The newly minted 19th Arkansas was now standing by idly as Parsons’ Division strode forward. When Smith came upon Williams and his motley assemblage he struck on an idea for a flanking assault across Cox Creek using these idle troops from Churchill’s Division. The decision to assign Williams’ regiment such a critical task is highly questionable given the condition of the unit at this juncture. Nevertheless, Smith met with Williams briefly in the Saline Bottom and ordered him to cross to the north side of Cox Creek. Once on the left bank of the stream, Smith told Williams to take control of some high ground that dominated the Union line of defense. This point, perpendicular to the Federals, would provide the Rebels with an ideal location to enfilade the bluecoats. This fire, combined with the frontal assault by Parsons, might force the Federals to abandon their strong position. Then Smith could pour in Walker’s Greyhounds to finish off the cornered Federals at the bridgehead.21 The plan had promise, but once again Smith’s haste doomed the endeavor. For one thing, the combined strength of Williams and Parsons numbered barely 2,500 men while Salomon had about 4,000 muskets in line. Second, as already touched upon, Williams’ regiment suffered from a host of problems, notwithstanding the horrible conditions of the battlefield and exhausting marches. Had Smith waited another two hours he could have weighted the flank attack with elements of Walker’s Division. Patience on Kirby Smith’s part could have delivered the results the departmental commander so desperately sought. Longer casualty rolls, instead, would accompany this lack of foresight.
Smith assigned his aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Cunningham, to act as a guide for Williams and then departed to observe Parsons’ frontal assault. Williams promptly assembled his regiment and moved out toward the overflowing creek. Perhaps the most difficult aspect of the mission was to find an appropriate crossing site. Cox Creek, like the Saline, was out of its banks at several points making any attempt to cross a challenge. Lieutenant Cunningham searched diligently for a ford and his efforts paid off as he located a suitable site under the circumstances. Williams pushed his men into the swirling water with cartridge boxes and muskets raised above their heads in the chest-high creek. The regiment got across quickly and scrambled up the slick opposite bank. After a short break to catch their breath and realign the regiment for movement forward, Williams again stepped off. The Arkansans’ progress was agonizingly slow as thick undergrowth on the north side of the stream held up the struggling regiment.22 The slow pace ensured that Parsons’ assault would proceed unsupported meeting the same fate as Churchill’s hapless brigades only an hour earlier. As Lieutenant Cunningham and Lieutenant Colonel Williams struggled along to deliver the flank attack, they soon heard the unmistakable sound of heavy musketry swell on the south side of the creek confirming Parsons’ men had engaged.
Thomas Churchill had not sat by complacently as Salomon pummeled his division in Coopers Field. He had held Colonel Lucien Gause’s Brigade in reserve while Tappan and Hawthorn made their individual attacks. Therefore, Gause had a relatively fresh brigade awaiting orders to join the fight. Churchill sent word back to Gause to come up immediately to the support of Hawthorn’s hotly engaged men in the muddy field. Gause promptly complied setting his men in motion shortly before 10:00 A.M. When Gause arrived, the Federals greeted his brigade in a similar fashion to the way they had greeted his comrades. A hail of fire slammed into his butternut infantrymen as they emerged from the woods. Gause’s men quickly made for the muddy ditch where Churchill’s other brigades had found shelter from the Federal musketry. Everywhere Gause’s men passed they could observe the fury of the earlier fight in the field as it was strewn with dead, wounded, and the inevitable debris that littered a contested battlefield. Gause’s arrival, however, allowed Tappan to make an organized withdrawal while giving heart to Hawthorn’s flagging men. This stabilized the situation enough for Churchill to hang on in the swale until Parsons arrived.23
Shortly after Gause came to the relief of his fellow brigade commanders, Parsons’ line of battle came up in the rear of Churchill’s hard-pressed troops. Along the way Parsons happened upon Churchill’s command post where he quickly received a brief of the situation ahead. The Arkansan told him that the Union defense had devastated his center and that it would likely fall back in the next few minutes. Churchill informed Parsons of Shaver’s limited success and from it surmised that the Federal defense did not extend very far into the swamp south of the field. Churchill suggested that Parsons could possibly overlap the Federal line and that he would assist this endeavor by attaching Gause’s Brigade to Parsons for the renewed attack. Since this coincided with Parsons’ own plans he readily accepted Gause and thus, had more force to land the attack as well as a longer line to threaten the Federal left flank. Accordingly, Parsons ordered Clark and the artillery to maintain the original course while having Burns pass to the rear of Gause in order to form on his right. This gave Parsons a three brigade front that extended beyond the Federal line for a considerable distance. As soon as the division had made its adjustments, Parsons ordered it forward for the attack.24
The combined strength of the Missourians and Arkansans represented the only real opportunity the Confederates had at Jenkins’ Ferry to defeat the Union army. It was the time on the field when the Rebels brought the greatest strength to bear at a single moment. With Parsons’ three brigades—including Gauses—the grayclads had a little over 3,000 men. If Williams’ flanking column north of the creek is added to the tally, the Confederates had about 3,500 men in action. However, this gave them only a one-to-one ratio for the attack and Salomon could, and did, readily call forward the Frontier Division from their position in reserve. Therefore, even this assault stood no realistic chance of success.
