The influx of military men into civilian posts aroused considerable criticism, particularly in the years from 1946 through 1948. The military appointments were held to be a sign of the militarization of the government, the abandonment of civilian control, and the imminency of the garrison state. Congress refused to approve three of President Truman’s military appointments.† The selection of General Marshall as Secretary of Defense in 1950 stimulated renewed debate of the issue. Some of the Eisenhower Administration’s military appointees met vigorous congressional opposition.9 Virtually all the criticism of the military influx was couched in terms of abstract constitutional and political principles and generalized dangers to civil government. With a few exceptions, it was impossible to demonstrate that the actions of any particular military officer reflected the inherently dangerous qualities of the military mind. It was all very well to cite the general influx of military men as evidence of a trend toward the garrison state. But, when one got down to the specifics of Bradley as Veterans Administrator or Marshall as Secretary of State, the threat of militarization rapidly evaporated. The professional officers blended into their new civilian milieu, serving nonmilitary ends, motivated by nonmilitary considerations, and performing their jobs little differently from their civilian predecessors and successors. Undoubtedly the officers who moved into the State Department in 1946 and 1947 did contribute to the more conservative outlook which developed in that department during those years. Yet even this was largely an adjustment to the civilian environment, for the new approach to foreign policy which became dominant in the Department in 1947 and 1948 had deep roots in the Department’s own professional staff. The general ease with which the officers adjusted to their civilian roles and outlook forced their critics to shift to the argument that, although the particular officers appointed were harmless exceptions to the desirable rule, dangerous precedents were being set for the future. This, too, was unconvincing. The “civilianizing” of the officers was not the exception. It was instead the only rule which American liberalism would permit.
THE MILITARY-BUSINESS RAPPROCHEMENT. Few developments more dramatically symbolized the new status of the military in the postwar decade than the close associations which they developed with the business elite of American society. Prior to World War II, the professional officers and the capitalists in spirit and in fact had been poles apart. The American business community had little use for military needs, little appreciation of the military outlook, and little respect for military men. The military reciprocated in kind. After World War II, an abrupt change took place in this relationship. Professional officers and businessmen revealed a new mutual respect. Retired generals and admirals in unprecedented numbers moved into the executive staffs of American corporations; new organizations arose bridging the gap between corporate management and military leadership. For the military officers, business represented the epitome of the American way of life. Association with business was positive proof and assurance that they had abandoned their outcaste status and had become respected members of the American community. Financially and psychologically, the military men who moved from the officers corps to the corporation gained in security, acceptance, and well-being. The business firms, on the other hand, capitalized upon the prestige of well-known commanders, the special skills and expertise of the officers in nonmilitary technical fields, their general administrative and organizing abilities, and their assistance in doing business with the Department of Defense. The ties that bound the two groups together in the postwar decade were apparently many and strong. In actuality, they rested upon two quite different foundations: one broad in scope but temporary in duration; the other more restricted but also more permanent.
The more ephemeral basis of the military-business alliance was the prestige of the military from World War II. Big business was eager to employ famous battle commanders: MacArthur went to Remington Rand, Bedell Smith to American Machine and Foundry, Bradley to Bulova, Halsey to International Standard Electric. This type of appointment was necessarily a temporary phenomenon, the Cold War producing few military figures of sufficient prestige to be of interest to business. The businesses which appointed these officers were usually large manufacturing corporations, holding sizable defense contracts, but so large and diversified as to be in most cases neither exclusively nor even primarily dependent upon government business. The military heroes came in at the top of the corporate structure, assuming posts as president, vice president, board chairman, or director. Although a few had occurred after World War I, prestige appointments on this scale were quite unprecedented in the United States. They were the American equivalent of the British practice of rewarding successful generals with peerages, a commercial society substituting corporation presidencies and board chairmanships for earldoms and viscounties. The military heroes, on the other hand, brought glamour and public attention to the businesses.* The corporations were honored and so were the generals. The large industrial concerns which hired the military men, however, had been the principal locus of opposition to a large military establishment. They were the major institutional base of business liberalism and the dominating element in the National Association of Manufacturers, which consistently demanded the reduction of military expenditures. There is little evidence that their employment of the military officers signalized any fundamental change in what Walter H. McLaughlin, Jr. has described as their “indifferent attitude” toward military affairs. Nor, apparently, were the officers able to work any change in the business political outlook. The corporations accepted the officers and utilized their talents and reputations, but they did not accept the professional military viewpoint. Insofar as there was a rapprochement in thinking between the military heroes and their business colleagues, it was the military men who made the concessions, adjusting to their new environment by surrendering their professional outlook.
