The Siege of Jerusalem: Crusade and Conquest in 1099

by Conor Kostick

  An even more shattering blow, however, had struck the troops further to the rear led by Gottschalk. Coloman, the king of Hungary, had at fi rst been tolerant of his fellow Christians’ desire to march through the kingdom in order to fi ght for Jerusalem. Th

  e reckless behaviour of the crowds, however, their frequent

  attacks on the property of his people and the danger as more and more armies were rumoured to be on their way, led to the Hungarian population becoming uneasy and, indeed, downright hostile. A dispute in the market at the fortress of Mosony (now Mosonmagyarórvár) had led to the Bavarians and Swabians driving a stake through the genitals of young Hungarian. As word of this incident spread, Coloman came under pressure from his warriors, who insisted upon taking up arms against the insults of the intruders. But when the Hungarian army came to the Benedictine abbey of St Martin at Pannonhalma, they found the crusaders drawn up in solid formation, ready to fi ght for their lives. Realizing that there was going to be no easy victory against an unprepared rabble, Coloman and his offi

  cials entered negotiations with Gottschalk. Agreement

  was reached that if the crusaders handed over their weapons to the Hungarians for safekeeping, they would be permitted markets and safe travel though the kingdom; their weapons would be returned at the border. Grateful for the opportunity of avoiding a battle, Gottschalk and his more responsible offi cers

  persuaded the German army to accept the king’s proposal. Th

  ey piled up their

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  T H E S I E G E O F J E R U S A L E M

  weapons in good faith. Once the crusaders were safely disarmed, Coloman and his troops then attacked without mercy. Th

  e ensuing massacre was the

  fi rst great disaster to fall upon people who had taken up the cross. Only a hand-ful of Gottschalk’s people escaped, returning to Swabia with a tale of terrible betrayal. 11

  While this contingent of the People’s Crusade was being annihilated, Peter met with Alexius: the small, roughly dressed, hermit with the sophisticated emperor bedecked in gold and purple. Th

  e meeting was relatively successful.

  Alexius was pleased with the humility shown by the leader of the Latins, while Peter was grateful on behalf of his people that the Byzantines had donated a massive hoard of coins to replace that which had been lost at Nish. It was by mutual agreement that Peter’s army was shipped across to Asia Minor fi ve days later, to take up station in the fortifi ed camp of Civitot on the thin strip of costal land still controlled by the Byzantines.

  Th

  ere, the limits of having a hermit as a military leader became evident.

  Following the advice of the emperor and his own assessment of the situation, Peter wished to hold the popular army in check until the nobles of Europe arrived, with their experienced leaders and large bodies of armoured knights.

  Wait six months? When they had a divine mission and already greater numbers than any army in memory? Why, they were capable of great deeds. Two months of idleness saw what little discipline Peter’s army had break down, as rival contingents formed and outdid one another in undertaking daring raids against the Muslims, travelling as far as Nicea in search of booty. Th

  e hermit had no

  reliable chain of command, no loyal offi

  cer corps, to reign in these provocative

  expeditions and insist upon a policy of patiently awaiting the princes.

  As yet, the enormous agitation that had bestirred Christian Europe mattered very little in the Near East. A series of reports stating that armies of Franks were marching east had been circulated in the major Turkish and Arab ruled cities and, over time, as the truth of them was confi rmed, a sense of trepidation would grow among the Muslim and Jewish populations. But in the summer of 1096, the attention of the ruling Seljuk dynasts was on their own political rivalries. In particular, Qilij Arslān I, the young sultan of Rūm, the fi rst Muslim-ruled region in the crusaders’ path, had only come to power in 1092. His priority since then had been the restoration of a sultanate that had lost ten years earlier with the death of his father. In the three years preceding the arrival of the crusaders Qilij Arslān had spent more time on horseback than in his palace, riding back and forth with his troops across Anatolia enforcing submission to his rule on the cities and tribes of the region.

  I N T H E B E G I N N I N G

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  Th

  e Turkish leaders of the region were able to call upon a variety of soldiers to serve them, but every ruler also had a permanent standing force of cavalry, their askar. Th

  ese were technically of very low social status, slaves or freedmen, but in practice the elite household guard. As the popular proverb put it regard-ing those who lived off the labour of others, life was easy for ‘the horse of the askar, with fodder, pasturage and little to do.’12 Th ese lightly armed troops were

  expert with the bow, the favoured weapon of the Muslim world. Th

  ey could fi re

  at a gallop; indeed they could turn and fi re over their shoulder at a chasing opponent. Qilij Arslān, like his fellow rulers, had an askar recruited personally and closely devoted to him as well as garrisons stationed across his realm who could be mobilized rapidly to create the core of his full army.

