The Camden Expedition of 1864

by Michael J Forsyth

  The enemy broke in the wildest confusion, and from this out [sic] his retreat was a perfect rout. The road and timber were strewn with blankets, saddlebags, hats and guns, and prisoners were being constantly brought in and sent to the rear. The pursuit was vigorously kept up until we arrived at a point about 5 miles from Mount Elba, where the road crosses Big Creek. Here the enemy succeeded in tearing up about 20 feet of the bridge, carrying off the plank. The creek could not be forded. We were consequently very suddenly and effectively checked.32

  Sergeant August Bondi, an Austrian immigrant from the 1848 revolutions turned Union soldier, confirmed Clayton’s report in his recollections while adding a few details from the perspective of the common soldier. He stated:

  As the 5th Kansas [Cavalry] came in from across the river the engagement began to wax warm. We dismounted and deployed. Company K ordered to support two howitzers of the 1st Indiana and a detail of the 28th Wisconsin Infantry already in position: went in, on double quick with the 28th Wisconsin detail, to an old log corn-crib for shelter, using the cracks for loop-holes. This being just opposite the enemy’s center, greatly contributed to the repulse of his charges. During the action one of the 28th Wisconsin men by the cabin was hit in the forehead and fell back dying. While I tried to raise him up, both of the howitzers … discharged … and my left ear became deaf and has remained so since then. The enemy, without artillery, retreated, and Colonel Clayton ordered me to take a squad across the river and scout…. The cavalry was ordered to charge and harass the retreating enemy, which we did till we came to a very defective bridge, partially destroyed, where we halted.33

  The engagement of Mt. Elba cost the Confederates about 260 men and scattered the remainder of Dockery’s men in all directions. On top of the success Lieutenants Young and Greathouse had achieved, the expedition from Pine Bluff realized brilliant results effectively removing two brigades from the Confederate order of battle and eliminating a serious threat to Steele’s line of communication. With the exception of the logistic problems, the Camden Expedition was meeting and exceeding expectations. Unknown to the Federal high command, the neat little Mt. Elba engagements would represent the only solid success of the entire expedition.

  While Powell Clayton’s Yankee cavalry had dazzled their opponents, Frederick Steele’s column continued to press on to Arkadelphia. Amid the advance there were visible signs of increasing pressure from Price’s horsemen, as clashes became more frequent. Nevertheless, the army had little trouble in reaching the town brushing aside Rebel resistance. Andrew Sperry took note that the area surrounding Arkadelphia “looked much fresher and greener than anywhere else. The change was great and noticeable…. It had almost the appearance of magic.” The change of scenery from the dank bottomlands of the Saline to the rolling, forested hills surrounding Arkadelphia served to lift the spirits of the army.34

  Arkadelphia rests on the west bank of the Ouachita River and this point represented roughly the halfway mark between Little Rock and Washington. From Washington it is another 90 miles to Shreveport where Steele hoped to link up with Banks to deliver the death blow to Kirby Smith’s Trans-Mississippi Confederacy. Thus far, Steele’s column had progressed with relative ease losing no men along the way. Even Rebel major John Edwards, aide to General Shelby, recounted that “Steele’s movements were admirable and precise.”35 Now Steele would wait to link up with Thayer’s column from Fort Smith. Once concentrated the unified VII Corps would continue the march to Washington and Shreveport. Steele expected Thayer by April 1, two days after arriving, but as we have already seen, the Frontier Division was behind schedule. For the time being Steele would have to wait at Arkadelphia for the rest of his forces.

  The village, even in 1864, had a fine appearance and the soldiers looked forward to a restful couple of days waiting for their comrades. The men were disappointed as their stay became consumed in the never-ending quest for food. Private Sperry provided a glimpse of the Federal army’s repose in Arkadelphia. The town reminded the Iowa infantryman of quaint northern villages in contrast to the “dilapidated huddles to which [we] had been more accustomed.” Oddly, the inhabitants seemed to welcome the newcomers. Sperry recalled the women commenting that, “Yur [sic] men treat us better than our own do.” As the soldiers supplemented their diet with what was available, they were confounded by the fact that the locals refused to accept payment. Upon further inquiry they discovered that the people worried that the Rebels might retaliate against those who accepted Yankee greenbacks as collaborators.36 Arkadelphia, however, had little surplus food and within hours of arrival the stocks of available victuals dried up. With a tenuous supply line and little local forage the Federals could not long remain in town.

