Fusionist theory manifested itself in two forms. One demand was that military leaders incorporate political, economic, and social factors into their thinking. This school of thought answered the recurring question “Should military men have military minds?” by replying: “No, they should not and cannot have military minds, at least at the highest levels of military authority.” It condemned narrow-minded “military mechanics” and praised broad-minded “military statesmen” whose perspectives transcended the purely military. It argued that the only means whereby administrative coordination could be secured among the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department, and other agencies was for them to share a common national outlook. Every decision on national policy, it was held, contained both military and nonmilitary elements which could not be segregated. “There is no such thing as a purely military decision,” chorused the fusionists, thereby begging the issue of what were the proper civil-military administrative arrangements. Of course, there is no “purely military decision” at the level of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This is the exact reason why the Joint Chiefs are legally constituted as an advisory body rather than a decision-making body. There is very definitely, however, a military viewpoint on national policy which stresses the importance of military security considerations. Any decision on national policy involves choices among competing values. The job of the military is to insure that military security is not neglected by the political decision-maker who must balance the desirability of maximizing military security against its costs in other values. The fusionist call for broad-minded military statesmen was a demand that the military leaders deny themselves in order to play a higher role. As such, it was the most subtle and most persuasive form which liberal antimilitarism could assume. Fusionist theory extended the undeniable fact that every military policy recommendation must rest upon certain political and economic assumptions to mean that the military should furnish themselves with those assumptions. Supporters of this position pointed to the extent to which at interdepartmental conferences State Department representatives brought up military arguments while the Joint Chiefs defended the importance of political considerations. They also praised the establishment of institutions such as the National War College, not just because they would enable military officers to appreciate the complexities of national policy, but because they would also enable military officers to arrive at their own conclusions concerning political and economic issues. The one point on which exponents of this theory remained vague was the substantive content of the political thinking they wished to see the officers engage in. To what, or, more significantly, to whose political ideas were the officers to adhere? This question the fusionists never answered specifically. If they had grappled with it, the almost unanimous civilian opinion that the military leaders should integrate nonmilitary elements into their thinking inevitably would have dissolved into the bitter controversy of one civilian against another.
A second manifestation of fusionist theory was the demand that military leaders assume nonmilitary responsibilities. The argument for nonmilitary thinking on the part of military leaders implicitly rejected functional specialization and objective civilian control. This second demand explicitly preferred subjective civilian control. It was impossible, it was argued, to rely upon the political neutrality of military leaders and their simple obedience to state institutions. Instead, as Lasswell put it, minimizing the possibility of military professionalism, “the perpetuation of civilian supremacy would appear to depend not upon maintaining a specific set of governmental forms but upon ensuring the vitality of the value goals of the free society among all members of society, in or out of uniform.”3 Just as “military mechanics” who restricted their thinking to military considerations had been rejected, so also were “military technicians” who narrowly defined the scope of their responsibilities. One most notable manifestation of fusionist theory was the argument that the German generals shared in the moral and political guilt of Hitlerism by not openly and energetically opposing the domestic and foreign programs of the Nazi regime. Some supporters of this critique rather brazenly defied logic by supplementing their denunciation of von Rundstedt in 1945 with an equally vehement attack on MacArthur in 1951. Other critics, such as Telford Taylor, understood the dilemma and attempted to deal with the implications of their criticism for the American scene.4 American military officers themselves in the postwar decade did not miss the relevance of the Nuremberg “higher loyalty” philosophy to their own behavior. General MacArthur echoed many of the American civilian critics of the German generals when he denounced the “new and heretofore unknown and dangerous concept that the members of our armed forces owe primary allegiance and loyalty to those who temporarily exercise the authority of the executive branch of government rather than to the country and its Constitution which they are sworn to defend.”5 More explicitly, another American officer defended what he agreed was the “insubordination” of Captain Crommelin in the 1949 B-36 controversy on the grounds that:
The decisions of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal were in large part based on the tenet that the professional military defendants should have followed their consciences and not the orders of Hitler. There are, then, occasions when the refusal of a military man to comply is not insubordinate, but is positively his duty.6
In cutting loose from the safe grounds of objective civilian control, the advocates of fusion brought out a weapon which could be turned to a variety of uses.
MILITARY INFLUENCE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY
The influence of military professionals in American society between 1946 and 1955 was significantly less than it had been during World War II. Nonetheless, it was still at an unprecedented level in the absence of total war. The extent to which professional military officers assumed nonmilitary roles in government, industry, and politics, and developed affiliations with nonmilitary groups was a new phenomenon in American history. Military officers wielded far greater power in the United States during this period than they did in any other major country. Three of the most significant manifestations of their influence were: (1) the influx of military officers into governmental positions normally occupied by civilians; (2) the close ties which developed between military leaders and business leadership; and (3) the widespread popularity and prestige of individual military figures.
