The Camden Expedition of 1864

by Michael J Forsyth

  The Confederates designated all the territory west of the Mississippi River the Trans-Mississippi Department. The department encompassed some 600,000 square miles of territory that included the states of Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana, except for the parishes east of the Mississippi. The Confederacy also claimed Missouri, still a Union state, Indian Territory (modern-day Oklahoma) and Arizona Territory. Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas were the focus of Rebel and Federal actions in the Civil War with the far western territories playing a minor role. The region produced large amounts of cotton and sugar cane, and had the potential for producing foodstuffs to sustain Rebel armies. While the department had substantial natural resources, these would remain largely untapped due to the undeveloped infrastructure. Rail transportation west of the Mississippi lagged far behind the east with no coherent system connecting key points. Water transportation proved more robust due to the existence of several navigable rivers, including the Red, Arkansas, Ouachita, and Saline. The area also had hundreds of miles of coastline, the number one port in the south, New Orleans, and an uninterrupted trade outlet by land with Mexico. Trade with Mexico represented the one source of foreign trade that the Federal blockade proved unable to shut down throughout the war. By 1864, though, Union naval power had seriously constricted southern sea lines of communication. The Federal authorities had control of New Orleans and the entire length of the Mississippi. The terrain varied widely, from rugged hills in Arkansas and forested lowlands in Louisiana, to open plains in Texas.1 While deficient in many aspects the department did have some significant advantages.

  On the surface it appears that the Trans-Mississippi Department was completely unimportant, but a closer look reveals that it was an area of vast strategic importance—at least early in the war. Both the Confederacy and the Union dismissed the area as a backwater in their policy making. Each combatant tended to focus its war effort on the east bank of the Mississippi as a result. Jefferson Davis’ Administration wrote off the Trans-Mississippi by mid-1862 deciding on an eastern strategy centered on Richmond and the Confederate heartland—the area between the Appalachians and the Mississippi River. In addition to these, Davis dispersed forces around the nation to protect vital points. This territorial strategy would prove the undoing of the Confederacy. Federal policy early in the war aimed at capturing the Confederate capital and isolating the Trans-Mississippi by wresting control of the river from the Rebels. However, by disregarding the Trans-Mississippi, the Confederacy unwittingly failed to leverage a vast pool of resources that included manpower and previously mentioned agriculture and raw materials.2

  The Confederate Trans-Mississippi Department encompassed a vast landmass and a substantial population. Of a total white population of 6.51 million, approximately 2.16 million lived in the Trans-Mississippi or 33 percent of the total.3 The Confederate government recognized that here was an excellent source of military age men to fill the armies. Indeed, in 1862 Richmond virtually stripped the department of soldiers to stem the Federal tide after the defeat at Shiloh. Throughout Lieutenant General Theophilus Holmes’ tenure as departmental commander, the Rebel War Department badgered him for transfers to serve in Confederate armies east of the Mississippi River. The manpower drain served to diminish the strength and morale of the people for a couple of reasons. First, since the Rebel government considered the main theater of war to be the area east of the Mississippi, it made sense that the bulk of Confederate soldiers should serve in the east. Believing that there was only a minimal military threat to the region, the Confederacy continually demanded that the Trans-Mississippi supply troops to the main armies across the great river. Second, the Trans-Mississippi became the junkyard of incompetent officers for the Confederacy. As the war intensified in 1862 failed officers were sent packing to this “quiet” area where they could do little harm. Men the likes of Holmes and John Magruder filled the upper echelons of leadership in the department. The combination of these factors caused a serious problem among the citizens and a resulting recruiting challenge.4

  Theater of Operations, Trans-Mississippi Department. Source: Battles and Leaders of the Civil War: Retreat with Honor, Vol. 4, p. 348.