  No one in Steele’s army was more concerned about logistics than the quartermaster, Captain Charles A. Henry. Without any inkling of the length of their stay, Henry took the initiative to organize foraging parties to fan out around town and bring in provender. Surprisingly, the area provided much more than expected as the Confederates had failed to destroy granaries surrounding Arkadelphia. If Thayer could reach his destination by the April 1 deadline, the Federals would remain in good shape to continue the advance.37 Steele had other considerations aside from uniting his forces and logistics. He had to achieve a concentration with Banks in Louisiana as soon as possible and could not afford to wait too long for Thayer. But, what was happening in Louisiana?

  Steele’s ability to communicate with Banks was poor when the army remained in Little Rock, but now with both columns on the move it became impossible. Neither general knew where the other was and since Halleck had not established an overall commander to coordinate the far-flung elements, lack of information would plague Steele and Banks. Brigadier General Nathan Kimball commanding the rear echelon troops at Little Rock did have access to newspapers and from these he gleaned what intelligence he could. Kimball reported on March 30 that he “had no news from General Banks other than newspaper reports of the capture of Fort DeRussy.”38 But this information was already sixteen days old and on the 30th the bulk of the Army of the Gulf had already reached Grand Ecore upriver from Alexandria. What Kimball did not report, since he had no way of knowing, was that Grant had ordered Banks to wrap up the Red River Campaign by April 10 in order to return Sherman’s troops to Mississippi and begin preparations for an assault on Mobile. Banks received this message on April 1 at Grand Ecore, the same day of Thayer’s expected combination at Arkadelphia with the rest of the VII Corps.39 April 10th was only nine days away and Banks still had over 60 miles to go and an army between him and his quarry. Banks made a hasty decision to save time that would lead to his demise at Mansfield. Steele, however, was still 100 miles away and not yet massed for the final leg of the march. Meanwhile, Kirby Smith had concentrated the bulk of Trans-Mississippi forces south of Shreveport under Richard Taylor, and his irascible subordinate meant to strike a blow. It seemed unlikely that Steele would be able to give full cooperation.

  Steele had spent only three days in Arkadelphia by April 1, but with no word from Thayer and worried over his supply vulnerability, he resolved to continue the march without the Frontier Division. Thayer would have to catch up with Steele to unite their forces further south. Accordingly, Eugene Carr’s cavalry swung out onto the Military Road in the direction of Washington that morning. The previously light Confederate resistance took a noticeable up-tick as Price’s minions began to resist in earnest. The terrain favored hit and run tactics and the Rebels used them to perfection. The Military Road beyond Arkadelphia ran through a pine forest down to the Little Missouri River and then to Washington. The woodland forced the Federals to lengthen their line of march over many miles as the army snaked southward. The Rebel division commander in this sector was Brigadier General John S. Marmaduke and he had laid his plans out carefully. With two brigades in front, Greene’s and Cabell’s, Marmaduke would slow Steele’s forward progress while Jo Shelby circled around to the rear to snap at the Federal’s heels and if oppo
rtunity offered to attempt a foray at the supply train.40

  Colonel Samuel J. Crawford, commander of the 2nd Kansas Infantry (Colored) of the Frontier Division, was quite critical of Steele’s decision to push on from Arkadelphia without forming a junction with Thayer. He asserted that Steele had not considered the length of Thayer’s march before setting the April 1 deadline and exposed the separate columns to destruction by moving forward before uniting. This criticism is unfounded since as a regimental commander Crawford was not privy to the fact that Thayer had not raised any objections to the deadline or informed his superior of the change of his route of march. Further, Crawford failed to consider Steele’s logistic situation which fast became untenable every day that the army sat idle. When these factors are taken into account, Steele’s decision to move on was probably his only available alternative.41

