Delphi Complete Works of Cornelius Nepos

by Cornelius Nepos

  6. Cuius victoriae non alienum videtur quale praemium Miltiadi sit tributum docere, quo facilius intellegi possit eandem omnium civitatum esse naturam. [2] ut enim populi Romani honores quondam fuerunt rari et tenues ob eamque causam gloriosi, nunc autem effusi atque obsoleti, sic olim apud Athenienses fuisse reperimus. [3] namque huic Miltiadi, qui Athenas totamque Graeciam liberarat, talis honos tributus est, in porticu, quae Poecile vocatur, cum pugna depingeretur Marathonia, ut in decem praetorum numero prima eius imago poneretur isque hortaretur milites proeliumque committeret. [4] idem ille populus, posteaquam maius imperium est nactus et largitione magistratuum corruptus est, trecentas statuas Demetrio Phalereo decrevit.

  VI. For this victory it does not seem improper to state what reward was conferred on Miltiades, that it may be the more easily understood that the nature of all states is the same; for as honours among our own people were once few and inexpensive, and for that reason highly prized, but are now costly and common, so we find that it formerly was among the Athenians. For to this very Miltiades, who had saved Athens and the whole of Greece, such honour only was granted, that when the battle of Marathon was painted in the portico called Poecile, his figure was placed first in the number of the ten commanders, and he was represented as encouraging his men, and commencing the battle. The same people, after they acquired greater power, and were corrupted by the largesses of their rulers, decreed three hundred statues to Demetrius Phalereus.

  7. Post hoc proelium classem septuaginta navium Athenienses eidem Miltiadi dederunt, ut insulas, quae barbaros adiuverant, bello persequeretur. quo in imperio plerasque ad officium redire coegit, nonnullas vi expugnavit. [2] ex his Parum insulam opibus elatam cum oratione reconciliare non posset, copias e navibus eduxit, urbem operibus clausit omnique commeatu privavit, dein vineis ac testudinibus constitutis propius muros accessit. [3] cum iam in eo esset, ut oppido potiretur, procul in continenti lucus, qui ex insula conspiciebatur, nescio quo casu nocturno tempore incensus est. cuius flamma ut ab oppidanis et oppugnatoribus est visa, utrisque venit in opinionem signum a classiariis regiis datum. [4] quo factum est ut et Parii a deditione deterrerentur et Miltiades, timens ne classis regia adventaret, incensis operibus, quae statuerat, cum totidem navibus atque erat profectus Athenas magna cum offensione civium suorum rediret. [5] accusatus ergo est proditionis, quod, cum Parum expugnare posset, a rege corruptus infectis rebus discessisset. eo tempore aeger erat vulneribus, quae in oppugnando oppido acceperat. itaque cum ipse pro se dicere non posset, verba fecit frater eius Stesagoras. [6] causa cognita capitis absolutus pecunia multatus est, eaque lis quinquaginta talentis aestimata est, quantus in classem sumptus factus erat. hanc pecuniam quod solvere in praesentia non poterat, in vincla publica coniectus est ibique diem obiit supremum.

  VII. After this battle the Athenians gave Miltiades a fleet of seventy ships, that he might make war on the islands that had assisted the barbarians. In the discharge of this commission he obliged most of them to return to their duty; some he took by assault. Being unable to gain over by persuasion one of their number, the island of Paros, which was vain of its strength, he drew his troops out of his ships, invested the town, and cut off all their supplies; soon after, he erected his vineae and tortoises, and came close up to the walls. When he was on the point of taking the town, a grove on the main land, which was some distance off, but visible from the island, was set on fire, by I know not what accident, in the night; and when the flame of it was seen by the townsmen and besiegers, it was imagined by both that it was a signal given by the men of the king’s fleet; whence it happened that both the Parians were deterred from surrendering, and Miltiades, fearing that the royal fleet was approaching, set fire to the works which he had erected, and returned to Athens with the same number of ships with which he had set out, to the great displeasure of his countrymen. He was in consequence accused of treason, on the allegation, that “when he might have taken Paros, he desisted from the siege, without effecting anything, through being bribed by the king of Persia.” He was at this time ill of the wounds which he had received in besieging the town, and, as he could not plead for himself, his brother Tisagoras spoke for him. The cause being heard, he was not condemned to death, but sentenced to pay a fine, which was fixed at fifty talents, a sum equivalent to that which had been spent on the fleet. As he could not pay this money, he was thrown into prison, and there ended his life.

