What Williams saw as he surveyed the ground troubled him greatly. The Confederates had selected an ideal location for an ambush and the force that Williams had on hand was not nearly enough to protect the entire length of the train. Therefore, Williams had the train park three wagons abreast on the north side of the road in a compact mass to enable his small force to better protect them. To the east on the Upper Washington Road, the Confederates blocked a portion of the highway bordered by dense woods on either side making it difficult for the Federals to flank the position. To the south of the road lay an open farm field—known as Lee’s Plantation—that ascended in a gradual slope upward to a wooded ridge that dominated the lane below. The field was cut variously by a fenceline and meandering ravine that would act as obstacles to a Rebel advance. Conversely, the ravine would also offer cover to the greycoats as they moved to close with the train guard. All in all the terrain offered great advantages to the attacker and the Rebels had disposed their forces well to leverage its benefits.21
The Confederate command consisted of approximately 3,500 picked troops from Marmaduke and Maxey’s divisions and Cabell’s Brigade. The Confederates were in the saddle well before dawn in order to get into a strong position to contest the train’s movement back to Camden. Marmaduke had nothing less than full destruction of the train on his mind as the grayclad troopers made their way through the pre-dawn darkness. The Rebels moved north from Woodlawn up parallel dirt farm paths that intersected with the Upper Washington Road east of the Federals. Marmaduke’s Division led followed by Cabell and Maxey. While Maxey held nominal command, Marmaduke made all the dispositions for the coming action making him the de facto commander. This was a point not lost on the contentious Maxey especially when it came time to claim laurels from victory. As such, Marmaduke planned to move his own division and Cabell’s Brigade on the Upper Washington Road and then turn west until he found an appropriate location for a blocking position. There they would deploy with Crawford’s Brigade on the north side of the road, Cabell on the south side and Greene bringing up the rear giving Marmaduke the flexibility to move to the left or right as the situation required. Marmaduke placed Harris’ and Hughey’s batteries in line to sweep the road of Federals. Maxey would continue north up an adjacent path, but his division would diverge from the trail before reaching the Upper Washington. The division would then proceed cross-country through the woods south of the road to the ridge overlooking Lee’s Plantation and the Upper Washington.22 The Federals would run into Marmaduke’s roadblock and halt the train. Then at the moment of confusion, Maxey would launch a flank attack from concealed positions on the ridge. Thus, Marmaduke would form an anvil, while Maxey acted as the hammer in the coming operation.
The endeavor contained inherent risks in execution that could undo all the careful arrangements made by Marmaduke. First, timing was a critical element to success. While Marmaduke held off the Federals in front, Maxey had to get into position to launch his attack before the Federal infantry overwhelmed the blocking position. If Maxey failed to reach the ridge in time, Marmaduke would suffer a serious defeat and the train would be able to reach Camden safely. A more serious danger was that Marmaduke’s Division would have to fight with its back to Camden. Upon hearing a heavy engagement to the west, Steele could then decide to sally forth a relief force from town. Marmaduke would then be in danger of attack from the rear while engaged in front. In order to win this battle, the Confederates needed a combination of good leadership, impeccable timing, and a little luck. The Confederates would get all three.
