The Lily and the Totem; or, The Huguenots in Florida

by William Gilmore Simms

  XXII.

  THE FATE OF LA CAROLINE.

  CHAPTER I.

  The fleet of Ribault consisted of seven vessels. The _three_ smallest ofthese had ascended the river to the fortress. The _four_ larger, whichwere men of war, remained in the open roadstead. Here they were joinedon the fourth of September by six Spanish vessels of large size andarmament. These came to anchor, and, at their first coming, gaveassurance of amity to the Frenchmen. But Ribault had been warned, priorto his departure from France, that the Spaniards were to be suspected.The crowns of France and Spain, it is true, were at peace, but theSpaniards themselves contemplated settlements in Florida, to whichthey laid claim, by right of previous discovery, including, under thisgeneral title, territories of the most indefinite extent. Philip theSecond, that cold, malignant and jealous despot, freed by the amnestywith France from the cares of war in that quarter, now addressed hisstrength and employed his leisure in extending equally his sway, withthat of the Catholic faith, among the red-men of America. Prior to thesettlements of Coligny, he had begun his preparations for this object.The charge of the expedition was confided to Don Pedro Melendez deAvilez, an officer particularly famous among his countrymen for hisdeeds of heroism in the New World. He himself, bore a considerableportion of the expense of the enterprise, and this was a considerationsufficiently imposing in the eyes of his sovereign, to secure for himthe dignity of a Spanish Adelantado, with the hereditary governmentof all the Floridas. It was while engaged in the preparations forthis expedition that tidings were received by the Spaniards of thesettlements which had been begun by the Huguenots. The enterprise of DonPedro de Melendez now assumed an aspect of more dignity. It became acrusade, and the eager impulse of ambition was stimulated by all theusual arguments in favor of a holy war. To extirpate heresy was anobject equally grateful to both the legitimates of France and Spain; andthe heartless monarch of France, Charles the Ninth, in the spirit whichsubsequently gave birth to the horrible massacre of St. Bartholomew,it is reported--though the act may have been that of the QueenMother--cheerfully yielded up his Protestant subjects in Florida, to thetender mercies of the Spanish propagandist. There is little doubt thatthe French monarch had signified to his Spanish brother, that he shouldresent none of the wrongs done to the colonies of Coligny; he himselfbeing, at this very time, busied in the labor which was preparing forthe destruction of their patron and brethren at home. Coligny well knewhow little was the real sympathy entertained by the monarch for thisclass of his subjects, and he felt that there were sufficient reasons tofear, and to be watchful of, the Spaniards. He had some better authoritythan mere suspicion for his fear. Just as Ribault was about to take hisdeparture from France, the Lord Admiral wrote him as follows, in a hastypostscript:--"As I was closing this letter, I received certain advicesthat Don Pedro Melendez departeth from Spain to go to the coast of NewFrance, (Florida,) see that you suffer him not to encroach upon you, nomore than you will suffer yourself to encroach on him."

  The preparations of Melendez began to assume an aspect of great andimposing magnificence. Clergy and laity crowded to his service. Nearlytwenty vessels, some of very considerable force, were provided; andthree thousand adventurers assembled under his command. But Heavendid not seem at first to smile upon the enterprise. His fleet wasencountered by tempests as had been the "Grand Armada," and the numberof his vessels before he reached Porto Rico had been reduced nearlytwo thirds. Some doubt now arose in the minds of the Spanish captains,whether they were in sufficient force to encounter Ribault. The bigotryand enthusiasm of Melendez rejected the doubt with indignation. Hisfanaticism furnished an argument in behalf of his policy, imposingenough to the superstitious mind, and which his followers weresufficiently willing to accept. "The Almighty," said the Adelantado,"has reduced our armament, only that his own arm might achieve the holywork."

