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Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy

Page 59

by Daron Acemoglu


  democracy defined by

  Second Reform Act

  Second Republic, France’s

  Sese Seko, Mobutu

  seventeenth century, Britain in

  shocks/crises

  democratic consolidation and

  Singapore

  acquisition of

  equality in

  inequality in

  nondemocracy of

  political development of

  single-peaked preferences

  citizen’s

  ideal point (political bliss point) and

  ideas related to

  indirect utility function and

  individual preferences and

  MVT and

  skill-biased technology

  Smuts, Jan

  social-choice problems

  Social Democratic Party

  socialism

  Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Moore)

  society. See also civil society; democratic society

  agrarian

  composition of

  cross-section of

  egalitarian

  equality in

  inegalitarian

  inequality in

  land-intensive

  makeup of

  oscillations of

  plurastically based

  postrevolutionary

  preferences of

  socioeconomic class. See class, socioeconomic

  sociopolitical conflict

  softliners

  hardliners v.

  identity of

  South Africa. See also apartheid

  democracy in

  Dutch settlements in

  European presence in

  future for

  inequality in

  male suffrage in

  nondemocracy of

  trade unions of

  white elite of

  South Korea

  Soviet socialism

  Soweto’s riots

  Spa Fields Riots of 1816

  Stanley, Edward

  state formation

  static model

  statics, comparative. See comparative statics

  strategy

  equilibrium

  formal definition of

  history-dependent

  Markovian

  Proposition 5.3’s

  punishment

  Viet Minh

  strikes

  threat of

  structure-induced equilibrium

  subgame perfect equilibria

  substitution

  capital/land

  labor, production, and

  suffrage, male

  Argentina and

  Britain and

  Latin America and

  Sáenz Peña’s establishment of

  South Africa and

  white

  suffrage, universal

  Colombia and

  surplus

  redistribution of

  Sweden

  democracy’s beginning in

  government of

  inequality’s rise in

  World War 1 and

  Swing Riots of 1830

  Taiwan

  targeted transfers

  availability of

  coup’s and

  democracy and

  introduction of

  societal conflict and

  two-class model and

  taxation

  burden of

  capital

  costs of

  coups influence on

  democracy and

  elastic base for

  elites and

  GDP and

  income and

  inequality and

  labor

  median voters and

  middle class and

  nondemocracy and

  poor and

  progressivity of

  promising lower

  redistributive

  tax rates

  preferences in

  reducing of

  tax-smoothing

  achieving

  argument

  revolution and

  technology

  collective action

  embedded

  Heckscher-Olin model and

  importance of

  skill-biased

  theorem/theory

  of democratization

  envelope

  game

  implicit function

  impossibility/possibility

  modernization

  Therborn, Goran

  Third Reform Act of 1884

  thought experiments

  threat(s)

  of coups

  elite and

  of revolution

  of strikes

  three-class model

  Tiananmen Square

  Tory party

  trade. See also international trade

  frictions of

  integration

  model

  opening of

  unions

  trade-offs

  concessions v. democratization

  median voter’s

  transitions

  to democracy

  to nondemocracy

  of regimes

  Tupac Amaru Rebellion

  two-class models

  equilibrium policy in

  targeted transfers and

  Tyler, Wat

  Unión Cívica

  Union Civica Radical (Radicals)

  unions

  United States

  democratization of

  Venezuelan intervention by

  War of Independence

  unrest, social

  democratization and

  utility function

  value functions

  citizen’s

  recursive structure of

  variability, inequality and

  Venezuela

  caudillismo of

  democracy’s reinstatement in

  U.S. intervention in

  Verwoerd, Hendrik

  Videla, Jorge

  Viet Minh strategy

  Vietnamese revolution

  Viola, Roberto

  volatility, fiscal. See fiscal volatility

  voting. See also probabilistic voting

  exclusions from

  Germany’s system of

  Latin America

  majority

  PAP’s influence on

  political parties chosen via

  preferences

  restrictions on

  swing voters and probabilistic

  War of Independence

  wealth

  democracy and

  democratic consolidation and

  democratization and

  middle class and

  Weimar Republic

  welfare

  elites and

  Germany and

  white(s)

  ANC’s guarantees for

  elites

  suffrage of

  William of Occam

  winners/losers

  policies of

  Witte, Sergei

  workhorse models

  World Bank

  World Politics

  World War I

  Germany after

  globalization in pre-

  Sweden and

  World War 11

  Yrigoyen, Hipólito

  deposition of

  election of

  Zaire

  ZANU. See Zimbabwe African National Union

  Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)

  Zimbabwe, revolutionary war of

  1

  In the text, despite the title of our book, we prefer to use the term nondemocracy to alternatives, such as dictatorship or authoritarian regime, because it has fewer specific connotations than any of the other terms.

