The political involvement of Eisenhower and MacArthur affected not only the officer corps but the men themselves. Neither was able to adhere to the fundamentals of the professional military ethic. In due course, both emerged as “unmilitary” military men, deviants from the professional standard, heroic and symbolic figures for millions of Americans. MacArthur’s involvement in political roles long antedated that of Eisenhower as did also his deviation from the professional military ethic. From the start, MacArthur had been a brilliant soldier but always something more than a soldier: a controversial, ambitious, transcendent figure, too able, too assured, too talented to be confined within the limits of professional function and responsibility. As early as 1929 his name was mentioned in connection with the Presidency, and in 1944, 1948, and 1952 he was on the fringes of the presidential political arena. The MacArthur ideology which evolved in the 1920’s and 1930’s was essentially religious, mystical, and emotional, contrasted with the normally practical, realistic, and materialistic approach of the professional soldier. To an even greater extent than Mahan, MacArthur’s attitudes appeared to reflect a deeply felt and profoundly personalized version of Christianity. In contrast to the professional stress on military force in being, he emphasized the moral and spiritual aspects of war and the importance of the citizen-soldier. In contrast to the bulk of the officer corps, MacArthur viewed the threats to the United States as arising from insidious political philosophies rather than from other nation states of equal or superior material strength. His sense of mission and dedication gave rise to a sustained and unbridled optimism which contrasted with the normal professional pessimism. The professional officer exists in a world of grays. MacArthur’s universe was one of blacks and whites and loud and clashing colors. His articulate and varying views reflected a continuing quest for beliefs and policies which would satisfy his own ideological inclinations and at the same time inspire favorable popular response.
In contrast to MacArthur, Eisenhower was still an unknown lieutenant colonel as the nation moved toward involvement in World War II. While MacArthur had specialized in being different, Eisenhower specialized in adjusting to and reflecting his environment, absorbing the attitudes and behavior patterns of those about him. During the 1920’s and 1930’s, immersed in a professional milieu, he was the typical professional officer. When he catapulted to the heights of rank and fame, Eisenhower rapidly adjusted to his successive new environments, easily emerging as distinctly “civilian minded.” Speaking less and smiling more than MacArthur, he appeared the embodiment of consensus rather than controversy. MacArthur was a beacon, Eisenhower a mirror. While the former attempted to build a variety of bridges to the American consciousness, the latter waited and let the bridges be constructed under him. With few pretensions to philosophy and creative originality, Eisenhower had little need to commit himself on public issues or to identify himself with any except the most widely held American values. The Eisenhower ideology was elusive because it was so familiar and acceptable. Substituted for it was a warm, sympathetic, but noncommittal, understanding.
The full measure of the extent to which both MacArthur and Eisenhower by their different paths departed from the professional code was dramatically indicated in the early 1950’s. MacArthur became the leading advocate of the abolition of war. Eisenhower emerged as the most effective instrument in the reduction of the armed forces. Both roles reflected the influence of the civilian environments in which the soldiers had become immersed. By 1956 even Henry Wallace was endorsing the views of the two old soldiers on peace and war.