By 9:30 A.M., Marmaduke had the blocking position set and his skirmishers were already sparring with the Federals. Skirmishing continued for a half-hour as the Federals who charged the roadblock were sent reeling back on their main body. About this time Maxey reined up to Marmaduke requesting a situation report. Marmaduke graciously reported to Maxey and suggested the course of action he had previously contemplated. Surprisingly, Maxey listened attentively and approved of his subordinate’s plan. Maxey probably appreciated Marmaduke’s obvious knowledge of the situation and, anxious for success, decided to accept an admittedly good plan. With the anvil set, Marmaduke now needed the hammer to make haste to its jump-off position located on the ridge. Maxey now quickly moved to execute his division’s part of the operation.23
Maxey called in his two brigade commanders in order to give them a quick brief outlining their parts in the attack. Colonels Charles DeMorse and Tandy Walker commanded the two brigades of Maxey’s undersized division. Numbering about 1,200 men, Maxey’s Division was the most eye-catching and unusual unit in the entire Confederate army. Walker’s Brigade consisted entirely of Choctaw Indians from the Indian Territory who cast their lot with the South. One observer noted upon their arrival in Arkansas that they were “mounted on ponies, dressed in all sorts of clothing, including buckskin with feathers in hats.”24 While some may have disparaged their appearance, no one doubted their aggressive fighting qualities.25 Maxey briefed his commanders that they would play a pivotal role in the coming fight. Nonchalantly whittling on a pine stick, Maxey instructed that the men dismount short of the Upper Washington Road and move on foot to the reverse slope of the ridge. Upon reaching their destination, DeMorse’s Texans would form at a right angle with Cabell’s left and parallel to the road. Walker’s Choctaws would pass to the rear of DeMorse forming on the Texans’ left in line. Captain Butler Krumbhaar’s Texas Battery would form the center to provide fire support. As the dismounted cavalrymen filed into position the artillery would initiate a preparation lasting a half-hour to soften up the Federals, make them reveal their locations, and induce confusion. At the conclusion of the barrage, Maxey would advance in flank drawing Federal attention to the south. Once Maxey’s attack produced its intended effect, Marmaduke would attack in front surprising the Federals and crushing them between the pincers.26
Ambush at Poison Spring. Confederate cavalry under overall command of General Marmaduke located the Federal forage train about 10 miles west of Camden. Marmaduke made a quick assessment of the situation and executed a well-placed ambush. Elements of two Rebel divisions routed the two Union regiments guarding the train resulting in loss of the entire train and a series of atrocities directed toward the men of the 1st Kansas (Colored) Infantry Regiment.
When the conference broke DeMorse and Walker immediately led their respective brigades off through the woods to their attack positions. The wiry Texans and Indians took only thirty minutes to set their units for the assault. As Maxey’s men approached the ridge, Harris’ and Hughey’s artillery opened on the Union column. The din of the cannonade was “the loudest and most terrific it has ever been my lot to listen to,” one participant reported. While the crash of sound swirling about startled the Union soldiers guarding the train, the preparation failed to produce the effect Marmaduke desired. Major Ward commanding Williams’ 1st Kansas ordered his men to lie down in order to prevent the Confederates from learning the exact locations of his regiment. The rest of the train guard followed suit and the storm of fire resulted in little more than thunderous noise as the Unionists suffered minimal casualties.27
Colonel Williams had maintained his faculties throughout the preparation and made his own dispositions to counter the Rebel moves. As Williams’ own artillery attempted to reply, the colonel coolly surveyed the situation and noticed the dismounted Confederates filing onto the ridge to the south just as he had feared earlier they would. Williams ordered Major Ward to refuse his right wing to face south so that half of the 1st Kansas faced east toward Marmaduke’s men and the other half fronted Maxey’s Division. Williams had Captain Duncan likewise wheel a portion of his rear guard to the south and order the four cannons to orient in that direction as well.28 These dispositions had barely been made when Maxey’s Division came crashing off the ridge into the train guard.
Walker and DeMorse moved across the broken field in a rather ragged order due to the many obstacles that laced the field. The brigades were for
ced to halt at one point to adjust their alignment to maintain a proper battle line. This done the line lunged forward again only to run into a galling fire from the 1st Kansas. “I suffered them to approach within 100 yards of my line,” Colonel Williams reported, “when I opened upon them with musketry … and compelled them to fall back.” The stunned Texans and Choctaws stumbled back to the protection of the ravine to reform for a second assault. Meanwhile, Krumbhaar’s Battery had struggled to push the guns to the top of the ridge to support the attack. The dense undergrowth on the back side of the ridge conspired to prevent Krumbhaar from using the horses to haul the guns up the hill. Therefore, the gunners had to manhandle them up the hill. Krumbhaar made a request of DeMorse for assistance in moving the guns, but was rebuffed by the brigade commander. Undaunted, the battery commander used the numerous short saplings in the area to help him leverage the pieces forward.29
Krumbhaar now brought his guns to bear against the Union line with great effect as the Confederates reformed for a second assault. As Maxey’s Division regrouped Cabell and Crawford pushed forward for Marmaduke’s assault on the Union line. While Marmaduke made steady progress a potential crisis developed when Cabell failed to link his left flank with Maxey’s right creating a yawning gap. In response, Marmaduke quickly called forward Greene’s Brigade—the only one still mounted and uncommitted—to fill the gap.30 The now massed Confederate force brought well over 2,500 men to bear against the thin train guard and this time the hapless Union soldiers would struggle to stop them.
