by Yael Tamir
workers, led to the removal of the “rotation clause,” intended to
limit a foreign worker’s initial stay in Germany to two years. Re-
alizing that they were not going back, workers settled in cheap
neighborhoods, leading to the rise of immigrant neighborhoods
that now are seen as the strongholds of so- called parallel societ-
ies. Germany is now paying the price of the ongoing avoidance
of dealing with challenges of integration and the social effects of
the growing cultural tensions.
Even in Sweden, one of the most open social democracies, the
extreme right is becoming stronger. For decades, Sweden was a
162 • Chapter
19
racially and culturally homogeneous country with an expansive
social welfare system. Swedes insisted that they could absorb
large numbers of non- European migrants, but they never asked
themselves how those migrants would be integrated into Swed-
ish society.
In other cities across Western Europe, migrants tended to
cluster in low- income neighborhoods; facing poor job pros-
pects and rampant employment discrimination, they naturally
turned inward. More young women have started wearing the
hijab recently, Mr. Abdirahman says, and more young men “in-
ternalize the otherness”— rejected by their new society, they
embrace the stereotypes imposed on them.10 This allowed the
extreme right- wing party, Sweden Democrats, to solicit growing
support that is going to change the Swedish political landscape.
When Angela Merkel says that Islam is part of Germany,
claiming that “we are all Germany,” and when Macron looks at
the people of Marseilles, saying “this is France,” they nurture the
illusion that national affiliations, culture, language, tradition, and
religion do not matter. Not only is this description imprecise, but
it also leaves the “left behind” to fight each other for goods that
are not valued by the elites yet are necessary for their survival.
In his book The People vs. Democracy, Yascha Mounk11 ac-
knowledges the return of nationalism and argues that it should
be domesticated. The future, he argues, demands that we shal
build on a tradition of multiethnic democracy “to show that the
ties that bind us go well beyond ethnicity and religion.” Is there
really such a tradition? Multiethnic empires and monarchies—
yes; a multiethnic commonwealth— indeed, but multicultural,
multiethnic democracies have a very poor track record.
Liberals like to believe that social diversity breeds tolerance
and open- mindedness, but research does not support this. Even
in the United States, diversity intensifies the spread of native
Liberal
Nationalism • 163
sentiments and harsh laws on immigration.12 As Carol Larsen’s
comparative study shows, growing multiculturalism pushes even
the most liberal countries closer to the national pole.13 When
asked in 1995 about aspects defining their identity, 52 percent of
Canadians emphasized being born in the country, 55 percent
stressed living most of one’s life in Canada, and 26 percent high-
lighted being Christian. When asked the same question in
2003, after two decades of growing diversity, the national point
of view was reinforced: 82 percent emphasized being born in the
country, and 83 percent and 54 percent, respectively, emphasized
living most of one’s life in Canada and being Christian.14 Con-
trary to many predictions, extensive diversity evoked a growing
emphasis on birthrights rather than choice. The reason is clear—
diversity was never a goal— it was a compromise based on the
assumption that the social reality is stable and unlikely to change.
The acceptance of diversity, hence, piggybacked on a sense of
security. When cultural and political identity was cemented and
nationalism turned banal, giving room to a wider range of so-
cial, cultural, ethnic, racial, and linguistic representations seemed
harmless. In this stage of “assumed stability,” the nation- state
could easily take pride in its ability to accommodate internal dif-
ferences, congratulating itself on outgrowing “national infancy”
and maturing into a civic stage.
At a certain point the transformation of the public sphere
turned from stimulating and invigorating into threatening.
When the threshold of “reasonable diversity” is crossed, social
cohesion col apses and the balance of power is tilted back in the
direction of homogenization. The majority, especially its most
vulnerable members, realizes the influence of this process on its
ability to cash its national capital and starts worrying about the
disintegration of the familiar social fabric. Fearing the loss of sta-
tus and opportunities and being exposed to a greater internal
164 • Chapter
19
and external competition, vulnerable members of the majority
become more defensive, trying to reclaim some of the tradi-
tional structures of the nation- state.
