Randal Marlin
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in November 1968.
In 1969, the Task Force on Government Information produced its report, To
Know and to Be Known,92 with recommendations that led to the establishment of
Information Canada. The report included results of a national public opinion survey,
which found:
Canadians are generally ill-informed on the responsibilities of their provincial and
Federal governments; and a majority of the public want more information than they
are now receiving. (TK 50)
Evidently, the government needed to find some better way of getting information
out to the public. The task force confronted the accusation that government advertis-
ing was tantamount to propaganda:
Exposure to federal advertising and use of available information sources do not seem
to influence attitudes that might favour the Federal Government. Those who remem-
ber seeing federal advertisements are not predisposed to be more favourable toward
the government; nor does their exposure apparently make them more favourable.
(TK 50)
This interpretation of the data showed that additional government information was
not successful as propaganda; therefore, the government could not reasonably be
judged to be motivated by propaganda considerations in seeking extended informa-
tion channels.
The report began its recommendations urging that “[t]he right of Canadians to
ful , objective, and timely information and the obligation of the State to provide such
information about its programs and policies be publicly declared and stand as the
foundation for the development of new government policies in this field.” Its fifth
recommendation sought “[s]teps ... to reach sections of the Canadian public that
are at present outside the mainstream of the government information flow.” Among
the suggestions was inviting the co-operation of provincial and municipal govern-
ments, private agencies, and voluntary organizations to establish and finance Citizens
Advisory Bureaux and neighbourhood councils. It sought also an “enhanced role of
the information function” and the strengthening of relations with media and with par-
ticular publics nationally and regionally. It called for “[a] central resource and services
organization, to be known as Information Canada” to be established in an existing
ministry. Information Canada “should ensure that the two official languages are used
as equal instruments of creativity and communication.” It was to be given the function
of public advocate in matters of access to federal information and timeliness of replies
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to citizen’s queries, with adequate staff to fulfill this function. Other recommendations included the setting up of an audiovisual unit in Information Canada to “advise government, departments and agencies on policy and to conduct approved operations of
limited scope in this field.” Also included among the proposals was that “[a] daily, ana-
lytical press digest on significant developments and views within and outside Canada
(when they involve this country) be produced for officials and, on request, for other
interested persons and organizations” (TK 61). Once again, there was concern about
the securing of advertising contracts, with a recommendation that an independent
board, knowledgeable about media and advertising but free of conflicts of interest,
would get the best value for money when choosing advertising agencies for govern-
ment assignments.
D.F. Wall Report
Information Canada came into being shortly after the task force report was issued, and
hopes were created about its ability to provide, free of charge, answers to complex ques-
tions about government and the law. From the beginning, the media tended to treat it
with distrust, some seeing it as a propaganda tool. Certainly, if one were interested in
having the government engage in propaganda, the centralizing of information would be
the first step. Such propaganda is undermined when different branches of government
say contradictory things; the law of orchestration is central to effectiveness. In any case,
for whatever reason, Information Canada did not last long. A report, The Provision of
Government Information, was prepared by D.F. Wall for the Privy Council and circulated in April 1974. It provides a very interesting analysis of what went wrong, while defending
a philosophy of government information favouring openness in dealings with the public.
Since this was also the task force’s philosophy, it is interesting to look at Wal ’s analysis of its failings.
Wall identified four main policy objectives:
1. To keep secrecy to a minimum.
2. To detect and expose existing problems in the provision of information services.
3. To deal with concerns that special interest groups were getting better access to
information than others, even backbench MPs.
4. To deal with concerns that government had become too anonymous and faceless.
The basic flaw in existing information practice was that the Canadian government
would “release only that information which was considered advantageous or harmless,
and automatically ... withhold the rest.”93 The operative principle, he wrote, seemed to
be “When in doubt—classify it!” He quoted the Minister, Don Jamieson, favourably:
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Somewhere, way back, we started from the assumption that everything was secret and that only the minimum possible information should be released. Surely a far
better and more democratic approach would be to proceed on the assumption that
everything is open, and only to withhold information from the general public when
this is clearly necessary on the grounds of public interest or for security reasons.
