by Yael Tamir
Similarly, the claims of the affluent for greater cultural and po-
litical autonomy are much more justified than their claims to be
less generous to poorer regions. Are we having a debate about
justice disguised as a national debate? The answer is yes! The
growing social and economic gaps, alongside the democratic cri-
sis, provoke a discussion about fundamental political questions:
How are we to define the boundaries of political units and who
is to be included within them? Nationalism provides an accept-
able justification: first to the question of the boundaries issue,
then to the definition of “the people,” and finally to distributive
issues. The alternative is to accept the arbitrariness of political
(and personal) life, admitting that, when circumstances will
change, other solutions may be viable or desirable. This is
likely to invite short- termism, undermining the feeling of inevi-
tability states rely on, assuring their citizens that this is our land,
our country, our traditions, and these are the obligations that
come with it.
Can separatists succeed despite the fact that their claims chal-
lenge the integrity of existing states? The sustainability of exist-
ing states is a powerful motivational force; hence, I allow myself
to predict that in the foreseeable future the old nation- states are
unlikely to fall apart, but within the European sphere two
The Nationalism of the Affluent • 151
processes most probably would gather momentum: the strength-
ening of local cultures and languages (2018 has been declared
the European Year of Cultural Heritage, celebrating the diversity
of European cultures) and the erosion of state- based distribu-
tive systems, thus giving affluent regions (Catalonia, Flanders,
Basque country) more control over their resources. This has al-
ready happened in Belgium, where the Flemish Party (the New
Flemish Al iance) has given up the struggle for independence in
return for undoing the shared social safety net, moving certain
services, such as child allowance and health care, from the fed-
eral to the regional level. The Basque region gained control over
its own tax receipts and the Catalans are also likely to compro-
mise on a greater economic, cultural, and political autonomy that
would allow them to better protect their assets in return for in-
dependence. Separatist nationalism is therefore leading in the
opposite direction from the nationalism of the vulnerable— its
end result is the erosion of civic solidarity and deeper social gaps.
Although its language is inclusive and easier to endorse, separatism
may be the less morally valuable of the two kinds of nationalism.
Separatism aspirations are here to stay; their effect on future politi-
cal events will be much less significant than those of the national-
ism of the vulnerable— for once justice may have the upper hand.
Part IV
A New Social Contract
It’s time to fight back, Nationalism can, and should be reclaimed
for liberals.
Yascha Mounk, How Liber a ls Ca n
R eclaim Nationa lism
The nations we are imagining aspire to justice. They want to figure
out how emotions can help them in their work, motivating good
policies and rendering them stable. They also want to thwart, or at
least to control, emotions that would derail their efforts.
Martha Nussbaum, Politica l Emotions:
Why Love Matters for Justice
19
Liberal Nationalism
Reaching the end of our journey, the bottom line is clear: though
the nation-state’s powers have been eroded, its solidarity worn,
its distributive powers limited, and cultural homogeneity chal-
lenged, the theoretical inability to define an alternative set of
agreed- on, applicable moral and political principles leaves the
nation- state the only viable option. Despite internal and external
pressures, it “has proven remarkably resilient and remains the
main determinant of the global distribution of income, the pri-
mary locus of market- supporting institutions, and the chief re-
pository of personal attachments and affiliation.”1
Globalism failed to replace nationalism because it couldn’t
offer a political agenda that meets the most basic needs of mod-
ern individuals: the desire to be autonomous and self- governing
agents, the will to live a meaningful life that stretches beyond the
self, the need to belong, the desire to be part of a creative com-
munity, to feel special, find a place in the chain of being, and to
enjoy a sense (or the illusion) of stability and cross- generational
continuity.
Those who believed that postindustrial, postmodern societ-
ies would promote the development of new political structures
grounded in a division of labor between different spheres of
human life— economic globalism, local culturalism, and regional
democracies— have a reason to be disappointed. The discussion
of Nutopia explains why these kinds of solutions are too open
156 • Chapter
19
and discontinuous to allow a welfare democracy to work. Two
decades of hyperglobalism taught us four important lessons:
a. A divorce between markets and political systems works
against the worst off, leaving them exposed to higher risks and
fewer opportunities. It leads to growing social and economic
gaps and allows the 1 percent to drift further and further away
from the 99 percent. The middle classes, losing their social
holding and social status, join the lower classes in nurturing a
deep sense of social and economic pessimism. Society
disintegrates, spreading a sense of alienation and anomie.
b. The distance between local, regional, and global decision-
making processes deepens the democratic deficit. The
growing power of mega global corporations and international
institutions ridicules the democratic aspiration of individuals
to be “the authors of their lives.” Helplessness, pessimism, and
social passivity spread.
c. Feelings of frustration and despair intensify political distrust
and deepen social schisms. Society turns from a locus of
cooperation into a battlefield.
d. The separation of culture and politics leaves cultures open to
economic exploitation and states void of a creative mission.