A more restricted but more lasting tie developed between the military leadership and those businesses supplying goods to the Department of Defense. Prior to 1940, the Army and Navy offered little in the way of markets to American industry. In World War I industry had accepted large defense contracts only to suffer dislocation and hardship when they were abruptly canceled at the end of hostilities. As a result, business was most reluctant to take on military orders again in 1939 and 1940. Once the United States entered the war, of course, industry cooperated wholeheartedly in the production of military goods and equipment, and hundreds of businessmen went to Washington to work in the War and Navy Departments. The rapid demobilization in 1945 and 1946 first seemed to indicate a repetition of the post-World War I pattern. In due course, however, and particularly after the outbreak of the Korean War, it became obvious that the Cold War military demand was going to be substantial and relatively stable. The dollar volume of military orders and the complex technological requirements of the modern armed forces brought a significant permanent defense industry into existence for the first time in the United States. The defense suppliers were composed in part of large general manufacturing corporations, such as those in the automobile industry, which furnished military items while at the same time catering to the civilian market.* On the other hand, some industries, such as the aircraft manufacturers and sections of the electronics industry, were almost totally dependent upon military orders.
The economic nexus which joined the defense producers to the military was reflected both in the large numbers of former officers who entered the management of these companies and in the various organizations which developed to cement the military-business tie. The officers hired by the defense producers were not normally well-known public figures, but rather younger men who entered the corporations in operational rather than honorific positions. Most of the officers were technical experts in some specialized scientific field and many had held high positions in the Army’s technical services and in the Navy’s bureaus. Some of them resigned from the service to pursue their careers in business. The technical specialists employed by defense indust
ries constituted the largest single group of general and flag officers hired by private business in the postwar decade. The aircraft companies and their associated industries alone accounted for a significant portion of them. Unlike the prestige appointments, this type of business-military arrangement appeared to increase rather than decrease during the course of the postwar decade.10
The professionalization of the military in the 1880’s and 1890’s and their withdrawal from society had been reflected in the organization of numerous military associations designed for officers only. The return of the military to society and their close links with the Cold War defense industries were marked by the formation of a different type of organization open both to officers and to civilians and business firms. Probably most significant among these groups was the National Security Industrial Association organized by James Forrestal in 1944 to insure that “American business will remain close to the services.” The Association in 1954 was composed of six hundred industrial firms, virtually all of whom had significant defense contracts. Many officers of the Association were former generals or admirals. The Association was principally active in helping its member firms and the Department of Defense resolve problems of production techniques, procurement, and patents. The Armed Forces Chemical Association and the Armed Forces Communications Association came into existence in the immediate postwar years to bridge the gap between the interested segments of the military and of business. The previously existing Quartermaster Association, formed in 1920 as an organization of military officers only, was broadened to admit civilians to active membership and to provide for company membership. The Army Ordnance Association, founded in 1919, was reorganized as the American Ordnance Association, covering all three services. While its staff was composed largely of retired military officers, the thirty-five thousand members of AOA were mostly representatives of ordnance manufacturers.11 Both the Aircraft Industries Association and the Air Force Association provided links between the aviation industries and the military.*
In general, the defense businesses supported for economic reasons the same military policies which the officers supported for professional reasons. Exceptions to this existed, of course, in the case of businesses interested in producing or continuing to produce weapons or equipment not believed essential by professional judgment. But on the whole a coincidence of viewpoint existed which permitted the officers an easier association with defense industry than with those businesses which had more diversified customers. Corporation officials and military officials shared a common interest in technological development, and the defense industries for the first time in American history furnished the military program with a significant base of economic support. In other respects, however, association with the defense industries did not aid military professionalism. Inevitably, the businesses thought of themselves first and attracted to their staffs many younger officers who still had many years of useful service to offer their country. In the middle 1950’s over two thousand regular officers each year were leaving the services for the more lucrative positions in business. In addition, there was the likelihood that the ability to move from one of the technical branches of the armed forces into a well-paying industry job would enhance the popularity and attractiveness of the technical staffs as against the line. A very small proportion of the business appointments in the postwar decade went to military commanders who were neither famous public figures nor technical specialists, but simply regular line officers with back-grounds in military command. The businesses who hired these officers seemed to assume that any general or flag officer must necessarily be a good administrator. Their relatively small numbers, however, were indicative of the gap which still remained between even defense business and the more strictly professional military elements of the services. A major general whose principal experience was in commanding regiments and divisions had little to offer the manufacturing corporation.
