Captain Marmaduke Darnall in command of the Union detachment, made his own assessment and recognized that Williams’ regiment represented a serious effort to flank the Union line by fire. Should Williams gain the enfilade position, it would destabilize the integrity of Salomon’s line. Darnall also realized that his own sparse force north of the creek was inadequate to stop the Arkansans from taking their objective. Therefore, Darnall sent an urgent note to Salomon describing the situation and requesting immediate reinforcement. Upon receiving Darnall’s message, Salomon flew into action. Grasping the gravity of the situation, Salomon found Adolph Englemann and ordered him to send a regiment across Cox Creek and drive the Rebels back.38
Englemann passed the mission on to his dependable subordinate Colonel Adolph Dengler. The colonel formed the 43rd Illinois and hastily turned his regiment toward the creek. On arrival at the south bank the troops showed “some hesitancy” to wade into the stream due to the depth and current. Dengler angrily ordered his men into the creek and in his haste did not take the precaution to remove cartridge boxes. As a result, many of them filled with water fouling the black powder in their boxes, effectively neutralizing many of his men. Reaching the far bank, Dengler turned left and drove toward the sound of skirmishing from Darnall’s detachment. “The Forty-third,” one observer reported, “was soon briskly engaged” and finding many men unable to fire, Dengler called for help. Salomon responded with two companies from the 2nd Kansas (Colored) under Captain Frank Kister and the other four companies of Garrett’s 40th Iowa commanded by Major Sherman G. Smith.39
Meanwhile, Dengler and Darnall’s detachment engaged in a hot fight until the needed reinforcements arrived. Shortly, Smith reported to Dengler who had him form the right wing. Together, the two units plunged forward through the underbrush. Dengler moved frontally while Smith executed a turning movement on the Rebel left flank. This maneuver convinced Williams that he could not hold his position and he began a steady withdrawal. Now, Captain Kister arrived and likewise reported to Dengler for instructions and the colonel told him to place his unit on the left anchored on the creek. Having gained the upper hand, Dengler sought to push Williams from the north side of the creek and then wheel to assist his comrades on the south bank. Kirby Smith helped Dengler at this point by ordering an astonished Williams back across the creek to assist the hard-pressed Rebels in Cooper’s Field. With the Confederates pulling back, Dengler executed his left wheel until his line paralleled the stream on a rise overlooking the left flank of Clark’s Brigade. Once set, he had the men from these three regiments pour a devastating fire into the stunned Rebels to the south.40 Dengler’s initiative staggered Parsons’ assault, ending the second major attempt to destroy Steele’s force against the Jenkins’ Ferry bridgehead.
It was now about 11:30 A.M. and the rain had finally subsided. Salomon’s Federal division reinforced by Thayer’s Frontier Division had completely frustrated two uncoordinated attempts to destroy the VII Corps, buying time for the Federals to evacuate the remainder of the trains and artillery from the west bank of the Saline. Steele, who had been curiously absent from the fighting, now ordered the unengaged regiments of the Frontier Division to begin filing down to the river. Simultaneously, Salomon took advantage of the lull in the fighting to adjust his lines by ordering Dengler to recross the creek, effecting an extension of the line further south, and replenishing cartridge boxes that were running low after over three hours of continuous fighting.41 The Federals had used their time wisely because the battle was not yet over. As Parsons’ assault began to falter, Walker’s Texans finally started to assemble on the ridge overlooking the Saline Bottom.
Walker’s Division made an exhausting 23-mile march through driving rains and atrocious road conditions to reach the field. Walker, like his predecessors, allowed his men to snatch a much deserved rest upon arrival. As his men filed by to find a suitable spot to halt, Walker could be seen on the side of the road offering them words of encouragement. The hardy Texans responded with “cheer after cheer” for their respected leader. Walker reciprocated their affection, yet the mask of command could not hide the concern he felt for them now. For Walker knew that he would soon have to lead many of them to their deaths in the dank woodland of the Saline.42 Indeed, Kirby Smith was already planning a third assault that he hoped would deliver the destructive blow he had sought throughout the morning.