  2

  In political science, such an approach is often called “rational choice.”

&n
bsp; 3

  That is, individuals should be convinced to take part in revolutionary activity despite the individual costs and the collective benefits to them as a group.

  4

  Although many details of Beard’s arguments are now contested, the general thrust of his argument is accepted by many scholars. For instance, Wood (1969, p. 626) notes in his seminal book that the constitution “was intrinsically an aristocratic document designed to check the democratic tendencies of the period.” See McGuire (1988) for partially supporting statistical evidence.

  5

  As discussed in Chapter 4, there are theoretical and empirical arguments for why the relationship between inequality and redistribution may be more complex (e.g., greater inequality may enable the elites to lobby more effectively against redistribution in democracy). Nevertheless, it is generally the case that with greater inter-group inequality, democracy imposes a greater burden on the elites than nondemocracy does.

  6

  These are all, of course, statements where “other things are held equal.” Inter-group inequality is not the only thing that determines whether a society democratizes or a democracy consolidates.

  7

  See Freedom House (2004) and http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/methodologyhtm.

  8

  See Marshall and Jaggers (2004) and http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/.

  9

  See Mulligan, Sala-i-Martin, and Gil (2003) for the argument that democracies do not redistribute more. See Rodrik (1999) for the original analysis of the link between democracy and labor share. For more details on the relationship between democracy and inequality, see Li, Squire, and Zou (1998). See also Persson and Tabellini (2003) and Persson (2003) on different policies pursued by democracies and different forms of democracies.

  10

  For example, it appears that, empirically, electoral systems with proportional representation lead to greater income redistribution than majoritarian institutions (see Austen-Smith 2000; Milesi-Feretti, Perotti, and Rostagno 2002; Persson and Tabellini 2003).

  11

  In fact, the weaker concept of strict quasiconcavity is all that is necessary for Vi to be single-peaked. However, in all examples used in this book, Vi is strictly concave so we do not introduce the notion of quasiconcavity. It is also possible to state the definition of single-peaked preferences with weak inequalities; e.g., if q” ≤ q’ ≤ qi or if q” ≥ q’ ≥ qi, then Vi(q”) ≤ Vi(q’). In this case, the corresponding concept would be quasiconcavity (or concavity). Such a formulation allows for indifference over policy choices (i.e., the utility function could be flat over a range of policies). We find it more intuitive to rule out this case, which is not relevant for the models we study in this book.

  12

  Throughout this book, we consider only pure strategies.

  13

  More formally, in the case of equality, the citizens would be indifferent between revolution and no revolution, and their choice should also be determined as part of the equilibrium. In the models studied throughout this book, there is no loss in generality in assuming that in case of equality, they do not revolt.

  14

  There is another Nash equilibrium where, even though (5.5) is satisfied, there is a “coordination failure,” so that no agent takes part in revolution because they all believe that nobody else will take part. In the remainder, we presume that the group is somehow able to solve the coordination problem- for example, due to the actions of its leaders - and avoids this less attractive equilibrium.

  15

  Many scholars have emphasized the fact that a key feature of political economy is that there is no third party that can enforce the promises made by the state and that this leads to problems of commitment and endemic inefficiencies. This idea is discussed by North (1990) and Olson (1993), is central to the work of North and Weingast (1989) and Weingast (e.g., 1997, 1998), and is implicit in many other studies. See also Grossman and Noh (1994), Dixit (1996), Dixit and Londregan (1995), and Besley and Coate (1998) for discussions of how inability to commit generates inefficiencies in political outcomes.

  16

  More explicitly, consider a pair of taxes, τL and τH > τL, that satisfy (5.37). Now imagine we construct a weighted average of these two taxes,Inspection of (5.38) together with the (strict) convexity of C(·) immediately establishes that Vp(N, µH, [,]) > Vp(N, µH, [τL, τH]), so the tax vector [,] also avoids revolution. Moreover, again by the convexity of C(·), Vr(N, µL, [,]) > Vr(N, µL, [τL, τH]), so the tax vector [,] also gives higher utility to the elites. This establishes that tax-smoothing is preferable (if it is incentive-compatible).

  17

  http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/dddeisqu.htm.

  18

  For other examples, see Schmitter (1971, p. 484) and Cox (1976, pp. 207-8).

  19

  We could write these values as Vp(C, ϕ, τN = τr) and Vr(C, ϕ, τN = τr) to emphasize that after a coup the elites get to set the tax rate and choose their ideal point. However, because it is immediate that τN = τr in any subgame perfect equilibrium, we suppress this notation. Similar considerations apply to the values Vp(D, rD = τ,D= τP) and Vr(D, τD =,D = τp), where with probability 1 - p the citizens choose the tax rate again and setD. We also suppress the argumentD = τp from these value functions.

