22. Edwards, Shelby and His Men, 219.
23. Sperry, History of the 33rd Iowa, 82; and OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 687 and 838.
24. Lothrop, History of the First Iowa Cavalry, 160; Fisher, “The Camden Expedition,” 60–61; Richards, “The Camden Expedition,” 58–59; and OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 661.
25. Sperry, History of the 33rd Iowa, 82–83.
26. Lothrop, History of the First Iowa Cavalry, 160; and Sperry, History of the 33rd Iowa, 83.
27. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 780; and Atkinson, “The Action at Prairie De Ann,” 48.
28. Lothrop, History of the First Iowa Cavalry, 161.
29. Sperry, History of the 33rd Iowa, 83–84; and OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 733–734.
30. Atkinson, “The Action at Prairie De Ann,” 49; and OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 687 and 761.
31. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 675.
32. Zorn, “Campaigning in Southern Arkansas: A Memoir by C. T. Anderson,” AHQ (Autumn 1949), 242.
33. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 780–781.
34. McLeod, “The Frontier Division in the Camden Expedition,” 8–9; Crawford, Kansas in the Sixties, 113; and Burke, Official Military History of the Kansas Regiments, 375–376.
35. Edwards, Shelby and His Men, 266–267; and OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 762–763.
36. OR, Vol. 1, Part 1, 762.
37. Ibid., 695; Sperry, History of the 33rd Iowa, 87; Edwards, Shelby and His Men, 268–269; and Britton, The Civil War on the Border, II, 275–277.
38. M. A. Elliot, ed., The Garden of Memory, Virginia M. Stinson, “Memories,” 28–29; Sperry, History of the 33rd Iowa, 88; and McLeod, “The Frontier Division in the Camden Expedition,” 10.
39. Steele would use two of the residences in Camden as his headquarters during his stay there. He would variously use the Graham House and the Chidester House, although the exact dates of his stay in either are not known.
40. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 661 and 676.
41. Ibid., 530.
42. Jeffery S. Prushankin, “A Crisis in Command,” 98–102.
43. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 494.
44. Ibid., 531.
45. Ibid., 541–543; and Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction, 224–225.
46. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 212–213.
47. OR, Vol. 34, Part 3, 192.
7
“… a destroying mania had seized the rebels”
As the Yankee army arrived in Camden many concerns had arisen to cause morale of the soldiers to wane. Food and forage to sustain the VII Corps was becoming ever more difficult to find. Failure to procure adequate quantities of either would certainly bring the expedition to a halt here at Camden or worse some place to the south where the enemy might trap the hapless army. The disturbing rumors of Banks’ defeat also had an adverse effect on the spirits of the men. In sum, the time at Camden would prove a turning point in the expedition as Steele and his immediate subordinates pondered their next move. The Confederates under Price noticed a surge of confidence in their endeavors. Price’s ragtag cavalry had not defeated Steele, but they had delayed his approach south and made it extremely hazardous and unrewarding to search for sustenance. Price and his subordinates had full knowledge of the disasters in Louisiana, which heartened their spirits. Further uplifting their morale was the fact that Kirby Smith was personally leading three infantry divisions northward to Arkansas for the purpose of destroying Steele’s army. As Price’s troopers cordoned off Camden with a thin picket, Price and his generals plotted their countermoves to bring about the destruction of their enemy holed up in the fortifications of Camden.
Upon closing his army within the earthworks surrounding the town, Steele sat down at his headquarters in the Chidester House to ponder what he must do next. He had to do two things immediately in order to enable his army to continue the march south. First, he had to establish communications with Nathaniel Banks to determine his next objective. If the rumors swirling about proved true, he might have to adjust his march route to affect a junction with Banks at a point other than Shreveport. Without knowledge of Banks’ whereabouts or the condition of his army, Steele could find himself walking into a trap. Second, Steele had to do something to alleviate the supply situation. Without food for man and beast he could do nothing to support Banks.
