Operation Moonglow

by Teasel Muir-Harmony

  In 1964, with no crewed missions on NASA’s agenda for at least a year, the USIA focused on promoting the significance of the photographs taken by lunar probe Ranger 7 as well as emphasizing the applications of communication satellites. In July 1964, Ranger 7 sent more than 4,300 pictures of the moon to Earth.26 USIS posts placed these photographs on their walls, circulated NASA-produced pamphlets, and broadcast television programming featuring the mission.27 President Johnson sent special volumes of Ranger 7 photographs to foreign heads of state and leading scientists around the world in ceremonies that were heavily covered by local journalists and television crews. The gift included a letter noting that “the people of the United States hope that this knowledge will work to the ultimate benefit of mankind in all lands.” Nevertheless, a worldwide opinion survey taken a few months before Ranger 7 indicated that the USSR still led the space race.28

  Unbeknownst to the world, the Soviet Union did not officially join the Americans in a race to the moon until August 1964. As part of a larger five-year plan, the USSR pursued two lunar programs: a crewed circumlunar program and a separate lunar landing program. Driven primarily by rocket designer Sergei Korolev’s enthusiasm, not Premier Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet lunar program aimed for a landing in 1967 or 1968 to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution.29

  On October 12, 1964, the Soviet Union launched the three-person Voskhod spacecraft, once again demonstrating the program’s superior heavy-lift capacity. Normally, the test range would call Khrushchev after a launch, updating him on the results. That day, no one called. Little did Khrushchev know at the time that this was a sign that secret plans were already under way to overthrow him. “One of the first rules for an autocrat on his last legs,” Khrushchev biographer William Taubman explained, “is not to leave rivals minding the capital.” This is exactly what Khrushchev had done, spending 170 days away in 1963 and 150 days away in the first ten months of 1964.30 Khrushchev spoke to the cosmonauts in orbit, bobbing “up and down in unashamed excitement and pride.” A few hours after the call, Khrushchev was put under house arrest. The blurry television broadcast of his conversation with the cosmonauts would be Khrushchev’s last public appearance. He had told the cosmonauts about a homecoming celebration he was planning, but in the end he would be barred from attending it. Khrushchev’s fears from 1957 had come true. But it was not Zhukov who overthrew the Soviet premier.31

  Two days later, the Soviet Union announced a new period of “collective leadership.” Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin assumed power. Under this new regime, the organization and authority of the Soviet space program cleaved as well. Khrushchev-era initiatives were overturned, but the public relations repercussions of this upheaval would take more time to manifest.32 Although Khrushchev’s swift ouster displaced most other news, Voskhod was still a public relations boon for the Soviet space program. Voskhod was the Soviet Union’s follow-on series of spacecraft to its first human spaceflight program, carrying three cosmonauts into Earth orbit. However, what the broader world public did not know at the time was that the spacecraft itself was the same size as the earlier Vostok series. Cosmonauts forewent space suits so that all three could squeeze into the compact vehicle. Little was known about the new program. The dimensions of the spacecraft, its capabilities, and the technical details remained a mystery for the general public. As one of the engineers working on the program later commented, “The program made no contribution whatsoever to the further development of space research. Sending three people into space together was done purely for prestige.”33 The first launch of Voskhod achieved the prestige that the Soviet Union was after, and the United States fell behind again in foreign public opinion polls. According to the USIA, “The capacity of the Soviets to launch larger spacecraft in manned flight remained the negative factor affecting foreign opinion of US space activities.”34 Later that month, Brezhnev hosted the celebration in Red Square that Khrushchev had promised the cosmonauts. The next mission the following spring, Voskhod 2, would add momentum to the Soviet lead in space when cosmonaut Alexei Leonov performed the first spacewalk in history.35

  In 1965 the US could compete in human spaceflight again when NASA started launching crewed missions in quick succession to prepare for lunar exploration. NASA leadership selected the “lunar orbit rendezvous” approach to the moon in 1962. This would involve launching a multistage rocket and a modular spacecraft. After a brief stay in Earth orbit, the spacecraft would speed toward the moon in what was called translunar injection. Once the spacecraft reached lunar orbit, a lander with two astronauts inside would descend to the surface of the moon while one astronaut in a separate command module (and service module attached) remained in orbit. Once the astronauts completed their moonwalk, they would launch and rejoin their crewmate in the orbiting spacecraft and then return home to Earth. This multistep process saved on fuel, weight, and the length of time needed to develop a rocket, but it required the development of new techniques and capabilities such as spacewalking, rendezvousing, and docking. That is where Project Gemini came in. In a series of ten two-person missions over two years, NASA mastered these tasks while also testing the effects of long-duration spaceflight on the astronauts’ physiology and psychology. The Gemini spacecraft resembled the Mercury vehicle: blunt-ended and bell-shaped. With a white adapter module attached, it could carry enough oxygen, water, power, and propellants for two weeks in space. NASA recruited two new classes of astronauts to fill its ranks for the Gemini flights as well as the upcoming Apollo missions. This decision also meant that there was a greater number of astronauts who could promote the space program and its successes.36