  20

  In this chapter, we do not examine non-Markovian equilibria. See Powell (2004) for a study of subgame perfect equilibria in a simplified version of the model presented here.

  21

  Because partial democracy is less than full democracy, we could refer to it as a form of nondemocracy. Recall from Chapter 2, however, that the focus of our analysis is to understand the forces that push a society toward or away from democracy. Although most of our analysis has focused on contrasting full democracy with the rule of some elites, we can therefore study the move from political control by the rich to a partial democracy - which includes also the middle class — as an instance of democratization.

  22

  For example, the support of Perón in Argentina was mostly urban and his policies aimed at redistributing from the rural sector to Buenos Aires. Clearly, as in the British and other Western European cases, urban workers were not interested in land redistribution.

  23

  In Chapter 4, the parties’ objectives function was to come to power; thus, they simply wanted their vote share to be greater than ½ . The assumption here is that they wish to maximize their vote share. This assumption is adopted to simplify the discussion.

  24

  There may also exist asymmetric equilibria in which the two parties choose different platforms.

  25

  Grossman and Helpman (2001) also prove that for each lobby n, there exists a policyn ∈ arg maxq∈Q(which satisfiesn(n) = 0. This means that the equilibrium contribution function of each lobby is such that there exists a policy that makes no contributions to the politician and gives him or her the same utility If this condition were not true, the lobby could reduce all its contributions and still induce the same behavior. This feature of the equilibrium is not important for the results we highlight here; hence, it is relegated to this footnote.

  Table of Contents

  ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY

  Title Page

  Copyright Page

  Dedication

  Preface

  PART ONE. - QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

  Chapter 1 - Paths of Political Development

  1. Britain

  2. Argentina

  3. Singapore

  4. South Africa

  5. The Agenda

  Chapter 2 - Our Argument

  1. Democracy versus Nondemocracy

  2. Building Blocks of Our Approach

  3. Toward Our Basic Story

  4. Our Theory of Democratization

  5. Democratic Consolidation

  6. Determinants of Democracy

 
7. Political Identities and the Nature of Conflict

  8. Democracy in a Picture

  9. Overview of the Book

  Chapter 3 - What Do We Know about Democracy?

  1. Measuring Democracy

  2. Patterns of Democracy

  3. Democracy, Inequality, and Redistribution

  4. Crises and Democracy

  5. Social Unrest and Democratization

  6. The Literature

  7. Our Contribution

  PART TWO. - MODELING POLITICS

  Chapter 4 - Democratic Politics

  1. Introduction

  2. Aggregating Individual Preferences

  3. Single-Peaked Preferences and the Median Voter Theorem

  4. Our Workhorse Models

  5. Democracy and Political Equality

  6. Conclusion

  Chapter 5 - Nondemocratic Politics

  1. Introduction

  2. Power and Constraints in Nondemocratic Politics

  3. Modeling Preferences and Constraints in Nondemocracies

  4. Commitment Problems

  5. A Simple Game of Promises

  6. A Dynamic Model

  7. Incentive-Compatible Promises

  8. Conclusion

  PART THREE. - THE CREATION AND CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY

  Chapter 6 - Democratization

  1. Introduction

  2. The Role of Political Institutions

  3. Preferences over Political Institutions

  4. Political Power and Institutions

  5. A Static Model of Democratization

  6. Democratization or Repression?

  7. A Dynamic Model of Democratization

  8. Subgame Perfect Equilibria

  9. Alternative Political Identities

  10. Targeted Transfers

  11. Power of the Elites in Democracy

  12. Ideological Preferences over Regimes

  13. Democratization in a Picture

  14. Equilibrium Revolutions

  15. Conclusion

  Chapter 7 - Coups and Consolidation

  1. Introduction

  2. Incentives for Coups

  3. A Static Model of Coups

  4. A Dynamic Model of the Creation and Consolidation of Democracy

  5. Alternative Political Identities

  6. Targeted Transfers

  7. Power in Democracy and Coups

  8. Consolidation in a Picture

  9. Defensive Coups

  10. Conclusion

  PART FOUR. - PUTTING THE MODELS TO WORK

  Chapter 8 - The Role of the Middle Class

  1. Introduction

  2. The Three-Class Model

  3. Emergence of Partial Democracy

  4. From Partial to Full Democracy

  5. Repression: The Middle Class as a Buffer

  6. Repression: Softliners versus Hardliners

 

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