From an early period MacArthur’s attitude toward war embodied the dominant ideas of the American liberal tradition. During the 1920’s and 1930’s he had justified war on moral and religious grounds, and surrounded the warrior’s art with a sentimental romanticism. Unlike Dennis Hart Mahan, but similar to Mahan’s Jacksonian opponents, MacArthur preferred the warlike spirit to the military spirit.14 Some observers detected irony many years later in 1951 and 1952, when MacArthur denounced the dangers of the “military mind.” But the general was on firm ground. A vast gulf existed between his thinking and that of the professional officer. After World War II he adopted the pacifist ideas which he had castigated in the 1920’s and 1930’s, urging in Kellogg-Briand terms that war must be “outlawed from the world.” Seldom has a professionally trained military man more completely departed from the cardinal tenet of military doctrine that war is ultimately inevitable and beyond the power of humans to prevent. MacArthur had the ban on the maintenance of armed forces written into the constitution of Japan. He urged his own nation to “proclaim our readiness to abolish war in concert with the great powers of the world.” MacArthur’s demand for the total abolition of war reflected his unwillingness to accept the frustrations, embarrassment, and burdens of continued international friction. In Lasswellian phrases he declared that “in final analysis the mounting cost of preparation for war is in many ways as materially destructive as war itself.” Instead he turned to the abolition of war as the panacea of the world’s ills, “the one issue, which, if settled, might settle all others.”15 Despite their differences, an underlying consistency existed between MacArthur’s earlier and later views on war. War was always a total, cataclysmic act. In his earlier years he stressed the heroic self-sacrifice and glory involved in this act. In his later years he saw the destruction and calamity it entailed. But his reactions to war were always extreme. “You cannot control war; you can only abolish it,” he declared, rejecting vigorously the concept that “when you use force, you can limit that force.” Adherence to the total war-total peace dichotomy necessarily led MacArthur to a theory of civil-military relations closer to Ludendorff than to Clausewitz. War represented the utter bankruptcy of politics, not simply the extension of politics. Consequently, in war full control, “politically, economically, militarily,” must be in the hands of the military commanders, and the nation must concentrate its complete trust in the military leadership.18
While MacArthur emerged as the nation’s most eloquent advocate of the abolition of war, Eisenhower became its most effective instrument in the reduction of American military strength. In this again Eisenhower demonstrated his responsiveness to the forces about him, performing a double service for the Republican Party. As a popular military hero candidate, he helped the minority party secure control of the national government for the first time in two decades. Once in office, his military prestige aided the dominant elements in that party toward a realization of their goals of reducing expenditures, lowering taxes, and balancing the budget. The first three military budgets submitted by his administration all cut back the size of the armed forces, all encountered resistance in Congress, and all were approved on the personal assurance of the President that they would provide adequately for the national defense. When in 1953, for instance, congressional supporters of air power threatened to upset Administration plans to reduce Air Force appropriations by $5 billion, the President intervened and saved the budget, assuring Congress that the cuts had his “personal endorsement in all major particulars.” As Senator Ferguson accurately predicted: “I believe . . . most of the Senators will go along with the President on this because he is a military expert and his judgment must be trusted.”17 He was the indispensable instrument of the arms cuts. Neither Adlai Stevenson nor Robert A. Taft could have carried out the reductions with so little resistance. The opposition was disarmed from the start. As one Democrat sadly remarked, “How in the devil can a mere Senator argue about military matters with General Ike Eisenhower?”18 The result was a rift between the President and his erstwhile professional colleagues, and the identification of America’s most popular military officer with its most antimilitary philosophy of business liberalism.
* Maj. Gen. Philip Fleming, for instance, was executive officer and deputy administrator of the P.W.A., 1933–35, and Federal Works Administrator, 1941–49. Maj. Gen. Edmond H. Leavy was deputy administrator of the W.P.A. in New York City, 1936–40, and ass
istant commissioner of the W.P.A. in 1940. The Eisenhower Administration appointed Brig. Gen. Herbert D. Vogel chairman of the T.V.A. and Brig. Gen. John S. Bragdon public works coordinator.
