Why Nationalism
Page 12
tributes to the erosion of trust in governments and the ongoing
weakening of state apparatus.
Schools are made less relevant not only because of their in-
ability to allow a real meritocracy to develop but also because
they are deprived of the role of promoting social cohesion. In the
Closing of the American Mind, Alan Bloom criticizes modern lib-
eral philosophy for placing self- interest and self- expression at
its core. For Bloom, this created a void that was filled by post-
modern ideologies celebrating diversity and relativism. The
failure of contemporary liberal education, he argues, has led to
a sterile social dialogue in which commercial pursuits have be-
come more highly valued than the search for truth or for a com-
mon good. Although Bloom’s alternative is, I believe, far too
Breakdown of the Coalition • 97
conservative, his basic question still resonates: “when there
are no shared goals or vision of the public good, is the social
contract any longer possible?”6
Unable to fulfill its most basic traditional goals— namely,
preparing children to cope with future social and economic
tasks, supporting social mobility, and nurturing social
cohesion— national education became one more divisive force.
The crisis did not skip higher education, which also became a
source of public disappointment. More people than ever attend
higher education institutions, but graduating— especially from
an institution that is not one of the few Ivy League institutions—
no longer guarantees a suitable job or entry into the ever-
shrinking middle class. All over the world, the growing frustra-
tion of the educated poor is motivating social and political
unrest. With education no longer fulfil ing its traditional social
and political role, the gratitude associated with getting educated
has evaporated; it has turned sour.
Disappointingly, higher education also promotes social po-
larization, cultural differences, and political schisms: as mem-
bers of different classes and social groups attend different univer-
sities and are being socialized to hold different values and beliefs.
Arlie Russell Hochschild compares voluntary activity groups
at Louisiana State University and the University of California,
Berkeley, both large universities with over 30,000 students.
The 375 active student groups found in the former included the
Oilfield Christian Fellowship, the Agribusiness Club, and the
Society of Petrophysicists and Well Log Analysts. None of these
has equivalents at Berkeley with its 1,000 active student
groups, among them Amnesty International, the Anti- Trafficking
Coalition, and Global Student Embassy.7 This is just one exam-
ple of the way in which higher education sharpens social, eco-
nomic, and cultural gaps.
98 • Chapter
13
The collapse of unifying institutions on the one hand and
the emergence of new global realities on the other eroded the
notion of collective fate essential for the development of a na-
tional worldview and with it the readiness to share national
and private resources and responsibilities. Sharing resources
and social responsibilities is logical for those who anticipate
spending a lifetime together; it is far less so for those who ex-
pect to move from one political entity to another. As I have
already argued, there is a good reason why democratic welfare
states are grounded in closure that ensures the persistence of
stable and continuous communities, allowing for lifelong and
often cross- generational bonds to develop. In a world of per-
meable borders, where social stability is no longer guaranteed,
the “haves” have less reason to share and the “have-nots” are
left unprotected.
Old money elites were not more virtuous than their prede-
cessors; however, their scheme of risks and opportunities tied
them to their communities in ways that do not apply to the new
elites who are permanently “on the way”; if they haven’t yet
moved they are about to move, come back, or go away again.
Those in transit have no interest in fostering social solidarity. The
fact that affluence has been dissociated from the ownership of
land and real estate has made wealth portable.
The forefather of modern liberalism, John Locke, believed that
voting rights should be attached to the ownership of tangible
property. While this could be regarded as a way of privileging the
rich and the powerful, it emphasizes the link between voting
rights and property that grounds one in a community. In his clair-
voyant book, The Revolt of the Elites, Christopher Lasch describes
the way in which the elites have deserted their societies. There
were always privileged classes, he argues, but they were never
isolated from their surroundings:
Breakdown of the Coalition • 99
In the nineteenth century wealthy families were typically settled,
often for several generations, in a given locale. In a nation of wan-
derers their stability of residence provided a certain continuity. Old
families were recognizable as such, especially in the older seaboard
cities, only because, resisting the migratory habit, they put down
roots. Their insistence on the sanctity of private property was quali-
fied by the principle that property rights were neither absolute nor
unconditional. Wealth was understood to carry civic obligations.8
Those days are over, and today those who stay at home forfeit
the chance for upward mobility: “success has never been so
closely associated with mobility.”9
A study published in 2016 by New World Wealth revealed that
the most rapidly growing group of immigrants is the mil ionaires.