Colonel Williams once again allowed the Confederate troopers to come in close before unleashing a devastating volley. The Rebel line staggered momentarily, but the sheer weight of the assault allowed them to recover in the face of galling fire from the blue line. A toe-to-toe firefight now ensued for the next hour as both sides fired volley after volley into each other at close range. The lines were so close together that the soldiers could hear the opposing lines talking. At one point, men from the 1st Kansas and the 29th Texas took the opportunity to become reacquainted. These regiments had met face to face before on the field at Honey Springs where the 1st Kansas had routed the Texans. Meeting again a year later, the Texans cast disparaging barbs at the Negro regiment and the 1st Kansas answered with a deluge of fire.31
The Confederates of Maxey’s Division once again fell back a short distance to recover from the incessant fire of the Union troops, but now Cabell’s Arkansans and Greene’s Missourians closed in from the east. Williams’ artillery, after firing continuously for well over an hour, had nearly exhausted all of its precious ammunition and gunners had suffered catastrophic casualties from Rebel cannon fire. With the Federal guns now falling silent, the infantry began to find their own situation deteriorating due to desperate shortages of ammunition. With these developments, Colonel Williams began to realize that he could no longer defend the train. His only hope of salvation was for the intense noise of the engagement to reach Steele at Camden. Maybe then Steele would send out a relief column to extract Williams from his predicament. He, therefore, resolved to fight it out as long as he could.32 Ironically, Steele’s men did hear the report of the fighting at Poison Spring, but never made an effort to relieve the beleaguered train guard.33
The Confederates advanced a third time with irresistible force and the Union line, too thin to cover the entire wagon train, began to bend back on the center. While Greene and Cabell pressured the middle, Crawford’s Brigade on the Union left succeeded in outflanking the Federal line. As the Union left—the half of the 1st Kansas facing east—gave way it caused the rest of the line to melt away and Williams lost control of the fight. The 1st Kansas had fought heroically as long as it maintained a coherent line, but when the left gave way the regiment became gripped by panic. This uncovered the head of the train and Williams now turned his efforts to making an orderly retreat. He rode back to Captain Duncan of the 18th Iowa to inform him that he should form a line to allow the disordered elements to rally. Then he would attempt to retreat to the north by bounds to safely extract his force from the onslaught.34 This decision, of course, meant that Williams intended to abandon the train and the booty it carried. However, to continue defending it with no hope of success translated into a loss of over 1,000 soldiers in addition to the train. In light of these facts, Williams made the only logical decision available.
The 18th Iowa barely had time to reform when fugitives from the 1st Kansas and screaming Rebels overwhelmed the regiment. The Confederates overlapped the Iowans’ line by a wide margin and the white troops soon joined their comrades in beating a wild retreat in every direction. Jubilant Rebels swarmed the train, scooped up prisoners by the dozen and tore off in a ragged pursuit of the scurrying defenders. With little regard for unit organization, pockets of Union soldiers made a hasty retreat from the field by passing through a swamp bordering Lee’s Plantation. The pursuing Rebels continued after the Federals to the edge of the swamp, but gave up in favor of easier pickings back at the abandoned wagon train. By about two in the afternoon the fighting had ended and the result was nothing short of a disaster for the VII Corps.35
As the remnants of the Union troops made good their escape, the rift in the Confederate high command began to take center stage. Marmaduke felt that too many Union soldiers had managed to escape and had unmercilessly driven his men to run down the fragmented command. Marmaduke had successfully managed affairs the entire day with tacit acceptance from Maxey up to now. At this point, Maxey decided to assert his right to command and recalled the scattered Rebels engaged in pursuit. Maxey preferred to round up the spoils of victory and directed the Confederates to begin gathering up the plunder to carry it back to Woodlawn. Also, he stated in his report, that he feared Steele would surely attack his rear and wanted to clear the area quickly. Marmaduke bitterly disagreed with this decision, yet he acquiesced in Maxey’s insistence on calling off the pursuit.36 A flap would later develop over who deserved the lion’s share of credit for the victory. However, both men were careful in their reports to suppress a desire for laurels and for the most part stuck to the facts, a credit to both Maxey and Marmaduke. However, it must be stated that the concept and execution of operations at Poison Spring came from Marmaduke and therefore, he deserves credit for outstanding service.