  The warning of danger contained in the letter of the Lord Admiral toRibault did not fall upon unheeding senses. Still, the French captainwas quite unprepared for the rapidity of the progress made by theSpaniards. When, with six large vessels, they suddenly appeared in theroadstead of May River, Ribault was at La Caroline. His officers hadbeen apprised of the propriety of distrusting their neighbors, andaccordingly showed themselves suspicious as they drew nigh. It was wellthey did so. In the absence of Ribault, with three of the ships at LaCaroline, they were inferior in force to the armament of Melendez,and were thus doubly required to oppose vigilance to fraud and force.Fortunately, the Spaniards did not reach the road till near evening,when they had too little time for efficient operations. Hence thecivility of their deportment, and the pacific character of theirassurances. They lowered sail, cast anchor, and forbore all offensivedemonstrations. But one circumstance confirmed the apprehensions of theFrenchmen. In the brief conversation which ensued between the parties,after the arrival of the Spaniards, the latter inquired after the chiefcaptains and leaders of the French fleet, calling them by their namesand surnames, and betraying an intimate knowledge of matters, which hadbeen judiciously kept as secret as possible in France. This showed,conclusively, that, before Melendez left Spain, he was thoroughlyinformed by those who knew, in France, of the condition, conduct, andstrength of Ribault's armament. And why should he be informed of theseparticulars, unless there were some designs for acting upon thisinformation? The French captains compared notes that night, in respectto these communications, and concurred in the belief that they stoodin danger of assault. They prepared themselves accordingly, to cut andrun, with the first appearance of dawn, or danger. With the break ofday, the Spaniards began to draw nigh to our Frenchmen; but the sails ofthese were already hoisted to the breeze. Their cables were severed, atthe first sign of hostility, and the chase begun within the greatestanimation. But, if the ships of the Huguenots were deficient in force,they had the advantage of their enemies in speed. They showed theSpaniards a clean pair of heels, and suffered nothing from the distantcannonade with which their pursuers sought to cripple their flight. Thechase was continued through the day. With the approach of evening, theSpaniards tacked ship and stood for the River Seloy, or Selooe, calledby the French, the River of Dolphins; a distance, overland, of but eightor ten leagues from La Caroline. Finding that they had the advantageof their enemies in fleetness, the French vessels came about also, andfollowed them at a respectful distance. Having made all the discoverieswhich were possible, they returned to May River, when Ribault cameaboard. They reported to him that the great ship of the Spaniards,called "The Trinity," still kept the sea; that three other ships hadentered the River of Dolphins; that three others remained at its mouth;and that the Spaniards had evidently employed themselves in puttingsoldiers, with arms, munition, and provisions, upon shore. These, andfurther facts, reached him from other quarters. Emoloa, one of theIndian kings in amity with the French, sent them word that the Spaniardshad gone on shore at Seloy in great numbers--that they had dispossessedthe natives of their houses at that village; had put their "negroslaves, whom they had brought to labor," in possession of them; and werealready busy in entrenching themselves in the place, making it a regularencampment.

  Not doubting that they meant to assail and harrass the settlement of LaCaroline from this point, with the view to expelling the colonists fromthe country, Ribault boldly conceived the idea of taking the initiate inthe war. He first called a council of his chief captains. They assembledin the chamber of Laudonniere, that person being sick. Here Ribaultcommenced by showing the relative condition of their own and the enemy'sstrength. His conclusion, from his array of all the facts, was, that thetrue policy required that he should embark with all his forces, andseek the fleet of the Spaniards, particularly at a moment when it wassomewhat scattered; when one great ship only kept the seas; when therest were in no situation to support each other in the event of suddenassault, and when the troops of the Adelantado, partly on the shore, andpartly in his vessels, were, very probably, not in proper order to beused successfully. His argument was not deficient in force or propriety.Cert
ainly, with his own seven ships, all brought together, and all hisstrength in compact order and fit for service, he might reasonably hopeto fall successfully upon the divided forces and scattered squadrons ofhis enemy, and sweep them equally from sea and land.