This process is accelerated in times of austerity. When social
resources are scarce, the ideological wind changes and more na-
tionalistic voices settle in, reflecting an anti- diversity and anti-
immigration mood and a desire to revive some of the policies
effective in the first stages of nation- building. Experiments,
Krastev argues, have demonstrated that “people are far readier
to tolerate migrants not only when they judge their numbers ac-
ceptable but also when they see signs of their successful integra-
tion.”15 In other words, people rightly wish that social changes
will be moderated and managed.
While states neglected the role of planning and monitoring
integration and accommodation, the market determined both
the number of immigrants and the spread of the costs and ben-
efits of their inclusion. Like in so many other cases, this means
that those who benefit and those who carry the burden are two
separate groups. The benefits go to those who use the cheap labor
and profit from it, and the burdens are placed on the shoulders
of the less wel - off members of the society who are struggling
to keep their jobs, protect the value of their property, and main-
tain the quality of their schools. Ignoring this injustice was/is a
fatal political and moral mistake.
Rather than asking who is for or against diversity, maybe it’s
time to stop and think not in for and against terms but in terms of degrees: how much diversity can be taken in while retaining
social cohesion? How fast can a society adjust to demographic
changes? Who carries the burden of such changes, and can these
be more evenly distributed? The mere fact of asking these ques-
tions could sow the seeds of a new discourse that does not
Liberal
Nationalism • 165
position people against one another but tries to offer appli-
cable solutions.
In searching for a proper solution it is important to remem-
ber that the current social and political
unrest is grounded not
only in an economic crisis but also in a crisis of identity for which
the civic version of nationalism offers an insufficient, too abstract
and legalistic answer. Constitutionalism, universal rights, and
equal membership are valuable guidelines for political action, but
they cover a limited scope of a person’s life. Most of all, they offer
a very thin base for social and political cooperation. This is why
nationalism keeps coming back, pushing civic ideals aside, mak-
ing its way to center stage. Those who wil know how to espouse
it will be the winners of the coming decades.
20
This Is the Time
National sentiments, I argue, should be used to induce a
readiness to rebuild a cross- class coalition, giving individuals
worthwhile reasons to work together to promote the common
good, securing a more just distribution of risks and opportu-
nities. There are four reasons why this is the right time to do so:
First, as we have already seen, processes of globalization have
deepened the rift between the privileged globetrotter elite and
the many bound to stay home. More and more residents of the
developed world realize that they are far more rooted in their
homelands than globalists would have liked to believe. Realiz-
ing that their personal fate is tied with that of their country, it is
only logical for them to wish to put it first.
Second, understanding that the era of Western domination is
coming to an end and that power is being redistributed across
the globe in new and unknown ways instil s fear and places many
in the developed world on the side of the vulnerable. The shift
in global hegemony forces democracies to explore new ways of
defending their citizens’ long- term interests. Hyperglobalism
united the “99 percent,” class structure became fluid, and a grow-
ing percentage of the middle class felt increasingly insecure and
exposed to the risks of the less wel - off. Thus a cross- class coali-
tion seems more attractive than ever, and with it emerges the
demand to bring the elites back home, convincing (even forcing)
them to share their wealth with fellow nationals.
This Is the Time • 167
Third, some of the traditional social tools used to promote
greater social cohesion are not working as well as they used to.
It was commonly assumed that in the twenty- first century—
when so many jobs require advanced human skills— better
education is the key for greater competitiveness. Nowadays, in
the developed world, more and more people realize that educa-
tion is not enough to secure a prosperous life. State intervention
is necessary in order to build an infrastructure that will allow
the educated to make good use of their skil s, investing in re-
search and development, in the preservation of jobs as well as in
the creation of new ones. The days of the lean, minimal state,
when it was enough to nurture skills and then practice nonin-
terference in order to protect the ability of citizens to make the
best use of their accumulated human capital are over. Nowadays,
state planning, financing, and monitoring are necessary precon-
ditions for providing citizens with good enough opportunities
while minimizing their risks.
