Operation Moonglow

by Teasel Muir-Harmony

  Inspired by Borman’s warm welcome in Europe, Nixon told Kissinger in early June, “Henry, I believe we could needle our Moscow friends by arranging more visits to the Eastern Europe countries.” What Borman’s success had demonstrated was that people in the Eastern Bloc, “if given a chance,” would enthusiastically embrace Nixon’s Cabinet. “It is time we start causing them some trouble,” he added with emphasis.14 Within a few weeks Nixon decided that he should be the one “needling” Moscow. Romania should be added to the Operation Moonglow itinerary, he told Kissinger. In 1967 Nixon received a more gracious reception in Romania than any other Eastern European country he visited. “Nixon never forgot courtesies of this kind,” Kissinger commented.15

  “By the time we get through with this trip they [the Russians] are going to be out of their minds that we are playing a Chinese game,” Nixon told Kissinger.16

  On June 21 Kissinger called Romanian ambassador Corneliu Bogdan. Nixon would be meeting the Apollo 11 astronauts at splashdown, then embarking on a diplomatic trip, he explained. “Would it be convenient for the President to stop in Bucharest on August 2 or 3?”17 The immediate response was positive although, as one would expect, Bogdan mentioned that he needed to confer with his colleagues in the Romanian government.18 Forty-eight hours later, the response came: the Romanian government welcomed Nixon’s visit. It required postponing the Romanian Party conference, a sign that Kissinger took as proof of the “importance Romania attached to a separate opening to Washington.”19 According to Kissinger, Soviet leaders Brezhnev and Kosygin canceled their attendance at the rescheduled Romanian Party conference because “they did not want to compete with President Nixon’s trip.”20

  By 8:10 a.m. on July 24, the ceremony on the USS Hornet had finished. Nixon boarded his helicopter and took off for Operation Moonglow. When he arrived in Guam, Nixon gave remarks at the Top O’ the Mar Officer Club for members of the press. Outlining the “Nixon Doctrine,” the president explained that the United States would supply arms and assistance to threatened nations but would expect that these nations supply their own personnel for military defense. Later he clarified that he was not suggesting a full US withdrawal from Asia. The United States was a Pacific power, he stated, and would remain so. But unless a major nuclear threat arose, the United States would support other nations with only material, economic, and military aid in the future.21

  Nixon stunned his advisors. They had expected the president simply to give a few informal remarks. It was 6:30 p.m., the tail end of a full day, after all. But the Apollo splashdown affected Nixon profoundly. “I do not think that Nixon intended a major policy announcement in Guam,” Kissinger reflected. “But, perhaps carried away by the occasion, Nixon, in an effective and often eloquent statement, spelled out his concerns and approach toward Asia.”22

  London’s conservative Sunday Telegraph called the Nixon Doctrine “an almost complete reversal of what his predecessor used to say,” while the Manila Times wrote that Nixon “declared America’s readiness to scrap old special relations and to develop a new one based on mutual respect.” The Nixon Doctrine received positive coverage internationally, but Moscow Radio broadcast programming throughout South and Southeast Asia to counter this message. It warned that Nixon had plans for a “strategic belt” that stretched across Asia from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean. US military-political plans for the area were a serious threat, it alerted listeners ahead of Nixon’s diplomatic tour.23

  A description of Operation Moonglow prepared for Kissinger noted that Apollo “dramatically demonstrate[d] the interdependence of men and nations travelling through space together on this planet.” The “earthly interdependence” made apparent by Apollo and the astronauts’ space-based perspective of Earth “unites Americans with peoples of all countries—whether they be new allies in Asia or an old ally in Europe, large neutral nations in Asia or a small Communist one in Eastern Europe.” Throughout the rest of his trip—which took the president to the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Romania—Nixon drew on space-themed rhetoric to couch larger foreign relations issues, especially the US role in Vietnam.24

  Operation Moonglow officially began in Manila. In anticipation of the visit, Filipino newspapers expressed mixed expectations. One welcomed the visit, seeing it “as an auspicious signal of all the forthcoming benefits to the Philippines and to the human race of U.S. aerospace adventures,” while another paper suggested problems in Asia would remain “when the present euphoria has worn off.” Everyone was clear-eyed about Nixon taking “advantage of the new spirit of friendship toward America [amid Apollo 11 acclaim] to lay groundwork for departures in his Asian policy,” as the Manila Chronicle observed.25