Clark and Gause had not proceeded far across Cooper’s Field before the sustained fire of Salomon’s solid ranks arrested any movement beyond the swale, which by now was filled with the human wreckage and wild-eyed survivors of the earlier attacks. One aspect of Clark and Gause’s assault that differentiated it from those previous is the fire from the artillery. Lesueur and Ruffner pushed their respective guns far to the front to support the infantry. In the process, they enabled Clark and Gause to make the farthest sustained advance of the day in this quarter, moving at one point to within 50 paces of the Union line. However, both battery commanders had placed their guns a little too far forward for when the infantry assault petered out the mud conspired to leave them stuck in an exposed position. Colonel Samuel Crawford, commanding the Union troops in this sector, recognized an opportunity to snatch the guns from the struggling gunners and formed a strike column from his 2nd Kansas (Colored) Infantry to take the guns. The boldness of the 2nd Kansas’ counterattack and a surprise showing by Yankees north of Cox Creek prevented the Rebels from cracking the Federal defense in Cooper’s Field.25
On the right, Burns’ Brigade came closer to achieving success. Burns’ Missourians had a hard-earned reputation for embodying the image of warriors, having fought in some of the hardest battles in the Confederate west. As they moved forward to engage the Federal left Dr. Bragg noted that “this brigade was one of the best the Confederacy ever had.” Further, the doctor recorded the regard the men in his regiment held for the Missourians as they passed. The Arkansans raised a cheer for their comrades and encouraged them to “get even” when they closed with the enemy. This is exactly what they intended to do.26 Pushing on through intractable undergrowth and standing water, Burns’ men soon happened upon the 33rd Iowa and 12th Kansas Infantry regiments that had so roughly handled Shaver’s regiment. A hot firefight quickly developed as the opposing lines traded volleys at point blank range in the woods. Battle smoke began to blanket the dank forest and soldiers from the 33rd Iowa “soon learned to stoop down” to dodge choking from the pungent odor and to avoid the deadly missiles emitting from hundreds of Rebel muskets. After about a half hour of firing, Burns’ Brigade soon pressed ahead having gradually worked their way around the Federal left. This turned the outnumbered Yankees out of
their position forcing a retreat. Colonel Mackey called for his 33rd Iowa to pull back and the 12th Kansas conformed to his movements. As Mackey coolly sat on his horse managing the retrograde, a stray ball shattered his arm forcing the indomitable commander to leave the field. Command now devolved upon the steady Major Cyrus Boydston, who guided the regiment through the rest of the fight.27 Although the Iowans and Kansans made an orderly withdrawal, the rearward movement rendered the whole Union line vulnerable since an entire Rebel brigade was lurking in the woods off the Federal left. The situation required initiative and prompt action and this is exactly what John Thayer delivered at the precise moment Salomon needed reinforcements, just as he had on other fields such as Fort Donelson.
