The Camden Expedition of 1864

by Michael J Forsyth

  Price’s army now numbered roughly 7,000 cavalry under a varying standard of discipline. This placed him at a 1.6 to one disadvantage in terms of force ratio, with Steele having about 12,000 men. This was a very favorable ratio for mounting a defense capable of delaying Steele and checking the rate of his advance, but with a determined effort by Steele, Price simply could not stop him. A closer look provides further insight as to why this is so. First, Price had virtually no infantry forces. Cavalry in the Civil War usually fought dismounted since firepower of massed rifles precluded making the glorious cavalry charge of a bygone era. When cavalry troops deployed for battle one in four men did not actually engage the enemy because they were assigned duty as horse holders for the other three troopers. This pared down Price’s forces in combat to a 2.3 to one disadvantage. Another critical fact is that cavalrymen did not carry comparable arms as the infantry placing them at a firepower deficit. In the Trans-Mississippi Department, Rebel cavalry often had weapons varying from short carbine to shotgun, which were inferior to the weaponry of the foot soldiers. This further multiplied the challenges of defense for Price lowering his force ratio as a he prepared to give Steele battle. The advantage that Price did enjoy was greater mobility and a shorter line of communication. Since his entire force rode horses and these animals were considered in better shape than those of the Federals, Price had a distinct advantage in the ability to shift forces quickly.12 He would have to rely on this to enable him to comply with Kirby Smith’s guidance not to bring on a general engagement unless sure of his ability to win until Smith could defeat Banks. In light of Price’s loose direction of affairs since taking personal command, he could very well lose what advantages he did have through mismanagement.

  Steele was in more of a jam then Price realized and when he advanced toward Prairie D’Ane on April 10, he was not intent on advancing into Price’s trap, but rather side stepping to the east. On the evening of the 9th Steele issued Field Order #8 to begin the advance at six in the morning. The army would march with Carr’s cavalry in the lead, followed by Salomon’s 3rd Division, the supply and pontoon train, and the Frontier Division as the rear guard.13 Carr’s cavalry would push forward to develop the situation while the infantry would fall in behind and deploy when necessary to push Price back.

  Carr received his orders that night and made arrangements to carry them out as directed. But, at 5:30 A.M. on April 10 Carr had determined that his division was incapable of making the “strong reconnaissance” that Steele desired. One reason for this was the lack of forage required for the horses. This had forced Carr to dismount a large contingent of his overall strength. The 1st Iowa Cavalry, for example, had over 300 troopers on foot.14 Compounding this problem, Carr reported that he could not account for part of his division that had not returned from a scout the day before. Combined this left Carr with only 600 mounted men to begin the march out of a total division strength of 2,600. Therefore, Carr requested that Thayer’s cavalry brigade send help to make up for his shortage of horsemen.15

  There is no record of Steele’s reaction upon receipt of Carr’s note, but the commanding general must have felt some irritation since Carr penned the dispatch only thirty minutes before start time. With Carr unable to carry out his orders at the appointed time the army would have to delay its movement until adequate cavalry was on hand. This inevitably caused the rest of the column some discomfort in waiting to move. The 33rd Iowa waited for hours standing by the road to take its place in march column. After a short delay Carr finally jumped off, but this gave little relief to the impatient infantrymen waiting by the road. The road was a narrow dirt path through the thick stand of timber winding to the prairie. All the units in front had to work their way forward before the rearward troops could file into the road. As a result, it was one o’clock in the afternoon before the 33rd Iowa lurched forward. Even then the maddening accordion effect caused the column to lunge by fits and starts. It took Private Sperry and his comrades almost four hours to march the four short miles to Prairie D’Ane.16

  John B. Martin of the 1st Iowa Cavalry was among the dismounted horsemen sent forward with Carr’s division on April 10. He recalled being deployed in skirmish order for the first time in the expedition. This was hard work, especially for cavalrymen, because the skirmishers had to fan out in the woods and move forward through the thick pine forest. Shelby had a token force of pickets in the woods to provide him early warning of enemy dispositions. Martin and his fellow troopers made contact with the fleeting Rebels in early afternoon. Bounding forward in small groups, the 1st Iowa “quickly cleared the woods and compelled the enemy to retire to their works.”17 As Carr’s cavalry broke through the forest into the open, they got their first glimpse of Price’s line at Gum Grove. Judging from the extent of the earthworks Carr knew that the infantry would have to come forward to push the Rebels out of their fortifications. He halted the division at the edge of the woods and continued to develop the situation while Salomon brought his division to the front for an assault.

