Why Nationalism
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interviewed are well aware of the fact that “liberals think that
Bible- believing Southerners are ignorant, backward, Rednecks,
losers. They think we are racist, sexist, homophobic and maybe
fat.” “I am not sure they are wrong,” one of her interviewees says,
“but even if they are, the feeling of being looked down on is a
devastating one.”12 As social and economic alienation takes root,
contempt between members of the majority surges; progressives
take hil bil ies to be worthy of disdain, while hil bil ies see the
metropolitan liberals as an untrustworthy, self- interested, selfish
lot who raped the country (and them) of its riches.
The vulnerable are offended that members of the elite do not
try to understand their pain. Being so lightly dismissed they as-
sume they have nothing to offer but their misery. There is no
glory in poverty, and no one really wants to be identified with
it or befriend it. In the preamble of his book, Vance explains that
he writes in order to give “his people” a voice:
I want people to understand what happens in the life of the poor
and the psychological impact that spiritual and material poverty has
on their children. . . . I may be white, but I do not identify with the
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WASPs of the Northeast. Instead, I identify with the millions of
working class white Americans of Scots- Irish descent who have no
college degree. To these folks poverty is a family tradition. Ameri-
cans call them Hil bil ies, Rednecks, or White Trash. I call them
neighbors, friends and family.13
The move from being working class to being poor is devastat-
ing. It is well reflected in the discomfort Vance felt at Yale (his
alma mater) in comparison to the way the British writer Marga-
ret Foster felt at Oxford in the 1960s. To her surprise, she dis-
covered that “being working class . . . was the thing . . . instead
of being embarrassed by our class, or concealing it, we flaunted
it, to great effect, realizing how special it made us . . . working class
became fashionable.”14 Almost half a century and an ocean apart,
Foster’s experience fundamentally differs from that of Vance. As
Foster recalls, some grandeur was associated with the notion of
the “working classes,” while none is associated with being poor.
Working- class people are perceived as diligent, self- supporting,
dignified, unspoiled by wealth and uncorrupted by the pursuit
of pleasure; the poor are seen as lazy, loud, vulgar, and often re-
pellent. The poor would have liked to emphasize other qualities
like honor, courage, or family, local and national loyalties, but
adhering to such national traits makes them seem anachronistic
if not reactionary. They are therefore on the lookout for a more
satisfying self- definition.
Class has its heroes, its representatives, its demands, and most
of all the ability to organize. The poor are unorganized, under-
represented, and often ashamed of their social standing. Surren-
dering the energizing and motivating “class talk” thus leaves the
poor neglected, ignored, disregarded, with nothing to rely on.
The poor are stripped of role models; they do not have a Martin
Luther King, Cornel West, or Barack Obama to represent their
The Nationalism of the Vulnerable • 135
cause, neither do they have literary figures such as Virginia Woolf
and Sylvia Plath or inspirational theorists such as Iris Young,
Carol Gil igan, or Martha Nussbaum to organize their resistance.
“We never looked at our parents as role models and actually I
don’t think they wanted us to, I think they wanted us to go on,
do something different,” says one of the interviewees in Selina
Todd’s The People: The Rise and Fall of the Working Class.15 Those
who make it move on; those left behind are deprived of the
chance of being valued for who they are.
The individualization of poverty sets our way of thinking
about the present social challenges as well as of the range of de-
sirable solutions. It is particularly poisonous in the age of iden-
tity politics. As the burdens involved in being a minority were
recognized, social and political moves were taken to alleviate it.
Women, people of color, immigrants, alongside members of other
minority groups, could thus refer to their identity in order to vin-
dicate their social position, but male members of the majority
were held accountable— not to say culpable— for their misfor-
tune. The less well- off members of the majority saw “others”
being helped while they were criticized and scorned for their
misery.
The crystallization of the vulnerable into an identity group
went unnoticed until the liberal progressive camp started losing
one election campaign after the other. This wasn’t, as many as-
sumed, a moment of democratic crisis but of democratic victory,
not because the people elected were democratic champions but
because certain social trends that had previously been silenced
suddenly got a voice. Democracy was now fulfil ing its assigned
role, highlighting the importance of unattended social and
political issues.