* These included: Gen. of the Army George C. Marshall, Special Representative to China, 1946, Secretary of State, 1947–49; Brig. Gen. Henry C. Byroade, Dir., Bur. of German Affairs, 1949–52, Asst. Sec. of State, 1952–55, Amb. to Egypt, 1955—; Maj. Gen. John H. Hilldring, Asst. Sec. of State, 1946–47; Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, Amb. to U.S.S.R., 1946–49, Under Sec. of State, 1953–55; Rear Adm. John W. Bays, Chief, Div. of Forgn. Service Adm., 1947–49; Capt. Lee W. Park, USN, Chief, Div. of Cartography, 1944—; Maj. Gen. Thomas Holcomb, USMC, Min. to South Africa, 1944–48; Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, Special Representative to China and Korea, 1947; Adm. Alan G. Kirk, Amb. to Belgium, 1946–49, Amb. to U.S.S.R., 1949–52; Maj. Gen. Philip Fleming, Amb. to Costa Rica, 1951–53; Adm. Raymond A. Spruance, Amb. to Philippines, 1952–53; Brig. Gen. Frank T. Hines, Amb. to Panama, 1945—48; Rear Adm. Arthur A. Ageton, Amb. to Paraguay, 1955—. Other significant military appointments included: Maj. Gen. Kenneth D. Nichols, Genl. Manager, A.E.C., 1953—; Maj. Gen. Edmund B. Gregory, Admistr., War Assets Adm., 1946; Maj. Gen. Robert M. Littlejohn, Admistr., War Assets Adm., 1946–47; Lt. Gen. William E. Riley, USMC, Dep. Dir., F.O.A., 1953—; Vice Adm. Walter S. DeLaney, Dep. Dir., F.O.A., 1953—; Maj. Gen. Glen E. Edgerton, Mngng Dir. & Chrman. Bd. of Dirs., Export-Import Bank, 1953—.
† Maj. Gen. Lawrence S. Kuter to be Chrmn. of the C.A.B., Gen. Mark Clark to be Ambassador to the Vatican, Fit. Adm. Chester W. Nimitz to be Chrmn. of the President’s Commission on Internal Security and Individual Rights. All three cases involved controversial issues other than the military background of the nominees. President Truman reportedly offered the CAB chairmanship to six civilians, all of whom declined the job, before selecting Gen. Kuter.
* The pros and cons of adding General Marshall to the General Motors board of directors were debated among corporation officials in 1945, President Sloan suggesting that: “General Marshall might do us some good, when he retires, following his present assignment — assuming he continues to live in Washington; recognizing the position he holds in the community and among the government people and the acquaintance he has — and [if] he became familiar with our thinking and what we are trying to do, it might offset the general negative attitude toward big business, of which we are a symbol and a profitable business, as well.” Lammot du Pont, on the other hand, secured the rejection of Marshall on the grounds of, “First, his age; second, his lack of stockholdings, and, third, his lack of experience in industrial business affairs.” New York Times, Jan. 7, 1953, pp. 33, 35. Owen D. Young, after World War I, defined the qualifications he wanted in the president of the Radio Corporation of America in the following words, and concluded that they could best be filled by a military man, General James G. Harbord, Pershing’s Chief of Staff in France:
“1st. He should be well known both nationally and internationally and he should have made such a place for himself as would enable him to speak with authority either to foreign Governments or to our own Government.
“2nd. He should not have been previously identified with politics because that would mean party alignment and partisan reaction.
“3rd. He should not have been identified with Wall Street or the money interests because it is important that the American people should accept the Radio Corporation as an organization for service to American interests both at home and abroad rather than as an organization primarily to make a profit for Wall Street interests.
“4th. He should have had administrative experience and if possible business experience.
“5th. He should be well known in Washington and in a position to appear before Committees of Congress and before the Departments and have his statements of facts accepted without question. It is particularly important in this connection that no one should be able to question his Americanism, such as they have done in several instances in the case of our international bankers.
“6th. He should be a man of public position whom to attack would be bad politics rather than good politics.”
Quoted in Gleason L. Archer, The History of Radio to 1926 (New York, 1938), pp. 246–247.
* General Motors was the largest producer of defense goods, yet only 19.3 per cent of its 1951 sales were to the military. New York Times, Mar. 11, 1952, p. 42.
* The new military-business relationship was illustrated by the career lines of Maj. Gen. Harry C. Ingles — Chief Signal Officer in World War II, organizer of the Armed Forces Communications Assoc, in 1946 and 1947, president of R.C.A. Communications in 1948 — and Lt. Gen. Levin H. Campbell — World War II Chief of Ordnance, later exec. vice pres. of International Harvester and president of the Amer. Ordnance Association, author of The Industry-Ordnance Team (New York, 1946) which expresses the philosophy of military-business cooperation.