  Three television stations gave full coverage of Nixon’s visit to the Philippines, repeating a new precedent that was set during the Apollo 11 moon landing for significant events. At every stop, Nixon encountered “placards among the crowds, moon shot exhibits in the streets and toasts of foreign presidents celebrat[ing] the U.S. triumph in space.” In Manila people held signs reading “Fly us also to the moon, Mr. President” and even “Viva Apollo, viva America.”26 But alongside this warm welcome, a critical cross-current could be found in the Philippines. Although massive demonstrations never materialized, cartoons like one featured in Manila’s Daily Mirror depicting Filipinos holding signs that instead read “Stop Abusing Bases Pact!” and “Remove Your Poison Gas Stockpiles” indicated the tenuousness of Nixon’s warm reception.27

  Not long before, a secret CIA memo had warned that a recent chemical weapons leak in Okinawa would lead to “the possible embarrassment of the US during President Nixon’s Asian tour.… [Japanese leftists] may well be tempted to try to give this present incident a good propaganda ride.”28 Okinawa had become the primary staging post for the US military during the war in Vietnam. Although island residents were well aware of the B-52 bombers flying in and out of Kadena Air Base and US ships transporting troops and supplies through Okinawa’s ports, the full extent of munitions—including hundreds of nuclear warheads and chemical weapons—was unknown. Even though the Geneva Protocol prohibited the use of chemical weapons in 1952, both the US and Soviet Union built stockpiles during the cold war. Over the course of the 1950s and 1960s, for example, the US amassed the extremely toxic chemical weapons sulfur mustard, sarin, and VX near the Kadena Air Base. On July 8, 1969, a chemical leak sent twenty-four Americans to the hospital. Then, spread across the front page of the Wall Street Journal on July 18—two days into the Apollo 11 mission—the headline “Nerve Gas Accident: Okinawa Mishap Bares Overseas Deployment of Chemical Weapons” prompted sharp criticism around the world. Although US officials assured the Philippines government that there was not a similar stockpile in the Philippines, skepticism greeted Nixon on his arrival.29

  To counteract the impact of planned anti-Nixon demonstrations, concern over rumored US nerve gas stocks in the Philippines, and critique of US foreign policy, Nixon drew on the moon landing in each of his speeches in Manila. His staff prepared arrival remarks claiming that the world has “entered a new age, the Age of the Moon.” Nixon then referenced Apollo to introduce his new Asia policy: “I am convinced that if mankind can send men to the Moon, then we can also bring peace to the earth. If we can travel across the reaches of space to explore newer worlds, we can also travel across the surface of the earth to build a better world.” He concluded by expressing the significance of unity inspired by Apollo: “A great French writer has said that true affection develops not from sitting and looking at one another but rather from ‘looking outward together in the same direction.’ It is when we look outward together—as we now look out into space—that we appreciate more fully our common condition and our mutual destiny.”30

  At a toast in Manila, Nixon’s prepared remarks read “I am sure that during this historic week, your thoughts—like mine—go back frequently to the inspiring fact that men have actually landed on the surface of the moon.” He then went on to tell a story
of how a “fellow citizen” became involved in US spaceflight. Recalling First Lady Marcos’s Washington visit in May 1968, Nixon playful remarked how a member of her party showed great interest and knowledge in Apollo, so an escort brought him to Cape Kennedy, where he “exchanged views with some of our space experts and told them that he would like to be the first Filipino to go to the moon.” In a classic storytelling twist, Nixon revealed that the “fellow citizen” was President Marcos’s son Bongbong: “I might add that in answer to his request, we are reserving a seat for him on the first passenger ship which goes to the moon.… Provided of course that he obtains the consent of his parents.”31

  Before boarding Air Force One for Indonesia, Nixon explained that “the people of Asia must seek “Asian solutions to Asian problems.” Then he added that “the imagination of all mankind has been fired by the success of man’s first landing on the moon.” Using Apollo 11 as a model, he suggested that “it is that same human spirit, applied in different circumstances, which is even now bringing economic and social progress in this part of the world.”32

