The Camden Expedition of 1864

by Michael J Forsyth

  As the infantry huddled around the bridgehead on the Ouachita, Smith sought to mobilize the cavalry for immediate pressure on the retreating Federals. The most promising possibility was for Fagan’s large contingent to get in front of Steele on the Military Road blocking his way back to Little Rock. Fagan’s men had spent the 26th clearing the battlefield at Marks’ Mills and scouting the Saline River crossings. As Fagan policed the battlefield, he pondered how he could find food for his force. The captured wagon train contained very little booty in the way of foodstuffs and Fagan had not made provisions to sustain his division beyond the ambush at Marks’ Mills. Following the successful action at the mills, Fagan had orders to proceed to Little Rock to harass Steele’s logistics base. However, Fagan felt that the pressing supply situation demanded that he place first priority on finding sustenance for his troopers and mounts. Having no inkling that Steele was preparing to leave Camden, Fagan resolved to move west to Princeton on the Military Road in search of forage, ironically in perfect position to block Steele’s retreat up that route.15 Jo Shelby was quite disturbed by what he perceived as a distinct lack of drive in Fagan. According to his biographer, Shelby believed the disaster at Marks’ Mills would force Steele to retreat back to Little Rock. Thus, he believed that Fagan should either attempt to move closer to Camden to establish communication with Kirby Smith or aggressively cross the Saline and emplace blocking positions on possible crossing sites Steele might use in a retreat.16 In spite of Shelby’s effort, Fagan opted to search for food around Princeton.

  Kirby Smith recognized these possibilities and attempted to send a dispatch to Fagan ordering him to block the crossings over the Saline. The problem is that Smith had no idea where to have the message delivered since he had lost contact with his subordinate. The only alternative was to send several couriers in various directions hoping to catch Fagan in time to counter Steele’s retreat. Meanwhile, Smith set Marmaduke’s well-rested troopers into action telling him to proceed to a place called White Hall, a known ford site, and from there proceed with all possible speed to cut off Steele’s flight. Marmaduke’s Division, with Colton Greene in the lead, reached White Hall around 5:00 P.M. and attempted to ford the river. The river was running at a high stage due to the incessant rains of late and the process took longer than expected. To speed the movement up, Greene obtained two small boats to ferry his troops and artillery to the far shore. The animals were forced to swim to the opposite bank. The combination of ferrying and swimming took all night to complete and Greene’s troopers did not begin an all out pursuit until 6:00 A.M. on the 28th.17 Yet, another unit spent the day hung up by the formidable obstacle of the Ouachita providing Steele precious time to widen the gap between his fleeing corps and the anxious Rebels.

  In addition to Smith’s efforts to marshal his forces for pursuit, he issued a curious order that weakened his army at a time when he needed every man he could lay his hands on. On April 28 Smith instructed Maxey’s small division to return to the Indian Territory. Allegedly, the Federals under Major General James G. Blunt planned an operation to wrest control of the region from the Rebels once and for all. Talk of Blunt’s thrust into the Indian Territory proved false, but Smith nevertheless persisted in sending away one quarter of his mounted force as he simultaneously attempted to catch Steele. Pursuit is a mission best suited for a cavalry division and yet Smith issued orders returning them back to their district. It seems plausible that a sound defeat of Steele would have arrested any offensive in the Indian Territory since the Federals would have had to consolidate strength to stop an inevitable counteroffensive. Edwin Bearss points out in his narrative that it is hard to imagine anything in the backwater Indian Territory “important enough to justify this drastic reduction” of the cavalry.18 The order returning Maxey westward represents one of a series of blunders committed by Kirby Smith as he assumed command in Arkansas. As the pursuit progressed the effect of his decisions would only compound as the Rebels struggled to come to grips with the Federals.