Since 2013 the number of “mil ionaire immigrants” has grown by
60 percent. While they are still, proportionally, a small group,
they nonetheless set the tone. The flight of the rich and power-
ful should worry nations as much, if not more, than the arrival
of “the tired and poor”; the former might erode the wealth of a
nation, the latter may, if properly handled, help build it.10
The new elites, Lasch argues, rebel against those who try to
hold them back. They “congregate on the coasts, turning their
back on the heartland and cultivating ties with the international
market. . . . It is a question whether they think of themselves as
American at all.”11 It is regrettable that these words did not echo
more loudly in liberal democratic circles, as they could have led
to a process of self- reflection and may have even prevented the
present state of affairs.
The growing rift between the haves and the have-nots leads
them to hold different values, norms, and political beliefs, re-
flecting their assessment of their life chances. Attitudes toward
free trade exemplify this tendency clearly. While the consensus
100 • Chapter
13
among mainstream economists is that free trade is desirable,
&nb
sp; there is no such consensus among the voters. An analysis of the
views individuals hold on this issue show high correlation with
economic status measured in terms of income. “Individuals
who rank high in the domestic income distribution or consider
themselves to belong to the ‘upper classes’ are significantly
more likely to be pro- trade. It is relative income not absolute
income that seems to matter.”12
As expected, antitrade attitudes and protectionism correlate
significantly to neighborhood attachments, nationalism, and pa-
triotism, whereas free-trade attitudes are associated with cos-
mopolitanism.13 The same correlation repeats itself in matters
regarding the free movement of people. Those who resent free
trade are also threatened by immigration. They object to the fact
that “national boundaries become totally porous with respect to
goods and capital and even more porous with respect to people
who are simply viewed as cheap labor— or in some cases cheap
human capital.”14 They see immigrants as invaders who enter
their national sphere, violating its unity, demanding a share of
goods created collectively.15
The risk of losing their economic and social status motivates
individuals to be suspicious of “others” who might threaten their
social position. Weakness and fear inspire calls to erect walls and
protect members from newcomers. Realizing that there is
no place for them in the global sphere, the immobile wish to use
their political power in order to force the mobile to remain within
the national framework and pay their dues.
To their dismay, they find that today’s elites wish to become
nationless; they do not see their success as connected with the
future of any specific nation or state. They build their home(s)
and stay in them the exact number of days their tax consultant
advises. They send their children to the best global schools and
Breakdown of the Coalition • 101
universities that can secure their future. They buy and sell com-
modities in the international stock exchange and own homes in
several countries. They ski in the Alps, sunbathe in Bermuda, and
enjoy theater in London and restaurants in Paris. In fact, the elites
of the world have been united; they are citizens of the world and
would not like any national affiliation to be forced on them.
Those less affluent, less educated, and less skil ful fear being
thrown into the global competition as their chance of winning
are minute and the price of failure unbearable. They tend to pre-
fer “a bird in hand than two in the bush.” They hope to protect
local opportunities by slowing down globalism while making
national borders higher and less permeable than ever. They call
on their states to protect them, defending them from misplace-
ment and exploitation, helping them to take control over their
lives. While searching out ways to secure their future they are
likely to cling tightly to their national and religious traditions and
seek solace in God and nation.
The workers of the world will never unite. They have no real
interest in doing so. Nationalism is, therefore, here to stay, turn-
ing from the vision of the elites into their nightmare. The pres-
ent wave of nationalism is not, as many have suspected, driven
by irrational forces; it is a rational response grounded in the
self- interest of the masses eager to protect themselves from a
global dream they cannot share.
14
One Nation, Divided, under Stress
As has been argued, many assume that the emergence of na-
tions in general and of nation- states in particular was an evolu-
tionary stage that must be transcended. History, it is claimed,
develops linearly:
from the small group to the larger one, from the family to tribe to
region, to nation, and in the last instance, to the unified world of
the future in which . . . the barriers of nationality which belong to
the infancy of the race will melt and dissolve in the sunshine of sci-
ence and art.1
A united humanity may be an attractive vision, yet it is nowhere
in sight. States have not been replaced by other types of global
political structures; instead, they are carelessly ripped apart in
ways that bring about national and international chaos.