  But Laudonniere had his argument also, and it was not without itssignificance. He opposed the scheme of Ribault entirely; representingthe defenceless condition of the fortress, and the danger to the fleetat sea, and upon the coast, during a season proverbially distinguishedby storms and hurricanes. His counsel was approved of by other captains;but Ribault, an old soldier and sea captain, was too eager to engagethe enemy to listen to arguments that seemed to partake of thepusillanimous. It was very evident that he did not regard Laudonniereas the best of advisers in the work of war. He took his own headaccordingly, and commanded all soldiers that belonged to his command togo on board their vessels. Not satisfied with this force, he lessenedthe strength of the garrison by taking a detachment of its best men,leaving few to keep the post but the invalids, who, like Laudonniere,were suffering, or but just recovering, from the diseases of the climatein midsummer. Laudonniere expostulated, but in vain, against thisappropriation of his garrison. On the eighth of September, Ribault leftthe roadstead in pursuit of the Spaniards, and Laudonniere never beheldhim again. That very day the skies were swallowed up in tempests. Suchtempests were never beheld before upon the coast. The storms prevailedfor several days, at the end of which time, apprehending the worst,Laudonniere mustered his command, and proceeded to put the fortress inthe best possible condition of defence. To repair the portions of thewall which had been thrown down, to restore the palisades stretchingfrom the fortress to the river, was a work of equal necessity anddifficulty; which, with all the diligence of the Frenchmen, advancedslowly, in consequence of the violence and long continuance of thestormy weather. The whole force left in the garrison consisted of buteighty-six persons supposed to be capable of bearing arms. Of theirdoubtful efficiency we may boldly infer from these facts. Several ofthem were mere boys, with sinews yet unhardened into manhood. Some wereold men, completely _hors de combat_ from the general exhaustion oftheir energies; many were still suffering from green wounds, got inthe war with Olata Utina, and others again were wholly unprovided withweapons. Relying upon the assumption that he should find his enemy atsea and in force, Ribault had stripped the garrison of its real manhood.His vessels being better sailers than those of the Spaniards, he tookfor granted that he should be able to interpose, at any moment, for thesafety of La Caroline, should any demonstration be made against it.This was assuming quite too much. It allowed nothing for the caprices ofwind and wave; for the sudden rising of gales and tempests; and accordedtoo little to the cool prudence, and calculating generalship of PedroMelendez, one of the most shrewd, circumspect and successful of theSpanish generals of the period: nor, waiving these considerations, wasthe policy of Ribault to be defended, when it is remembered that he hadbeen specially counselled that the Spaniards had made their lodgments inforce upon the shores of Florida, not many leagues, by land, from theendangered fortress. His single virtue of courage blinded him to thedanger from the former. He calculated first to destroy the fleet of theenemy, thus cutting off all resource and all escape, and then to descendupon the troops on land, before they could fortify their camp, andoverwhelm them with his superior and unembarrassed forces. We shall see,hereafter, the issue of all these calculations. In all probability hisdecision was influenced quite as much by his fanaticism as his courage.He hated the Spaniards as Catholics, quite as much as they hated him andhis flock as heretics. This rage blinded the judgment of the veteransoldier, upon whom fortune was not disposed to smile.

  The condition of things at La Caroline, when Ribault took his departure,deplorable enough as we have seen, was rendered still worse by anotherdeficiency, the fruit of this decision of the commander. The supplies offood which were originally brought out for the garrison, were mostlyappropriated for the uses of the fleet, allowing for its possiblyprolonged absence upon the seas. This absorbed the better portion of thestore which was necessary for the daily consumption at La Caroline. Asurvey of the quantity in the granary of the fortress, made immediatelyafter the departure of the fleet, led to the necessity of stinting thedaily allowance of the garrison. Thus, then, with provisions short, withLaudonniere sick, and otherwise incompetent,--with the men equally fewand feeble, improvident hitherto, and now spiritless,--the labors ofdefence and preparation at La Caroline went forward slowly; and itswatch was maintained with very doubtful vigilance. We have seen enough,in the previous difficulties of the commandant with his people, to forma just judgment of the small subordination which he usually maintained.His government was by no means improved with the obvious necessitybefore him, and the hourly increase of peril. Alarmed, at first, by thecondition in which he had been left, Laudonniere, as has been stated,proceeded with the _show_ of diligence, rather than its actual working,to repair the fortress, and put himself in order for defence. But,with the appearance of bad weather, his exertions relaxed; his people,accustomed to wait upon Providence and the Indians,--praying little tothe One and preying much upon the others--very soon discontinued theirunfamiliar and disagreeable exertions. They could not suppose--aversethemselves to bad weather--that the Spaniards could possibly exposethemselves to chills and fevers during an equinoctial tempest, under anyidle impulses of enterprise and duty; and their watch was maintainedwith very doubtful vigilance. On the night of the nineteenth ofSeptember, Monsieur de La Vigne was appointed to keep guard with hiscompany. But Monsieur de La Vigne had a tender heart, and felt for hissoldiers in bad weather. Seeing the rain continue and increase, "hepitied the sentinels, so much moyled and wet; and thinking the Spaniardswould not have come in such a strange time, he let them depart, and, tosay the truth, hee went himself into his lodging." But the Spaniardsappear to have been men of inferior tastes, and of a delicacy lesssympathising and scrupulous than Monsieur de La Vigne. Bad weatherappeared to agree with them, and we shall see that they somewhat enjoyedthe very showers, from the annoyance of which our French sentinels wereso pleasantly relieved. We shall hear of these things hereafter. Inthe meanwhile, let us look in upon the Adelantado of Florida, PedroMelendez, a strong, true man, in spite of a savage nature and amaddening fanaticism,--let us see him and the progress of his fortunes,where he plants the broad banner of Spain, with its castellated towers,upon the lonely Indian waters of the Selooe, that river which ourHuguenots had previously dignified with the title of "the Dolphin."