  Incessant skirmishing with the pesky Rebels took its toll on the ability of the Yankees to make progress. Much time was spent deploying from march column into line of battle in the dense forest. One Union infantryman remembered “double-quicking a good deal of the time, first to the rear as reinforcements, and then back … again.”42 This necessarily slowed the advance to a crawl and exhausted the men. In an attempt to accelerate the movement Steele closed the column into a tight mass and elements of Carr’s cavalry set dry leaves in the forest on fire foolishly believing this would help screen the march of the army from the searching eyes of the enemy. Rather than screening anything, they succeeded in choking the men struggling along in the rear in a pall of acrid smoke and stifling heat. The slowing rate of march in the pine woods continued to exacerbate the logistic situation.43 Marching through wooded areas cannot provide forage for man or beast and the incessant deployment to skirmish with elusive Rebels increased the appetite of soldiers who already had little to eat. Rebel pressure from Marmaduke was beginning to pay dividends and Smith’s Fabian strategy worked to perfection.

  Brigadier General Samuel A. Rice led Steele’s rear guard on the march from Arkadelphia. As such he would bear the brunt of fierce little attacks by Jo Shelby’s troopers. Around noon of April 2 near Terre Noir Creek Shelby’s men announced their presence as the blue mass slowly made their way south. Shelby’s brigade mounted an all-out charge with about 1500 troops supported by three pieces of artillery. Rice, near the front of his column, became alarmed by the crash of fire near the rear of the column. He perceived by its sustained nature that this was not harassing fire, but an attempt to snatch the precious supply train and pontoon bridges. He therefore “proceeded at once to the field of action” and deployed his whole brigade including a battery of artillery to repel the assault. “This was a hard day all around,” Private Sperry recalled as Rice’s brigade engaged in a running six hour fight before the onset of darkness finally broke off the fight near Okolona. Shelby compared the fight to a posse on a manhunt with his men as “eager as bloodhounds” to get at the Yankees. The newly promoted Shelby nearly succeeded in his attempt to break through to the train, but the determination and agility of Rice saved the day for the Union army.44

  The exhausted army arrived on the Little Missouri River on the 3rd of April amid continued pressure from Marmaduke’s Division at Okolona in rear and at the river crossing sites in front. Steele’s frustration began to mount as he still had no word from Thayer, and because of the fresh fighting and a deteriorating food supply. For some days he had been considering a modification in his route. The Military Road had served well as a line for rapid movement, but as discussed earlier it was a rather circuitous path to Shreveport. In addition, keeping his army supplied by road from Little Rock was infeasible. He now began to contemplate diverging from the Military Road in favor of a move to Camden. Camden had the advantage of position since it rested on a high bluff overlooking the Ouachita River—a sort of “Confederate Gibraltar on the Ouachita.” If Steele could take Camden he could use the river—which the Union navy controlled—to resupply and refit his troops before pressing on to Shreveport.45

  There were, however, three problems with adopting this modified course of action. First, the Confederates were in full possession of Camden, the most heavily fortified location in southern Arkansas. A perimeter of several redoubts and strongpoints ringed the town making it virtually impregnable to assault. Should Steele move east to Camden and fail to take the town, his army could starve in hostile country. Second, he could not move in this direction without having established positive communications with Thayer as the latter would have no idea where Steele had gone. Finally, sidestepping back to the east would further delay his movement south to make the junction with Banks on the Red. This would upset Banks’ very tight timetable and jeopardize success of the enterprise.46

  While Steele could immediately put this plan into execution, instead he determined to first set the conditions for its possibility later. To do this Steele decided to stay on course toward Washington on the Military Road. This would enable him to establish communication with Thayer as soon as he came in range. Also, continuing south to Washington would have a deceptive effect on Price. Since Washington now stood as the seat of Confederate authority in Arkansas, Steele reasoned that by threatening the place Price would have to draw in his own forces to defend the capital. This would result in a corresponding weakening of Rebel defenses at Camden. By throwing forward a cavalry screen to cover his movements, Steele could then turn quickly off the Military Road toward a thinly defended Camden. Then with a head start and hard marching the VII Corps could reach the relatively undefended town and refit for continuation of the expedition.47