In his book If Venice Dies? , Salvatore Settis2 argues that cities
die in different ways: they could be destroyed or captured by a
powerful enemy or they could be taken captive by capitalism.
The commercialization and globalization of cities means they are
losing their souls, tempted to produce cheap replicas rather than
original cultural products. Their inhabitants become foreigners
in their own land, often choosing to go elsewhere. The city is
emptied of permanent residences and falls prey to the mo-
mentary passions of passers- by. Similar processes happen to
states that turn into faint replicas of what they used to be; no
Liberal
Nationalism • 157
wonder there is a growing desire to bring back some of the nor-
mative, economic, political, and cultural values lost in the age
of hyperglobalism.
Nationalism is called back as a content provider, but its return
is far from innocent, it opens up a Pandora’s box that hosts fears
from the past as well as present- day anxieties. There are then no
easy choices. Meaningful communities are, by their very nature,
appealing to some and exclusionary for others. One the most
important lessons of the present crisis is that inclusion, not ex-
clusion, has its costs.
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle teaches us that we must
sacrifice either the accuracy of measuring the momentum of a
particle or its position. Similarly, we must acknowledge that ei-
ther the meaningfulness and internal cohesiveness of commu-
nity or its openness must be sacrificed as we cannot have them
both. A cultural version of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle
may suggest the following:
One cannot create communities that are both meaningful and en-
tirely open: the more meaningful a community is to its members
the more exclusive it would be to all others.
Acknowledging that some sacrifices must be made in order
to allow democratic states the ability to be politically and cultur-
ally engaging is an important political lesson. Ignoring it seems
self- serving. As Ivan Krastev argues, the inability and the unwil -
ingness of liberal elites to acknowledge and discuss the desta-
bilizing force of diversity and migration and contend with
their consequences, “and the insistence that existing policies
are always positive sum (win- win), are what make liberalism
for so much synonymous with hypocrisy.”3 The revolt against
liberal idealism is fundamentally reshaping Europe’s (as well as
America’s) political landscape.
158 • Chapter
19
Or maybe it’s not hypocrisy but part of the liberal illusion,
wel grounded in the Enlightenment, that all good things go
hand in hand. It is natural to wish that all valuable social processes
will support each other, that pluralism and democracy will
be reinforcing, openness and commitment will go hand in
hand, while fairness and care will lead to the same social solu-
tions. Unfortunately, that is not the case. Quite often they lead
in conflicting directions. As a result we are forced to make dif-
ficult choices.
A common means of avoiding the moral conflicts raised
by a clash of ideologies, of making nationalism more palat-
able and less threatening to liberals and democrats, is paint-
ing nationalism in a civic light, offering a nationalism that is
free of all exclusionary aspects, grounded in citizenship and
void of all exclusionary features. Is this kind of nationalism
viable?
The longing for a civic nationalism that annuls the role of cul-
ture, language, religion, ethnicity, or race— and therefore never
leads to exclusion or xenophobia— is understandable, but it has
little to rely on. It takes us back to the early days of identity poli-
tics (the late 1980s) and forces us to revisit the complex inter-
play among politics, culture, and identity. In the first round,
identity politics voiced the complaint of members of minority
groups against the liberal vision of the neutral state. It forced
the majority to acknowledge that cultural, national, and linguistic
affiliations determine not only who we are but also what we
get. Progressives became sympathetic to these arguments, and
identity politics turned into a major ideological pil ar of twenty-
first- century liberalism. In order to remedy identity biases,
minorities demanded the reshaping of the public sphere, making
space for their own particular identities. Diversification be-
came the liberal war cry.
