The African Dream

by Ernesto Che Guevara

  We can report that we now have control of the supplies, and that the ammunition and other material are as Massengo left them with you. How long this happy state of affairs will last is another matter. We think problems will emerge soon because they request nothing for work or combat but are already asking for provisions, and there has been some friction both at the Lake and the [Upper] Bases. But we are sticking firmly to our motto “everything for the front,” and insisting that anyone who wants to have the benefit of the supplies must go to the front. We also proposed solutions such as sending a third of the men to look for food in the nearby villages. Rather than solve the problem, however, they prefer to do nothing and stay hungry in their homes. They definitely have nothing to eat.

  Situation at Aly’s front: Kabimba

  In reality, they are at Katala, a little closer to Kibamba, because the guardsmen took and burned Kabimba and then withdrew. The chief there did not allow Aly to put up any resistance, nor does he let Aly give him advice; moreover he stubbornly insists on staying close to the lake, ignoring the danger that the guardsmen might capture the hillside. Siki sent orders to Aly that the Cubans should capture them on their own in order to avoid being encircled or caught off guard. Aly’s situation with the chief is rather delicate, as the chief told him it would be best if the Cubans went off to the base (on the pretext of taking a break). A Congolese political commissar told Aly in private that the chief had called the soldiers together and said that the best thing the Cubans could do was to go away. Siki discussed all this with Massengo, and he agreed to sort things out by having a personal chat with the chief of Kabimba. A few days ago, while traveling for three days to lay an ambush on the Albertville road, they picked up some civilians and detained them. The civilians stated that an enemy supply truck was due to pass by soon, but the Congolese insisted on leaving without waiting for it. This gives you a picture of the state of morale at that front. We sent them some provisions. There are a total of 11 Cubans at that front.

  Situation at Kazima

  Kazima was captured by the guardsmen, as we reported before. They advanced by boat as far as Kaela, set it on fire and then withdrew. Everything was lost, including at least one antiaircraft machine gun. (It had been rendered inoperative and had been concealed by a Cuban who had been left behind by the Congolese and who, as he said, had to retreat under fire from aircraft.) We are telling you what has been reported to us. Fifty Congolese were sent with a chief to the front to place themselves under Cuban command and create a barrier. Later a commander, who had been in Cuba, turned up there with seven others, saying that he was going to Baraka. Tom, the political commissar, explained the situation to him and tried to make him abandon the idea, but he stubbornly persisted and fell into an ambush in which he and three others were killed. Almari asked Siki to go there with 10 Congolese and first-aid supplies. At the present time, there are three ambushes between Kaela and here. Clearly, given all the difficulties of ambushes with Congolese who run away, it is necessary to pressure and threaten them; they get lost, etc. Tom, the political commissar, says he didn’t start shooting them because he would have to shoot everyone. In all there are six Cubans at that front.

  Communications

  We make contact with Kigoma three times a day by R805 in code, at 8:00, 14:30 and 19:00. We are trying to get through to Dar es-Salaam, although it is at the limit of our range. If contact is made, it is twice a day in code. Kabila is using facilities in Kigoma to contact the base, so that now there is better leadership. It may be possible to install a microwave on a launch so that we can communicate while crossing the lake (if you authorize it). We are reorganizing telephone communications. Massengo agreed that two or three men should be sent to teach them how it works and how to repair it.

  After the previous page was written, contact was made via the apparatus with Dar es-Salaam. Reception and transmission was 100 percent.

  After the general report on the situation was completed, Ngenje called us from the Lake [Base] to say that Massengo was preparing to go to Kigoma. A short time later, a second call from there informed us that all the “top guys” had had a meeting with Massengo; this had been attended by Ngenje and Kumi. At the meeting, Massengo proposed that he go to Kigoma because he was the only leader inside the Congo. The “top guys” opposed this and Massengo agreed to stay. Nevertheless, we were told that preparations for his departure are continuing.