  8. Hic etsi crimine Pario est accusatus, tamen alia causa fuit damnationis. namque Athenienses propter Pisistrati tyrannidem, quae paucis annis ante fuerat, nimiam civium suorum potentiam extimescebant. [2] Miltiades, multum in imperiis magistratibusque versatus, non videbatur posse esse privatus, praesertim cum consuetudine ad imperii cupiditatem trahi videretur. [3] nam in Chersoneso omnes illos quos habitarat annos perpetuam obtinuerat dominationem tyrannusque fuerat appellatus, sed iustus. non erat enim vi consecutus, sed suorum voluntate, eamque potestatem bonitate retinebat. omnes autem et dicuntur et habentur tyranni, qui potestate sunt perpetua in ea civitate, quae libertate usa est. [4] sed in Miltiade erat cum summa humanitas tum mira communitas, ut nemo tam humilis esset, cui non ad eum aditus pateret; magna auctoritas apud omnes civitates, nobile nomen, laus rei militaris maxima. haec populus respiciens maluit illum innoxium plecti quam se diutius esse in timore.

  VIII. Although he was brought to trial on the charge relating to Paros, yet there was another cause for his condemnation; for the Athenians, in consequence of the tyranny of Pisistratus, which had occurred a few years before, looked with dread on the aggrandizement of any one of their citizens. Miltiades having been much engaged in military and civil offices, was not thought likely to be contented in a private station, especially as he might seem to be drawn by the force of habit to long for power; for he had held uninterrupted sovereignty in the Chersonesus during all the years that he had dwelt there, and had been called a tyrant, though a just one; for he had not acquired his power by violence, but by the consent of his countrymen, and had maintained his authority by the uprightness of his conduct. But all are esteemed and called tyrants, who become possessed of permanent power in any state which had previously enjoyed liberty. In Miltiades, however, there was both the greatest philanthropy and a wonderful affability, so that there was no person so humble as not to have free access to him; he had also the greatest influence among all the states of Greece, with a noble name, and reputation for military achievements. The people, looking to these circumstances, chose rather that he should suffer, though innocent, than that they should continue longer in fear of him.

  II. THEMISTOCLES.

  Youth of Themistocles; he is disinherited by his father, I. His eminence in the Corcyraean and Persian wars, II. Battle of Artemisium, III. His stratagem against Xerxes at Salamis, IV. Causes Xerxes to quit Greece, V. Builds the walls of Athens, deceiving the Lacedaemonians, VI. VII. Is ostracised, and seeks refuge in various places, VIII. His letter to Artaxerxes, and reception by him; dies at Magnesia, IX.

  1. Themistocles, Neocli filius, Atheniensis. huius vitia ineuntis adulescentiae magnis sunt emendata virtutibus, adeo ut anteferatur huic nemo, pauci pares putentur. [2] sed ab initio est ordiendus. pater eius Neocles generosus fuit. is uxorem Acarnanam civem duxit, ex qua natus est Themistocles. qui cum minus esset probatus parentibus, quod et liberius vivebat et rem familiarem neglegebat, a patre exheredatus est. quae contumelia non fregit eum, sed erexit. [3] nam cum iudicasset sine summa industria non posse eam exstingui, totum se dedidit rei publicae, diligentius amicis famaeque serviens. multum in iudiciis privatis versabatur, saepe in contionem populi prodibat; nulla res maior sine eo gerebatur; celeriter quae opus erant [4] reperiebat, facile eadem oratione explicabat, neque minus in rebus gerendis promptus quam excogitandis erat, quod et de instantibus, ut ait Thucydides, verissime iudicabat et de futuris callidissime coniciebat. quo factum est ut brevi tempore illustraretur.

  I. THEMISTOCLES was the son of Neocles, an Athenian. The vices of his early youth were compensated by great virtues, so that no one is thou
ght superior, and few are considered equal to him.

  But we must begin from the beginning. His father Neocles was of a good family, and married a native of Acharnae, of whom Themistocles was the son. Falling under the displeasure of his parents, because he lived too freely, and took no care of his property, he was disinherited by his father. This disgrace, however, did not dishearten him, but incited him to exertion, for being aware that it could not be obliterated without the utmost efforts on his part, he devoted himself wholly to affairs of state, studying diligently to benefit his friends as well as his own reputation. He was much engaged in private causes, and appeared often before the assembly of the people; no matter of importance was managed without him; he quickly discovered what was necessary to be done, and readily explained it in his speeches. Nor was he less ready in managing business than in devising plans for it, for, as Thucydides says, he formed a most accurate judgment of present affairs, and the shrewdest conjectures as to the future. Hence it happened that he soon became distinguished.