  The second crewed Gemini mission launched in June 1965. Two astronauts—Edward H. White and James McDivitt—spent four days in space, orbiting the Earth sixty-two times, conducting the first American spacewalk, and performing a series of experiments to prepare for future missions. The Voice of America (VOA) featured the mission in more than ten hours of radio programming. In Latin America alone, four hundred radio stations in eighteen countries updated audiences on the flight. The USIA provided posts with stories about the flight, features on the astronauts and their families, pictures, posters, and the exhibit “Man Maneuvers Moonward.” The Times of India said that the Gemini expedition “in many ways, particularly in daring and scientific precision, equals the flight of Voskhod 2 last March.”37 Forty-seven countries carried television coverage of the flight, including the program Conversation with Astronauts White and McDivitt, prepared in English but translated into Spanish, French, and Arabic. More than a hundred countries screened the USIA film The Flight of Gemini 4, which was made available in more than twenty languages.38

  A USIA assessment of international press coverage observed that “the very manner in which the American astronauts chatted and joked while performing feats of courage drew considerable comment, and appears to have subtly encouraged a measure of self-identification with the U.S. space effort,” a goal of US foreign policy. The Swedish newspaper Svenska Dagbladet called the mission “refreshingly human and winning,” while the Hong Kong South China Morning Post commented on “a certain carefree and cheering lack of regimentation… a pleasing combination of lightheartedness and high courage.” International journalists appreciated that the astronauts snuck a sandwich on board and that White was reluctant to finish his spacewalk.39

  According to a USIA report, openness “provided the main peg for contrasting the US and Soviet political and social systems” after the Gemini 4 flight. Throughout Latin America in particular, praise for the openness of the American space program spilled over and became praise of the United States’ open democratic system. Media coverage of the space race in the mid-1960s continued to stress the “openness” of the United States space program in contrast to the Soviet Union’s more closed program. As Vienna’s Neues Oesterreich playfully commented, “From Cape Kennedy not even a white mouse can be launched without the nation and the world learning about it a few minutes la
ter. Cape Kennedy symbolizes democracy.”40 In 1965 the State Department viewed the policy of openness and information dissemination of civilian space activities as “desirable from the viewpoint of our foreign relations.”41

  Shortly after they returned to Earth, McDivitt and White dined at the White House. As Johnson told the story, he looked at the astronauts and their families sitting in his living room and thought, “What finer representation, what greater ambassadors, what more appealing personalities could this country send out to the world than these astronauts?” It happened to be the same week as the Paris Air Show. Inspired, he asked them to fly to Paris that very night to represent the United States at the opening day of the air show. The astronauts and their wives had planned only for a dinner at the White House and not a trip to Paris, so they had not packed the necessary clothing. Lady Bird Johnson solved this problem by taking the astronauts’ wives to her and her daughters’ closets, where she gathered up enough dresses and gowns for their trip. A NASA photographer was called in to the White House to take pictures for impromptu passports. The astronauts’ five children stayed behind and slept at the White House, swam in the president’s private pool, and watched Disney movies in the White House theater. The astronauts and their wives boarded a 3:00 a.m. flight to Paris and, according to Johnson, “performed a very valuable service to their country.”42

  The Soviet Union had already made arrangements for cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin to attend the Paris Air Show. According to satirist Art Buchwald, “The belief here in Washington is that the president made his decision [to send the astronauts to the air show] because the Russians had sent cosmonauts Gherman Titov and Gagarin to Paris and this put the Russians ahead of us in ground travel.”43 A model of the Vostok capsule accompanied the cosmonauts, making this the second time that the Soviet Union revealed substantial information about the spacecraft to the general public. Much as with earlier displays, the Vostok model on display in Paris was not meant to share technical details with the audience. The model was a pared-down, simplified version of the capsule. In interviews, Gagarin stressed that the new Voskhod spacecraft was “of [an] entirely different design,” a misleading statement meant to suggest that the Voskhod was the product of major technological advances, even though it was simply a version of the earlier Vostok retrofitted to carry an additional two people into space.44

  Large crowds greeted the Gemini 4 astronauts and their wives, along with Vice President Hubert Humphrey, when they arrived at Le Bourget Airport on the morning of June 19, 1965. The astronauts spent the day speaking to the press, attending a large reception hosted by the US ambassador, and meeting with French president Charles de Gaulle. The French press gave extensive coverage to the astronauts’ spontaneous visit to the Paris Air Show and ruminated over its broader political ramifications for Franco-US relations. The success of this brief visit prompted President Johnson to support an expanded astronaut tour program.45

  Many US embassies enthusiastically embraced President Johnson’s decision to send astronauts abroad in 1965. Embassy staff throughout the world outlined a number of positive political outcomes of astronaut tours: (1) they would foster support of the local government’s relations with the US, strengthening international alliances; (2) they would demonstrate American interest in particular countries; (3) they would offset negative reactions to other US foreign policies and international interventions; and (4) the astronauts would demonstrate the ideal virtues of American citizens.46