Days earlier, Steele had written General Kimball at Little Rock ordering him to rush thirty day’s rations to Camden where he would meet them by April 15 to refit his army.1 Kimball went to work on this order preparing supply steamers to go by water to Pine Bluff and notifying Powell Clayton to outfit a wagon train to transport the provisions from there overland to Camden. In military operations there are times when seemingly anything that can go wrong will go wrong. Mid-April 1864 was one of those times as the supply steamers failed to reach Pine Bluff at the prescribed time. The steamers, Adams and Chippewa, had been carefully laden with supplies to succor Steele’s hungry men and cast off from the docks at Little Rock on the evening of April 12. The boats had gone down river only twenty miles when they collided in the dark, sinking the Adams. The Chippewa sustained damage requiring repairs and a partial loss of ammunition and quartermaster stores. Kimball’s assistant adjutant general attributed the cause of the accident to the carelessness of the pilot on the Adams.2 The cause notwithstanding, Steele’s men would have to go hungry a few more days waiting for relief since the wagon train did not arrive as the army pulled into Camden.
An unexpected incident occurred on the 16th that did temporarily alleviate the food situation. The Confederate steamboat Homer had moved up the Ouachita loaded with corn for Rebel soldiers in the area. The boat captain was not aware that Camden had fallen to the Federal army. As a result, the pilot moved the boat toward town oblivious of the danger ahead. John Martin of the 1st Iowa Cavalry had spent the 16th fanning out in small patrols from Camden to screen the main Union army as it consolidated in town. Martin and some of his friends had taken the opportunity to drop a fishing line in the Ouachita, in addition to the mundane duty of picketing. They “caught a fine lot of catfish and white perch which afforded an agreeable change to our bill of fare.” The satisfied troopers had just finished filling their bellies with fried fish when they were ordered to “bring up the steamer Homer of Virginia [sic].” A mounted portion of the regiment had captured the hapless boat further down river and Martin’s detail would take control of the Homer and direct it to Camden.3 To the Federal quartermaster’s surprise the boat contained a vast supply of corn amounting to over 3,000 bushels. Upon arrival of the ship the quartermaster had work details begin grinding corn in to meal at the still operating mills in town. This find would allay the food situation for a few days, but the army required more than this to continue offensive operations.4
As Steele contemplated his next move the Rebels began a systematic effort to destroy the available food supplies and mills in the region surrounding Camden. A veteran stated that “a destroying mania had seized the rebels” as they torched every source of food they could find.5 Price was keenly aware of the desperate situation his antagonist found himself in and he sought to make logistics the Achilles’ heel of Federal fortunes.6 Camden itself had little to offer in the way of sustenance as the citizens themselves struggled to feed their families. In spite of Confederate efforts, Steele believed he knew a way to provide for his army after all. The Federal commander still had Carr’s report of the availability of a large store of grain and meat west of Camden in the region known locally as Poison Spring. If Steele could procure this supply before the Rebels destroyed it, the effect might stave off further delay of the expedition. Captain Henry, chief quartermaster, suggested that the commander general assemble a forage train with an adequate guard to double back to Poison Spring. There the quartermaster department would requisition foodstuffs from willing Union families or appropriate it from the unwilling. This combined with the expected arrival of the train from Pine Bluff would place the army in good shape for future operations. Accordingly, Steele authorized the endeavor and Captain He
nry made a request of John Thayer to supply the train guard for his wagons.7 Unknown to all concerned, Steele had just set the wheels in motion that would result in arguably the biggest disaster to Union arms west of the Mississippi during the war.
Price established his headquarters at a place called Woodlawn southwest of Camden after the failure to cut off Steele. While he had not prevented Steele from reaching Camden he knew he would soon have an opportunity to pounce on his prey. After two meetings with Richard Taylor and tense correspondence, Kirby Smith had ordered three infantry divisions detached from the District of West Louisiana. The units he designated for service in Arkansas were Thomas Churchill’s Arkansas Division, Mosby Parsons’ Missouri Division, and John G. Walker’s Texas Division. On April 11 the lead elements of this reinforcement had pulled back from Pleasant Hill, Louisiana, en route for Shreveport. From Shreveport the concentrated force would march north for Camden where Kirby Smith hoped to inflict a decisive defeat on Frederick Steele restoring the integrity of the Trans-Mississippi. The three divisions arrived at Shreveport on the 14th where Smith personally joined the assemblage for the movement. General Walker recorded that his division crossed the Red River by pontoon on the next day. While Walker felt there was an opportunity in Arkansas, he sided with Richard Taylor in believing that “the true line of action lay in Louisiana.8 Price expected Smith to arrive within ten days thereby giving him a chance to finish off Steele.