  The citizenry believed that the Richmond government had abandoned them and taken all of their soldiers, and they were reluctant to serve in the army. Why, many asked, in the face of a very real Federal threat should the male population join the Confederate army only to be sent east to fight? This would lay their homes open to pillage, and the resultant resentment led to anti-government sentiment. The out-of-touch Rebel government did not realize the true extent of the Federal military threat even as the bluecoats steadily gobbled up territory. The demand for soldiers, constant Union incursions, and weak leadership produced an air of pessimism that strangled the potential positive contribution the department could have made to the war effort. To make matters worse Richmond did little to remedy the problems.5

  Rather than forming a coherent strategy for the defense of the Trans-Mississippi, the administration simply made a change in the top man. By doing so, the Davis administration demonstrated its belief that the problem in the west lay in the realm of leadership rather than policy and it did little to allay the fears of the people. While a change in command was warranted, it proved only a half measure in the face of the challenges west of the Mississippi. President Davis replaced the decrepit and aged Holmes with the more energetic and youthful Kirby Smith in order to rejuvenate the stagnating theater and lift sagging morale. In doing so, Davis also informed Smith not to expect much in the way of material help from the Confederate government. Thus, he formally stated the previously implied policy that the Trans-Mississippi region would have to make do with its own resources. Upon arrival in the west, Smith conducted an inspection tour and what he found appalled him. “The male population,” Smith reported, “are old men, or have furnished substitutes, are lukewarm, or wrapped up in speculations and money making.”6 In sum, no simple change of command would restore the confidence of the people of the Trans-Mississippi in their government. The administration would have to demonstrate true concern by changing the damaging policy that made the citizens west of the Mississippi feel abandoned.

  Kirby Smith had approximately 30,000 men in his department—of whom many were not combat troops—available for defense. While this sounds like a substantial number, a closer look reveals some inherent flaws in organization. Smith’s department was sub-divided into four separate districts, each with its own distribution of the total manpower. These districts were the Districts of Arkansas, West Louisiana, Texas, and the Indian Territory. The field returns from January 1, 1864, show Arkansas with about 11,000 troops, West Louisiana with another 11,000, Texas at 9,800 and the Indian Territory with 1,800. Therefore, Smith’s troops were actually dispersed across several hundred miles. While the Confederates had the advantage of operating on interior lines, the poor transportation infrastructure would minimize this strength somewhat.7

  The disposition of Rebel forces stemmed directly from the prevailing military strategy of the Confederacy. In essence, Jefferson Davis’ policy was one devoted to maintaining the territorial integrity of the fledgling nation. Political considerations were largely to blame for the decision to implement such a strategy, as state governors demanded that Davis provide troops to protect the interests of their individual states. This meant that the already small Rebel armies had to disperse themselves across many points to repulse any Federal incursion. The obvious problem with such a strategy is that a much larger Union army could puncture this cordon at any time while simultaneously gobbling up the very territory the Confederates were supposed to defend. Additionally, a real danger existed in that as the concentrated Federals pushed forward they would capture or destroy the scattered, diminutive Confederate armies as at Fort Donelson and Vicksburg, steadily eroding precious strength.8

  Kirby Smith’s strategy mirrored the overarching Confederate policy on paper and in practice. Smith coined his strategy a Fabian policy. Based on hi
s limited resources, Smith planned to make maximum use of interior lines to quickly concentrate against Federal thrusts. Once he detected a threat the confronting district would slowly fall back before the enemy advance. Meanwhile, he would order the other district commanders to reinforce the threatened district. When Smith had the force he needed to repulse the enemy, he could then pounce and defeat it. The policy traded space in order to gain time while placing scattered Confederate forces at minimal risk.9 In light of the disposition of his forces, Smith’s policy was probably the wise choice, but the policy caused tremendous friction within the department. The various district commanders, particularly Richard Taylor, did not like the policy. The dissension caused by the disagreement would spark fireworks in the Rebel command and doom hopes for a decisive victory in the Trans-Mississippi in 1864.