THE MACS AND THE IKES: RETURN OF THE SAMURAI. In an engaging article, T. Harry Williams argues that the United States has two military traditions.12 One is represented by the friendly, folksy, easygoing soldier who reflects the ideals of a democratic and industrial civilization and who cooperates easily with his civilian superiors. This “Ike” tradition is exemplified by Zachary Taylor, U. S. Grant, and Dwight D. Eisenhower. Opposing this is the “Mac” tradition, embodied in Winfield Scott, George B. McClellan, and Douglas MacArthur — brilliant, imperious, cold, dramatic officers deriving their values and behavior from an older, aristocratic heritage and finding it difficult to subordinate themselves to civilian authorities. Williams’ dichotomy is obviously real and significant; yet, in a sense, it is restricted in scope, failing to encompass important elements of the American military tradition which fall into neither the “Ike” nor the “Mac” category. Essentially, the Ikes and the Macs represent two aspects of the same strand of American militarism: the tradition of political involvement. The true opposition is not between the Taylor-Grant-Eisenhower line and the Scott-McClellan-MacArthur line, but rather between both of these, on the one hand, and the professional strand of American militarism (which might be described as the Sherman-Pershing-Ridgway line), on the other. The basic distinction is not between the Ikes and the Macs, but between the “Ike-Macs” and the “Uncle Billies” or “Black Jacks.” The differences between the Ike type and the Mac type are the differences between two kinds of politicians: the charismatic, inspirational, unbending political leader who leads because he is superior to his followers, and the flexible, earthy, unpretentious political leader who leads because he is representative of his followers. That the Ikes generally have been more successful than the Macs in their political pursuits indicates only that the American environment generally is more favorable to the Ike type, irrespective of whether he is civilian or military. The difference between the Ikes and the Macs is simply the difference between Jackson and Calhoun, Theodore Roosevelt and LaFollette, Wendell Willkie and Robert A. Taft.
Significantly, Williams mentioned no representative of either the Ike or the Mac traditions between the Civil War heroes and the post-World War II figures. During the intervening years both elements of the political strand of the American tradition were subordinated to the prevailing professionalism. Only with the return of the military to society after World War II did the political tradition which had wilted in the 1870’s and 1880’s reëmerge as a major theme of American militarism. For the first time in American history in the postwar decade, professional officers not only became popular public figures but also became deeply involved in the domestic politics of candidates and elections, political movements and political parties. The most obvious figures were, of course, Eisenhower and MacArthur. But other officers, although not numerous, also assumed conspicuous roles in popular politics. The causes of this political involvement essentially had little relation to the continuing issues and policies of the Cold War. While the officers disputed many points of national policy, their entrance into the partisan political arena does not appear to have been motivated primarily by ideological or policy considerations. Instead, their participation was fundamentally the result of the popularity of Eisenhower and MacArthur and the rivalry between these two great military figures. The conflict between the Macs and Ikes in the postwar decade was real, but it was a conflict of personalities not of traditions. Its roots lay in the confused events of World War I and in the inner tensions and feuds, obscured from public view, of the Regular Army of the 1920’s and 1930’s. At an early date MacArthur and George C. Marshall became identified with opposing groups within the Army. During and after World War I a rivalry, fed by a series of incidents and misunderstandings, developed between them. Eisenhower was an aide to MacArthur while the latter was Chief of Staff from 1930 to 1935 and military advisor to the Philippine government thereafter. Eventually, however, Eisenhower, too, broke with MacArthur, returning to the United States in 1939. In due course, he came to the attention of Marshall, now himself Chief of Staff, and was rapidly advanced
on the career which eventually led to his appointment as Supreme Commander of the European invasion. In this process Eisenhower became completely identified with the Marshall group. His rapid promotion and the priority given to the European theater over the Pacific necessarily drew the ire of the MacArthur supporters. The emergence of Eisenhower and MacArthur as the two popular military heroes of the war projected the essentially intramilitary feud upon the larger framework of national politics. The personal rivalry was enhanced by the identification of the contests with Europe-oriented and Asia-oriented strategies. Virtually all the significant participation of individual military officers in postwar partisan controversy was a function of the rivalry between these two personalities. On the one hand, there was the Marshall-Eisenhower, Europe, SHAEF-SHAPE, Pentagon group; on the other hand stood the MacArthur, Asia, SCAP, “Bataan” group. Retired officers played active roles on behalf of one or the other generals: MacArthur had his Wedemeyer and Bonner Fellers, Eisenhower his Clay and Bedell Smith. Other officers essayed a neutral role or made a difficult choice between the two.13 The impact of this controversy continued for some while after the war, but the passing of the World War II generation of military leaders and the rise of a new crop of generals removed from its animosities will undoubtedly diminish military political participation.
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