Pax Romana

by Adrian Goldsworthy

  Although this was little consolation to the victims, raiders busy looting and celebrating were highly vulnerable. As Caesar noted, the search for plunder made men scatter – whether in broken country or the alleys of a town or village – and caused them to be careless and off their guard. In Britain two auxiliary cohorts were ambushed and wiped out by the Silures, who used the prospect of plunder to lure them into an ambush. Under Claudius ‘a panic was caused to Upper Germany by an incursion of Chattan marauders. Thereupon, the legate Publius Pomponius sent the auxiliary Vagiones and Nemetes, supported by a cavalry ala, with instructions to head off the raiders, or, if they scattered, to envelop and surprise them.’ The Roman troops ‘separated into two columns; one of which, marching to the left, entrapped a newly-returned detachment of pillagers, who, after employing their booty in a debauch, were sleeping off the effects’.

  In AD 366 Roman scouts located a band of Germanic raiders resting after plundering several villas. The Romans approached with care, sheltered from view by woodland and achieved complete surprise. Some of the warriors were drinking, some bathing, and others dyeing their hair red.38

  Raiders inevitably returned home far more slowly than they attacked. Livestock had to be driven, human captives – some of them young or old, others unused to long journeys – had to be forced to keep going and kept under close guard. In the fourth century AD there is a grim account of the Persians hamstringing and abandoning captives too old or frail to keep up as their army returned from raiding the Roman provinces. Loot needed to be transported, and often it was heavy or bulky, which meant that it had to be carried by human porters, pack animals, or in carts. In recent years carts stuffed with plunder have been found where they sank into the mud of the River Rhine as Germanic raiders tried to get them home. The greater the success of a raid, the slower the band travelled. Wheeled transport restricted them to good going and often to known roads or tracks, making their route predictable. Carts, herds and captives also meant that rivers had to be crossed by bridge, at a good ford, or by the use of a lot of boats and rafts. Linear barriers – whether a ditch, stockade, curtain wall or a combination of these things – were far more formidable obstacles to an encumbered band of warriors trying to escape from the empire.39

  Tacfarinas was caught by a Roman flying column when he built a camp to protect the plunder he had gathered. In the raid launched by the Chatti into Upper Germany, the second Roman force:

  . . . who had taken the shorter route by the right, inflicted graver loss on the enemy, who met them and risked a set engagement. Laden with their spoils and honours, they returned to the heights of Taunus, where Pomponius was waiting with the legions, in the hopes that the Chatti, anxious for revenge, would afford him an opportunity for battle. They, however, afraid of being caught between the Romans on one side and their eternal enemies, the Cherusci, on the other, sent deputations to Rome with hostages, and ornamenta triumphalia were voted to Pomponius.40

  Unless raiders did not go far into a province before retreating, then under normal circumstances it was very likely that they would be intercepted by elements of the Roman army. An altar from Hadrian’s Wall was set up by ‘Quintus Calpurnius Concessinius, prefect of cavalry, after slaughtering a band of Corionototae, fulfilled his vow to the god of the most efficacious power.’ The Corionototae are otherwise unrecorded, and may well have been a small people, but the inscription, like the Patkoua ostrakon, offers a glimpse of small-scale skirmishing on the frontiers that was unlikely ever to be mentioned by our literary sources.41

  FEAR, REPUTATION AND DOMINANCE

  The establishment of systems of towers and fortlets became more common from the late first century AD, and was subsequently complemented in some places by linear barriers. All of this implies considerable dispersal of the units garrisoning the bigger forts. The bulk of the Roman army was deployed in frontier areas – or in mountainous or other difficult country inside the provinces – and significant numbers of soldiers were spread out in penny packets. Movement through these frontier areas and controlled zones like the roads to the Red Sea ports was restricted and regulated by the Roman army, which was also responsible for collecting tolls, taxes and other levies on the peoples on these routes. This financial role was important, but it cannot in itself justify the sheer scale of the military presence and the structures and bases built to assist it in its task. Controlling movement also made it harder for potential raiders to gain useful information about the provinces. None of the frontier systems were capable of stopping all attackers from crossing them, but no defensive system in history has been impregnable to all types of assault. The Roman frontier defences were worthwhile because they made it difficult for attackers to pass through, slowing them down and increasing the chances of detecting them, and then made it even more difficult for the band to escape.

  Once the band was spotted, the army was in a position to keep it under observation while a force was gathered to meet and defeat it in the open. It was impossible to defend everywhere – something shown in the campaigns against Tacfarinas – and the great strength of the Roman army was its skill in battle. As with the early stages of a rebellion, there was a precarious balance between waiting to muster sufficient troops to be confident of victory and acting fast enough to catch the raiders. Yet a raid was only a success if the attackers managed to reach their homeland with their plunder and boast of their achievements. In this context it did not matter whether the raiders were caught and defeated on their way into a province or on their way out. The latter was always far more likely, as gathering plunder made the raiders slower and far easier to locate. If the province was well garrisoned, then the longer a band stayed, the more the odds inevitably shifted in the Romans’ favour.