While the battle had ended, the violence had not as some of the Rebels began committing atrocities against wounded and captured Negroes of the 1st Kansas. Eyewitnesses reported dozens of men were bayoneted and murdered by the hand of Maxey’s men who hurled insults at the helpless prisoners as they carried out their ugly deeds. One Rebel observer was appalled at the sight “of so many dead Negroes.” Further, there are accounts that some of the Choctaws even took scalps as trophies. The scene disgusted a burial detail from the 1st Iowa Cavalry and 18th Iowa Infantry sent to the field three days after the battle to give the fallen a proper interment. A Captain Rowland reported that “the white dead were scalped and all were stripped of clothing…. To add insult to the dead officers of the colored regiment,” he added, “they were all laid on their faces, and a circle of their dead soldiers made around them.”37 A Confederate confirmed that “an uncounted number of dead negroes [sic]” littered the field.38 Not all the Rebels agreed with this account of what transpired. One Confederate recalled that Maxey’s men did indeed want to murder and “scalp the kill negroes [sic], but were not allowed” by their officers.39
Regardless of the opinions of witnesses, the statistics bear out that a disproportionate number of the 1st Kansas suffered a terrible fate as opposed to their comrades from the white regiments. Of the 438 men engaged from the 1st Kansas, 182 were listed as casualties, of whom 117 were killed—a very high ratio of dead to wounded. By contrast, of the 732 white soldiers from the train guard, 119 were listed as casualties. All total the Federals lost 301 troops, 175 wagons—145 of which had highly prized 6–mule teams—four cannon, and an estimated 5,000 bushels of corn.40 As Maxey inventoried the days’ spoils, his men discovered among the
plunder articles of no military significance such as furniture, women’s clothing, and farming implements.41 As expected, the Confederates derisively criticized the Federals for carrying off such articles.
Poison Spring had a much smaller price tag for the victorious Rebels. While Confederate reports are incomplete, the record shows their loss at 114 men killed, wounded, or missing out of more than 3,000 engaged.42 The figures confirm that Poison Spring was a signal victory for the Confederates. It raised Rebel expectations that they could force Steele to retreat or physically destroy his army. Conversely, the defeat demoralized the Federals in Camden, as the men would continue to struggle in their quest for food.
The ragged, defeated survivors from Poison Spring began straggling into Camden on the evening of the 18th and would continue in driblets for days to come. Inevitably, news of the debacle spread uncontrolled through all the regiments of the Union army. Soldiers gathered with their messmates around campfires to discuss the disaster and who could have been responsible. While opinions varied over culpability, the loudest complaints came from men who were desperately hungry. “We were now almost out of rations,” a veteran recalled. “Hard-tack grew more rare and valuable, with each succeeding day.” The Federals in Camden were certainly in a serious predicament as the regular ration issue for one day included only four ears of corn for each soldier.43
The supply situation was nearing desperation in Camden by April 19. The garrison was down to only three days’ rations for the men and an incredible one day’s forage for the 12,000 draft animals employed by the army. To make matters worse, there existed little forage in the valley of the Ouachita to offset the shortage of army provender.44 Steele simply had to obtain a reliable source of supply or else the entire expedition would have to retreat back to Little Rock. Even if Steele could now emplace a workable system, the expedition might still prove unwinnable. This is because of the huge loss in transportation at Poison Spring. When the VII Corps arrived in Camden on the 15th it brought with it around 800 wagons to provide transport for the army’s provisions. The loss of 175 wagons, complete with their teams, only three days later subtracted over twenty percent of the army’s available haul capacity. A question now arose as to whether the corps still had enough transport to support the army even if it could build up a stockpile of rations.
The Camden Expedition of 1864 Page 19