  Nicea, on the north-western edge of the sultan’s empire, was considered an impregnable strongpoint. It had natural defences in the form of a large lake against the western wall, new fortifi cations and towers along the city walls, and it was far from his enemies. Th

  e only possible assailants were the Byzantines,

  who had always shown a preference for signing peace treaties over making war. So confi dent was Qilij Arslān in the defences and location of his capital that while he and his warriors rode up to 500 miles to the east, his family and treasure were left at Nicea. It was a shock, then, to have messengers catch up with him with the news that the rumoured Christian barbarians had arrived and their foragers were pillaging the lands all the way up to his capital.

  Qilij Arslān responded quickly, collecting up all his available forces, raising levies and hiring mercenaries. His fi rst target was a small fortress about three miles north east from Nicea that the Christians had captured and were now using as a base from which to conduct their raids. Inside the castle was a force of some 3,000 Swabians who, having been become envious at the sight of booty brought back from a raid of the French and Italians, had marched out from Peter’s camp and successfully assaulted the stronghold. Th

  e fi rst attempt by the

  troops of Qilij Arslān to retake the fortress by storm failed, the Swabians inside fought bravely. Th

  ey could be driven back from the walls by an immeasurable

  hail of arrows, but every time the Turkish army attempted to ascend the walls the Swabians charged out to beat them off with sword, battleaxe and spear.

  Th

  warted in attempts to storm the fort, the Turkish forces changed their approach; utilising their advantage in missile fi re to keep the top of the walls clear while wood was brought all the way up to the gate of the castle and piled high against it. Th

  e confl agration that then started led not only to the destruc-

  tion of the entrance but many buildings inside. Leaping from the walls, the defenders tried to save themselves. But very few escaped. About 200 young

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  men, the most suited to the slave market, were kept as prisoners, the rest of the garrison were slain. Unsure as to the full strength of his enemies, Qilij Arslān did not follow up this victory with an immediate attack on the fort of Civitot, where the bulk of the crusaders were camped, but sent spies ahead, while taking the precautionary measure of withdrawing the bulk of his forces to Nicea. 13

  Th

  e sight of the clouds of smoke to their west and the arrival of scouts with news about the events at the fortress precipitated a crisis back at the main camp.
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br />   Peter the Hermit had been detained in Constantinople for several days, on a mission to obtain more supplies from the emperor. Th

  is left Walter Sanzavoir as

  the most authoritative fi gure in the camp, but by no means its general. Walter’s advice was to wait for Peter and not to rush recklessly to avenge those who, it was suddenly appreciated, were no longer dismissed as foolish Germans, but remembered as comrades and martyrs. Th

  is council quietened the majority,

  who settled down to a defence of the camp. Th

  e lull lasted eight days, during

  which time Qilij Arslān took the measure of the crowds that faced him. Th ey

  were large in number, but the vast majority were foot soldiers and that was no threat to light cavalry with a near infi nite supply of arrows.

  On Tuesday 20 October 1096, Qilij Arslān sent an advance party of 100 well-armed riders to see if he could draw out the Christian army from its defences.

  Coming across small numbers of pilgrims, in one or twos, fi ves or tens, this advance party scattered the bands of foragers and beheaded those whom they captured. Th

  ese skirmishes had the desired eff ect. For the rest of that aft ernoon and into the night a great tumult broke out in Peter’s army. Walter and several other knights continued to insist that no action be taken until Peter returned and they could benefi t from his talismanic presence as well as his counsel.

  Among the foot soldiers were a more professional and seasoned force than most in the camp. Only 200 strong, those who marched with Godfrey Burel as their commander and standard-bearer nevertheless were famous within Peter’s army for having been fi rst to dare the ladders at the Hungarian fortress of Zemun. Th

  at castle had been stormed by Peter’s army when they observed

  that weapons and goods belonging to captured stragglers from Walter’s army were being boastfully displayed on the walls. Th

  e assault on Zemun had made

  Godfrey’s name and although he was a foot soldier, not a knight, he was considered of such importance that when Peter had been obliged to hand over two prominent fi gures as hostages for safe passage through Bulgaria, Godfrey was one of them. And it was Godfrey who now insisted on a policy of immediate action.14

  Th

  ere was in Peter’s army a sense of pride that they were humble folk and equally a feeling of resentment that God’s mission should be delayed for the

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  sake of princes. Godfrey Burel cleverly appealed to this sentiment by accusing Walter and the other knights of being cowards and of little use in war despite their distinguished lineage. Th

  e more these knights forbade the army to march,

  the more bitter became Godfrey’s taunts. Such accusations before the thousands of onlookers were too insuff erable to be borne, it was better to die in battle than live with the label of coward. In a deadly rage, Walter and his fellow knights announced that they would lead the army out, to their mutual ruin, if such was necessary to prove their worth.

  Th

  e following morning, at the fi rst sign that the sky was brightening in the east, trumpets sounded throughout the crusader camp. Twenty-fi ve thousand men on foot and 500 knights on horse formed themselves up into six divisions and marched out with enormous clamour and pride in their strength. Only the sick, those without arms, and the countless numbers of women with the army, remained at the camp. Th

  e crusaders set forth in complete ignorance of the fact

  that Qilij Arslān with his main army had come up during the previous day and was camped barely three miles away.