One of the biggest threats to states’ unity results from the in-
dividualist nature of contemporary globalism. In his book The
World Is Flat, Thomas Friedman defined three stages of
globalism:
while the dynamic force in Globalization 1.0 was countries global-
izing and the dynamic force in Globalization 2.0 was companies
globalizing, the dynamic force in Globalization 3.0— the force that
gives it its unique character— is the newfound power for individuals
to collaborate and compete globally. . . . No one anticipated this
One Nation, Divided, under Stress • 103
convergence. It just happened— right around the year 2000. And
when it did, people all over the world started waking up and realizing
that they had more power than ever to go global as individuals,
they needed more than ever to think of themselves as individuals
competing against other individuals all over the planet, and they
had more opportunities to work with those other individuals, not
just compete with them. As a result, every person now must, and
can, ask: Where do I as an individual fit into the global competition
and opportunities of the day, and how can I, on my own, col abo-
rate with others globally?2
Friedman’s description accurately captures the way today’s glo-
balism erodes the power of states and encourages competitive
individualism. Yet, like many other commentators, Friedman
overlooks the conflict- ridden effects of this phenomenon.
Mesmerized by the power given to the few to freely enter the
global game as equals, he overlooks the social and political
price associated with the inability of the many to make the
same move.
Friedman’s description of globalism makes two vital points.
First, it emphasizes the fact that the move to Globalization 2.0
and 3.0 was quick and unintended: reality preceded ideology,
things happened, and only then were they understood, justified,
and finally theorized. Second, it explains why this process
motivated individuals to free themselves from their political
and national base in order to improve their competitiveness.
In the age of Globalism 3.0 the range of opportunities is endless,
yet the ability to take advantage of these opportunities is more
limited than ever. The recurrent saying, “in China if you are one
in a mil ion, there’s still 1,300 just like you,” could be rephrased
global y: if you are one in a mil ion, there are still 7,500 people
just like you, and the numbers keep growing every day.
104 • Chapter
14
The globalization of individuals (rather than of states or in-
ternational organizations) can be seen as providing
the highest
degree of personal freedom: social institutions lose the power
to restrain personal freedom, and the world is leveled in ways that
open up new venues for all. It seems as if nothing stands between
individuals and their success but human skil s and hard work. For
most individuals, however, this description is quite untrue. Glo-
balism 2.0 + 3.0 enlarges the gulf between the different classes,
eroding nationalism’s most powerful tools: a stable cross- class
coalition that makes all fellow nationals supportive of one an-
other, partners in generating common goods that otherwise
could not have been secured.
The mounting risks of some and the diminishing opportuni-
ties of others have created two nations where once there was
one. In The Vanishing Middle Class, Peter Temin provides a brac-
ing reflection of the two Americas.3 America, he argues, is now
made up of two groups: the “FTE sector”— the people who work
in finance, technology, and electronics— and “the low- wage sec-
tor.” The FTE citizens rarely visit the country of the low- wage
sector, where the world of possibilities is shrinking, often dra-
matically, and where people are burdened with debt and anxious
about their insecure jobs, if they even hold one.
Many of them are getting sicker and dying younger than they used
to. They get around by crumbling public transport and cars they
have trouble paying for. Family life is uncertain here; people often
don’t partner for the long- term even when they have children. If
they go to college, they finance it by going heavily into debt. They
are not thinking about the future; they are focused on surviving the
present. The world in which they reside is very different from the
one they were taught to believe in. While members of the first coun-
try act, these people are acted upon.4
One Nation, Divided, under Stress • 105
Members of the two nations rarely meet, live nearby one an-
other, have a serious conversation, or befriend each other. Fol-
lowing the 2016 elections, the New York Times described an
America divided into “the Clinton nation” and “the Trump nation,”
each belonging to a different social and economic class. America
is not alone.5 Right after the Brexit vote many commentators in
Britain described a country divided into “two nations which are