Liberal
Nationalism • 159
Today, protests regarding the identity of the public sphere are
raised again— this time by the less well- off members of the
majority, claiming diversity went too far, ripping from them
their social, cultural, and political status. The liberal response is
dismissive. The dismissal of identity demands raised by mem-
bers of the majority has more to it than just a refusal to allow
the privileged to retain power—it reflects the disinterest of the
elites in their own national identity.
An inclusive image of the public sphere paints it in an ideal
light that wishes to make conflicts go away. Idealistic descriptions
are dangerous as they can easily lead to misguided expectations
and harmful policies. Worse stil , presenting an ideal as a reflec-
tion of reality creates the impression that the desired change has
already happened (or is happening) and fosters the illusion that
nothing much needs to be done, or at least that things are under
control, going the right way.
Here is one example of many: Emmanuel Macron, the French
president, opened and closed his election campaign in Marseille,
one of France’s most diverse cities, with a mixed population of
French- born residents and immigrants from all over the world.
It was in Marseille that Macron chose to make his speech about
Frenchness:
When I look at Marseille, I see a French city, shaped by two thou-
sand years of history, or immigration, of Europe . . . I see Armenians
Italians, Algerians, Moroccans, Tunisians. I see so many people from
Mali, from Senegal, from the Ivory Coast, I see so many others I
haven’t mentioned. But what do I see? I see the people of Marseille!
What do I see? I see the people of France! Look at them. They are
here. They are proud. Proud of being French. Take a good look at
them. Ladies and Gentlemen of the Front National: this is what it
means to be proud to be French.4
160 • Chapter
19
Reality, however, is quite different. The people of Marseille
feel much less certain about their identity. Some of them openly
share their pain. “It’s difficult,” says Mohammed, “to find a job
if you have the wrong address or the wrong kind of name, such
as anything Arabic.” He cites a friend, a ful y qualified engineer
unable to get an interview: “If he puts Jean- Michel on his CV,
it’d be a different story.”5
Driving around Paris in one of the many neighborhoods in-
habited by minorities, the picture becomes clearer. Bondy, the
place where the new French football hero, Kylian Mbappé, grew
up, is one of Paris’s suburbs, a place inhabited by “working- class,
nonwhite communities, synonymous with riots and social
strife, thought of as breeding grounds for crime and terrorism.”6
Mbappé’s neighbors are French, but like many other minority
groups they feel less included in the French society than Macron
would have liked us (and them) to believe. Urban segregation has
worsened in France in recent decades; the social stratification
of residentia
l districts determines access to quality education
and subsequently further upward social mobility for the indi-
viduals who live there. This residential segregation has a clear
ethnic dimension. “In some urban districts, relations can only
be governed by violence, and those living there cannot experi-
ence upward social mobility. They wonder what integration
means. The fact of cohabiting with residents of a poor neigh-
borhood and sharing their social problems leads them to social
behaviors that are too different from those of the middle classes
or society ‘as a whole.’ ”7 The overlap of poverty, ethnicity, and
estrangement intensifies social schisms and helps paint immi-
grants in a nonfavorable light. The poor are left to struggle
among themselves as to who is offending whom, while the wel -
off, secluded in their protected neighborhoods, are busy ex-
plaining to them that they are all equal.
Liberal
Nationalism • 161
This is not only a French or an American challenge; the situa-
tion in most Western countries is similar. The lack of structural
policies of integration and accommodation, decades of failures,
misunderstandings, and missed opportunities, and “a recurring
and stubborn tendency to ignore reality,” led to the present vola-
tile situation.8 In Germany, for mil ions of Turkish immigrants
(many of whom are second- and third- generation), integration is
more of an aspiration than reality. The slow process of accommo-
dation is grounded in the initial assumption that the “guest work-
ers” will return to their homeland. The 1961 labor- recruitment
agreement between West Germany and Turkey was therefore
discussed in economic rather than cultural terms. Eager to recruit
young Turks at the prime of their labor capacity, Germany suc-
cumbed to demands to bring semiskilled or unskilled poorly paid
workers to take over unpopular jobs and supported immigration
from poor and remote regions of Turkey. The guest workers were
expected to live near the factories and return to Turkey after work-
ing for a few years. Hence, “no one in Germany cared much about
the fact that many of the new arrivals could hardly read or write,
making it difficult for them to participate in German society.”9
Mounting pressures from German industries, which didn’t
want to go through the burden of recruiting and training new
