In general, in warfare: When the formation is already solid, do not make it heavier. When your main forces are advancing, do not commit all of them for by doing so you will be endangered.
In general, in warfare: It is not forming a battle array that is difficult; it is reaching the point that the men can be ordered into formation that is hard. It is not attaining the ability to order them into formation that is difficult; it is reaching the point of being able to employ them that is hard. If is not knowing what to do that is difficult; it is putting it into effect that is hard. Men from each [of the four quarters] have their own nature. Character differs from region to region. Through teaching they come to have regional habits, the customs of each state [thus] being different. [Only] through the Tao are their customs transformed.
In general, whether [the troops] are numerous or few, even though they have already attained victory, they should act as if they had not been victori- ous.62 The troops should not boast about the sharpness of their weapons or speak of the stoutness of their armor or the sturdiness of their chariots or the quality of their horses; nor should the masses take themselves to be manyfor they have not yet gained the Tao.63
In general, if in warfare you are victorious, share the achievement and praise with the troops. If you are about to reengage in battle, then make their rewards exceptionally generous and the punishments heavier. If you failed to direct them to victory, accept the blame yourself. If you must fight again, swear an oath and assume a forward position. Do not repeat your previous tactics. Whether you win or not, do not deviate from this method, for it is termed the "True Principle."
In general, with regard to the people: Rescue them with benevolence; engage in battle with righteousness; make decisions through wisdom; fight with courage; exercise sole authority through credibility; encourage them with profits; and gain victory through achievements. Thus the mind must embody benevolence and actions should incorporate righteousness. Relying on [the nature of] things is wisdom; relying on the great is courage; relying on long-standing [relations leads to] good faith. Yielding results in harmony, and the men of themselves will be deferential. If men attribute failings to themselves, they will compete to be worthy." When men are pleased in their hearts, they will exhaust their strength.
In general, in warfare: Attack the weak and quiet, avoid the strong and quiet. Attack the tired, avoid the well trained and alert. Attack the truly afraid, avoid those that [display] only minor fears. From antiquity these have been the rules for governing [the army].
In general, as for the Tao of Warfare: When you employ a small number they must be solid.6s When you employ a large mass they must be well ordered. With a small force it is advantageous to harass the enemy; with a large mass it is advantageous to use orthodox [tactics].66 When employing a large mass advance and stop; when employing a small number advance and withdraw. If your large mass encounters a small enemy force, surround them at a distance but leave one side open.67 [Conversely,] if you divide [your forces] and attack in turn, a small force can withstand a large mass. If their masses are beset by uncertainty, you should take advantage of it. If you are contending for a strategic position, abandon your flags [as if in flight, and when the enemy attacks] turn around to mount a counterattack. If the enemy is vast, then concentrate your troops and let them surround you. If the enemy is fewer and fearful, avoid them and leave a path open.68
In general, as for warfare: Keep the wind to your back, the mountains behind you, heights on the right, and defiles on the left. Pass through wetlands, cross over damaged roads. Complete double the normal march before encamping; select ground [for encamping] configured like a turtle's back.
In general, as for warfare: After deploying observe their actions. Watch the enemy and then initiate movement. If they are waiting [for our attack], then act accordingly. Do not drum the advance, but await the moment when their masses arise. If they attack, entrench your forces and observe them.
In general, as for warfare: [Employ] large and small numbers to observe their tactical variations; advance and retreat to probe the solidity of their defenses. Endanger them to observe their fears. Be tranquil to observe if they become lax. Move to observe if they have doubts. Mount a surprise attack and observe their discipline.
Mount a sudden strike on their doubts. Attack their haste.69 Force them to constrict their deployment. Launch a sudden strike against their order. Take advantage of [their failure] to avoid harm.70 Obstruct their strategy. Seize their thoughts. Capitalize on their fears.
In general, when pursuing a fleeing enemy do not rest. If some of the enemy stop on the road, then be wary!71
In general, when nearing an enemy's capital, you must have a road by which to advance; when about to withdraw, you must ponder the return route.
f f f
In general, as for warfare: If you move first [it will be easy] to become exhausted. If you move after [the enemy, the men] may become afraid. If you rest, [the men may] become lax; if you do not rest, they may also become exhausted. Yet if you rest very long, on the contrary, they may also become afraid.
Writing letters of final farewell is referred to as "breaking off all thoughts of life." Selecting the elite and ranking the weapons is termed "increasing the strength of the men." Casting aside the implements of office and carrying only minimal rations is termed "opening the men's thoughts." From antiquity this has been the rule.