When Shaver’s Arkansans inadvertently slid around the open Federal left, the Union commanders suddenly realized that the swamp to the south did not provide the security that they had expected. John Thayer had spent the early morning hours listening intently as the sound of heavy musketry emanated from the west. He placed his regiments in a state of high readiness in Kelly’s Field, prepared to advance in any direction at a moment’s notice. Thayer’s foresight enabled the Union army to quickly plug Shaver’s incursion on the left flank before the situation became serious. As the tumult moved closer Thayer called for the 2nd Kansas (Colored), the 14th Kansas Cavalry, and the 1st Arkansas (Union) to form for movement. As they began to fall into ranks a courier arrived informing Thayer of Salomon’s need for reinforcements to shore up the left. Promptly, Thayer put the regiments in motion toward the troubled sector. Marching to the sound of the guns, Colonel Charles Adams commanding Thayer’s 2nd Brigade, sent the 1st Arkansas and the 14th Kansas to the left while dropping off the 2nd Kansas (Colored) in the center. The arrival of the Frontier Division troops extended the Federal line far beyond Shaver’s flank forcing him back.28
Salomon had also shifted some of his own regiments to meet the threat, as well as accepting the arrival of the reinforcements from Thayer. The 27th Wisconsin Infantry marched rapidly behind the line out to the sagging flank and was soon joined by the Frontier Division troops. The Wisconsin men and the 14th Kansas Cavalry moved far out to the left in order to extend the front further to the south. Together they would provide a screen to protect the main defense from being surprised by any further attempts to use the swamp as an avenue to the left flank. Colonel John Garrett’s 40th Iowa Infantry of Salomon’s division had busied themselves in the rear with refilling depleted cartridge boxes when a captain from the 12th Kansas Infantry sent an urgent request for support. Garrett curtailed his replenishment and hastily pressed his regiment back into line. In a twist of good fortune, the 27th Wisconsin arrived at almost the same time as the 40th Iowa. Garrett and Colonel Conrad Krez, commanding the Badger State troopers, agreed to cooperate in launching a spoiling attack on Burns’ advancing Rebels. Soon the Wisconsin and Iowa troops swung into line for an assault with the Frontier Division troops. The advance heartened the 33rd Iowa and 12th Kansas regiments, which now halted their retreat and conformed to the movements of their benefactors. The suddenness of the Federal recovery astounded Burns and his Missourians, as they believed victory was in their grasp. Moving ahead “with a shout” Garrett reported that the Union put the Rebels to their heels soon passing “over the enemy’s dead.”29 This turn in momentum reestablished the pattern of failed Rebel assaults as Burns’ deflated Missourians returned to their jump off positions.
As the Federals on the left repulsed Burns’ Brigade another drama was unfolding in the center as the 2nd Kansas (Colored) got a measure of revenge for their fallen comrades of Poison Spring. Colonel Samuel Crawford literally chafed with impatience as his regiment waited to enter the fray in Kelly’s Field. As part of the Frontier Division, the 2nd Kansas had been forced to sit in a reserve position as the fight in Cooper’s Field reached a crescendo. Finally, orders arrived from the front for Crawford to move to the relief of Salomon’s hard pressed line. The aggressive colonel put his crack regiment in motion at double quick time and soon reported to General Rice whose brigade was in the thick of the fighting. Rice was unimpressed with the appearance of the 2nd Kansas at the front. When Crawford went to ask Rice where to enter the line, the general sneered and asked Crawford if he believed the regiment would really fight. In addition to his reputation for hard fighting, Crawford was also a staunch abolitionist who had unwavering confidence in his men. Insulted by Rice’s question, he snapped back with a sarcastic tone that “I can take my regiment where any live regiment will go.” Taken aback, Rice smiled and told Crawford to “move over on the right and relieve the 50th Indiana,” which was running short of ammunition.30 Crawford’s regiment would soon have an opportunity to show their mettle.