  Tens of thousands of people welcomed Nixon to Djakarta for his twenty-two-hour visit in Indonesia. President Suharto and his wife met the Nixons at the airport for a ceremony where Nixon referenced Apollo 11: “It is not important what country the men came from who performed this act—what is important is that they represented all mankind.” Later that day, Nixon promised Suharto “a piece of the moon rock as a souvenir.”33

  At a white-jacket dinner in the palace pavilion, Suharto, echoing Armstrong’s first words on the moon, toasted “these small human steps which form a great leap to mankind.”34 Nixon responded with “you very appropriately referred to the fact that here on earth, too often, the steps for mankind are very, very small… we will be thinking of how those steps can be larger, how they can become, finally, a giant leap for mankind on earth at a time that we have made a giant leap for mankind in expanding his knowledge beyond the earth toward the heavens.”35 In private, Nixon assured Suharto sizable economic aid but stressed the need for “Asian solutions to Asian problems.”

  Thankful for the atypically positive press coverage, one US official based in Djakarta commented, “What a relief to have news like the moon shot after the usual Vietnam, Vietnam, Vietnam day after day.”36 Other press coverage of the visit noted the “hundreds of thousands” of people on the motorcade route cheering. The Suluh Marhaen, a paper that the USIA described as typically hostile to US interests, welcomed the Nixon Doctrine, agreeing that “the problem of the defense of the countries of Asia is the basic task of the countries themselves.” This article ran with the simple headline “U.S. Understands Indonesia’s Wishes.”37

  Against the Secret Service’s warnings, Nixon and his entourage flew to Saigon on July 30. This would be the one and only time Nixon visited Vietnam during his presidency. Flying low over the countryside from Thailand, they spotted triangle-shaped fortifications dotting the landscape. Instead of a welcome party at the airport in Saigon, they were met with a military helicopter to transport them directly to the palace. It “seemed to go straight up out of range of possible sniper fire and then plummeted like a stone between the trees of Thieu’s offices,” Kissinger recalled. Nixon and South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu gave remarks on the front steps of the palace before withdrawing for private talks.38

  The first official remarks that Nixon made in South Vietnam referenced Apollo: “I am happy that the moon landing, which in its universality signifies a symbolic drawing together of all mankind, has provided an occasion for me to meet with President Thieu in the capital of his country.” Nixon then articulated the Nixon Doctrine, stressing the progress already made in the political and security participation of the South Vietnamese. He described how the United States’ “purpose is peace” before introducing Thieu, who expressed his agreement with Nixon and US policy goals.39 After speaking with Thieu for two hours, Nixon and his advisors helicoptered north some twelve miles to a small Army base. Touring the base by jeep and by foot through the muddy red clay, Nixon made a point of shaking hands, “chatting in folksy tones about their favorite baseball and football teams,” pinning Distinguished Service Crosses on soldiers, and referencing the moon landing.40

  Most South Vietnamese press reported positively, recognizing the implications of the visit for propping up Thieu’s position in the region while simultaneously expressing optimism about the Nixon administration’s interest in peace. But some, like Tin Sang, expressed skepticism: “It is difficult for Asians to believe that ‘Asia belongs to Asians’ when the number of American troops in Southeast Asia increases daily, and especially when U.S. military bases are still here with warehouses full of poisons.”41

  Ahead of his stop in Pakistan, Karachi’s Morning News likened Nixon’s visit to Lahore with the astronauts’ visit to the moon, noting that both were twenty-two-hour stays. The journalist predicted that the talks would have something do to with US policy toward China and with helping achieve a “new equilibrium” in Pakistan-American relations.42 In Pakistan Nixon compared the lunar landing with local modernization efforts. Both, his speech argued, were “manifestations of that same human spirit.”43 But his primary objective there was passing a message through Pakistan leader Yahya Khan that the United States was interested in normalizing relations with China. While Nixon met with Khan, Kissinger received a briefing on the current state of Chinese politics. Chinese leaders, Kissinger was informed, were considering ending the period of diplomatic isolation.44

  Nixon left Pakistan, filled with anticipation for his next stop: Bucharest. No American president had stepped foot in the Eastern Bloc since 1945. Nixon’s visit to the Romanian capital signaled the new presidential administration’s interest in altering the trajectory of US foreign relations in a broad, public forum. This diplomatic tour stop, in particular, received heavy worldwide attention.