The elites were shaken and traumatized because they did not
see it coming; they failed to see how a growing segment of their
136 • Chapter
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fellow nationals were losing control over their lives. They con-
vinced themselves that while social inequality is a major feature
of contemporary Western societies, class struggles have been
eradicated. The British example is the most poignant one. In the
1950s and 1960s class occupied a major role in British political
discourse; this prominence faded away in the 1980s. By the end
of the 1990s an unusual consensus evolved between John Major
(the Conservative prime minister) and Tony Blair (the subse-
quent Labor prime minister): Britain had become a classless so-
ciety. During this period class consciousness was eroded, and
the British working class was individualized and de- organized,
losing its pride, its glory, and its trade unions. Yet social strati-
fication intensified, and those at the bottom had no illusion that
a new definition would improve their life chances.
The elimination of class from the social and the political dis-
course freed the elites from offering ways of closing income
gaps, al owing neoliberalism to be solidified, convincing the pub-
lic (and themselves) that the liberal economic model, including
the extreme accumulation of wealth in the hands of the few, is
socially beneficial for all. At the end of the day, it was assumed,
wealth will trickle down and help move the economy forward,
thus improving the quality of life for all members, including the
worse off.
According to Joseph Stiglitz, who is no stranger to the role of
the elites in shaping the economic debate of the last decades, “the
powerful manipulate public perception by appeals to fairness and
efficiency wh
ile the real outcomes benefit only them.”16 Warren
Buffett is blunter: “There’s been class warfare going on for the last
20 years and my class has won.”17 The victory of the elites over
the working classes was framed as a celebration of progress, plu-
ralism, and diversity; the losers were supposed to rejoice too.
The Nationalism of the Vulnerable • 137
The move to multiculturalism was a convenient distraction,
drawing attention toward cultural differences and away from
class- based conflicts. The more diversity blind a society became
the less able it was able to capture the discriminating power of
class. The whole idea of grouping people along the lines of gen-
der, race, ethnicity, or sexual preferences was that these identi-
ties transcend class differences. What was taken to be true of
minorities was assumed to be true also of the majority. This less-
ened awareness of poignant dilemmas such as who should get
more social support and protection, poor whites or middle- class
minority members.18
The move to identity politics allowed the elites to pick and
choose those who joined their ranks: Women were the first to
make good use of equal opportunities. When official barriers
were removed, enough middle- class women who had been wel
cultivated, sharing the elite culture and set of values, were ready
to join the race. Members of other groups adopted the same path
of integration. Those who wanted to fit in had to change, adopt-
ing habits, norms, tastes, culinary preferences, and the political
lingo of the ruling classes with a feminist, black, or gay twist.
The elites rightly assumed that adopting diversity or multicul-
turalism was far less costly than advancing a class- based social
change. Admitting skillful members of minority groups and
letting them prosper within existing frameworks was a less de-
manding social move than sharing resources with the have-nots.
Consequently, the last half of the twentieth century opened up
new opportunities to some very able women and the most tal-
ented members of minority groups. Exceptional individuals
made it all the way to the White House, but racial gaps remained
a sore issue; outstanding women were elected to run the world’s
banking system and head governments and international
138 • Chapter
17
corporations, yet women remain among the poorest members
of every society.
These processes turned the talent pyramid upside down: the
gaps between the opportunities of exceptionally talented mem-
bers of previously excluded groups and mediocre members of
the elite were closing down. This doomed mediocre members
of both minority groups and lower social economic strata to fail-
ure. A lot of talent was lost. Under the banner of meritocracy,
“social and economic inequalities deepen and the idea of equal
opportunities is ridiculed.19 The poor met the “class ceiling.” Even
though levels of education (measured by years of schooling,
rate of graduation, and enrollment in higher- education institu-
tions) reached unprecedented heights, social mobility slowed
down. It has become clear that education can no longer be the
magic panacea, as it fails to reduce social and economic inequal-
ities; in fact, it often reproduces and intensifies them. The haves
are opting out of the national education system and into private
ones, structuring a distinct social and cultural experience for their
children; the rest are left with a dilapidated public education sys-
tem that cannot serve their needs.20
In America a sense of helplessness, associated with a sense of
social loneliness and a lack of cross- class solidarity, allowed for
the emergence of two unusual candidates, Bernie Sanders and
Donald Trump, both wil ing to challenge the ruling social norms
and place the socially displaced at the center of his campaign.
