Goering

by Roger Manvell

  He then turned to the question of the Jews. He made a specious plea that Jewish influence was altogether out of proportion in German cultural and economic life, that the situation was unhealthy and could not be tolerated by patriots. However, he was violently opposed to the pogrom in 1938 and did his best to have this wasteful persecution stopped. He agreed, however, with the fine of one billion marks settled on the Jewish community and accepted full responsibility for promulgating the Nuremberg Laws.

  I should like to emphasize that although I received oral and written orders and commands from the Führer to issue and carry out these laws, I assume full responsibility for them. They bear my signature, I issued them, and consequently I am responsible and do not propose to hide in any way behind the Führer’s order. [IX, p. 92]

  In the same way, he proudly accepted full responsibility for rebuilding the German Air Farce and, although he was not an economic expert, for rebuilding the German economy. Of the Air Force he said, “I alone was responsible and am responsible, for I was Commander in Chief of the Air Force and Air Minister. I was responsible for the rearmament and building up of the Air Force and its spirit.” [IX, p. 94] Of his work initially as Commissioner of Raw Materials and Foreign Exchange, he added, “It was decided that in this sphere I, though not an expert, should be the driving power and use my energy. . . . Thus I entered the field of economic leadership.” [IX, p. 95]

  At lunch during the recess, Goering said to Gilbert, “Well, how was it? You cannot say I was cowardly.” He was aware that he had created a good impression among his fellow prisoners. Later that evening in his cell he was relaxed and self-satisfied. “Yes, it is quite a strain,” he said. “And it’s all out of memory. You would be surprised how few cue words I have jotted down to guide me.” Once more the cell became the actor’s dressing room.

  During the afternoon session, Stahmer took him phase by phase through the history and development of his panoramic responsibilities, all of which he naturally presented in a positive light, as part of his unique service to his country. The examination, in spite of Lord Justice Lawrence’s pleas for brevity, lasted some four days, including questions put by other defense counsel; the record of it amounts in the transcript of the trial to some 80,000 words, the length of a substantial book. The topics seemed to be presented in no particular order, questions concerning the occupation of the Rhineland being followed by others about the Reich Defense Council and the Research Bureau (which was later to cause Goering difficulties because as a body it was directly associated with grossly inhuman experiments on living people). The cavalier way in which an authoritarian state can be run was revealed in statement after statement in which Goering enjoyed the recollection of his power. Typical of these statements was one in which he described how he and Hitler attempted to save Neurath’s face (or, in effect, their own faces) after he had been retired from the Foreign Ministry.

  In order to avoid lowering Herr von Neurath’s prestige I myself was the one to make a proposal to the Führer. I told him that in order to make it appear abroad as if Neurath had not been entirely removed from foreign policy, I would propose to appoint him chairman of the Secret Cabinet Council. There was, to be sure, no such Cabinet in existence, but the expression would sound quite nice, and everyone would imagine that it meant something. The Führer said we could not make him chairman if we did not have a council. Thereupon I said, “Then we will make one,” and offhand I marked down the names of several persons. How little importance I attached to this council can be seen in the fact that I myself was, I think, one of the last on that list. [IX, p. 99]

  He was ironic about suggestions that Hitler should have taken more notice of the opinions of his generals on matters of policy as distinct from strategy. It was not Hitler’s way to ask for such opinions, said Goering.

  How does one imagine that a State can be led if, during a war or before a war which the political leaders have decided upon, whether wrongly or rightly, the individual general could vote whether he was going to fight or not, whether his army corps was going to stay at home or not, or could say, “I must first ask my division”; perhaps one of them would go along and the other stay at home. That privilege in this case would have to be afforded the ordinary soldier too. Perhaps this would be the way to avoid wars in future, if one asks every soldier whether he wants to go home or not. Possibly, but not in a “Führer” State. [IX, p. 113—14]

  Much time was spent going over the details of the Anschluss, the Munich Pact, the events leading up to the occupation of Czechoslovakia and the invasion of Poland, and Goering’s appointment as Hitler’s successor, which, according to him, the Führer had had in mind as early as 1934. Even when Hitler had acknowledged him to be the second man of the State, Goering said, the Führer did not at all times keep him informed as to what he was going to do, as in the case of the occupation of Czechoslovakia. Later he said of his prewar relations with Hitler:

  Of course he informed me of all important political and military problems. He acquainted me with these problems for the most part in very many long discussions, which would take place for many hours, day after day. Many times, to be sure, I was surprised in regard to foreign political questions, but whenever possible I would include myself, and on one occasion he said, in fact, that I had a decided opinion of my own in foreign political matters and that he did not always find it easy to agree with me. But I want to emphasize that in all important political questions I was, of course, included. [IX, p. 111]