  By 9:00 A.M. on April 27, Steele had made a clean break unfettered by the pursuit of any Rebels. To enhance his getaway, he had a major obstacle in his rear that would delay Kirby Smith for another 24 hours—the Ouachita River. The Federal commander had slipped away with an entire army corps without alerting the Confederates of his intent, which is no small feat. Steele’s management of the movement thus far had been nothing short of brilliant as he had stolen a full day’s march on his opponent. The opportunity to catch a retreating column on the march often portends destruction for the fleeing army and is a rare occurrence and the Confederates seemed intent on frittering away their chances. Kirby Smith’s management of affairs was dismal to the point of incompetence. First, by an unexplained mix up his pioneers had sent the precious pontoon bridge back to Shreveport where it was useless. Second, despite an effort to encourage more vigilance from Price’s command, the Rebel pickets had allowed the Federals to escape from under their very noses. Third, after sending Fagan in pursuit of the Federal supply train, Smith had lost all contact with half his cavalry. Fourth, while desperately grasping for any way to place pressure on the fleeing Yankees, he ordered Maxey’s mounted men back to the Indian Territory effectively reducing his cavalry force by one quarter. This left Smith with only Marmaduke’s single brigade under his direct control, not nearly enough to slow Steele. Finally, the agonizingly slow process of improvising a floating bridge served to delay the army as effectively as if they had attempted a contested crossing. So far, Smith, a highly competent commander in earlier campaigns in the Civil War, had not lived up to his reputation. However, nature would intervene once again allowing the Rebels to make good their earlier mistakes.

  As Smith’s Arkansas contingent struggled to catch Frederick Steele, events in Louisiana were quickly reaching a climax. Following the Battle of Pleasant Hill on April 9, Banks pulled his army back to his advanced supply base at Grand Ecore. Admiral Porter’s fleet received word of the reverse near Loggy Bayou about thirty miles short of Shreveport. Distressed, Porter ordered the navy to turn about and rendezvous with Banks at Grand Ecore. At this time Richard Taylor and Kirby Smith held their conferences and quarreled about the next phase of the campaign. Taylor favored an immediate pursuit of Banks aimed at the destruction of the Union army and by default the navy. Smith leaned toward allowing Banks to retreat unmolested from Louisiana and instead proposed shifting the bulk of Taylor’s forces north to stop Steele’s advance. Smith believed Steele represented the true threat to the Trans-Mississippi and Taylor’s tone had undoubtedly irritated Smith. Price, on the other hand, had given Smith cheerful cooperation throughout, encouraging the commanding general to reciprocate support. As a result, on April 14 Smith ordered three of Taylor’s four infantry divisions north to Arkansas without Taylor.

  As Smith proceeded to Arkansas, the reeling Army of the Gulf presented Taylor with three distinct opportunities for destruction or capture. First, Taylor invested Grand Ecore with a loose cordon temporarily trapping Banks against the Red River. But, Banks outnumbered Taylor by a margin of over five to one and the Army of the Gulf easily brushed the Rebels aside as they retraced their steps to Alexandria. The next chance occurred on April 23rd as the Union moved through a narrow strip of land ensconced by the Cane and Red Rivers. The unique geography of this region served to pin the Federals into a trap if only Taylor could engage the spring. He did manage to move his paltry force into position to command the potential escape routes, but the Federals simply overpowered him. By the 25th—the same day of the disaster at Marks’ Mills—Banks was back at Alexandria manning the city defenses. This was the final opportunity that Taylor had to destroy Banks and it was a major chance to discomfit the Yankees. This is because the Union navy could not proceed below the falls due to low water. In contrast to the incessant rains in Arkansas, Louisiana was experiencing a prolonged period of dry weather that caused the Red to drop far below seasonable levels. The army therefore, could not continue the retreat lest the navy
fall to Taylor’s Confederates. However, Taylor’s infantry-starved army handcuffed him at this juncture.19

  Taylor once again attempted to hem in the Army of the Gulf with a loose investment on the 28th of April. While he made these dispositions, he began a written campaign to plead for more troops for his command to ensure Banks’ destruction. Taylor wrote to General John B. Magruder, District of Texas, Governor Henry W. Allen of Louisiana, and Kirby Smith describing his want of adequate troops. From the tone of his dispatches it is obvious that Taylor was irritated by his inability to finish off Banks. His letters are laced with barbs at Smith, despair at sparse resources, and requests for more troops. Taylor knew that Alexandria was a golden opportunity and that as the loose siege protracted Banks would have time to extricate Porter’s boats—work had already begun on a dam to raise the level of the Red—and proceed south in retreat.20 Taylor simply had to have more troops to break up Banks’ work in the river and seal him in without hope of an escape.