(WR)
One obstacle to the free disclosure of information was the Public Service
Employment Act, s.23, which required civil servants to take an oath: “I ... solemnly
and sincerely swear ... that I will not, without due authority in that behalf, disclose or
make known any matter that comes to my knowledge by reason of [my employment
in the civil service].” Thus, Wall wrote, the civil servant had often nothing to gain and
everything to lose by giving out information of a sensitive nature. Interestingly, evi-
dence that the oath might still be an obstacle to giving out information was provided
at a Senate committee hearing in late 1999. Dr. Shiv Chopra, a science researcher at
Health Canada, said that he was told by higher officials in government that, in testify-
ing to the Senate Committee on Agriculture about Bovine Growth Hormone, he and
others “might be in conflict of two oaths: one, our existing oath to the public service
and the oath that we would take before the Senate Committee on Agriculture. We
were told that the only person who can give evidence is the minister or his delegate,
and so we will have to be careful.”94
Wall interviewed 100 public servants and 60 non-governmental people; almost
without exception, they felt the government did not do an adequate job of explain-
ing not only policies and programs to the public but also their rationale and how
ministerial rivalry. There was “a propensity of some Ministers and their offices to
seek maximum publicity for themselves and their programs, often to the exclusion
of other programs” (WR). Lack of appropriate co-ordination often resulted in pro-
vincial governments getting most of the publicity for projects initiated and largely
funded by the federal government. Information papers handed out on an occasional
or on a one-shot basis were not as useful as a constant stream. Some said there was
too much bureaucratese in the language used. Another complaint was that govern-
ment information was not adequately targeted to its appropriate audiences. Hans
Classen, an information officer whom I interviewed in 1979, confirmed the existence
of much wastage, such as warehouses of undistributed pamphlets. For that reason,
he recommended using the media to get things out, despite the unpredictable nature
of news demands on any given day. Even when the material is distributed, there is no
guarantee it will be read. The media, on the other hand, edit and publish material on
the basis of what people will read.
With regard to special interest groups having privileged access, Wall’s response
was to recommend more regular access to officials at the middle and senior levels.
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Over time, he felt this would “reduce the growing suspicion and scepticism between government and Parliament, and government and the media, and would help to
establish clearer and more acceptable ground rules as to attribution, adversary par-
tisan use of information, withholding publication in the public interest, publication
of ‘leaks,’ etc.” (WR). He felt that civil service “anonymity” had been carried too far,
even though, understandably, civil servants did not want to become centres of public
controversy in which they would be unable to defend themselves.
As to giving more of a human face to government information, Wall suggested
that admission of wrong would sometimes improve a government’s credibility rather
than the reverse. Nothing is as informative or persuasive, he wrote, as the combination
of “clarity, objectivity, simplicity, and pertinence.” These qualities were “often found
lacking in governmental statements, press releases, speeches and pamphlets, inserts
and so on, sometimes to the extent that credibility was seriously strained, and the
objective lost” (WR).
Information Canada: What Went Wrong?
Consolidation of government information services is always an attractive prospect,
both to leaders seeking greater control and to those looking for ways to reduce
expenses by avoiding duplication of equipment and personnel. In that light it is worth
reviewing the objections Wall found against centralizing information in the short-
lived existence of Information Canada. They were:
1. That the present terms of reference were unclear.
2. That its relationships with departments and agencies were so little developed that
it was not given much substantive information to disseminate.
3. That, as a result, the initiatives it did take were often annoying to departments and
unsatisfactory to its public clientele.
4. That in any event it could not possibly direct, control, operate, or even fully coor-
dinate substantive information programs in defiance of statutory departmental
and ministerial responsibilities and “dol ar control.”
5. That its officials did not have sufficient knowledge of the nature and substance of
government operations.
6. That, for many of these reasons, it was not attracting staff of the necessary quality
to make it credible and effective within its existing terms of reference.
Even those positively disposed towards Information Canada did not feel it had
become adequately co-ordinated with other departments.