  Salomon had ridden at the front of his division that afternoon as the infantry struggled forward. Upon reaching the clearing Salomon realized that the Confederate earthworks would require more than cavalry skirmishers to push the Rebels off the ridge. Wasting little time he began deploying his division into line of battle. Lieutenant Colonel Adolph Dengler’s 43rd Illinois Infantry Regiment led the advance of the 3rd Division and Salomon instructed Dengler to pass through the cavalry and file his brigade to the right of the Military Road. “Large numbers of the enemy cavalry and some artillery were deployed on the central ridge,” Dengler reported of the hard work that lay ahead. William McLean’s 2nd Brigade following Adolph Englemann’s Brigade, filed to the left once the 3rd Brigade cleared the road. Samuel Rice, head bandaged from the fight at Elkins’ Ford, was last in Salomon’s column and would deploy to the rear of the front brigades, prepared to reinforce either Englemann or McLean. As the sounds of battle filtered through the woods, Rice sped the pace of his brigade at the rear of the division. The stop and go marching created the inevitable gap that occurs when troops move long distances in a narrow column. This forced the 36th Iowa to move at the double quick—a brisk jog with full equipment—over two miles to reach the prairie.18 With these dispositions made, the soldiers would participate in an engagement that held much grandeur and as a pleasant bonus few casualties.

  Once the infantry found their places the artillery of both sides commenced a duel that entranced the soldiers of both armies. The Confederates had two batteries, Collins’ and Harris’, in place to challenge three Federal batteries, Voegele’s 9th Wisconsin Battery, Vaughn’s 3rd Illinois, and Peetz’ 2nd Missouri Light, that were busy emplacing on the north edge of the prairie. The artillery duel began at about five o’clock in the evening and lasted until after dark giving all observers quite a show of fireworks. Private Sperry, whose 33rd Iowa was ordered to support the 9th Wisconsin Battery, remembered “lying down flat on our faces” as the opposing batteries hurled iron at each other. Prairie D’Ane is one of the few battles of the Civil War where the antagonists could line up entire divisions in full view of each other. One writer described the scene as “the most imposing military display witnessed west of the Mississippi River during the war.” The spectacle of parade ground formations spreading out in the open for battle awed many of the common soldiers who had the rare fortune to observe an engagement without fear for their lives. “The batter[ies] continued their vigorous and well-directed fire,” Sperry noted. “The rebels responded actively; but their guns were of an old and inferior pattern, and their shot and shell, though very destructive to the trees in the rear, did not come very near us.”19

  While the artillery gave the troops a show, Salomon channeled his energies into pressing home an assault of the ridge held by Price’s Rebels. He ordered a general advance of the infantry in the evening twilight to push the Confederates from Gum Grove. It must be noted that night attacks during the Civil War were extremely ra
re. Yet, bucking all conventions, Salomon resolved to carry out the attack. Skirmishers moved out to develop the strength of the enemy, followed by the main line of Englemann and McLean. Adolph Dengler stated that his regiment “rushed forward” at double quick time “not stopping till the height was won.” The advance had been so rapid that the various regiments “vied with each other to be first to reach the ridge.” Englemann credited Dengler’s 43rd Illinois with accomplishing the feat, one that should have been far more difficult than it was.20

