

  the parable of the debtor who, after having been himself forgiven, claimed payment

  with rigid seve
rity from his fellow-servant; and on other similar lessons of scripture.

  Whately understood well, with Quintilian, that people’s emotions can be stirred

  not just by exhortation but also by descriptions. It is one thing to say someone was

  wounded, but it is much more moving to describe the wound in detail. In today’s world,

  we recognize that television pictures of starving children can be much more moving

  than the mere statement that so many children have been affected by a famine. Does

  it follow that use of graphic television images of suffering victims is justified, assuming

  their consent is obtained? Stated in such simple terms, the answer would seem to be

  yes. But the assumption that moneys raised through these images will be applied in an

  CHAPTER 4: ETHICS AnD PRoPAgAnDA 169

  BV-Propaganda-Interior-04.indd 169

  9/5/13 4:52 PM

  effective way to counteract starvation may need to be questioned. A corrupt distribution system or one that deprives indigenous food producers of their livelihood may not

  bring effective, long-term relief. Furthermore, people may become hardened by too

  much depiction of misery to the point where they cease to be moved, and they switch

  channels. The worthiness and urgency of the cause, the efficiency in delivering real relief

  so that money raised reaches its target as distinct from paying for the overhead—all

  these considerations factor into determining what would be a reasonable degree of

  emotional or other propagandistic means for influencing audiences.

  Having granted that appeal to emotions can be justified, Whately nevertheless

  identifies an important ethical problem connected with emotional appeals: people

  resent the implication that they are in some way so morally deficient that they need

  to have such things as feelings of compassion aroused. Even if a person admits that he

  or she is in need of some moral awakening, there is likely to be some negative feeling

  toward the orator: “The mind is sure to revolt from the humiliation of being thus

  moulded and fashioned, in respect to its feelings, at the pleasure of another; and is apt,

  perversely, to resist the influence of such a discipline.” Of course, if the orator is trying to instill unsuitable motives for the benefit of a special interest, the resentment will be

  much greater. In any case, in both these situations, Whately claims that appeals to the

  emotions should not be identified plainly as such:

  The first and most important point to be observed in every address to any Passion,

  Sentiment, Feeling, etc. is ... that it should not be introduced as such, and plainly

  avowed; otherwise the effect will be, in great measure, if not entirely, lost.

  The ethical problem that presents itself is the apparent necessity for some lack of

  candour. There is arguably something wrong with a method of persuasion that cannot

  pass the test of publicity. Or can it? If Whately is right, we might indeed recognize

  our propensity to feel resentment at having our emotions under the sway of the orator,

  even though we agree the job of influencing us needs to be done. If that is so, we might

  give our moral assent in theory to this lack of candour, even though we might still feel resistance in an actual case in which we are the targets of the emotion-rousing acts. In

  that way, the publicity test would be satisfied on a theoretical basis. In sum, we could

  concur with the orator dissimulating about what he or she is doing when influencing

  our emotions is involved. That we should feel resentment when we find out about the

  dissimulation does not morally invalidate it, any more than resentment against getting

  a ticket for speeding nullifies our judgment that it is right for the traffic cop to give

  it to us. It has to be emphasized, though, that we are talking about the case where the

  emotion is rightly called forth. If our emotions are manipulated for the special inter-

  ests of the orator, of which we don’t approve, we have good reason to object moral y

  to the methods used.

  170 PROPAGANDA AND THE ETHICS OF PERSUASION

  BV-Propaganda-Interior-04.indd 170

  9/5/13 4:52 PM

  Party Feeling

  Before leaving Whately, it is worth taking into account some very commendable and

  pertinent remarks he makes about civilized discourse in connection with what he calls

  “party feeling.”61 By this he means the tendency to identify strongly with a group—

  whether by religion, nation, family, political leanings, or whatever. It exists when

  there is an “us versus them” mentality. At the time he wrote, religion was the cause of

  acrimonious division, but the same remarks are applicable to political, linguistic, and

  ethnic loyalties today.