  Nixon interpreted the enthusiastic crowds that welcomed him in Bucharest as “proof that deep difference in political philosophy cannot permanently divide the people of the world.” He expressed this alongside statements about how Apollo 11 had brought the world together, how the “spirit of Apollo transcends geographical barriers and political difference.” It was the moon landing that brought “the people of this world together in peace,” Nixon emphasized. He had expected a warm welcome after the success of Apollo 11, but he did not anticipate the scale and excitement that greeted him in Bucharest. “At one point Ceausescu and I were literally swept up by the dancing in the streets,” he remembered. The Washington Post theorized that “President Nixon came here today not only as the envoy of capitalist America but also as the man from the moon. This is the most obvious explanation for the remarkable welcome he received—warmer, many observers suspect, than the Rumanian Communist regime wanted.”45

  Romania had been one of the few Eastern Bloc countries that carried the lunar landing live on television. Armstrong’s first step was broadcast around 6:00 a.m. local time. Maria Mihaly, who worked at a cooperative store, recalled that “I had such an emotion when I saw the astronauts on the moon that I stood up in my chair—I did not know what to do.” The moon landing stirred her interest “in seeing Mr. Nixon and learning more about the United States,” she told a reporter. Eugen Bituleani, a forty-year-old economist, agreed: “Of course [the moon landing] increased our interest in Mr. Nixon.” This unprecedented decision to broadcast the coverage suggested a potential thaw in relations, especially given that the country had yet to broadcast live coverage of Soviet space missions.46

  Thousands of people lined the motorcade route. Stopping spontaneously at the Arch of Triumph, Nixon stepped out of his host’s black Mercedes limousine and into the crowd. After shaking hands and then having the Secret Service escort him back into the limousine, he told Ceauşescu, “These are very warm people—very warm.” Estimates suggest that half of this crowd had been recruited by the Romanian government. The small Romanian and American flags they waved were
handed out by Romanian authorities ahead of Nixon’s arrival. As Septimiu Bratu, a history teacher, explained, he and his colleagues were given free time and encouraged to gather in a particular location to greet the American president.47 Kissinger recognized the Romanian government’s hand in staging the reception but still found it “an extraordinary demonstration of Romania’s independence from the Soviet Union.” Furthermore, “It would have been difficult if not impossible for any government to create the emotional, joyful, human quality of the public outpouring… it was profoundly moving.”48

  Nixon brought up the theme of Apollo and global unity in his toast in Bucharest: “People all around the world watched the television pictures of the landing on the Moon. And thoughtful men saw the earth in a new perspective—as the home of the human mind—where our similarities and our common interests far outweigh our differences.”49 Once the evening reception wore down, Nixon returned to the guesthouse where he and his party were staying. It was a large, modern facility, with a swimming pool, banquet room, and lake.

  After 11:30 p.m., Nixon called for Haldeman and Kissinger. The three men, with Kissinger already dressed in pajamas, went for a walk in the garden. For over an hour they walked and talked and smoked cigars as they evaluated the day. “Feels history was made,” Haldeman wrote. Stopping at the edge of a lake in the gardens, Nixon took a seat on a concrete bench. He “expounded on all this… [and] sees the great historical first of United States P[resident] here, topped by the fantastic reception of the people, as highly significant.”50

  Although the public remarks and toasts advanced US policy objectives, it was Nixon’s private meeting with President Ceauşescu the following day that distinguished the visit. After touring the city, Nixon and Ceauşescu sat down for a private conversation with only two interpreters and Kissinger also in the room. “Romania had good diplomatic relations with the North Vietnamese, and I knew that anything I said would be repeated to them,” Nixon stated frankly in his memoir.51 But it was not only the North Vietnamese that Nixon planned to communicate with via Ceauşescu.