  2. Primus autem gradus fuit capessendae rei publicae bello Corcyraeo: ad quod gerendum praetor a populo factus non solum praesenti bello, sed etiam reliquo tempore ferociorem reddidit civitatem. [2] nam cum pecunia publica, quae ex metallis redibat, largitione magistratuum quotannis interiret, ille persuasit populo ut ea pecunia classis centum navium aedificaretur. [3] qua celeriter effecta primum Corcyraeos fregit, deinde maritimos praedones consectando mare tutum reddidit. in quo cum divitiis ornavit, tum etiam peritissimos belli navalis fecit Athenienses. [4] id quantae saluti fuerit universae Graeciae, bello cognitum est Persico. nam cum Xerxes et mari et terra bellum universae inferret Europae, cum tantis copiis eam invasit, quantas neque ante nec postea habuit quisquam: [5] huius enim classis mille et ducentarum navium longarum fuit, quam duo milia onerariarum sequebantur, terrestris autem exercitus septingenta peditum, equitum quadringenta milia fuerunt. [6] cuius de adventu cum fama in Graeciam esset perlata et maxime Athenienses peti dicerentur propter pugnam Marathoniam, miserunt Delphos consultum, quidnam facerent de rebus suis. deliberantibus Pythia respondit, ut moenibus ligneis se munirent. [7] id responsum quo valeret cum intellegeret nemo, Themistocles persuasit consilium esse Apollinis, ut in naves se suaque conferrent: eum enim a deo significari murum ligneum. [8] tali consilio probato addunt ad superiores totidem naves triremes suaque omnia, quae moveri poterant, partim Salamina, partim Troezena deportant: arcem sacerdotibus paucisque maioribus natu ad sacra procuranda tradunt, reliquum oppidum relinquunt.

  II. His first step in the management of public affairs was in the Corcyraean war. Being chosen commander by the people to conduct it, he increased the confidence of the citizens, not only as to the struggle in which they were engaged, but for time to come. As the public money, which came in from the mines, was annually wasted by the profusion of the magistrates, he prevailed on the people that a fleet of a hundred ships should be built with that money. This being soon constructed, he first reduced the Corcyraeans, and then, by vigorously pursuing the pirates, rendered the sea secure. In acting thus, he both supplied the Athenians with wealth, and made them extremely skilful in naval warfare. How much this contributed to the safety of Greece in general, was discovered in the Persian war, when Xerxes assailed the whole of Europe by sea and land, with such a force as no man ever had, before or since; for his fleet consisted of two hundred ships of war, on which two thousand transport vessels attended, and his land force was seven hundred thousand foot, and four hundred thousand horse.

  When the news of his approach was spread through Greece, and the Athenians, on account of the battle of Marathon, were said to be the chief objects of his attack, they sent to Delphi to ask what they should do in their present circumstances. As soon as they put the question, the Pythian priestess replied that “they must defend themselves with wooden walls.” As no one understood to what this answer tended, Themistocles suggested that it was Apollo’s recommendation that they should put themselves and their property on board their ships, for that such were the wooden walls intended by the god. This plan being approved, they added to their former vessels as many more with three banks of oars, and carried off all their goods that could be moved, partly to Salamis and partly to Troezen. The citadel, and sacred things, they committed to the priests, and a few old men, to be taken care of; the rest of the town they abandoned.

  3. Huius consilium plerisque civitatibus displicebat et in terra dimicari magis placebat. itaque missi sunt delecti cum Leonida, Lacedaemoniorum rege, qui Thermopylas occuparent longiusque barbaros progredi non paterentur. ii vim hostium non sustinuerunt eoque loco omnes interierunt. [2] at classis communis Graeciae trecentarum navium, in qua ducentae erant Atheniensium, primum apud Artemisium inter Euboeam continentemque terram cum classiariis regiis conflixit. angustias enim Themistocles quaerebat, ne multitudine circumiretur. [3] hinc etsi pari proelio discesserant, tamen eodem loco non sunt ausi manere, quod erat periculum, ne, si pars navium adversariorum Euboeam superasset, ancipiti premerentur periculo. [4] quo factum est ut ab Artemisio discederent et exadversum Athenas apud Salamina classem suam constituerent.