The failure of Parsons’ attack disheartened Smith greatly, but the Rebel commander was not ready to give up. As he had observed the assault, Smith realized that the Federal left was in the air and that Burns’ Brigade had come very close to turning Salomon’s line. Smith believed that the only thing that had stopped Parsons’ assault was the lack of weight on the Confederate right as they attempted to outflank Salomon. If Smith could properly array Walker’s Division for another drive, exploiting the vulnerability of the Federal left, he believed he could drive through to the Ferry. Walker, however, was skeptical of this assessment for he saw a much different situation. Walker had fought recently at Pleasant Hill and this battle on the Saline looked remarkably similar. At Pleasant Hill Richard Taylor had committed division after division piecemeal into the teeth of bristling Union defenses. Now only two and a half weeks later, Kirby Smith was about to commit “the same fatal blunder.”43
In spite of his reservations, Walker, a consummate professional, would do his duty and lead the third attack. Smith had studied the topography closely over the past couple of hours and found a little used farm track that he hoped would lead to the exposed Federal left flank. Smith wanted to send two brigades on this path while Walker’s third brigade used the Military Road to approach the Federal front. Meanwhile, Parsons’ two brigades, along with elements of Churchill’s Division, would provide support to bolster Walker’s attack. Once the flanking brigades were in position, Walker would launch his assault seeking to gain the Federal rear cutting Salomon off from the bridgehead.44 This plan had promise if the farm branch actually led beyond the Federal flank.
In accordance with Smith’s orders, Walker began forming the 4,000 men of his division after rousing them from their short repose. Walker told Brigadier General Thomas Waul to take his brigade and advance straight up the Military Road. While Waul did this Walker would accompany his other two brigades down the farm lane with Colonel Horace Randal in the lead followed by Brigadier General William Scurry. Walker hoped that Waul’s Brigade attacking on the left in Cooper’s Field would distract the Federal line drawn up there. Then, Walker would land a two-brigade blow on the unsuspecting Federal flank. Accordingly, Walker lurched forward with a division of worn out Rebel infantrymen sometime after 11:30 A.M. Around noon Waul’s lone brigade emerged from the timber surrounding Cooper’s Field and made ready for a charge. When Waul believed that Walker’s column was in position to attack the Federal flank he gave the order for his own unit to plunge into the open field. Waul reported that his brigade came “under a continuous and destructive fire” upon entering the field forcing him into the same ditch that had sheltered a succession of Confederate units. As Waul’s tenacious Rebels held on in the midst of a murderous fire, Randal and Scurry were attempting to untangle themselves in the densely wooded area west of Cooper’s Field.45
Unfortunately for Thomas Waul and his men, Walker’s column was nowhere near their proposed assault position when he attacked. The isolated farm track that Kirby Smith had placed his hopes for success upon proved disappointing. Randal’s and Scurry’s brigades trudged through a morass of mud in pressing toward what they believed was the exposed Federal left. Yet, when they finally emerged from the path in the timber Walker discovered that the lane led to the southeast corner of the Jiles’ Cornfield, far from the intended objective. As the Confederates emerged into the field they suddenly realized the error of their advance. About the same moment, Walker could distinctly hear the rumble of musketry signaling Waul’s now unsupported attack. The division commander valiantly redirected his two brigades toward the sound of firin
g to extricate Waul’s lone unit. This required Randal and Scurry to shake out a line of battle and then advance through the dense belt of timber separating the Jiles’ Cornfield from Cooper’s Field. The task brought about an interminable delay in deploying the flanking column and pressing into action.46
Salomon’s division had once again easily repulsed a piecemeal, uncoordinated brigade attack and was waiting in readiness for Randal’s and Scurry’s struggling Rebels to appear. It took about a half-hour for the Confederates to reach the battle area. A portion of Randal’s Brigade was the first to arrive and they appeared behind Waul’s hunkered down men in the swale. This meant that instead of attacking an open flank, Randal and Scurry would actually have to assault frontally. Walker attempted to shift the hapless Rebels further to the right so that Randal would not become entangled with Waul in his charge. Yet, even with this adjustment the Confederates did not overlap the Federal line. On the contrary, Salomon’s division extended beyond Walker’s flank, and, making matters worse, Major Smith and Captain Kister had their pesky bluecoats in position north of Cox Creek to pour a deadly crossfire into the Rebel left.47 In essence, Walker’s attack was a forlorn hope.