Wal ’s study went beyond Information Canada to look at the overall functioning
of government information. He found in his discussions that a recurring strand of
concern was that information officers were ineffective for several reasons. First, they
did not have enough access to or participation in the processes of policy formation, so
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they didn’t fully understand what they were supposed to convey. Second, they tended to be used for cosmetic purposes, apologists for ill-conceived or poorly explained initiatives. Third, many were failed journalists who didn’t command respect. Finally, the
development of an information community within the public service had the effect of
isolating this community rather than integrating its members into the broader func-
tions of public service and the government as a whole. Emphasis within the informa-
tion community was more on career patterns in terms of more pay, etc., than on the
essential function of informing the public.
One other constant problem in government is the existence of leaks, which can
undermine a government’s policy. Why do people engage in the practice? Junior peo-
ple may be frustrated that their ideas are not getting through to the top echelons, or
they may shift their loyalties in the direction of causes such as Quebec independence,
minority rights, etc. Some may be sympathetic to the political opposition. The oath
of office, mentioned earlier as a source of a penchant for secrecy, for some people
lacks credibility because of the absence of clear sanctions for violation and so has no
restraining influence. More often than one would suspect, leaks are made by persons
with no axe to grind, pranksters out to shake people up in the higher ranks. Finally, in
some cases there is the desire to leak something judiciously at an appropriate time to
bring favourable public reaction to a minister, who will then be favourably disposed
to the leaker.
The problem with leaks in Wall’s view is that they have negative and damaging
aspects: they arouse interest in the fact of the leak rather than the substance; they
almost invariably lead to distortion; they can engender inequality, market instability,
and an atmosphere of “doubt, suspicion, and loss of confidence”; they are wasteful,
since clarification will be needed and there will be efforts to track the leak; they tend
to upset an orderly approach to government priorities; and, overal , they are at best an
inefficient way of informing the public.
Sydney Freifeld added further observations about possible motives for leaks, such
as currying favour with the news media. Leaking a hot item will benefit a reporter, who
may repay the favour by writing up an item of dubious newsworthiness that is beneficial
to the leaker. Freifeld made an interesting suggestion relating to journalistic ethics in
dealing with leaks from anonymous sources. Wherever possible, the circumstances of
the leak should be made clear, so that the reader can make some inference as to whose
axe is being ground and, thus, can approach the news item with appropriate scepti-
cism. Obviously, the recipient of the leak cannot betray a source, but short of that, it is
contends first, that the editor be told of the source in confidence and, secondly, that the
public be told as much about the circumstances of the leak as is relevant to making an
informed assessment and yet does not violate the code of source confidentiality. This
will not always be easy, since it is often a temptation to give the reader the impression
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that intrepid investigatory reporting was behind the story rather than that it was handed on a platter. No one said the ethical is always easy to carry out.95
Wall concluded that information officers ought to be more involved in the
decision-making process. Too often they were viewed as “the PR boys who are always
boozing it up at the Press Club when you need them” (WR). Information should be
viewed as an integral function of government in general. He wrote that experience
surely made it clear that information unjustifiably withheld almost inevitably found
its way out, usually in circumstances that provided not one but several targets for crit-
ics, some of them impossible to miss. Not just the government, but the whole process,
suffered as a result.
In the light of the Somalia affair96 years later, and the protracted attempts at cov-
ering up which have come to light, the final warning seems prescient.
government Advertising as Propaganda
If we hark back to the Glassco Report and look at government information in Canada
in the decades since the 1960s, we can see no diminution of government advertising,
and we have reason to recall the admonition that sheer quantity can turn government
information into propaganda. Bursts of advertisements accompany every new federal-
provincial rivalry, and spending limits are sidestepped with subliminal messages paid
for by the taxpayer. For instance, in the May 1980 referendum on Quebec independ-
ence, the federal side was to vote “non” and the separate side “oui.” One advertisement
for not mixing drinking with driving, sponsored by a federal department, read “NON”
in big letters; the overt intent was to indicate not drinking alcohol before driving, but