Until the arrival of Smith, Price intended to institute a vigilant system to prevent Steele from obtaining food. Smith had ordered Price to torch anything of use to the Federals, which Price’s eager troopers had done with great zeal. In addition to destruction of foodstuffs, Price detailed Marmaduke, Fagan, and Maxey to observe the major routes in and out of Camden. Should Steele attempt to send out for or receive any supplies, Price’s wide ranging cavalry was to pounce on the relief column. This would either force Steele out of Camden or starve him into submission. Since no one expected VII Corps to submit to defeat by the humiliating method of siege, the Confederates felt that Steele would retreat to Little Rock. With enough early warning, the Rebels believed they could hit the Federal army on the retreat giving them the advantage of striking the Unionists in the open.9
In the early morning of April 17 Captain Henry’s forage train and guard assembled in Camden for an expedition on the Camden Road leading west toward the Prairie D’Ane. The train consisted of 177 wagons to procure the estimated 5,000 bushels of corn available around Poison Spring. To protect this vast assemblage of wagons, John Thayer detailed Colonel James Williams with his First Kansas Infantry (Colored) to lead the endeavor. Williams’ command included his own regiment under command of Major Richard G. Ward and elements of three cavalry regiments—the 2nd, 6th, and 14th Kansas—and a two-gun section of the 2nd Indiana Battery. The entire task force totaled 670 soldiers of whom 438 were Negro troops. The column departed mid-morning for its destination about fifteen miles to the west.10
The Confederates of Colton Greene’s Brigade had the proposed route of the Federals under surveillance. Greene immediately reported the departure of the train to his division commander, John Sappington Marmaduke. Marmaduke promptly relayed the developments to General Fagan, his fellow division commander, and suggested that with reinforcements he could destroy the train and escort. Fagan grasped the opportunity readily granting Marmaduke’s request by sending William Cabell’s Brigade to reinforce his division. As Marmaduke awaited Cabell’s arrival, he hatched a scheme that aimed at the destruction of the Federal forage train.11
As the train and escort rumbled westward, Steele received at his headquarters positive confirmation of the disaster in Louisiana. Steele sent out several “spies”—scouts or couriers—at intervals during the expedition in attempts to keep Banks informed and obtain intelligence of Banks’ progress in Louisiana. The intervening area between Steele and Banks, of course, was Rebel territory. This made it extremely time-consuming, not to mention downright dangerous, to get a message to Banks and return. Finally, after desperately trying to get reliable information for weeks, a scout arrived at Steele’s headquarters. This man, while bearing no written communication from Banks, stated that the general had instructed him to say he had “defeated” the Confederates, but failing supplies compelled him to fall back. Steele was skeptical of this account, particularly the part about Banks having defeated the enemy. He could not see how Banks could lose 22 pieces of artillery and a brigade train, then retreat from the field and lay claim to a victory.12 Since Banks had retreated Steele had two options left to him. He could retreat immediately or he could attempt to drive on to link up with Banks and salvage the operation. A retreat could leave Banks out to dry if he had major problems. An advance could expose Steele’s corps to destruction because the Confederates may decide to mass against him. Without any written communication with Banks and no orders from the War Department, Steele was not quite sure of his next move. In the absence of guidance, Steele resolved that he must press on in order to aid Banks. To ensure he could reach the Red, he made a request of Chief of Staff Halleck to supply him via the Ouachita among his other efforts to open a supply route.13
The foraging party made good progress in its move west making fifteen miles. Colonel Williams camped by the road in the late evening as a central location for sending out smaller elements to gather corn. Williams knew that sizeable contingents of Rebel cavalry lurked nearby and that they would pounce on his small detachment as a lucrative target as soon as they could gather strength. Therefore, rather than allow the men to encamp he decided to press on with gathering food in order to get back to Camden before the Confederates could strike. Sending out wagons in all directions, the men quickly found the available stores of food. The Confederates, it seems, had not been as thorough as Price wanted in destroying foodstuffs that the Federals found useful. Around midnight most of the parties made it back to the rally point. After the rest of the foragers returned in the morning, the whole column would return to Camden, preferably by early afternoon. Williams estimated that he had nearly 5,000 bushels of corn along with a supply of meat and items confiscated from the local citizens by overzealous soldiers.14