  Goering’s answers seemed to grow longer and longer. His extraordinary memory came into full play as each phase of the questioning gave him a fresh chance to deliver the burden of his case. There could be no doubt that here was the real Nazi authority as he poured out his version of the German penetration into the surrounding countries, his version of the bartering and pillaging of foreign art treasures, his version of the behavior of the German soldiers against the resistance movement in France—until in the end Jackson could stand it no longer and demanded of the president how far all this wordy commentary was relevant to the issues of the trial. Afterward, Goering adopted a man-of-the-world air of candor: “I do not in any way deny that things happened which may be hotly debatable as far as international law is concerned. Also, other things occurred which under any circumstances must be considered as excesses.” What could you expect, he implied, when the German soldiers were threatened on every side by a nation supposed to be conquered? With the same air of authoritative reasonableness he defended the bombing of Rotterdam and Coventry and stated his regret that Hitler turned down his advice against launching any attack on Russia while Germany was still in conflict with Britain.

  As far as the acquisition of works of art from abroad was concerned, he explained the extraordinary competition that existed between himself and Hitler, both of whom wanted to establish their personal collections, which were, he said, destined for the nation. He claimed that he was willing to pay for the works of art he wanted from the collection at the Salle du Jeu de Paume, representing confiscated Jewish property.

  From the beginning, however, I wanted to have a clear distinction made, inasmuch as I meant to pay for these objects which I wanted to have for the gallery I was going to build. Therefore, I ordered that an art expert, and, indeed, not a German but a Frenchman—it was some professor, whose name I do not recall and to whom I never have talked—appraise those things. I would then determine whether the price was too high for me, whether I was no longer interested or whether I was willing to pay the price. One part, the first part, was settled that way, but then the whole thing stopped because some of these objects were sent back and forth—that is, they went back to the Führer and they did not remain with me—and not until the matter was clarified could the payment be made. [IX, p. 125]

  He answered the attacks made on him for taking food from the occupied countries (“We did not dismantle and transport the entire Russian economy down to the last bolt and screw, as is being done here. These are measures th
at result from the conduct of war. I naturally take complete responsibility for this.”) and using forced labor from the prisoner-of-war and concentration camps (“At that time everyone had to work in Germany.”). As for the charge that he had connived at the shooting of the R.A.F. prisoners in Stalag Luft III, this he resented most keenly, for, at the height of his unpopularity with the Führer, he had risked further displeasure by opposing in his presence any form of reprisals against flyers who were prisoners of war.

  The examination by Stahmer turned next to Nazi administration and the responsibilities of the high command and of the various ministries with which Goering was connected. Then the story of the Anschluss was reviewed. In the course of this long series of statements on the morning of Saturday, March 16, Goering made a revealing aside about Hitler’s conservatism, in a remark which has a curious relevance to himself in his later relations with the Führer:

  I assume that . . . despite all tension, the decisive factor for the Führer was that it was extremely hard for him to get used to new faces, and that he did not like to make any changes in his entourage. He preferred to continue working with men . . . whom he did not like, rather than change them. [IX, p. 166]

  Later he said of Hitler and himself during the period immediately before and after the start of the war, “There was no one who could even approach working as closely with the Führer and who was as essentially familiar with his thoughts and who had the same influence as I.” [IX, p. 175]

  During the weekend recess that followed, Goering rested. Gilbert records that he grumbled at the arguments for humanitarianism to which he was being subjected. The British Empire, he said, had not been acquired through humanitarianism, and America had “hacked its way to a rich Lebensraum by revolution, massacre and war.” He felt it unjust that he should be chosen as history’s scapegoat among the masters of conquest.

  During the morning of Monday, March 18, the question turned on Goering’s relations with the S.A. and the Gestapo; his reply to the question whether ill-treatment of prisoners took place during the period he was in control of the Gestapo is characteristic of his attitude to one of the most damaging of the charges he had to face. He said:

  At the time when I was still directly connected with the Gestapo such excesses did, as I have openly stated, take place. In order to punish them, one naturally had to find out about them. Punishments were administered. The officials knew that if they did such things they ran the risk of being punished. A large number of them were punished. I cannot say what the practice was later. [IX, p. 184]

  When the time came for Jackson to begin the cross-examination, there was an atmosphere of curiosity and expectation in the court. He began with a curious question: “You are perhaps aware that you are the only living man who can expound to us the true purposes of the Nazi Party and the inner workings of the leadership.” This only served to please Goering, who replied, “I am perfectly aware of that.” Both question and answer seemed to establish the relationship between these two men who were to argue and counterargue for the best part of two days. The cross-examination had to be interrupted, however, while Dahlerus’ evidence was taken, since he wanted to return to Stockholm and could not wait on indefinitely until Goering’s long harangues were over.