Translator's Introduction, 149
1. Initial Estimations, 157
2. Waging War, 159
3. Planning Offensives, 160
4. Military Disposition, 163
5. Strategic Military Power, 164
6. Vacuity and Substance, 166
7. Military Combat, 168
8. Nine Changes, 171
9. Maneuvering the Army, 172
10. Configurations of Terrain, 175
11. Nine Terrains, 178
12. Incendiary Attacks, 183
13. Employing Spies, 184
OF THE Seven Military Classics only Sun-tzu's Military Strategy, traditionally known as the Art of War, has received much exposure in the West. First translated by a French missionary approximately two hundred years ago, it was reportedly studied and effectively employed by Napoleon and possibly by certain members of the Nazi High Command. For the past two thousand years it remained the most important military treatise in Asia, where even the common people knew it by name. Chinese, Japanese, and Korean military theorists and professional soldiers have all studied it, and many of the strategies have played a significant role in Japan's storied military history, commencing about the eighth century A.D.' Over the millennia the book's concepts have stimulated intense debates and vehement philosophical discussions, commanding the attention of significant figures in many realms. Although the book has been rendered into English numerous times, with the translations of Lionel Giles' and Samuel B. Griffith' still widely available, further translations continue to appear. Some of these are merely versions of Giles-acknowledged or otherwise-under a different cover, whereas others represent entirely new works.'
Sun-tzu and the Text
It has long been claimed that the Art of War is China's oldest and most profound military treatise, with all other works relegated to secondary status at best. Traditionalists attribute the book to the historical Sun Wu, who is recorded in the Shih chi and the Spring and Autumn Annals of Wu and Yueh as having been active in the last years of the sixth century B.C., beginning about 512 B.C. In their view the book should therefore date from this period and should contain his theories and concepts of military strategy. However, other scholars have (1) identified numerous historical anachronisms in the extant text that encompass terms, events, technology, and philosophical concepts;5 (2) emphasized the absence of any evidence (such as should appear in the Tso chuan, the classic record of the period's political events) corroborating Sun Wu's strategic role in the wars between Wu and Yiieh;' and (3) focused on the disparity between the advanced concepts and nature o
f large-scale warfare discussed in the Art of War and the more limited, primitive battles that characterized the end of the sixth century B.C.'
The traditionalist interpretation derives critical support from the numerous passages from the Art of War that are visible in most other military writings because, it is asserted, such extensive borrowing could only have been possible from the earliest text.8 Moreover, this widespread copying is thought to provide ample evidence that the Art of War was considered early on the most important military treatise and was valued far more than any other work, oral or written. The origination of certain analytical concepts, such as terrain classification, is also credited to Sun-tzu; therefore, their utilization by the compilers of the Ssu-ma Fa is thought to prove Sun-tzu's historical priority indisputably rather than to raise the possibility that Sun-tzu benefited from other works.
However, even if the likelihood of later accretions and revisions is disregarded, the traditionalist position still ignores the development and existence of more than two thousand years of warfare and tactics prior to 500 B.C. and attributes the virtual creation of military strategy to Sun-tzu alone.' The concise, often abstract nature of his passages is cited as evidence that the book was composed at an early stage in the development of Chinese writing, but an equally compelling argument can be advanced that such a philosophically sophisticated style would only be possible from a foundation of extensive battlefield experience and a solid tradition of serious military contem- plation.10 Basic concepts and common passages seem to argue in favor of a comprehensive military tradition and evolving expertise rather than creation ex nihilo.
Excluding the now-untenable position of those skeptics who dismissed the book as a late fabrication," three major views seem to prevail regarding the composition date of the Art of War. The first identifies it with the historic Sun Wu, with final compilation occurring shortly after his death in the early fifth century B.C.12 The second, which is based on internal evidence, consigns it to the middle-to-late Warring States period, or the fourth to third centuries B.C.13 The third, also founded on internal evidence supplemented by recently discovered texts, places it somewhere in the last half of the fifth century B.C.14 It is unlikely that a final determination can ever be realized, especially because traditionalists tend to be very emotional in their defense of Sun-tzu's authenticity. However, it seems likely that the historical figure existed and that he not only served as a strategist and possibly a general but also composed the core of the book that bears his name. Thereafter, the essential teachings were probably transmitted within the family or a close-knit school of disciples, being improved and revised with the passing decades while gradually gaining wider dissemination. The early text may even have been edited by Sun-tzu's famous descendant Sun Pin, who also extensively employed its teachings in his own Military Methods. is
The Shih chi incorporates the biographies of numerous distinguished military strategists and generals, including Sun-tzu.'6 However, the Spring and Autumn Annals of Wu and Yueh recounts the somewhat more interesting version that follows:
In the third year of King Ho-la's reign Wu's generals wanted to attack Ch'u, but no action was taken. Wu Tzu-hsu17 and Po Hsi spoke with each other: "We nurture officers and make plans on behalf of the king. These strategies will be advantageous to the state, and for this reason the king should attack Ch'u. But he has put off issuing the orders and does not have any intention to mobilize the army. What should we do?"
After a while the King of Wu queried Wu Tzu-hsu and Po Hsi: "I want to send forth the army. What do you think?" Wu Tzu-hsu and Po Hsi replied: "We would like to receive the order." The King of Wu secretly thought the two of them harbored great enmity for Ch'u. He was deeply afraid that they would take the army out, only to be exterminated. He mounted his tower, faced into the southern wind, and groaned. After a while he sighed. None of his ministers understood the king's thoughts. Wu Tzu-hsu secretly realized the king would not decide, so he recommended Sun-tzu to him.