  Whately observes that party feeling—the kind of feeling that we encourage with

  political ral ies, national celebrations, sports, school teams, and the like—is bound up

  with our nature and makes important things such as government possible, but it has

  also been the cause of the “most gigantic wars.” (Whately was writing in 1822 following

  the Napoleonic War, but this is no less true about the two twentieth-century world

  wars.) It is necessary to come to terms with this feeling, he says. Carried to extremes,

  it makes people lose their sense of proportion. What starts as a verbal, symbolic, or

  political action as a means to some legitimate goal can come to take precedence over

  the ends sought. Those engaged in the battle may come to prefer the power, the leader-

  ship, and the glory to finding acceptable solutions. This can lead to disaster.

  Whately condemns not party feeling as such but excess of it. He identifies four

  causes leading to this excess: the desire of taking the lead; the desire for some excite-

  ment or novelty; love of disputation; and pride, or what we might now call ego-

  gratification, bound up with triumph over an opponent. We can see these destructive

  forces at work not so long ago, such as in some of the triumphal sectarian marches that

  have taken place in Northern Ireland. The advice he gives to combat these generators

  of violence is intended to get people thinking about their own conduct, not to give

  them additional means for finding fault with others. However, peace-lovers might

  profitably encourage their political and other leaders to abide by these maxims.

  1. Regarding Ourselves. We should beware of mistaking what anyone means and imput-

  ing to our opponents feelings that they do not really entertain. We should make due

  allowance for the intellectual failings opponents may have and the likelihood they

  might make inaccurate statements unintentionally and without necessarily being

  malevolent. We should not jump to the conclusion that those who differ from us

  merely in temperament and outlook are for that reason immoral.

  2. Regarding Others. We must be prepared to find our opponents liable to the same

  faults as ourselves, including bitterness. We should counteract, or at least avoid pro-

  moting, those faults. As a practical matter, we should guard against putting our case

  too simplistically in a way easily rebutted. We should avoid inflaming the spirit of

  controversy by assuming the polemical style where an instructive style, in the spirit of

  truth-seeking, would be more suitable. We should take a comprehensive view of any

  CHAPTER 4: ETHICS AnD PRoPAgAnDA 171

  BV-
Propaganda-Interior-04.indd 171

  9/5/13 4:52 PM

  question instead of being exclusively occupied in answering every quibble that may be brought forwards. The argument should be tailored to the ends either of convincing

  those who are opponents or of warning others away from false beliefs. In other words,

  we should be thinking about the likely impact of what we say and whether it is likely

  to accomplish our objective.

  3. Regarding the Subject Matter. We should avoid thinking that we understand some-

  thing merely by the fact that the name is familiar.

  4. Regarding Language. We need to guard against the ambiguity of terms. We should

  not judge rashly other people’s doctrines from their phraseology, and we should not

  insist that they use the same terms as ourselves. We should avoid adhering too closely to

  expressions that have been made, or are likely to become, the cant language of a party.

  Whately recognizes the strength of the argument that “if bad men combine, good

  men must unite” and allows that reaction may sometimes be necessary. But he cau-

  tions that, if all the evils are laid at the door of our opponents, “we shall see no need

  for caution against these evils, in our own conduct.... If we are not charitable in inter-

  preting the motives of others, we may find ourselves aggravating the very errors we

  oppose.”

  Acrimonious debate and an increase in “party feeling” do not necessarily lead to

  violence, but they greatly increase the risk that a vicious spiral of violent activity will

  get underway. Whately’s precepts deserve to be taken to heart by politicians and other

  opinion shapers.

  on THE ETHICS oF PRoPAgAnDA

  Enough has been said to be able to draw from the foregoing at least a preliminary

  sketch of some ways in which propaganda should be assessed morally.

  First, insofar as we see propaganda as aimed at provoking action of some sort, it

  must be evaluated in the light of such action. If the acts aim at conquest motivated by

  greed or adventure, the propaganda promoting this is wrong.

  Second, even when the object sought is good—for example, the defeat of a

  tyrant—the means chosen may go beyond acceptable limits. Was it necessary to pro-