  A third call informed us that they were continuing to meet; Massengo stated that he had received a message from [Joseph] Kasavubu offering him a ministry. The message said that a ship was waiting for him a short distance from Kibamba, and that he had only to take a boat and board it. According to Massengo, he replied that his brother Mitoudidi had died in battle and that he was willing to die also.

  Ngenje and Kumi are on the alert, with instructions to inform us of anything that takes place. Massengo is putting all the problems that are raised with him to the Cubans, saying that they are the ones who can fix things. He even avoided dealing with Aly’s problems with the chief at Kabimba (which he had been asked to solve), saying that Tembo would have to sort it out.

  Tomorrow, Siki and I will go and talk to Massengo, acting as if we knew nothing about these matters, in order to see what he says. Meanwhile, we remain on a state of alert.

  We have informed [Oscar Fernández] Padilla of these events in code by radio, so that he can be on his guard, because we assume that if they have approached Massengo they must also be working on Soumialot and Kabila. The first time he contacted us from Dar es-Salaam, Padilla already requested a report on the latest events and the situation at the Lake [Base], and also—something that struck us as a little odd and may be starting to make sense—he asked us to send him our views of Kabila.

  Obviously the points toward the end of this report were highly alarming, implying that Massengo was on the verge of giving up the struggle. I wrote back the following:

  Tembo and Siki:

  I will reply to your letter point by point, and then I’ll make an assessment of the situation here and the other matters.

  The international situation is not so bad, regardless of any betrayal by Kabila and Massengo. Soumialot’s declarations are good and so we have a leader there; I spoke to “Tremendo Punto” so that if Massengo leaves, he will take charge and organize a full-scale resistance. With regard to Kabila’s plans, there is no problem as long as he does everything over the radio; if there is a conflict, we will censor him and see what happens. By no means must we leave the base now. You should ask Dar es-Salaam about the outcome of the interview with the Tanzanian government.

  As to the Lake and the [Upper] Bases, the sketch of the defense indicates that they are very vulnerable to attack from the side. The machine guns should have a clear field of fire on land to defend the flanks, and trenches should also be dug there. Attempts should be made to ensure that the heavy weapons are manned by staunch Cubans,4 which is not the same as regular Cubans, as I have learned from my own painful experience here. The hillsides giving access to the base should be reconnoitered and defenses set up there. Be as strict as possible about the supplies.

  With regard to Aly, I sent a note for him to join in the defense; with them and Maffu’s men, we will have enough there and you can deploy them in such a way that we will have some reserves. Don’t forget the bare hill overlooking the base; it is one of the keys to the defense (where the mortars and antiaircraft machine guns are located).

  With regard to Kazima, I have already told you about the reconnaissance that I ordered to be conducted. I think that unless the guardsmen get a move on, we can surprise them there as soon as I reorganize my outfit a little.

  With regard to communications, that is great news, but it strikes me as excessive to contact the other side three times a day and Dar es-Salaam twice a day. You won’t have anything to say to each other before long; the gasoline will run out and the codes can always be discovered, not to speak of the base being spotted from the air. Leaving asid
e the technical conditions, which have to be analyzed on the spot, I would recommend one normal communication daily with Kigoma and the specification of a fixed hour for exceptional contact, plus once every two or three days with Dar es-Salaam. This will allow us to save on gasoline. The contact should be at night, and the apparatus should be protected against attack from the air. I think the microwave is a good idea, with simple codes that are changed frequently.

  When I received the above-mentioned report on Massengo, I spoke with “Tremendo Punto,” as I said I would in my letter. He broke down and said that he was not the right man to take over the leadership; he didn’t have the temperament and was too high strung; he was willing to die there in the line of duty, resigned to his fate, almost like a Christian martyr, but he was not capable of doing more than that; that was something his brother Muyumba could do. It was then decided to write to Muyumba, but the situation couldn’t be explained in a letter because of the danger that it might fall into enemy hands; so he was asked to come and discuss some important matters. The letter went off with two messengers but we never found out if it reached its destination because we never received a reply or heard anything more of the bearers.