  In countries with tracking stations, such as Nigeria, embassy staff explained how these tours could be “unparalleled” public relations events for the national governments that hosted the stations. The government of Nigeria, the US Embassy in Lagos explained, could “gain credit [for] their participation [in] space scientific program thru [the] Kano tracking station.”47 In Kenya, US Embassy staff described how an astronaut visit to Nairobi would “have a great impact on Kenya and East Africa showing that US recognizes importance of this part of the world at the highest level” and that it “would get more attention in black Africa than any other combination of programs or events imaginable.” The US Embassy in Manila, vying for an astronaut visit, pointed out that it would “provide [a] considerable psychological boost to Philippine ego and do much to counter Philippine attitude that [the] US always take Fils for granted.” The US Embassy in Ankara presented its case to the secretary of state for scheduling an astronaut visit to Turkey in August 1965: the “psychological impact” of such a visit would be “extremely useful [for] this NATO partner which directly confronts USSR, and which since Cyprus dispute has experienced some frustration with NATO.” The previous summer, the US had tried to broker an agreement between Greece and Turkey over control of Cyprus but ultimately failed to find terms that both countries could agree on, prolonging the ongoing dispute. The US Embassy added that an astronaut visit to Turkey could also have the benefit of counteracting the successful improvement of Turkish-Russian relations since the Turkish prime minister’s recent visit to Moscow.48

  Gemini 5 crew members Charles “Pete” Conrad Jr. and L. Gordon Cooper Jr. show President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya photographs from their mission, 1965. (NATIONAL ARCHIVES)

  In a May 1965 public opinion poll conducted in Morocco and Nigeria, the USIA found that “in science and space we are clobbered both north and south of the Sahara,” among what the agency considered the elite in primarily urban areas. In Morocco respondents preferred cosmonauts to astronauts by a margin of 51 percent to 13 percent. In Nigeria the split was even larger. Cosmonauts were favored by 75 percent to the astronauts’ 7 percent. On the other topics covered, the Soviet Union usually came out on top. Almost everyone polled knew about the civil rights injustices in the United States, with two-thirds commenting on how “the problem had darkened the U.S. image in their eyes.” The United States was moving too slowly on addressing these issues, those polled agreed. “In Morocco we are in worse order even than the South Africans!” exclaimed the USIA report. In addition to providing a hard look at why the US was faring as badly in perceived race relations as apartheid South Africa, the poll prompted the major conclusion that “clearly, we must devise dramatic new departures in our space propaganda.”49

  In the fall of 1965, Johnson sent Gemini 5 astronauts Gordon Cooper Jr. and Charles “Pete” Conrad Jr. on an elaborate two-week-long goodwill tour of Athens, Thessaloniki, Izmir, Istanbul, Ankara, Addis Ababa, Tananarive, Nairobi, Lagos, a handful of smaller cities in Nigeria, and Las Palmas.50 The astronauts spoke to scientists and engineers at the International Astronautical Federation Congress, met with cosmonauts in Athens, appeared on television programs, were received by foreign heads of state, appeared before large crowds of people, and visited NASA tracking stations.51 Favorable reports on the tour filled the State Department mailbox.52 An aide reported back to President Johnson that the response to the astronauts in African countries was especially positive.53

  The American ambassador in Tananarive found the visit of Gemini 5 astronauts Cooper and Conrad the “most impressive demonstration [of] US-Malagasy friendship ever achieved here.” During the two-day program in mid-September 1965, Cooper and Conrad took a motorcade through the city with an estimated seventy thousand people lining the route. The American ambassador reported that it rivaled the reception given French general Charles de Gaulle in 1958, when he presented the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, leading to the colony of Madagascar’s independence from France. President Tsiranana and his wife greeted the astronauts “with unusual warmth” and took great interest in learning about the details of their mission. US Embassy receptions attracted most of the Malagasy Cabinet and “everyone else who could beg or borrow an invitation.” Before they left, the astronauts presented awards to American and Malagasy staff at the NASA tracking station.54

  When Cooper and Conrad visited Nigeria, public diplomats attempted to make “the Nigerian mass aware that the US considers Nigeria of sufficient importance” to schedule the longest stay of the tour in the
ir country. During this stop, the astronauts visited cities throughout the country; received elaborate gifts, including ostrich feather fans and hand-embroidered robes; gave countless lectures on spaceflight; appeared on television shows; learned the popular West African “highlife” dance; and met with Nigerian officials.55 At the tour stop in the northern Nigerian city of Kano, the location of one of the US tracking stations, the party “received tumultuous welcome, reminiscent of 13th century feudal celebrations, given by Emir of Kano. Waves of horsemen carrying spears swept across open courtyard in traditional salute… for half a mile up to gates of palace.”56 This stop played an important role in ensuring continued cooperation with Nigeria in running a tracking station from Kano. Agency officials asked the astronauts to “take every opportunity to thank Nigeria for its contribution to the success of US space exploration. To underline this ‘partnership,’ they were asked to share the scientific results of space exploration with the educated Nigerian elite.”57 It is worth pointing out how the public diplomat used quotation marks, suggesting that he viewed the “partnership” between the United States and Nigeria as more theoretical than literal. This attitude was not unusual among Americans involved in cooperative space programs in this period.58