  The Rebels expended a great deal of ammunition in the initial contact, yet inflicted few casualties—neither side suffered more than one hundred—and inexplicably put up a rather feeble defense of the dominating terrain feature in the area. With the open fields of fire the Rebels should have decimated the blue host as they advanced forward. The reasons for the hasty retreat require some explanation. First, as already elaborated upon, Price did not plan on making his stand at Prairie D’Ane. His intent was simply to delay Steele and draw the Yankees into a trap on ground he selected near Washington. Becoming decisively engaged at the prairie would jeopardize his ability to defeat Steele later since he did not quite have his army fully concentrated. Within a couple of days Price would have his force in hand to mount a more stubborn defense. Until then it behooved Price to conserve strength for the right moment. Second, as alluded to previously, the cavalry armaments were of uneven quality and lacking in range and accuracy against Steele’s superior infantry small arms. Finally, atmospheric conditions exerted some influence on the outcome. The twilight assault combined with a nocturnal inversion held the smoke from cannon and rifles close to the ground making visibility problematic. This probably covered the approach of the Federals enabling them to move close to the entrenchments before the Confederates could bring aimed, massed fire to bear. These factors explain why the Confederates seemingly transferred possession of the ridge to the Federals at so small a cost.

  Marmaduke ordered Shelby to retire from Gum Grove to a position about one mile southwest on the Military Road. Here the Rebels had prepared a second line of works to check the enemy.21 Although flushed with success, Salomon decided to halt the assault as darkness now engulfed the landscape and the Federals needed to untangle units that became intermixed as a result of the attack. The Confederates had emplaced their batteries flanking their new position and the artillery duel ignited afresh “lighting up the very sky and making night hideous with screaming missiles.”22 The light show continued until around midnight when the fighting finally petered out. As the troops settled down with a watchful eye toward the enemy, they realized how cold it was that night. April 10 had been a warm day and the weary troops’ exertions caused the men to swelter under their loads and wool uniforms. When the battle ended the sweat clinging to their bodies made the effects of the cold seem unbearable. Forced to lie on their arms in close proximity of the enemy, both armies had no fires to dry their clothes or warm up. The cold “compelled [men] to stay awake and shiver all night, and that without their accustomed supper.” Yet, few of the suffering soldiers uttered a word of complaint as they waited for daylight to reopen the engagement.23

  The “unclouded splendor” of the sunrise on Monday, April 11 promised to warm the stiff-jointed troops who lay cold and unsheltered on the open prairie. All those in line of battle expected an immediate advance that morning, but Steele had other plans. Rather than rushing pell-mell to the attack, he decided to assess the situation and then implement a course of action to satisfy his overall campaign design. The Rebels had pulled back from their positions at Gum Grove, but they still occupied a defensible location on the prairie. Before Steele could make his break to the east for Camden he had to push the Confederates completely off the open plain so they could not have direct observation of Federal movement. In order to give Price the slip he would resume operations in the afternoon with the cavalry leading, followed by a solid two-brigade front of infantry. Once the Rebels relinquished their entrenchments the cavalry would continue to press the enemy beyond the prairie creating a screen to allow the infantry divisions to turn left toward Camden.24

  The soldiers of the Union army made the most of the morning respite while their leaders planned for future operations. Details moved to the rear to obtain meager rations of hard tack and salt pork from the wagon trains while others kindled cooking fires just behind the crest of the ridge. Hot coffee refreshed the soldiers as they waited for orders. Following breakfast many of the troops took the opportunity to snatch some needed sleep to make up for the restless night they had just come through. The time seemed to drag as the men waited, but as soldiers are inclined to do, they found ways to entertain themselves. Sperry recalled that some engaged in a rabbit hunt in the thickets while others played cards, read novels, wrote letters home to loved ones, or simply enjoyed the singing birds.25

  Abruptly, around 2:30 P.M. the leisurely day ended when Steele ordered a general advance. Preceded by the blue cavalry, Salomon’s division fell into line of battle and lurched forward in a seemingly irresistible advance. As John Martin of the First Iowa Cavalry turned back to gaze at the assembled 3rd Division, he regarded it as “the most imposing spectacle I ever witnessed.” Further, Martin stated that “we advanced steadily and rapidly under a sharp fire … but, nothing could stop us and the Johnnies fell sullenly back.” Sperry confirmed Martin’s observations adding with a bit of grandiose flare that when “Gen. Price saw us thus advancing, he threw up his hands and exclaimed ‘My God, they are coming in clouds,’ and immediately ordered a retreat.”26