  III. This measure of Themistocles was unsatisfactory to most of the states, and they preferred to fight on land. A select force was accordingly sent with Leonidas, king of the Lacedaemonians, to secure the pass of Thermopylae, and prevent the barbarians from advancing further. This body could not withstand the force of the enemy, and were all slain on the spot. But the combined fleet of Greece, consisting of three hundred ships, of which two hundred belonged to the Athenians, engaged the king’s fleet for the first time at Artemisium, between Euboea and the main land; for Themistocles had betaken himself to the straits, that he might not be surrounded by numbers. Though they came off here with success equally balanced, yet they did not dare to remain in the same place, because there was apprehension, lest, if part of the enemy’s fleet should get round Euboea, they should be assailed by danger on both sides. Hence it came to past that they left Artemisium, and drew up their fleet on the coast of Salamis, over against Athens.

  4. At Xerxes Thermopylis expugnatis protinus accessit astu idque nullis defendentibus interfectis sacerdotibus, quos in arce invenerat, incendio delevit. [2] cuius flamma perterriti classiarii cum manere non auderent et plurimi hortarentur, ut domos suas discederent moenibusque se defenderent, Themistocles unus restitit et universos pares esse posse aiebat, dispersos testabatur perituros, idque Eurybiadi, regi Lacedaemoniorum, qui tum summae imperii praeerat, fore affirmabat. [3] quem cum minus quam vellet moveret, noctu de servis suis quem habuit fidelissimum ad regem misit, ut ei nuntiaret suis verbis, adversarios eius in fuga esse: [4] qui si discessissent, maiore cum labore et longinquiore tempore bellum confecturum, cum singulos consectari cogeretur: quos si statim aggrederetur, brevi universos oppressurum. hoc eo valebat, ut ingratiis ad depugnandum omnes cogerentur. [5] hac re audita barbarus, nihil doli subesse credens, postridie alienissimo sibi loco, contra opportunissimo hostibus adeo angusto mari conflixit, ut eius multitudo navium explicari non potuerit. victus ergo est magis etiam consilio Themistocli quam armis Graeciae.

  IV. Xerxes, having forced a passage through Thermopylae marched at once to the city, and as none defended it, destroyed it by fire, putting to death the priests that he found in the citadel. As those on board the fleet, alarmed at the report of this catastrophe, did not dare to remain where they were, and most of them gave their opinion that they should return to their respective homes, and defend themselves within their walls, Themistocles alone opposed it, saying that united they would be a match for the enemy, but declaring that if they separated they would be destroyed. That this would be the case he assured Eurybiades, king of the Lacedaemonians, who then held the chief command, but making less impression on him than he wished, he sent one of his slaves, the most trustworthy that he had, to Xerxes in the night, to tell him in his own precise words, that “his enemies were retreating, and that, if they should make off, he would require more labour and longer time to finish the war, as he w
ould have to pursue those singly, whom, if he attacked them immediately, he might destroy in a body and at once.” The object of this communication was, that all the Greeks should be forced to fight even against their will. The barbarian, receiving this intimation, and not suspecting any guile to be hidden under it, engaged, the day after, in a place most unfavourable for himself, and most advantageous for the enemy, the strait being so confined that the body of his fleet could not be brought into action. He was defeated in consequence rather by the stratagem of Themistocles than by the arms of Greece.

  5. Hic etsi male rem gesserat, tamen tantas habebat reliquias copiarum, ut etiamtum iis opprimere posset hostes: iterum ab eodem gradu depulsus est. nam Themistocles, verens ne bellare perseveraret, certiorem eum fecit id agi, ut pons, quem ille in Hellesponto fecerat, dissolveretur ac reditu in Asiam excluderetur, idque ei persuasit. [2] itaque qua sex mensibus iter fecerat, eadem minus diebus triginta in Asiam reversus est seque a Themistocle non superatum, sed conservatum iudicavit. [3] sic unius viri prudentia Graecia liberata est Europaeque succubuit Asia. haec altera victoria, quae cum Marathonio possit comparari tropaeo. nam pari modo apud Salamina parvo numero navium maxima post hominum memoriam classis est devicta.

  V. Though Xerxes had thus mismanaged his affairs, he had yet so vast a force left, that even with this he might have overpowered his enemies. But in the meanwhile he was driven from his position by the same leader. For Themistocles, fearing that he would persist in protracting the contest, sent him notice that it was in contemplation that the bridge, which he had made over the Hellespont, should be broken up, and that he should thus be prevented from returning into Asia; and he convinced him that such was the fact. In consequence Xerxes returned into Asia in less than thirty days, by the same way by which he had spent six months in coming, and considered himself not conquered, but saved, by Themistocles. Thus Greece was delivered by the policy of one man, and Asia succumbed to Europe. This is a second victory that may be compared with the triumph at Marathon; for the greatest fleet in the memory of man was conquered in like manner at Salamis by a small number of ships