  The Confederates held the far side of the Little Missouri and planned to contest Steele’s crossing on the Military Road. The wily Steele had no intention of butting his head against a wall in a foolish attempt to force a river crossing under fire. Instead, Steele sent out reconnaissance parties to find an alternative crossing location. These detachments found Elkins’ Ford a few miles to the east only lightly guarded by graybacks from Marmaduke’s division and Steele quickly sent out Colonel William E. McLean’s 2nd Brigade of Salomon’s 3rd Division to seize the ford. McLean assigned Lieutenant Colonel Francis Drake—after whom present-day Drake University is named—to lead the advance of three companies each from the 43rd Indiana and 36th Iowa Infantry regiments to establish the foothold. Upon arrival Drake found elements of the 1st Iowa Cavalry already skirmishing with Marmaduke’s men on the far side. The small Rebel contingent put up an unusually stiff resistance and Drake reported that he could not take control of the ford with the force at hand. McLean reinforced Drake with a section of Lieutenant Charles Peetz’ 2nd Missouri Light Artillery and orders to assume command of all forces at the ford. This action enabled Drake to push the Rebels back and assume a commanding position at the crossing site. Marmaduke was not yet ready to let the Federals have the ford without a fight and he heavily reinforced his men at Elkins to prevent the Federals from advancing. Launching a fierce counterattack, Marmaduke placed enormous pressure on Drake holding the ford, but his small contingent held long enough for the van of Steele’s army to reach his position ensuring it would serve as the crossing place for the VII Corps. The skirmish at Elkins had been sharp indeed, but the Federals claimed a tactical victory that would allow them to make a smooth crossing, and further they took great delight in capturing Marmaduke’s own aide-de-camp in the fight. The Federals began crossing that evening while a frustrated Marmaduke fell back from the river in the direction of the Prairie D’Ane.48

  On the 4th Steele redoubled his effort to make contact with the tardy Thayer sending out patrols to find the erstwhile division. As these feelers fanned out the Federals continued to push across the Little Missouri when another spring deluge unleashed itself on the hapless Yankees. Once again the blueclad soldiers supervised by Junius Wheeler’s pioneers had to corduroy the roads to enable the ponderous artillery and wagons to make their way out of the bottoms to higher ground. About this time the Confederates stepped up their own efforts to delay and h
arass the Union army. Rice’s brigade, now on advanced guard, once again bore the preponderance of the action as Marmaduke pressed home an assault. While the army was never in any real danger the attack did fray nerves and sap more strength from the tired Union soldiers. Rice again demonstrated his fortitude as a leader, personally directing the defense, and in the process he received a painful wound that carried away “a piece of his scalp.”49 The Federals finally completed the crossing late on the 4th and moved forward to the Prairie D’ Ane where a showdown awaited.

  On April 5 Steele finally received the intelligence he had been anticipating hearing for over a week. A courier arrived that day informing him that Thayer had just passed through Rockport. It would take another three to four days for the Frontier Division to reach the Little Missouri. Rather than continue the advance Steele decided to call a halt in order to wait for Thayer. Steele ordered the army to a place known locally as the Widow Cornelius’ plantation. This location would secure the crossing from further Confederate assaults. Further, it would allow Captain Wheeler, chief engineer, the breathing space he needed to improve the roads and build a pontoon at the ford. The rains had turned the bottoms into a swamp and caused a three-foot rise in the river at the crossing site.50

  The Confederates were not idle as the Federals finally effected their concentration on the Little Missouri. Several events occurred that would set the stage for the rest of the expedition. First, Price, believing from his own sources and from a message penned by Kirby Smith, that Steele intended to continue down the Military Road to Washington, ordered all his available forces to mass at the Prairie D’ Ane. This uncovered Camden as Price left only a token force in the earthworks and had all the public stores removed. The brigades already at the prairie began to throw up breastworks across the Federal line of march to contest the advance. Second, the van of Maxey’s Division, Gano’s Brigade, commanded by Colonel Charles DeMorse, arrived in southern Arkansas giving Price his first accession in strength since the infantry had left for Louisiana and the disaster at Mt. Elba. Third, Dockery and Crawford had reconstituted their cut up brigades in record time making good the embarrassing losses south of Pine Bluff. Price left Camden on the 5th to take personal command in the field. He arrived on April 7th with a plan to frustrate the Federals in his front and make his contribution to Kirby Smith’s overall campaign to defeat Steele’s VII Corps.51