In analyzing these postwar military roles, two issues are of peculiar importance. First, was the increased influence of the military due fundamentally to factors associated with World War II, and, consequently, a temporary phenomenon? Or did it arise from causes associated with the Cold War and, consequently, something which might continue indefinitely into the future? Unquestionably, the increased military imperatives stemming from America’s involvement in world politics contributed to a much higher level of military influence than ever existed prior to 1940. Nonetheless, military influence during the first postwar decade was also in many respects an aftermath of World War II, a carry-over into peacetime both of the prestige and influence which the military acquired between 1940 and 1945 and of the weakness of civilian institutions and leadership during those years.
Second, was increased military influence accompanied by more widespread acceptance of the professional military viewpoint? In general, the inverse relationship between these two factors which had prevailed earlier in American society continued throughout the 1946–1955 period. A significant gap existed between the rapid and extensive rise of military influence and the considerably less success of military demands and military requirements. Those military elements which acquired the greatest political influence went farthest in abandoning the professional ethic, and their diversified roles made it easier for civilians to reject the postulates of professional military thinking. On issues where there was a clearcut distinction between the professional military viewpoint and the traditional American civilian attitudes, such as universal military service and the size of the military budget, the latter usually triumphed. Indeed, American military policy t
hroughout these years was in many ways a series of continuing efforts to escape from the professional military conclusion that the best means of achieving military security is through the maintenance of substantial forces in being.
PARTICIPATION IN CIVIL GOVERNMENT. The penetration of professional officers into governmental positions not requiring solely military skills took two forms: military occupancy of conjoint positions combining military and political functions, and military occupancy of civilian positions with exclusively nonmilitary functions.
The most notable examples of conjoint positions were: (1) the military governorships of occupied territories such as existed in Germany until 1949 and in Japan until 1952; (2) international military commands such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s SHAPE and the United Nations Korean Command; and (3) military advisory and training groups in nations receiving American aid. The conjoint positions reflected the failure of governmental organization to adjust rapidly enough to increased functional specialization. They were one area where fusionist theory was manifested in reality. In the absence of appropriate institutional mechanisms for the separate performance of the military and political responsibilities, the occupants of the conjoint positions discharged both duties. The occupation governorships were a temporary phenomenon developing out of World War II. While hostilities were still in progress and immediately after their termination, the separation of political and military functions was virtually impossible. Military government and civil affairs were naturally handled through the military command organization. After the end of the war, however, the military security function in the occupied territory declined in importance; the immediate problems were economic, social, political, and constitutional. Theoretically, military control should at this point have given way to civilian direction, and in the French, British, and Russian zones of Germany, civilian control did replace military control. The national popularity and political support of General MacArthur, however, made it impossible to reduce him to the status of a military subordinate to a civilian occupation governor. In Germany, the reluctance of the State Department to undertake the responsibility for occupation rule prolonged military control until 1949. In the Far East and in Germany large staffs, devoted purely to political and civil affairs, developed to assist the military governor in the discharge of his political responsibilities. In one form or another, these staffs, largely civilian in composition, were subsumed under or attached to the military command organization.
The international military commands were a reaction to military security threats stemming from the Cold War. Consequently, as a type they were a more permanent manifestation of conjoint office. The Commanders in Chief of SHAPE and of the United Nations Command in the Far East both had to devote substantial portions of their time to the discharge of political and diplomatic duties. The more ad hoc nature of the UN Command precluded any effort to develop means of segregating political and military responsibilities. In Europe, on the other hand, the initial creation of the SHAPE military organization and the piloting of it through its first tests required a unique combination of military, political, and diplomatic skills. Once the structure was established, however, a degree of segregation of function became possible. The more thoroughly military approaches of Ridgway and Gruenther to their job and the emergence of the civilian organization under Lord Ismay both reflected an effort to disassociate military and civilian activities in NATO. The complete segregation of the two functions, however, required the development of new forms of international political institutions which were probably impractical. Consequently, under a military guise and through military mechanisms, the commanders and staffs of NATO continued to perform political functions which the exigencies of politics did not permit to be performed more openly.7
The military advisory groups to nations receiving American military assistance combined diplomatic and military responsibilities. By virtue of their control over the most significant form of American assistance, the advisory group and its chief at times tended to absorb duties and influence which properly belonged to the ambassador and the State Department. While the problem of the organizing of civil and military representation in foreign countries on such a scale was relatively new to the United States, it had in the past been effectively dealt with by other nations. American military assistance and advisory groups will undoubtedly continue as a relatively permanent fixture in the conduct of American foreign affairs, and the eventual delimitation of responsibilities and duties between military and civil missions abroad should not present unsoluble difficulties.