Early afternoon of the 17th, General Thayer, fearing that Williams had inadequate strength, decided to reinforce the forage train with another infantry regiment. He quickly organized a combined arms force to go to Williams’ aid consisting of the 18th Iowa, a small contingent of cavalry, and two howitzers. Captain William Duncan would command the 500–odd soldiers sent out to relieve Colonel Williams. This would give Williams a strength of about 1200 troops to defend the spoils of their little expedition. Duncan had his force assembled and on the move in the late afternoon.15
Amid a flurry of Unionist activity, the Confederates had busied themselves with assembling a force of their own to destroy the train. Marmaduke had his own division—minus Shelby16—and Cabell’s Brigade were moving toward Poison Spring when one of his scouts watching the approaches to Camden reported another column departing town heading west. A disquieted Marmaduke halted his own column and again contemplated the situation. His hasty assessment told him that the force at hand was inadequate and he decided to ask Price for additional reinforcements. Reporting in person at Price’s headquarters, Marmaduke laid out the situation and his belief that it would require a larger force to carry out the operation he had in mind. Eager to execute his aggressive subordinate’s plan, Price assented to strengthening Marmaduke’s strike force.17
In his haste, Price demonstrated his inattention to detail when he carelessly gave the mission to Samuel Maxey’s Division. While this satisfied Marmaduke’s need for additional troops, it also created a question of command. Maxey, by date of commission, outranked Marmaduke and by army protocol had the right and duty to assume command of the operation. While Marmaduke in all probability was not pleased with this turn of events, he nevertheless consented to offer up command to Maxey who quickly accepted. The magnanimity would not last as problems soon d
eveloped between the two senior officers. Maxey, now in charge, got things rolling immediately putting every unit in motion for Poison Spring. They would trudge through the night in order to get in position to ambush the unsuspecting Yankees.18 Everything was now set for one of the ugliest engagements of the Civil War.
Over the course of the night all of the smaller Union foraging parties made their way safely back to the wagon train. This gave Colonel Williams reason to breathe easier for he knew he could get the train on the road back to Camden early in the morning. At dark on the 17th Captain Duncan halted his detachment about ten miles west of Camden on the Upper Washington Road. As his men prepared to bivouac for the night, Duncan dispatched a patrol to Williams to establish communication and inform the colonel of his mission to provide support for the train. The presence of reinforcements earmarked for Williams undoubtedly delighted the colonel as he worked to gather in his widely dispersed foragers. Williams told Duncan’s courier to tell the captain to hold his position for the night. At dawn Duncan should then move to the train where his column would assume the mission as train rear guard.19
At daybreak Williams stepped off moving east toward Camden with Duncan simultaneously moving west to link up with the main column. As the sun rose in the eastern sky, Duncan and Williams effected a junction approximately a mile east of a place known by the locals as the crossroads. The united column now pressed on to the east in the following order: Williams’ 1st Kansas under Major Ward in the lead, the trains in the center, and the Duncan detachment bringing up the rear. Shortly after restarting the march the Union troopers came into contact with Confederate skirmishers. Federal cavalrymen chased the Rebels east down the road until they encountered a roadblock. The surprised Federals quickly turned about and raced back to the main body to report. This development gave Williams pause as he realized he might have to fight his way back to Camden. Sensing the true nature of the danger, Williams stopped and closed the column into a tighter, more defensible formation and took stock of the situation.20
The Camden Expedition of 1864 Page 18