While Sanders invoked class issues, Trump played the national
card, and both pierced the thin crust covering liberal hypocrisy
toward globalism, an ideology justified by universal values that
benefited a few at the expense of many. Social frustration released
a repressed nationalist voice. To the great disappointment of
those who believed that the class war was over; it is now reap-
pearing, wearing a national gown.
The Nationalism of the Vulnerable • 139
The strong affinity between class and national choices is a
worldwide phenomenon. Brexit made it clear that class differ-
ences play a prominent role in determining peoples’ minds,
social and economic status highly correlated with voters’
positions on the Remain- Leave continuum (which parallels
the Globalism- Nationalism continuum previously discussed).21
The morning after Brexit, Fiona Trott from Hartlepool in north-
east England was neither surprised nor disappointed. Although
the town had benefited from international investments, seven
out of ten residents backed Brexit. She explained it as “a vote
against the establishment. Unemployment is 9.4%. People feel
hard done by. When you stop and talk to voters in the street,
they tell you things couldn’t get any worse, so why not vote for
change?” In Dudley, a town near Birmingham, some of the
poorest areas voted by the largest margin (68 percent) to leave,
and working- class Labor voters in Wales voted “Leave” against
their party line.22 The very same morning, at Oxford University,
people were shocked to find out that they had lost the vote. Not
surprisingly, the farther away you were from the university, the
more likely it was that you voted Leave. For many Remain sup-
porters, the day after Brexit felt like waking up in a foreign land.
The “other country” was a few blocks away; “town and gown”
were more divided than ever.
Why did social frustration translate into conservative anti-
European or a nationalist sentiment rather than support for the
Labor party and the welfare state? The answer reflects the fact that
the leadership of the British Labor party, like many other progres-
sive leaders around the world, was closer to the elites than to the
people. For many liberal, progressive leaders even a small dose of
patriotism was too much, not because they were indifferent
to the well- being of their fellow nationals but because they
feared the slippery slope of racism, xenophobia, Islamophobia,
140 • Chapter
17
anti- immigration policies, and the like. Yet the slope is slippery
on both sides; the other side leads to neoliberalism, globalism,
and ultimately social alienation and the col apse of social soli-
darity. There is a clear need to restore the balance.
In its prime, nationalism was “the great equalizer”; it turned
subjects into citizens, motivated the construction of an inclusive
public sphere, and inspired the creation of a comprehensive edu-
cation system and a shared language that promoted a fusion of
high and low cultures in
to one national culture to be enjoyed by
all members. Above all, it gave individuals a place in the world
they could call their own.
In our global world it is often assumed that it is better to be
free than equal, to cross national boundaries than feel at home;
hence the social, political, and economic goods nationalism
offered seem outdated. But they are not; those feeling exposed,
unable to secure a decent life for themselves and their children,
would like to revive them. They have secured a significant victory
with political attention having been given to their claims. To the
dismay of the elites, in the near future, we are therefore likely
to hear more about the need to re-create a new national cross-
class coalition and about the benefits of nationalism.
Those adopting the global point of view claim that “Putting
America First” is a fascist slogan, identical to “Germany Above Al
Else”; they are mistaken. Rather than expressing a sense of su-
premacy, this slogan articulates a desire to regenerate a sense of
commitment among fellow nationals. And there are many ways of
putting one’s nation first: Bernie Sanders’s call to America’s bil-
lionaire class— “you cannot continue to take advantage of all the
benefits of America, if you refuse to accept your responsibilities”— is
one option; John F. Kennedy’s famous summons: “Ask not what
your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your coun-
try” is another. Theresa May’s statement that “citizens of the world
The Nationalism of the Vulnerable • 141
are citizens of nowhere,” and Macron’s description of his debate
with Marine Le Pen as a debate between “patriotism and national-
ism” all testify that a new wave of nationalism is here.
A paradigm shift has occurred; it is now clear that elites have
been using a social and economic prism that distorted their view,
preventing them from seeing what they should have seen, lead-
ing them to misinterpret reality. Going global over the head of
their own fellow national was a moral and democratic mistake.
No democracy can survive without the firm support of the elites
and upper middle classes. We must then shed new light on na-
tional sentiments; rather than seeing nationalism as the last ref-
uge of the scoundrel we should start thinking of nationalism as