  The only real hope Taylor had for realizing an accession to his force was for Smith to dispatch some of the precious infantry that he took from Taylor after Pleasant Hill back to Louisiana. For this to happen, Taylor would have to change the fundamental thinking of his commander. As we have seen, Smith fervently believed that Frederick Steele was the main threat to his department. Further, he seemed perfectly content to have Banks leave Louisiana unmolested while he and Price pummeled Steele to destruction. Therefore, it is extremely doubtful that Taylor could have altered Smith’s course given his propensity to insult Smith while arrogantly offering his own alternative course of action. The question then arises, should Smith have continued to chase Steele after he left Camden or, should he have shifted forces for an attempt to run down Banks. Perhaps, John Walker answers this question best in his account of the campaign.

  Banks’ army was no longer capable of offensive operations and such was the demoralization [of] the battles of Mansfield and Pleasant Hill…. Doubtless it was to have been expected that the whole Confederate force would have thrown itself upon the track of his flying army, but unfortunately for the Confederates, General E. K. Smith was not the leader to comprehend the true line of action … against the opinion and advice of all his principal subordinates [obviously referring to Taylor and his entourage], he unwisely determined to leave the pursuit of Banks … and to dispatch Walker’s Div., and the Missouri Div. of Parsons, and the Arkansas Div. of Churchill against the Federal army still at Camden under Steele.21

  Taylor would not receive reinforcements because Smith had hardened in his resolve to close with Steele. There are three reasons for Smith’s fixation on the much weaker VII Corps. First, and most significant, is that Grant’s order forced Steele to commence the expedition and it had the intended effect. The threat the northern prong of the Red River Campaign posed forced a Confederate counteraction that relieved pressure on Banks. While the Camden Expedition did not ensure that Banks’ thrust would be successful, it certainly saved Banks from disaster. Second, is Taylor’s complete inability to exercise tact and good judgment in his relationship with his superior. Taylor’s penchant for acerbic, direct criticism of Smith caused the commanding general to disregard Taylor’s sound advice and a desire to distance himself from Taylor. Finally, Sterling Price had masterfully brought Kirby Smith around to his vision of present and future operations in the Trans-Mississippi Department. Price’s willing cooperation with Smith and good-natured suggestions for the defense of Arkansas and the utility of a Missouri expedition made Smith amenable to Price’s ideas. As a result of these factors, the Federal effort in Arkansas had accomplished its purpose by diverting attention away from Banks in Louisiana and ultimately saving the veteran Army of the Gulf from destruction.

  The Federal army spent the 27th of April putting distance between themselves and the immobilized Confederates at Camden. Eugene Carr led the van of the Union army and he pressed the march with unrelenting fury fanning out on the flanks and front of the main body to protect it from Price’s ever present mounted forces. By 10:00 A.M. Carr had already made about sixteen miles giving the army a good head start. Among his responsibilities this day was to maintain a keen eye out in search of forage to supplement the meager rations carried by the soldiers. Around midday Carr’s scouts reported that they had discovered a large cache of corn about thirteen miles south of Princeton. Further, the area had “two or three small spring branches” making the place ideal for obtaining food, water, and some much needed rest after an exhausting 24 hours spent evacuating Camden. Carr quickly penned a note to Steele informing him of the find and recommending it as a spot suitable for a bivouac. After closing the dispatch he added a post-script stating succinctly, “no enemy seen or heard of.”22 This was indeed good news.