Finally, as the hour approached 12:30 P.M., Walker rolled forward in his attempt to crack Salomon’s line. Soon it was evident that Walker would have no more success than his fellow division commanders had had earlier in the day. The leaders in charge of Walker’s brigades were courageous and well respected throughout the Texas Division and they validated that trust on this field, yet they fared no better than Churchill and Parsons. When the line advanced Waul, Randal, and Scurry were conspicuous in their presence on the battlefield as they shouted orders and provided steady guidance to their troops. Their personal leadership set an excellent example for their men and gave the Union infantrymen ideal targets for honing their marksmanship. Within minutes of the start of the engagement all three of Walker’s brigade commanders were hit as a murderous fire emanated from the Union line. Randal and Scurry received mortal wounds while Waul had a serious, though not life threatening injury to his leg. The loss of these senior commanders paralyzed the Confederate attack as the leaderless brigades fell into confusion. As Walker surmised the nature of the situation, the Federals began to curl around both flanks of the Confederate division threatening to imperil its safety. Realizing his position was untenable, Walker ordered a withdrawal from the field and asked Churchill’s cut up unit to give him assistance in this maneuver.48
With the exception of some scattered skirmishing, the Battle of Jenkins’ Ferry was over. However, the ordeal for the Federals would continue for a couple more days. As the fighting subsided after the third assault, Frederick Steele rode to the front to confer with Salomon. He had left all tactical dispositions and direction of the fighting on the shoulders of Salomon. Some may argue that his appropriate place on the field was at the front rather than down at the bridge supervising the passage of the trains. While this is a reasonable judgment, Salomon’s conduct of affairs was exceptional and the presence of Steele looking over the shoulder of a division commander might have caused great irritation. Further, Steele had an excellent cast of subordinates that he placed full trust in and these men justified that confidence with outstanding performance. By contrast, Kirby Smith meddled in his subordinates’ business to the point of detaching individual regiments for separate attacks. Rather than coordinating the army to utilize its clear advantage in manpower, Smith accompanied small-scale brigade assaults, thus squandering a reasonable opportunity to bag Steele’s army. When Steele’s performance is compared to Smith’s it appears that the Federal commander made a satisfactory decision in facilitating the withdrawal and allowing Salomon to fight the delaying action, which was essentially a divisional action.
Salomon received Steele cordially providing him with a succinct brief of the situation. As he concluded, Salomon suggested that perhaps now might be an appropriate time to withdraw closer to the ferry in order to contract his line into a more easily defensible perimeter. While Salomon’s division had performed admirably, the soldiers were utterly worn out, hungry, and had suffered several hundred casualties over the course of the day. In addition, Salomon had several prisoners interrogated and from these he identified the presence of three separate Confederate divisions on the field. On further questioning, the ragged Rebels claimed that the army was “continually receiving reinforcements.” This convinced Salomon that he must pull back since he was sure the Confederates would launch another attack when they had their forces assembled.49
Steele readily consented to this request and added that a deliberate defense was not necessary close to the ferry. The trains, artillery, and part of Thayer’s division were already across the Saline and Salomon’s stolid division could follow immediately. Salomon happily began assembling his division, but before starting he organized a small strike force to push forward to ensure the division was not attacked in the act of withdrawing. He also gathered up all the wounded—including the severely wounded General Samuel Rice—that were movable and sent them ahead of the column. Unfortunately, he could not carry all of them and assigned several surgeons and orderlies to stay behind and attend to their wounds. Meanwhile, Salomon’s strike force pursued the Confederates for about a mile with only minor contact before breaking off the action. Upon their rejoining Salomon’s main body, the whole division pulled back to the bridgehead. Shortly after 2:00 P.M. the last of the VII Corps crossed the pontoon bridge to the east side of the Saline and safety.50
The largest battle of the Camden Expedition resulted in some 700 Union casualties out of 4,000 soldiers committed from the 3rd Division and Frontier Division. This is an 18 percent casualty rate for the Federals who fought the battle primarily from defensive positions. On the other hand, estimates of Confederate casualties reveal a loss of over 1,00051 soldiers including several general officers of some 8,000 who made the attacks. Such a high percentage of losses with reference to troops engaged attests to the ferocity of the engagement. The fight at Jenkins’ Ferry was a tactical victory for the Federals who successfully brought off their entire army. In contrast, the Confederates squandered an opportunity to destroy Steele with a series of piecemeal assaults that only produced a long casualty list. But, the true repercussions of the battle echoed far beyond the field in Arkansas. Smith’s decision to pursue Steele drew a sizeable Rebel force away from Louisiana and Nathaniel P. Banks’ imperiled army. This gave the Army of the Gulf and the Mississippi River Squadron invaluable time to escape the grip of a frustrated and angry Richard Taylor.