  I want to note that all these reports about Massengo seem to me somewhat exaggerated. The way he continued to behave with me makes me think that the reports from Siki and Tembo (which were not first-hand but came via others) had been blown up out of proportion through nervous anxiety, mistrust, a lack of real direct communication across the language barrier, etc. I am also reminded that on October 27, a day after the letter arrived from Tembo and Siki, Massengo himself sent me a long letter in which he listed all the precautions taken throughout the front, the peasants who had been asked for and the defensive measures that had been adopted. And he added a phrase: “Whatever happens, let us always be optimistic.” Of course, these are only words, but it does indicate a state of mind very different from that attributed to him in our compañeros’ report and much closer to his real attitude, unless he was faking it quite masterfully, which seems out of character. I had decided to have nothing to do with Tembo and Siki’s appeals when, on the night of the 30th, I received a peremptory letter from them dated October 29. Here are some extracts:

  Luluabourg Base, October 29, 1965, 18:30 hrs.

  Tatu:

  We are sending you this urgent message because since 12:00 today seven aircraft have been constantly bombing us and dropping large objects that look like gasoline tanks in the direction of Kabimba and the Jungo area near the lake. This usually precedes an advance or a landing, and so we are warning you now before it’s too late. The bombing forced the machine gunners to retreat, and one of them has not been seen again. Ngenje will investigate and inform us immediately.

  As we said in all our previous reports, we have no confidence at all in the “Congos” who are defending the lake, especially as their demoralization is growing all the time. Many of the Cubans at the Lake and [Upper] Bases are sick and their number is not enough to mount a strong defense that would allow us to maintain our sole and vital communications base with the outside.

  In our previous reports we tried to present the most objective possible picture of the prevailing demoralization, so we don’t think it is necessary to stress this again, but you should be aware that things are quite alarming in this respect. Every shameless element from the fronts has taken refuge at the lake, joining the shameless ones already there. There is a large number of prisoners, despite the fact that, as we wrote yesterday, there is an even greater number of criminals and traitors that no one is capable of arresting. Massengo (who still has not left) sends frequent daily messages asking Kabila to report on the loyalty of certain officers. Another frequent accusation is that some officers are urging the “revolutionaries” to lay down their weapons and spreading the rumor that Soumialot is a good friend of Kasavubu.

  As we said in our last report, we don’t at all like the position you are in; we know that the guardsmen may seize roads away from the lake and leave us isolated. We think that the best solution would be to have a barrier where you are and to transfer the bulk of the Cubans here.

  In our view, we are writing to you sufficiently regularly and keeping you informed about both the international situation and the situation here. We seem almost like two old gossips. Please do the same with us, as we are always anxious for news. (Then we will be three old gossips.)

  Siki and Tembo S.A.

  We decided to head off to the base. Mbili would remain as commander of that area, stationing himself at the first barrier. Rebokate would form a second line of defense at the place where we had our camp, with a good number of Congolese undergoing training. This training was very basic, of course—shooting lessons, because the poor guys couldn’t hit a cow at five meters, and a bit of basic drill. We spoke to the peasants, who understood our decision perfectly; they felt secure with the men who were remaining, and with the doctors staying on at the hospital to look after the Congolese wounded and some sick Cubans. It was a very friendly farewell.