Prior to World War II professional military officers occasionally held civilian positions in the national government. However, the scope of military penetration into the civilian hierarchy after World War II was completely without precedent in American history. In 1948 it was estimated that one hundred and fifty military men occupied important policy-making posts in civilian government.8 Many of the most significant appointive positions in the government were at one time or another occupied by military officers. The reasons behind this influx of officers into civil posts were complex: some represented factors which had long been present in the American scene; some were the result of World War II; some derived from the new and continuing demands of the Cold War.
(1) Traditional appointments had been continuingly characteristic of American civil-military relations. In some areas of the federal government a tradition of military appointments antedated World War II. Officers were appointed to these positions either upon detached duty from their services or after retirement. The most significant areas of traditional appointments were closely associated with the technical specialties of the two services. Naval officers were frequently selected for federal posts connected with maritime affairs. Between 1937 and 1949, for instance, the United States Maritime Commission always had one to three officers among its five members, and throughout much of its life it was headed by an admiral. From an early period, Army engineering officers had been often appointed to civilian public works positions. In the thirties the New Deal utilized the services of a number of officers in the WPA and similar agencies, and their employment in comparable positions was continued by the Truman and Eisenhower administrations.* In another area, the directorship of veterans affairs to which General Bradley was appointed in 1945 had been occupied by another general since 1923. Although Bradley was succeeded by a civilian, it seems legitimate to conclude that a tradition of military occupancy also inheres in this post. The traditional appointments reflected civilian desire to capitalize upon special types of nonmilitary expertise possessed by certain classes of professional officers. They appeared to be a continuing and relatively constant phenomenon in American government.
(2) Honorific and political appointments were peculiarly characteristic of the years immediately following World War II. After World War II many military appointments were designed primarily to honor or reward military commanders who had distinguished themselves in the war. The selection of leading generals and admirals to serve on the American Battle Monuments Commission, the appointment of various military figures to ad hoc commissions, and some appointments of military men as ambassadors fell into this category. Honorific appointments were more frequent under Truman’s administration than under Eisenhower’s. Many of the military appointments between 1945 and 1953 also undoubtedly reflected the desire of the Truman Administration to utilize the political popularity of the top World War II commanders to carry the burden of its foreign policies. Probably the most notable instance where this motivation was present was the employment of General Marshall as presidential envoy to China, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense. Honorific and political appointments were both temporary phenomena. No subsequent administration was likely to have quite the peculiar need for such political support that the Truman Administration did, and nothing short of total war was likely to produce popular military heroes of sufficient stature to furnish such support or to be eligible for honorary posts.
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p; (3) Administrative appointments reflected the new but continuing demands of the Cold War. The great bulk of the military appointments to civil positions in the postwar decade occurred in the foreign affairs and defense agencies and may be termed “administrative” in nature. They derived from new imperatives likely to remain in existence for an indefinite length of time. Before 1933 the personnel requirements of the federal government were fairly small. The expansion of the domestic agencies during the New Deal period was handled by the movement to Washington of program-oriented professional workers, academicians, lawyers, and others. To perform its wartime activities the government attracted business and professional men through the double appeal of the temporary nature of its employment and the patriotic duty of government service. The staffing of those significant foreign affairs and defense activities which continued after 1945, however, presented a difficult problem. The temporary war employees dispersed homeward; the New Dealers were generally uninterested in foreign affairs; and the businessmen were generally unwilling to work for the Democratic administration. No ready source of civilians with administrative and diplomatic skills was available. Consequently, the military were called upon to fill the vacuum. The officers were willing to serve, used to public employment, accustomed to low salaries, untainted by leftist affiliations, and divorced from ties with special interest groups. While military skills were not prerequisite for the positions to which they were appointed, their military background furnished them with certain types of experience and training not possessed by any significant groups of available citizens. The State Department, in particular among civilian agencies, required experienced, competent personnel in the immediate postwar years and utilized the services of professional officers.* The proportion of officers in civilian foreign affairs and defense posts tended to decline after 1946 and 1947, and the Eisenhower Administration to some extent replaced professional officers with recruits from business. The complete elimination of military administrative appointments, however, depended upon the development of a continuing source of high-level civilian administrators with education and experience in this field superior to those of the military.
The Soldier and the State Page 43