Sun-tzu, whose name was Wu, was a native of Wu.18 He excelled at military strategy but dwelled in secrecy far away from civilization, so ordinary people did not know of his ability. Wu Tzu-hsu, himself enlightened, wise, and skilled in discrimination, knew Sun-tzu could penetrate and destroy the enemy. One morning when he was discussing military affairs he recommended Sun-tzu seven times. The King of Wu said: "Since you have found an excuse to advance this shih, I want to have him brought in." He questioned Su-tzu about military strategy, and each time that he laid out a section of his book the king could not praise him enough.
Greatly pleased he inquired: "If possible, I would like a minor test of your military strategy." Sun-tzu said: "It is possible. We can conduct a minor test with women from the inner palace." The king said: "I agree." Sun-tzu said: "I would like to have two of your Majesty's beloved concubines act as company commanders, each to direct a company." He ordered all three hundred women to wear helmets and armor, to carry swords and shields, and [to] stand. He instructed them in military methods, that in accord with the drum they should advance, withdraw, go left or right, or turn around. He had them know the prohibitions and then ordered: "At the first beating of the drum you should all assem ble, at the second drumming you should advance with your weapons, and at the third deploy into military formation." At this the palace women all covered their mouths and laughed.
Sun-tzu then personally took up the sticks and beat the drums, giving the orders three times and explaining them five times. They laughed as before. Sun-tzu saw that the women laughed continuously and would not stop.
Sun-tzu was enraged. His eyes suddenly opened wide, his sound was like a terrifying tiger, his hair stood on end under his cap, and his neck broke the tassels at the side. He said to the Master of Laws: "Get the executioner's axes."
Sun-tzu [then] said: "If the instructions are not clear, if the explanations and orders are not trusted, it is the general's offense. When they have already been instructed three times and the orders explained five times, if the troops still do not perform, it is the fault of the officers. According to the rescripts for military discipline, what is the procedure?" The Master of Laws said: "Decapitation!" Sun-tzu then ordered the beheading of the two company commanders, the king's favorite concubines.19
The King of Wu ascended his platform to observe just when they were about to behead his beloved concubines. He had an official hasten down to them with orders to say: "I already know the general is able to command forces. Without these two concubines my food will not be sweet. It would be appropriate not to behead them."
Sun-tzu said: "I have already received my commission as commanding general. According to the rules for generals, when I, as a general, am in command of the army even though you issue orders to me, I do not [have to] accept them." [He then had them beheaded.]
He again beat the drum, and they went left and right, advanced and withdrew, and turned around in accord with the prescribed standards without daring to blink an eye. The two companies were silent, not daring to look around. Thereupon Sun-tzu reported to the King of Wu: "The army is already well-ordered. I would like your Majesty to observe them. However you might want to employ them, even sending them forth into fire and water, will not present any difficulty. They can be used to settle All under Heaven."
The King of Wu was suddenly displeased. He said: "I know that you excel at employing the army. Even though I can thereby become a hegemon, there is no place to exercise them. General, please dismiss the army and return to your dwelling. I am unwilling to act further."
Sun-tzu said: "Your Majesty only likes the words, he is not able to realize their substance." Wu Tzu-hsu remonstrated: "I have heard that the army is an inauspicious affair20 and cannot be wantonly tested. Thus if one forms an army but does not go forth to launch a punitive attack, then the military Tao will be unclear. Now if your Majesty sincerely seeks talented shib and wants to mobilize the army to execute the brutal state of Ch'u, become hegemon of All under Heaven, and overawe the feudal
lords, if you do not employ Sun-tzu as your general, who can ford the Huai, cross the Ssu, and traverse a thousand li to engage in battle?" Thereupon the King of Wu was elated. He had the drum beaten to convene the army's staff, assembled the troops, and attacked Ch'u. Sun-tzu took Shu, killing the two renegade Wu generals Kai Yu and Chu Yung.21
The Shih chi biography further states that "to the West he defeated the powerful state of Ch'u and advanced into Ying. To the north he overawed Ch'i and Chin, and his name became manifest among the feudal lords. This was due to Sun-tzu's power among them." Some military historians identify him with several campaigns against Ch'u that followed, commencing in 511 B.c.-the year after his initial interview with King Ho-lu-although he is never mentioned in any recorded source as having sole command of the troops. Presumably, Sun-tzu realized the difficulty of surviving under the evolving, unstable political conditions of his time and set an example for later ages by retiring to obscurity, leaving his work behind.22
The Shih chi biography differs in another fundamental aspect from the Spring and Autumn Annals of Wu and Yueh because it identifies Sun-tzu as a native of Ch'i rather than of Wu.23 This would place his background in a state that enjoyed the heritage of the T'ai Kung's thought-one originally on the periphery of the ancient Chou political world, which was known for its diversity of views and imaginative theories. Because the Art of War clearly reflects many Taoist conceptions24 and is philosophically sophisticated, Suntzu may well have been a man of Ch'i.
The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China Page 19