  Th

  e sultan was, at fi rst, taken aback by this unexpected sortie by the army from the fort at Civitot. Fortunately for Qilij Arslān, the lack of mounted scouts on the Christian side meant that he could hastily withdraw from the mountainous and forested terrain near the camp to a plain more suitable for his cavalry to manoeuvre around the Christian foot soldiers. As the Christian army came out of the woods and reached the open fi elds their boastful clamour ceased.

  Formed up across the plain was the huge Turkish army. Not be to deterred, the crusaders encouraged each other with shouts invoking God, before the fi rst two divisions, the knights of the Christian army, set out to close with the enemy.

  Qilij Arslān waited, allowing a gap to open between the Christian riders and their foot soldiers, and then signalled that his troops should fi re. Th e arrows

  poured down, not on the front ranks of the fast moving cavalry, but on their second division and the foremost of the foot soldiers, many of whom, as intended, now shrank back from the lethal clouds of darts. A disastrous split had opened up in the Christian ranks. Th

  e foot soldiers at the rear halted and

  formed up in the relative safety of the trees, at the head of the path back to the camp. Th

  ose at the front hurried to keep up with the knights.

  Th

  e more heavily armoured western knight, if he could get within reach of his Muslim opponent, had the advantage in close combat. With their front ranks undisrupted, Walter and his companions on horseback crashed among the Turkish riders and in moments had cut down hundreds of Turkish troops.

  But as they scattered, the Muslim archers directed their arrows into the horses of the Christian knights. Too few to maintain the momentum of their initial

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  success, Walter and his illustrious companions were soon fi ghting on foot. At close range, layers of chain mail armour were no protection against contemporary light bows, let alone the sophisticated wood, horn and sinew composite bows favoured at the time by the Turkish cavalry. Staggering, with one arrow aft er another smacking through his armour and deep into his fl esh, Walter continued to slash out at the enemies nearest him, before expiring with seven arrows penetrating his chest. Did he die with bitter satisfaction at having given the ultimate proof of his courage?

  Ironically, as the dismounted crusader knights were killed, bravely fi ghting to the last, Godfrey Burel ran. It was the sight of their hero slipping through the woods back towards the camp that unnerved the rearguard. Th

  inking only of

  their own survival, they broke in panic. But the Turks were quickly upon them and, as is so oft en the case in war, the real massacre began with the rout rather than the battle itself. For three miles the Turkish army, rejoicing at their victory, chased the fl eeing crusader troops all the way back to the camp and right into it, not allowing the Christians a moment to regroup. 15

  Th

  e slaughter was immense, but not total. Once again beardless and attractive young men were spared for the slave market, as were young girls and the more appealing nuns. Th

  e only other survivors were some 3,000 soldiers who

  instead of making for the camp had run to a ruined fortress on the beach, where they desperately piled stones into the breaches. Many of these men were killed by the heavy fall of arrows that now rained down upon the ruins, but some survived until the departure of the Turkish army the following day, when news came that the Byzantine Emperor was on the way to assist the remnants of Peter’s army.

  Qilij Arslān returned to his capital, with immense booty and a triumph that looked set to make him famous. Th

  ose who had feared the consequences of a

  massive Christian army coming to the Muslim world had cause to celebrate; the young sultan of Rūm had destroyed the threat with ease. Th

  ere was no harm

  in being seen as a champion of Islam against the Christians, but what this victory really meant for Qilij Arslān was that he could now concentrate his forces 500 miles to the east, where the Danishmend ruler, Malik Ghazi Gumushtekin

  ‘the wise’, was becoming a decisive rival. Malik Ghazi was currently campaigning for control of the strategic Armenian city of Melitene and if he could be thwarted in this, it would be a ser
ious check to his ambitions.

  While the Turkish sultan once more rode across the entire width of his realm, one by one, the other Christian armies arrived at Constantinople. Th ese

  were a far more dangerous threat to the Muslim world than the more lowly

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  troops of Peter the Hermit. Th

  ey were also a potential threat to the Byzantine

  emperor. Despite the fact that the crusading mission was ostensibly the emancipation of Jerusalem from pagan rule, Alexius was distinctly uneasy about having such powerful and eff ective armies gather at his capital. Aft er all, back in 1082, Alexius had been general of a Byzantine troop against an invading force of Italian Normans led by Bohemond. In the course of a two-year campaign they had met twice on the fi eld of battle, and on both occasions Alexius had been forced to retreat. Now here was his former enemy returning with another great Norman army. Is it any wonder that the Byzantines looked warily at the response to Urban’s appeal for aid to the Christians of the East? Th e policy of

  the emperor in this unprecedented situation was to seek recognition from the leaders of the Latin armies that he was their overlord, to require from them a promise that all former Byzantine cities regained from their current Turkish rulers would be restored to the empire and, lastly, to avoid a situation where the crusading armies could unite together north of the Bosphorus. In return, the Byzantines would off er troops and logistical support to the overall expedition.