Nevertheless, the Yankees were still not yet out of the woods in Arkansas or Louisiana. Steele and his thoroughly used up army were still over fifty miles from Little Rock with a huge Rebel mounted force thought to be lurking west of the Saline. Simultaneously, Banks still needed a few more days to complete a dam that would raise the Red River enough to release the trapped Federal navy. Would the Union forces in the Trans-Mississippi have enough time to effect their escape? If the scattered Federals did receive the respite they required, then sizeable Union forces would be available for use in other important theaters in the east. Only time would tell.
* * *
Notes
1. Evans, ed., Confederate Military History, X, 261–262.
2. OR, Vol. 34, Part, 556.
3. Bragg, “Chasing Steele through Jenkins Ferry,” Ouachita County Historical Quarterly (Spring 1998), 10.
4. Blessington, Walker’s Texas Division, 248.
5. Bragg, “Chasing Steele through Jenkins Ferry,” Ouachita County Historical Quarterly (Spring 1998), 10.
6. Blessington, Walker’s Texas Division, 248–249.
7. M. Jane Harris Johansson, “Peculiar Honor: A History of the 28th Texas Cavalry (Dismounted), Walker’s Texas Division, 1862–1865,” UMI Dissertation Services, 193.
8. Ibid.; and OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 669, 677, and 681.
9. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 689 and 725–726; and Richards, “The Battle of Jenk
ins’ Ferry,” AHQ (Spring 1961), 7.
10. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 702–703 and 829.
11. Ibid., 697 and 829–830.
12. Ibid., 799–800; and Bragg, “Chasing Steele through Jenkins Ferry,” Ouachita County Historical Quarterly (Spring 1998), 10.
13. Bragg, “Chasing Steele through Jenkins Ferry,” Ouachita County Historical Quarterly (Spring 1998), 10–11; and OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 799–800.
14. Bragg, “Chasing Steele through Jenkins Ferry,” Ouachita County Historical Quarterly (Spring 1998), 11.
15. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 702–703 and 800.
16. Ibid., 669, 689, 697, and 702–703; and Sperry, History of the 33rd Iowa, 99.
17. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 724–725 and 735–736.
18. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 809.
19. Ibid., 556.
20. Arthur R. and Robert B. Buckalew, “Hillsboro’s Citizen Soldier: Horatio Gates Perry Williams,” AHQ (Spring 1972), 36–46.
21. Ibid., 48; Bearss, Steele’s Retreat From Camden, 130; and OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 807–808.
22. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 800 and 808.
23. Ibid., 800 and 806.
24. Ibid., 800 and 809–810.
25. Crawford, Kansas in the Sixties, 120–123.
26. Bragg, “Chasing Steele through Jenkins Ferry,” Ouachita County Historical Quarterly (Spring 1998), 11.
27. Sperry, History of the 33rd Iowa, 100 and 105; and OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 703.
28. McLeod, “The Frontier Division in the Camden Expedition,” 17–18; and OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 690 and 698.
29. OR, Vol. 34, Part 1, 740–741; and Burke, Official Military History of the Kansas Regiments, 376.
30. Crawford, Kansas in the Sixties, 120; and Burke, Official Military History of the Kansas Regiments, 428.
The Camden Expedition of 1864 Page 28