  Another month, October, had passed, and in my diary I wrote the following:

  A month of unmitigated disaster. The shameful fall of Baraka, Fizi, Lubondja and Lambert’s front was compounded by the surprise they gave me at Kilonwe [sic Kilombwe] and the loss of two compañeros, Awirino (missing) and Bahasa (dead). All this would have been insignificant if the Congolese had not completely lost heart. Nearly all their officers have run away, and Massengo seems prepared to weigh anchor. The Cubans are not much better, from Tembo and Siki to the ordinary soldiers. Everyone justifies his own guilt by shifting it onto the shoulders of the Congolese. But on top of my own mistakes, the Cuban combatants have shown some grave weaknesses in combat. It has also been very difficult to achieve cordial relations between them and to get the Cubans to shake off their scornful elder-brother attitude toward the Congolese, with special rights regarding provisions and burdens. In short, we are entering what may be the final month, when we will make a final push.

  My remark about relations between the Cubans and Congolese arose from the fact that the cooks, being Cuban, gave special helpings to their compañeros, while the Congolese tended to be the ones who carried certain heavy loads. We had not established entirely fraternal relations, and we always felt a little bit superior, like people who had come to give advice.

  We made the journey to the base in two days. On the second day, as we passed through Nganja, we learned that planes had machine-gunned here the previous day, killing about 30 cows whose corpses were scattered around the area. As we were making the most of this by consuming a good chunk of meat, Mundandi arrived and we had a serious talk. I told him that his idea of fleeing was crazy right now, that Rwanda’s fate was bound up with that of the Congo, and that he would have nowhere to continue the struggle, unless he was thinking of abandoning it altogether. He admitted that it was crazy, saying others had proposed this to him, but he had dissuaded them and had come specifically to discuss a sabotage operation against the power lines to Front de Force, thereby focusing the enemy’s attention on that point.

  On reaching the base I discovered a climate of defeatism and open hostility to the Congolese. This gave rise to some serious discussions with the compañeros; they had a long list of all the officers who had fled to Kigoma, which was not exact but clearly reflected the reality of the situation, in other words, the cowardice of the officers, their disdainful attitude to combat and their treachery. But the list also included unfairly the names of some who were firm right up to the last moment. The following two notes give some idea of the mentality prevailing at that time; one is a letter from Tembo to a compañero that suggests the recipient’s state of mind and the letter he must have written (which I do not have and never read).

  The Base, Thursday, October 28, 1965, 13:00 hrs.

  I received your note. Although it is not dated, I assume it crossed with one I sent you via Compañero Chei.

  You were writing after the painful loss
of a compañero who, I’m not going to deny it, deserved a death no less glorious but more useful.

  Your lines reflect the state of mind produced by recent events and the picture of desolation and liquidation offered by the so-called “Congolese revolution.” This worries me. I want to tell you quite frankly what I think and ask you once more to have confidence in me, although I cannot assure you that this confidence won’t end suddenly in a new misadventure.

  I know that you aren’t a jerk. On the contrary, I think you are a revolutionary who will do your duty whatever the circumstances. So I won’t appeal to your resolute character, which would be pointless and absurd, but I would like to remind you of the old saying that “Caesar’s wife must not only be above reproach but also appear to be above reproach.” You mustn’t allow anyone to think that your views about the situation, or about the particular measures taken to address the situation, imply that you feel defeated and have no heart for the struggle. You must keep yourself at a peak of combat-readiness, and your attitude should conspicuously serve as an example and an inspiration for other compañeros in the difficult circumstances in which we find ourselves.

  It is possible that there are some things you don’t understand and that measures are being taken that you consider misguided, but you should not conclude that Tatu and the other compañeros in charge aren’t aware of the real situation that is so objectively clear. Don’t forget that, at difficult moments, it is necessary to take extreme measures to preserve morale and avert a debacle.

  Siki and I have sent an extensive report to Tatu, which he is probably receiving right now, telling him in great detail of how things stand. It is possible that, after reading it, he will decide to come and speak to us. If not, I will go to speak with him personally by next Thursday at the latest. Meanwhile, we must keep our spirits high and set an example of calmness, confidence and courage. You can rest assured that everything possible will be done to solve the problem in the most revolutionary and effective manner, as befits Marxist-Leninist leaders.