Fourth, the need for planning is especially urgent in light of
the crisis of the millennials who, in the developed world, had a
run of bad luck:
Capital losses in the global financial crisis of 2008– 2009 and high
subsequent unemployment have dealt serious blows to young workers
and savers. Add rising student debt in several developed countries,
tighter mortgage rules after 2008, higher house prices, increased
income inequality, less access to pensions and lower income mobility
and you have a “perfect storm” holding back wealth accumulation
by the Millennials in many countries.1
As a result, the mil ennials are likely to experience greater chal-
lenges and greater wealth inequality than those in previous gen-
erations. State- directed actions must be taken in order to al ow
them to conduct a productive and satisfying life. Nothing
168 • Chapter
20
threatens democratic stability more than unmet expectations and
unused skil s. Invisible hands cannot draw and protect borders,
distribute resources, create jobs, foster solidarity and social em-
pathy, or motivate tolerance and accommodation. The state
needs to renter the public and economic sphere in order to make
a difference.
If the new task of the state is to reestablish a cross- class coalition
that will promote a fairer distribution of risks and opportunities,
it is important to acknowledge that some risks and opportunities
are unifying— promoting social cohesiveness and undermining
class tensions— while others are divisive— pul ing the different
classes in different directions and exacerbating social conflict. Un-
fortunately, the social and economic costs and benefits of unifying
risks such as war or social conflict are easier to imagine than the
costs and benefits of unifying opportunities and goods. The de-
struction caused by the former and the social unity that follows is
evident, whereas the benefits of the latter are quite obscure as they
often reflect the avoidance of disruptive events such as social cri-
sis, growing gaps, strikes, riots, or even revolution. Consequently,
when seeking unity, individuals are less motivated to invest in risk
prevention than in conflict promotion, hence the close affinity
between internal crisis and belligerent policies. Social crisis
and intolerance are therefore common bedfel ows.
Opportunities can also be unifying or divisive. They are uni-
fying when they are open to everyone and distributed in ways
that serve the common good; they are divisive when they are
unequally or unfairly allocated, or, worse stil , open to only a se-
lect few. The divisive effect of opportunities is well exemplified
by the nationalism of the vulnerable. A common theme among
the vulnerable is that they were twice betrayed: once when the
state did not prevent the dwindling of their opportunities, and
This Is the Time • 169
twice when it wil ingly handed over the few opportunities cre-
ated to those who “jumped the line.”
The line jumpers— women, blacks, immigrants, and indige-
nous people who were found to be deserving of affirmative
action— gained new opportunities while the vulnerable were left
behind. The individualization of poverty and the unmaking of
class- based policies placed poor members of the majority in a
disadvantaged position— having fewer opportunities and of
a lesser quality. No wonder many of them conclude that the
state is unsympathetic to their needs, taking the side of “the
others.”2 When those who need the state the most do not trust
its intentions, they are tempted to join anarchist, populist, and
antiliberal forces that offer no solution but adequa
tely express
their rage.
The situation gets even more volatile when it becomes clear
that it’s not only opportunities that are unevenly distributed but
also the costs of collective risks: those who pay the highest price
for policies such as free trade, free movements of people, and af-
firmative action are those who rejected these policies, while
those advocating them avoid carrying their burden. The uneven
distribution of risks and opportunities explains the felt injustice
and consequently the aggression associated with the national-
ism of the vulnerable.
Resistance to social change may be an innate attitude, but it
is intensified by feelings of unfairness. An ongoing neglect of the
obligation to compensate, support, and bail out individuals who
went bankrupt, while going all the way to support banks and in-
vestment companies on the verge of collapse, made the dis-
torted political order of priorities clear. A targeted attempt to
redistribute costs and benefits in a more just and effective way
could ameliorate negative feelings, promote a greater sense of
170 • Chapter
20
Table 1. The social role of risks and opportunities
Risk
Opportunity
Collective risks: war,
Collective goods: National
terrorism, ecological
goods.
risks, natural disasters.
Goods that are collectively
Welfare policies sharing
produced and consumed, Unifying
risks in a fair way
distributed in ways
across the community.
allowing all participants
to win some gains.
Selective risks to which
Zero- sum goods.
only some members of Goods only some can
the society are exposed.
enjoy.
Uneven distribution of
Unequal distribution of
burdens.
goods that leaves some
Divisive
members of the society
permanently on the
losing side.
fairness, reduce social tensions, and promote a readiness to re-
build a cross- class cooperation.
In order to develop and implement policies that foster justice
and fairness, one must convince the more powerful members of
society that compromising their privileges and sharing their
wealth and power is worth their while. No social and economic