The 2nd Kansas found a place at the south end of Cooper’s Field where the forest met the open area. They had no sooner closed the unit in line when a Rebel charge came bearing down on the 660 newcomers from the 2nd Kansas. Elements of Gause’s and Clark’s brigades came on with the notorious Rebel yell ripping the air. Crawford’s regiment stood unperturbed by the raucous Confederates as their colonel prepared them for combat. Crawford allowed the Rebels to approach within 150 paces before giving the command to fire. According to Crawford, the “balls went crashing through … bringing [them] to a standstill.” The Rebels traded shots toe to toe with Crawford for some time as the batteries that accompanied them brought their fires to bear on the bluecoats. For a time it appeared that the Rebels could have overcome the firestorm and overrun the Federal center. Then, from out of the blue, an enfilading fire began to tear holes in the compact ranks of Clark’s Brigade. The Rebels were astounded to find that their flanking force north of Cox Creek had foundered and a Federal regiment was pouring fire into their midst.31
The fire was too much for Clark and he ordered his brigade to fall back. The haste of their withdrawal left the Rebel batteries exposed in the open field with no support. The incessant rains of the past 24 hours had created a quagmire that was nearly impossible for heavy guns to maneuver through. As the Rebel gunners struggled to free their cannons, Crawford seized on an opportunity to deal a hard blow. Realizing that the Confederate guns were ripe for capture, Crawford sent his adjutant to Rice to appeal for permission to charge and bring the guns into Federal control. Rice, impressed by the 2nd Kansas’ performance thus far, consented to Crawford’s request. When Adjutant Playford arrived back at the regiment, Crawford issued the command to “fix bayonets” before stepping off. Next, the adjutant called for “forward, at the quick step” and the 2nd Kansas rolled forward with a cheer. “A third of the way across,” Crawford stated, “I leveled one volley at the battery, which brought down horses enough to hold three of the guns and sent the other three flying from the field.”32
With the horses of three guns down, the Federal infantry now quickened the pace to take control of the cannon. Upon reaching the remaining guns a hand-to-hand struggle developed for control between the outnumbered Rebels and determined Federals. The Kansas troops, caught up in the emotion of the melee, shouted “Remember Poison Springs” in honor of their fallen comrades. The 2nd Kansas is reputed to have reciprocated the Rebel atrocities of Poison Springs in kind by taking no prisoners. Crawford admitted to using the bayonet freely and “terroriz[ing] the Rebel line of infantry.” The colored troopers successfully captured three guns and dragged them back to Federal lines. While they were more than happy to capture the cannon, they took only one Confederate soldier alive, reportedly killing or mortally wounding 150 Rebels near the battery.33 Crawford decided to release this hapless lieutenant, but before sending him back the colonel dictated a message to deliver to his generals. After a dissertation on the evils of Confederate conduct with reference to Negro soldiers, Crawford got down to the point. He stated:
I want you to tell General Price, General Churchill, General Parsons, General Hawthorn, General Clark, General Dockery, Colonels Gause and Burns what regiment it was that held the pass south of Toxie [Cox] Creek, from 8:30 in
the morning until their lines were broken and their artillery captured at half-past twelve. Tell them further that I accept their new flag with all that its colors imply; and from this day forward, so long as they bear it aloft, by their action on the battlefield, I shall simply tell the men to remember Poison Springs.34
Crawford’s men, in spite of alleged atrocities, had performed in an outstanding manner helping stabilize the Federal center and capturing three cannon as well. The 2nd Kansas had “fought its most distinguished action of the war” and contributed immeasurably to a solid victory at Jenkins’ Ferry.35 Frederick Steele agreed with this assessment stating in his after action report that “the conduct of the colored troops of my command proves that the African can be made as formidable in battle as a soldier of any other color.”36
The 2nd Kansas was not the only regiment that had blunted Parsons’ fierce assault. Men from three other units delivered an unwanted surprise on the unsuspecting Rebels. Williams’ 19th Arkansas had struggled through thick undergrowth north of Cox Creek when Parsons crashed into the Federal line. Kirby Smith had intended for Williams to gain an enfilade position before Parsons landed his blow. However, the difficult nature of the terrain prevented the Arkansans from reaching the position. In addition, Salomon had taken the precaution of placing a thin line of two companies from the 29th Iowa and the scattered survivors of the Marks’ Mills debacle to act as skirmishers north of Cox Creek. Their purpose was to provide early warning of any Confederate attempt to use the area beyond the creek as an avenue to flank the Union army. As Williams and his regiment drew near the position they desired to occupy, the sharpshooters from the 29th took them under fire. This temporarily halted Williams as he attempted to determine the strength of these unseen snipers.37
The Camden Expedition of 1864 Page 27