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The Political Roles of the Joint Chiefs
POLITICAL ROLES: SUBSTANTIVE AND ADVOCATORY
The political involvement of a military leadership institution such as the Joint Chiefs may take two different forms. The military leaders may espouse or recommend policies which are derived from nonmilitary sources and which are unrelated to or contrary to the professional military viewpoint. In this event the military leaders assume a substantive political role. Alternatively, the military leaders may play an active part in the public defense or merchandising of policies (irrespective of their content) before Congress and the public. The political involvement in this case stems not from the substantive views of the military leaders but rather from the place, manner, timing, and effects of their expression of those views. This is an advocatory political role. It is essentially exoteric while the substantive political role is esoteric in the sense that the policy views of the military chiefs may not be known beyond a small group of executive officials. These roles are of course not mutually exclusive: military leaders could assume both at once by publicly urging a nonmilitary policy.
Although the Joint Chiefs in the postwar years retreated somewhat from their World War II heights of power and glory, they still continued a high level of political involvement. The most striking aspect of this period, however, was not the degree of their involvement, which it was to be expected would remain at a high level, but rather the differing forms which it took. During the Truman Administration the views of the Joint Chiefs on policy coincided to an astonishing extent with the professional military ethic. In many respects their attitudes would have done credit to the German General Staff in its heyday of professionalism. In view of the extent to which the Chiefs had deviated from the ethic in World War II, this return to the traditional military line stands out as all the more remarkable. On the other hand, the Truman Chiefs quite obviously did become involved in an advocatory political role as the proponents of policy before Congress and the public. In the first two years of the Eisenhower Administration, on the other hand, the reverse tended to be true. In many important instances the views on national policy of the Eisenhower Chiefs, as reported in the press, showed significant departures from the professional military viewpoint. Although thus assuming a substantive political role, the Eisenhower Chiefs were considerably more reticent than their predecessors in the public exposition of their views. It would be erroneous to overemphasize this difference between the Truman and the Eisenhower Chiefs — both to some extent assumed both political roles — but it would be even more unfortunate to ignore it. Each pattern of behavior was in its own way an effort to ease the tension between the professional military leadership institution and the political environment in which it operated.
What caused the differing tendencies in the political roles of the two sets of Joint Chiefs? The reason cannot be found in organization. The Defense Department was reorganized in 1953, but it had also undergone a more significant reorganization in 1949. Neither reorganization fundamentally altered the position of the JCS in the gov
ernment. While difference in organization may have been a contributing factor to the differences in behavior, it can hardly be rated as a decisive one. Nor can the change be explained by shifts in the fundamental national attitudes toward the military. Throughout the period these remained basically liberal. The answer must be found in the more specific environments created about the Joint Chiefs by the two administrations, their political leadership, their dominant interests, and their policy viewpoints. The Joint Chiefs operate immediately and primarily in a governmental framework. Inevitably they must be affected by the attitudes and behavior of the policy makers and statesmen with whom they are in constant contact. These immediate surrounding circumstances, the “governmental environment,” have a greater immediate influence on the Joint Chiefs than the more basic but also more remote national environment. In the long run, of course, the latter is decisive, but in the short run the two may differ. The differences between the Truman and Eisenhower Chiefs of Staff derive from the differences between the governmental environments of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations.
THE JOINT CHIEFS IN THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION
DUALITY. The reasons for the behavior of the Truman Joint Chiefs may be found in one of the most striking characteristics of the Truman Administration: its split personality between foreign affairs and defense, on the one hand, and domestic affairs on the other. In many respects it was two administrations in one. In domestic affairs the Administration pursued a policy of liberal reform which was formulated and executed by one set of officials. In foreign affairs the Administration followed a policy of conservative containment which was formulated and executed by a different set of officials. The contact between these two halves was almost minimal. In fact, the only place where they were really linked together was in the President himself.
The Soldier and the State Page 45