  Arkansas had witnessed the hard hand of war for three years by 1864 and it had been thoroughly ravaged. Early 1862 saw the first large engagement as Brigadier General Samuel R. Curtis’ Federal army defeated Major General Earl Van Dorn’s Rebels at Pea Ridge. While this campaign locked in Missouri as a Union state, it also lay Arkansas open to further encroachment. It began a cycle of depredations and hardships that would demoralize the state’s citizens. “Hit shore was mighty hard for us gals o’ th’ war [sic],” one northwest Arkansas woman recalled after the war. She continued, “[T]h’ boys had all tuck t’ th’ hills, an’ th’ horses was all gone, an’ nothin’ for we-uns t’eat, nohow.” Indeed, food became a scarce commodity for those left behind when the men left for the war, and times were especially tough for the women. Yet, the depredations were not the work of Yankee soldiers exclusively. The same Ozark woman recalled, “when ol’ Sterlin’ Price was a-raidin’, th’ Choctaw Injuns was with him, an’ they et up ever’ last stalk o’ sugarcorn even—jest all set down an’ peeled it an’ chawed it for th’sweet. We did make a leetle crop o’ corn thet year, but th’ dang Yankees come an’ tuck most of it.”10

  Such constant danger and struggle for survival sent morale sinking in Arkansas making it ripe for re-incorporation into the Union. In September 1863 Frederick Steele took Little Rock, the state capital. The taking of the seat of government was a serious blow to the Confederate cause in the state. Everything north of the Arkansas River was now under Federal control and much of the eastern part of the state close to the Mississippi River. This left the Confederates a small enclave in the southwest corner of the state. Losing the entire state in 1864 would represent a failure of Confederate arms and policy and likely deliver the state up to Federal authority. Many in the Lincoln administration had just such a scenario in mind in 1864 and Henry Halleck had a military plan in the works to bring these aspirations to fruition.

  Henry Halleck was the general-in-chief of all Union armies in late 1863 through early 1864. Halleck, known by the nickname “Old Brains,” was a cerebral commander in every sense. He had authored Elements of Military Art and Science before the war and the text served as unofficial army doctrine. While Halleck knew much of the theory of war he continually demonstrated a lack of understanding of the art of war in practice. His cautious nature and tendency to insist on tidying up his rear area as a pre-requisite to a forward advance always robbed the Federal armies of momentum. This aspect of his character exhibited itself in the formulation of plans for 1864.

  Halleck proposed a movement up the Red as early as August 1863 after the fall of Vicksburg “to restore the flag” to Texas. The reason for Halleck’s suggestion was the recent French intervention in Mexico. In mid–1863 Napoleon III, Emperor of the French, had installed Austrian archduke Maximillian I on the throne in Mexico City as head of a puppet regime. This was a clear violation of the Monroe Doctrine, but there was little that the Lincoln administration could do about it while engaged in a civil war. However, Napoleon dangled the possibility of a rapprochement to Confederate diplomats in Paris. Foreign recognition had long haunted the Confederacy and now it seemed achievable. This, of course, would be unacceptable to Lincoln and he solicited potential solutions to the problem. Lincoln’s personal secretary recalled that the president was “very anxious that Texas should be occupied and firmly held in view of French possibilities.”11 Halleck’s proposal for a campaign in the Trans-Mississippi in 1864 appeared to be a viable solution to Lincoln’s dilemma.

  Major General Nathaniel P. Banks rebuffed Halleck’s suggestions at that time, counter-proposing that incursions up the Sabine River or landings on the Texas coast might suffice to discourage the French in establishing ties with the Confederacy. Neither of Banks’ courses of action came to much as both were attempted in late 1863. Major General William B. Franklin attempted to establish a foothold in Texas by running through the Sabine Pass and occupying Galveston. This small-scale expedition failed miserably as a scratch force of Rebel artillerymen turned back the Federal gunboats and troop transports before Franklin could effect a landing. Additional attempts to “restore the flag” did little more than occupy worthless strips of bare beach on the Texas coast and proved equally abortive. Halleck expressed his displeasure with Banks in a series of dispatches between December and January.12 While the French situation troubled the administration, other factors closed in on the President and pressed Halleck to push Banks to more concrete action.