  The same familiar pattern of raiding is visible throughout our entire period, and appears typical of the ancient world as a whole. If a neighbour appeared weak then plundering attacks were likely, each success encouraging the raids to grow more frequent and larger in scale. In contrast, every band that failed to break through, and still more each one intercepted and badly mauled or destroyed, deterred future attacks. There was no simple divide between full-scale war and minor raiding and skirmishing, for one led naturally to the other. The physical presence of the army and its forts, towers, and even more the long linear barriers was in itself a deterrent, much like the depopulated strips of lands around the territory of a Germanic tribe. Something like Hadrian’s Wall was a very visible presence, running across the landscape. On some frontiers the army maintained a strip of depopulated land stretching for some distance – five and ten miles are both mentioned in treaties – employing a symbol of strength understood by the tribes.42

  It was never a question solely of static defence and keeping enemies out of the settled provinces. Apart from the diplomatic activity beyond the frontiers, the army operated aggressively outside the empire. Pomponius, the legate of Upper Germany, hoped to draw the Chatti into a major battle in the aftermath of destroying their raiding bands. Instead the tribe negotiated for peace and accepted the terms imposed by Rome, because they were frightened of the Cherusci. The Romans backed one tribe or leader to fight another, and also launched raids of their own into tribal territory, burning, pillaging, killing or taking captives. This reinforced their reputation as overwhelmingly strong and determined enemies. The communities closest to the frontier were most exposed to Roman punishment, for they were easy to reach and the location of their settlements and the routes through their land well known. It was harder and riskier, but not impossible, for the Romans to reach deeper into the lands beyond the frontiers, and as a result leaders there were more likely to be cultivated by gifts and other forms of diplomacy.

  The security of Rome’s frontiers was based on dominating her neighbours, very much in keeping with the belief that peace came from Roman victory. Rome was to be feared, which meant that her might was paraded as a constant reminder of her strength, while attackers were dealt with ruthlessly and the communities
believed to support them ravaged with fire and sword. Such methods were effective, but did little to win affection and instead reinforced old hatreds. This made it all the more likely that attacks would happen whenever the provinces were believed to be less well defended. The transfer of troops elsewhere, whether to fight against a rebellion, act on another frontier or take part in a civil war, was one sign of such weakness, as was inertia or inactivity on the part of garrisons. Newly arrived governors were expected to be slow to respond, and some emperors were believed to be cautious.43

  On occasions large numbers of raiders crossed a frontier and defeated the forces gathered to meet them. Such a defeat, or the substantial reduction in the size of a provincial garrison when troops were posted away, left the defences weak, so that the usual restrictions on raiders ceased to apply and there was no need to escape as quickly as possible. The raiders had time to settle down, search out prime targets and plunder with a thoroughness normally denied bands who wished to escape before the Romans caught up with them. Such things happened several times in northern Britain and on the Danube in the latter first century AD, and again during the Marcomannic wars of Marcus Aurelius. In the last case the army was weakened by the dreadful plagues which had ravaged the empire and spread quickest of all in crowded cities and army bases.

  Yet such major failures were rare. Large attacks were infrequent and in most cases punished severely by the Roman military response. The frontiers were maintained for generation after generation, and it is this that has sometimes led scholars to portray them not as defensive lines, but designed to regulate and tax the movement of people and animals. It is very likely that the frontier systems created and manned by so large a part of the Roman army did carry out this function, but the resulting revenue is unlikely to have met the expense involved. In a strange way the very success of the frontier systems in military terms has convinced some scholars that there were no serious threats facing them. The deployment of the army in frontier regions makes great sense when the problems posed by raiding are considered. They were very well designed to cope with it and were, on the whole, highly effective. This meant modifying the habits of an army designed for large-scale warfare, but the Romans adapted and adjusted to changing conditions. Only in the third century AD did large parts of the system come under strain.

  * As an aside, it is worth emphasising that this meant the loss of 10 per cent, not the far greater losses implied by the frequent journalistic misuse of the term.

  XIV

  BEYOND THE PAX ROMANA

  ‘For Ireland, I believe, which lies between Britain and Spain and also commands the Gallic Sea, would unite, to their mutual advantage, the most effective portions of our Empire.