  Staying within the framework of his plan, Price again drew off to entice the Federals south toward his planned ambush north of Washington. The Union men consolidated their latest gains and aggressively skirmished with Price’s troopers until night when they pulled back about halfway to their camp of the previous night. The Confederates, unknown to the Yankees, quietly abandoned their latest positions in a retrograde back to their fortifications just beyond the prairie. Price was still under the impression that Steele wanted to continue on to Washington.27 Steele’s ruse had worked to perfection as Price had done everything the Federal commander desired to enable him to reach Camden in order to re-cock for the rest of the expedition.

  After another uncomfortable night, the Union army proceeded at daylight on the 12th to complete their mission to drive the Rebels away from Prairie D’Ane. Carefully advancing, the Union cavalry and infantry crept forward closing in on the empty Rebel positions. Price had left only a small contingent forward to deceive the Federals into believing the Rebels remained in force. When the long lines of bluecoats began their advance the thin platoons of gray troopers put up a lively show of skirmishing and then made a gradual withdrawal. Around nine o’clock the Union army entered the line of breastworks. John Martin of the 1st Iowa Cavalry made a happy discovery upon entry to the enemy works. One unfortunate Rebel had busily prepared his breakfast that morning when the Union line closed in on their position. In his haste to escape the Reb failed to remove his corn “dodgers” from the fire. The hungry Martin greedily appropriated the cakes, thus supplementing his diet of two hardtacks and giving him a full belly for the first time in two days.28

  The Rebel line extended for about a mile and in spite of its hasty construction, the fortifications represented an admirable feat of engineering. “They [the Confederates] could have literally mowed us down in a direct assault,” a veteran noted. But, the hasty retreat of the graybacks revealed their intent to bait a trap for the VII Corps. Adolph Dengler observed, nonetheless, that “General Price had been entirely deceived to the intent of our army.”29

  Steele immediately ordered Carr to take up a pursuit of Price’s army to cloak his next move. After allowing VII Corps a short rest, Steele turned Salomon’s 3rd Division to the east on the Washington-Camden Road to get a head start in a race for Camden. Steele split Carr’s division, with the 3rd Brigade continuing to pursue the Rebels to the southwest while the 1st Brigade shifted to advance guar
d heading east. Thayer’s Frontier Division would assume the rear guard to ward off attempts by Rebel cavalry to disrupt the march to Camden. The Yankees marched the rest of the afternoon and into the evening opening a wide gap between VII Corps and the unsuspecting Price. Salomon moved rapidly passing the small village of Moscow on the east edge of the prairie before dusk and camping on Terre Rouge Creek for the night. Carr and his 3rd Brigade made it to a Dr. Rook’s Plantation and the Frontier Division settled in just west of Moscow.30

  It must be noted that the point at which Steele turned to the east represents the zenith of Federal fortunes in the Camden Expedition. From Prairie D’Ane onward the entire Federal effort was a retrograde operation punctuated by unmitigated disasters to Union arms that threatened to outright destruction of the VII Corps. Steele intended the change in plan as simply a short breather to reconstitute a failing logistic situation. To his dismay the Confederates confounded every effort to resupply the army forcing Steele to make unpleasant decisions.

  Early on the 13th the Union army started eastward, but the pace slowed precipitously as the troops began traversing the Terre Rouge Swamp bordering the creek of the same name. Once again the services of the Pioneer Corps proved invaluable. Captain Wheeler’s stoic engineers repaired bridges over Terre Rouge and Cypress Bayou and corduroyed the intervening space to pass the army on to Camden.31 In spite of their efforts, the work on the road dragged on in agonizing slowness giving the awakening Confederates an opportunity to recover from their malaise. Late on the 13th Price’s cavalry began to pressure the rear guard.