  At the rear of the Union army were indicators of a precipitous withdrawal as the infantry jettisoned unwanted equipment as they tramped forward. Private Sperry reported that the hungry soldiers found their loads too much to bear and began littering the roadside. As the day progressed, knapsacks, coats, and articles of every description marked the path of the retreat. Luckily, the weather cooperated with the bluecoats as the 27th had dawned clear promising good conditions for a march. Nevertheless, many of the Yankees found the going hard. Though the march was a challenge, the rank and file were happy that the Rebels had so far failed to make a foray on the column on the move. But, even this seemed to set the men on edge as it spawned “rumors that the rebels had got between us and Little Rock.”23 The soldiers reasoned that since the Confederates did not hit the rear they must have moved to the front to block their route to Little Rock. The discussion continued throughout the day as the army arrived at the campsite Carr had selected earlier in the day.

  The sun was beginning to descend on the western horizon when the tired army pulled into the bivouac. Upon arriving Carr turned over control of an estimated 1,500 bushels of corn that his cavalrymen had carefully gathered from local farmers. Captain Henry received the precious forage from Carr and quickly set priorities for distribution. Before any of the men received a kernel, Henry ensured that the draft animals were fed first. The animals were already in a weakened condition having suffered from the shortage of forage in southwest Arkansas. If Henry had lost control of the corn before feeding the animals it is quite likely they would not have been fed and would then have been unable to haul the artillery, pontoons, and supply wagons. After feeding the animals, Henry issued the remaining corn to the soldiers, a quantity quite inadequate for the need.24

  Most soldiers were more content to get some sleep and forget about their hunger. While the soldiers went about their business, Steele issued strict orders that evening to wake the army at 4:00 A.M. on the 28th in order to continue north maintaining the considerable distance gained on the previous day. Promptly before dawn the buglers sounded reveille rousing the army for another day of hard marching. In contrast to the 27th, storm clouds began to gather in the west threatening to make the movement a miserable affair. It did not take the army long to assemble on the road and step off toward Little Rock. One soldier reported that it took an astounding 26 minutes for his brigade to form for the march. “Never before,” he recalled, “had we seen such haste when a whole column was moving.”25

  The army retained the same divisional order of march as it continued to Little Rock. During the retreat Fred Salomon emphatically demonstrated his value as a division commander. Keenly aware of the strain of conducting a rear guard action, Salomon shuffled the march order of his division to ensure he could keep his brigades as fresh as possible. Englemann—who commanded the rear guard on the 27th—would lead the division while Samuel Rice would assume duty at the rear covering the retreat.26 Salomon’s judicious management of his unit throughout the retreat paid huge dividends for Frederick Steele only a couple of days later at Jenkins’ Ferry. The corps made only eight miles on the 28th as they went into camp north of Princeton. It was about one in the afternoon when the Yankees swung through the quiet, “ple
asant looking little town.” The reason for the short march was the discovery of a herd of cattle that Captain Henry quickly appropriated for the army’s consumption. The men happily filled their bellies that afternoon for the first time in several days. Unfortunately, the public animals did not fare as well since Henry failed to find a sufficient quantity of forage for them.27

  As the bluecoats enjoyed their supper, a few wild-eyed survivors of the Marks’ Mills fight wandered into camp. Their arrival touched off another round of rumors that the Rebels were surrounding the army and hovering for the kill. While the stories were not true, the Confederates were closing the gap the Yankees had opened on the 27th.28 Further, Fagan’s detached cavalry division was within a stone’s throw of the VII Corps, just to the north on the Military Road, yet neither Steele nor Fagan knew of each other’s presence. The lack of information and reliable intelligence available to the Confederates continued the comedy of errors that began with the graybacks’ failure to ascertain the Federal evacuation of Camden. However, the early halt of the 28th allowed the hard driving Rebels to right their earlier mistakes and in retrospect it appears that Steele made a grave blunder by stopping for food rather than driving forward with the cattle in tow. If Smith could catch Steele on the move, block him, or catch him at a point of disadvantage—such as in crossing the Saline—there was the real potential that Smith could destroy the VII Corps. Such a turn of events would lay Missouri open to invasion and possibly mollify a disgruntled Richard Taylor in Louisiana.