  ‘That island, compared with Britain, is of smaller dimensions . . . In regard to soil, climate, and the character and ways of life of its inhabitants, it is not markedly different from Britain; we are better informed, thanks to the trade of merchants, about the approaches to the island and its harbours.’ – Tacitus, end of the first century AD.1

  OUTSIDE

  Rome aimed to dominate the peoples living beyond the frontiers through a combination of military force and diplomacy. Although boundary stones and other markers survive showing the clear demarcation of areas subject to different cities or communities within the provinces, between provinces and with allied kingdoms, there are none marking the external frontiers where the empire ended. As in the past, the Romans refused to see other peoples or rulers as their equals and did not grant them any rights. Rome’s imperium did not and could not end at some fixed point. Even when the reality of Parthian power was undeniable, imperial ideology presented the Parthians as allies who had submitted to Rome’s imperium. In that sense they were part of the empire, even though they were ‘allowed’ by the Romans to govern themselves. A boundary was entirely acceptable between land directly ruled by the Romans and an allied realm where other laws and a king’s authority held sway.2

  None of this meant that it was not clear where the boundaries of frontier provinces lay, or that travellers would not have known when they crossed into or left the empire. These zones were tightly controlled and regulated by the army, whether marked by the line of a river, a man-made physical barrier, or the presence of outposts of soldiers. Both the Romans and their neighbours clearly knew the extent of the strips of depopulated land kept in advance of some frontiers. At times tribesmen occupied parts of this territory, but this was never done in ignorance and was conscious defiance of the ban. Everyone living adjacent to the frontiers of the empire was well aware of the restrictions imposed by Rome, and of their one-sidedness. The Romans kept land free of settlers and restricted access to the provinces, but accepted no limits on their own actions, intervening whenever they chose far beyond the frontiers of the empire. Leaders and peoples had to judge the chances of their actions provoking a hostile Roman response, aware that the odds varied depending on the aggressiveness of legates and, most of all, the attitude and priorities of the princeps.

  The empire’s frontiers were never intended to be impermeable fortified lines, keeping the provincial population and the peoples outside wholly separate. Not only did the Romans intend their power to reach far in advance of the frontiers, but it was both expected and seen as desirable to permit people to cross into and leave the empire as long as this occurred under their control. On occasions this meant the admission of large groups, even entire tribes, for settlement on land within the provinces, for instance during Plautius Silvanus’ tenure in Moesia. Massed immigration of this sort was rare, and on a day-to-day basis movement was smaller-scale and in most cases connected with commerce. Raiding and trading went hand in hand in the Roman period just as it did in the Viking era and much of human history. Peaceful commerce was always more common since, as with bandits, an area and an economy was only capable of supporting a limited number of raiders if it was not to become unstable, forcing its population to leave or turn to raiding – the situation in large swathes of Lusitania and Further Spain in the middle of the second century BC. Under the Principate, the strong military presence in frontier areas prevented such situations from developing. Attackers were deterred or dealt with, and on the rare occasions that the system broke down it was soon restored.

  Frontier systems allowed the Romans to dominate these areas and control movement, only preventing it when it was seen as a threat. People, goods – and indeed ideas – passed in both directions across the empire’s frontiers, but did so under official supervision. This was difficult, if not impossible, to evade, and bans on many tribesmen from crossing into the empire other than at designated market places do appear to have been enforced. In AD 70, during the revolt of Civilis in the Rhineland, the success of the rebels allowed their allies from the east bank of the river to cross freely. Tacitus says that the Tencteri were overjoyed, since they could now cross where they liked and no longer entered provincial communities ‘unarmed and almost naked, under guard and paying a price for the privilege’. Now allied to the Roman colony at Cologne, the Tencteri’s ambassadors tried to persuade the city to demolish its walls as a mark of friend-ship. Prudently the colonists refused to do this for the moment, and continued to insist that when the tribesmen came to the city on business, they should only do so during daylight hours and should not carry weapons.3

  Rivers, mountain passes, roads and fortified lines all helped channel traders and other travellers to crossing places observed and controlled by military outposts. This allowed certain groups to be detained and either turned back or only permitted to go on to a particular market, while others were granted more freedom. All were recorded, as were their animals and their loads, and at set places they were made to pay a toll or levy to continue on their journey. The Tencteri had resented this burden, but had had to pay – and soon were faced with the return of the system after the collapse of the rebellion and restoration of normal provincial rule. On the roads leading through the Egyptian desert to the Red Sea ports, travellers were charg
ed during their journey and again on arrival at the port, before being permitted to embark with their wares, their movements being tracked by the passes they were required to carry on their journey. The system was well established and clearly understood, so that hauliers and animal drivers were able to make a living transporting people and goods, while others provided services along the route. A pottery ostrakon records the leasing of a prostitute to a military outpost or praesidium:

  . . . to Ptolema, very many greetings . . . I have let Procla to the praesidium of Maximianon for 60 drachmas with the quintana [a levy of a fifth on transactions and goods]. Please send her with the donkey driver who brings you this ostrakon. I have received the deposit of 12 drachmas out of which I have paid the fare of 8 drachmas. Receive from the donkey driver [missing] drachmas. Give her the cloak. I shall give her the tunic. Do not do otherwise. Greetings.

  The writer is presumably a pimp writing to his local agent, and the hiring of a prostitute to go to a desert outpost is recorded on other ostraka. Apart from the soldiers in garrison, travellers routinely stopped to rest and draw water from the wells at these fortlets, so there was a good chance of business. We do not know whether women like Procla were hired by the army, by groups of soldiers clubbing together or by someone else eager to profit from their activity. The toll for a prostitute passing along the road was higher than that charged for a soldier’s wife or other woman.4