  The most compelling reason for action in the Trans-Mississippi was political in nature. 1864 was an election year in the United States. Under normal circumstances elections produce excitement, but this election would prove particularly interesting. This is because the United States was the first representative government to undergo a national election in time of a civil war. While 1864 dawned bright for Lincoln’s prospects for reelection due to the military successes in 1863, his retention in office was by no means a foregone conclusion. This was the third year of a bloody war. Scarcely anyone north or south remained unaffected by the fighting. With few exceptions all families either had a loved one or a friend that had died or been maimed in the war. The protracted nature of the conflict tended to drive morale down in the North the longer it continued.13

  In 1864 there were significant anti-Lincoln factions operating in the North, the most prominent among them was the Copperheads. Not only did they have the potential to sway the election; they also exhibited subversive tendencies. In light of this threat to his reelection, and consequently pursuit of his war aims, Lincoln and his handlers devised what became known as the Ten Percent plan. Under the plan rebellious states could gain readmittance to the Union when ten percent of its citizens reaffirmed loyalty to the Union and it adopted a new state constitution recognizing the Union. The state would then form a new government and its citizens—those who had taken the oath of allegiance—could participate in the national election in November.14 The key to this policy was that the Federal government, through the army, would have to exert control over the state before Lincoln could carry the scheme out. Many supporters of the Republican Party wholeheartedly agreed with this policy believing it would deliver an electoral boon for their cause.15 Thus, here was a major motivation for conducting an otherwise unnecessary campaign in what both sides considered a minor theater.

  Frederick Steele’s occupation of northern Arkansas and Little Rock figured prominently in the Ten Percent plan. With Federal forces in control of over half the state, Lincoln could institute his policy. Steele carried out Lincoln’s wishes as instructed in the winter of 1863 through spring 1864. Steele’s “conciliatory policy” drew both raves from the loyal citizens of Arkansas while simultaneously drawing the ire of Radical Republicans in Congress. Many of the Radicals felt that Steele’s focus on conciliation and restoration of loyal civil government came at the expense of his military duties and there is an element of truth to this. Less than one week from the start of the Camden Expedition, Steele could be found engrossed in the details of supervising the civil election rather than campaign preparations. Nevertheless, as a soldier he conducted himself as a professional in executing his instructions from the President.16
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  In addition to the election, economics had a role in initiating the Red River Campaign and Camden Expedition. Northern textile interests had suffered under a severe shortage of cotton since 1862 with mills operating at one quarter of capacity. Textile magnates began to exert pressure on New England lawmakers to do something to prop up their ailing industry. The textile interests asserted that a military offensive in the Trans-Mississippi would give them access to an unlimited source of the crop. In addition to extracting cotton, prominent German-American citizens were calling for the “liberation” of their kinsmen in Texas. A significant population of Free-Soil German farmers lived in Texas and utilized no slave labor in their production of cotton. These people felt no particular loyalty to the South and this resulted in Confederate repression of the Germans. A campaign to Texas up Red River then would produce several benefits. First, it would provide a source of cheap cotton to jump start New England’s textile economy. Second, liberation of the Germans in Texas would appease the influential pro-German lobby thus solidifying the loyalty of German soldiers then serving in the Union armies. Also, the German farmers would help wrest control of Texas from Rebel authorities and provide a source of additional voters for Lincoln in the upcoming election. Finally, cotton produced by free labor would prove a propaganda boon for the abolitionists because it would demonstrate to the South that a profitable cotton crop did not require the use of slave labor. While showing the Confederate states that their economic system was defunct, Lincoln would also reap the side benefit of quieting the abolitionists who constantly criticized his policy toward the South as being too soft on slaveholders.17 On the surface an 1864 campaign in the Trans-Mississippi appeared to have many benefits and a potentially high payoff for Lincoln, the war effort, and his reelection prospects.