  Jackson’s questions were too frequently of a kind that encouraged Goering to generalize about his actions and the patriotic emotion that inspired them. Compared with Goering’s vast knowledge and experience in German politics and administration, Jackson’s grasp of Nazi history was too scanty and ill-prepared to enable him to counter with facts Goering’s skillful evasions and carefully calculated affronts. There were even occasions when Goering had to put him right on matters of fact. Goering’s self-confidence rose as the sense of his growing success gradually spread through the courtroom. Everyone had expected to see his pride and effrontery laid low as question followed question in damaging sequence. It was known there was a wealth of documentary evidence against the Nazi leadership among the archives captured by the Americans. But evidently Jackson had not prepared himself sufficiently to break through Goering’s guard and press his attack home to the point of drawing blood.

  JACKSON: You established the leadership principle, which you have described as a system under which authority exists only at the top and is passed downward and is imposed on the people below, is that correct?

  GOERING: In order to avoid any misunderstanding, I should like once more to explain the idea briefly, as I understand it. In German parliamentary procedure in the past the responsibility rested with the highest officials, who were responsible for carrying out the anonymous wishes of the majorities, and it was they who exercised the authority. In the leadership principle we sought to reverse the direction; that is, the authority existed at the top and passed downward, while the responsibility began at the bottom and passed upward.

  JACKSON: In other words, you did not believe in and did not permit government, as we call it, by consent of the governed, in which the people, through their representatives, were the source of power and authority?

  GOERING: That is not entirely correct. We repeatedly called on the people to express unequivocally and clearly what they thought of our system, only it was in a different way from that previously adopted and from the system in practice in other countries. We chose the way of a so-called plebiscite. We also took the point of view that, of course, even a government founded on the leadership principle could maintain itself only if it was based in some way on the confidence of the people. If it no longer had such confidence, then it would have to rule with bayonets, and the Führer was always of the opinion that that was impossible in the long run—to rule against the will of the people. . . . I consider the leadership principle necessary because the system which previously existed, and which we called parliamentary or democratic, had brought Germany to the verge of ruin. I might perhaps in this connection remind you that your own President Roosevelt, as far as I can recall—I do not want to quote it word for word—declared, “Certain people in Europe have forsaken democracy not because they did not wish for democracy, but because democracy had brought forth men who were too weak to give their people work and bread and to satisfy them. For this reason the peoples have abandoned this system and the men belonging to it.” There is much truth in that statement. This system had brought ruin by mismanagement, and according to my opinion only an organization made up of a strong, clearly defined leadership hierarchy could restore order again. But, let it be understood, not against the will of the people, but only when the people, having in the course of time and by means of a series of elections grown stronger and stronger, had expressed their wish to entrust their destiny to the National Socialist leadership.

  JACKSON: The principles of the authoritarian government which you set up required, as I understand you, that there be tolerated no opposition by political parties which might defeat the policy of the Nazi Party?

  GOERING: You have understood this quite correctly. By that time we had lived long enough with opposition and we had had enough of it. Through opposition we had been completely ruined. It was now time to have done with it and to start building up. [IX, pp. 185—86]

  Time and again, Goering used the questions as cues for lecturing the court on Nazi principles in such a way as to put them in what appeared to be a reasonable light. He admitted establishing the concentration camps to eliminate opposition.

  JACKSON: Was it also necessary, in operating this system, to deprive persons of the right to public trials in independent courts? And you immediately issued an order that your political police would not be subject to court review or to court orders, did you not?

  GOERING: You must differentiate between the two categories. Those who had committed some act of treason against the new State were naturally turned over to the courts. The others, however, of whom one might expect such acts, but who had not yet committed them, were taken into protective custody, and these were the people who were taken to concentration camps. I am now s
peaking of what happened at the beginning. Later, things changed a great deal. . . . [IX, p. 187]

  JACKSON: But when it was State necessity to kill somebody, you had to have somebody to do it, did you not?

  GOERING: Yes, just as in other states; whether it is called Secret Service or something else, I do not know. . . .

  JACKSON: And there was nothing secret about the establishment of a Gestapo as a political police, about the fact that people were taken into protective custody, about the fact that there were concentration camps? Nothing secret about those things, was there?

  GOERING: There was at first nothing secret about it at all. [IX, p. 189]

  Irritation began to show itself in both men; Jackson felt that Goering was purposely avoiding the direct answer he was supposed to give, Goering that he was not being given the trial of strength he deserved.

  JACKSON: I can only repeat my question, which I submit you have not answered: Did you at that time see any military necessity for an attack by Germany on Soviet Russia?

  GOERING: I personally believed that at that time this danger had not yet reached its climax, and therefore the attack might not yet be necessary. But that was my personal view.

  JACKSON: And you were the Number Two man at that time in all Germany?

  GOERING: It has nothing to do with my being second in importance. There were two conflicting points of view as regards strategy. The Führer, the Number One man, saw one danger, and I, as the Number Two man, if you wish to express it so, wanted to put through another strategic measure. If I had imposed my will every time, then I would have probably become the Number One man. But since the Number One man was of a different opinion, and I was only the Number Two man, his opinion naturally prevailed. [IX, p. 191]