Main Concepts in the Art of War
Sun-tzu's Art of War, as transmitted through the ages, consists of thirteen chapters of varying length-each ostensibly focused on a specific topic. Although most contemporary Chinese military scholars continue to characterize the entire work as an organic whole, marked by the logical progression and development of themes from start to finish, obvious relationships between supposedly connected passages are frequently difficult to determine or are simply nonexistent. However, the major concepts generally receive frequent, logically consistent treatment throughout, which supports the attribution of the book to a single figure or a well-integrated school of thought.25
The military writings unearthed in the Lin-1 Han dynasty tomb include a copy of the Art of War essentially in its traditional form, together with significant additional material such as the "King of Wu's Questions. ,26 The translation that follows has been based on the heavily annotated classical version because that version reflects the understanding and views of the past one thousand years and the beliefs on which government and military officials based their actions in real history. The traditional text has been revised only when the tomb materials resolve otherwise-opaque passages, although the impact of such changes on the overall content remains minimal. Significant variations in characters and sentences are discussed in notes supplementing the translation.
Because the Art of War is remarkably lucid, if compressed and sometimes enigmatic, only a brief introduction of the major topics is undertaken here. General Griffith's translation, published by Oxford, remains widely available, and his detailed introduction to Sun-tzu's thought can be consulted by those who wish a more extensive, systematic English presentation. 27 The analytical literature in Chinese and Japanese is too copious to enumerate; selected works are cited in the notes because the commentators may cast light on different concepts or passages.
At the time the Art of War was probably composed, warfare had evolved sufficiently to endanger the very existence of virtually every state. Therefore Sun-tzu felt that mobilizing a nation for war and committing its army to battle could only be undertaken with the greatest gravity.2s His entire approach to employing the army is thoroughly analytical, mandating careful planning and the formulation of an overall strategy before commencing the campaign. The focus of all grand strategy must be the development of a prosperous, contented populace whose willing allegiance to the ruler is unquestioned .21 Thereafter, diplomatic initiatives can be effected, but military preparations should never be neglected. The primary objective should be to subjugate other states without actually engaging in armed combat, thereby realizing the ideal of complete victory. Whenever possible this should be achieved through diplomatic coercion, thwarting the enemy's plans and alliances, and frustrating its strategy. The government should resort to armed combat only if the enemy threatens the state with military action or refuses to acquiesce without being forced into submission through warfare. Even when exercising this option, every military campaign should focus on achieving maximum results with minimum risk and exposure, limiting as far as possible the destruction that is inflicted and suffered.
Sun-tzu emphasizes rational self-control throughout the Art of War, stressing the vital necessity to avoid all engagements not based on extensive, detailed analyses of the situation and combat options and of one's own capa- bilities.30 Haste, fear of being labeled a coward, and personal emotions such as anger and hatred should never be permitted to adversely influence state and command decisionmaking.31 The army should never be thrown rashly into an engagement, thrust into a war, or mobilized unnecessarily. Instead, restraint should be exercised, although measures should be implemented to ensure that the army cannot be defeated. Accordingly, certain tactical situations and configurations of terrain should be avoided and instead be turned to one's advantage when opportune. Thereafter, the focus can be directed toward realizing the predetermined campaign strategy and implementing appropriate tactics to defeat the army.
Sun-tzu's basic strategy focuses on manipulating the enemy, creating the opportunity for an easy victory. To this end he classifies the types of terrain and their exploitation; advances numerous tactics for probing, manipulating, and weakening the enemy; conceptualizes the tactical situation in terms of extensive series of mutually defining elements;32 and advocates the employment of both orthodox (cheng) and unorthodox (ch'i) troops to wrest the victory.33 The enemy is lured into untenable positions with prospects of gain, enervated by being wearied and exhausted before the attack, and penetrated by forces that are suddenly concentrated at vulnerable points. The army should always be active, even when assuming a defensive posture, in order to create and seize the temporary tactical advantage (ch'uan) that will ensure victory. Avoiding a strong force is not cowardice but indicates wisdom because it is self-defeating to fight when and where it is not advanta- geous.34
The basic principle is "go forth where they do not expect it; attack where they are not prepared." This principle can only be realized through secrecy in all activities, through complete self-control and strict discipline within the army, and by being unfathomable. Warfare is a matter of deception-of constantly creating false appearances, spreading disinformation, and employing trickery and deceit. When such deception is imaginatively created and effectively implemented, the enemy will neither know where to attack nor what formations to employ and thus will be condemned to making fatal errors.
The corollary to being unknowable is seeking out and gaining detailed knowledge of the enemy through all available means, including the rigorous employment of spies. The fundamental principle is never to rely on the goodwill of others or on fortuitous circumstances but to guarantee through knowledge, active study, and defensive preparation that the enemy cannot mount a surprise attack or gain a victory through simple coercion.
Throughout the book Sun-tzu discusses the essential problem of command: forging a clearly defined organization that is in control of thoroughly disciplined, well-ordered troops. The critical element is spirit, technically known as ch'i-the essential, vital energy of life.3S This is the component associated with will and intention; when the men are well trained, properly fed, clothed, and equipped, and if their spirits are roused, they will fight vigorously. However, if physical or material conditions have blunted their spirit; if an imbalance exists in the relationship between command and troops; if for any reason the troops have lost their motivation, they will be defeated. Conversely, the commanding general must manipulate the situation so as to avoid the enemy when its spirits are strong-such as early in the day-and exploit any opportunity presented by its diminishment, attacking when its troops no longer have any inclination to fight, such as when they are about to return to camp. Prolonged warfare can only lead to enervation; therefore, careful planning is paramount to guarantee the swift execution of the campaign strategy. Certain situations, such as fatal terrain on which a desperate battle must be fought, are conducive to eliciting the army's greatest efforts. Others are debilitating, dangerous, and even fatal and must be scrupulously avoided. Rewards and punishments provide the basis for control, but every effort must be made to foster and maintain the proper attitude of desire and commitment on the part of the men. Accordingly, all detrimental stimuli, such as omens and rumors, must be prohibited.36
Finally, Sun-tzu sought to maneuver the army into a position where it enjoyed such a great tactical advantage that the impact of its attack, the impulse of its "strategic configuration of power" [shih,]37 would be like the sudden onrush of water cascading down from mountain peaks. Deploying the troops into a suitable configuration [hsing] ;38 creating a favorable "imbalance of power" [ch'uan];39 concentrating forces on focused targets; exploiting advantages of terrain; and stimulating the men's spirits would all be directed toward this moment, toward this decisive objective.
Sun-tzu said:
"Warfare is the greatest affair of state, the basis of life and death, the Way [Tao] to survival or extinction. It must be thoroughly pondered
and analyzed.
"Therefore, structure it according to [the following] five factors, evaluate it comparatively through estimations, and seek out its true nature.' The first is termed the Tao, the second Heaven, the third Earth, the fourth generals, and the fifth the laws [for military organization and discipline].
"The Tao3 causes the people to be fully in accord with the ruler.' [Thus] they will die with him; they will live with him and not fear danger.'
"Heaven encompasses yin and yang, cold and heat, and the constraints of the seasons.6
"Earth encompasses far or near, difficult or easy, expansive or confined, fatal or tenable terrain.'
"The general encompasses wisdom, credibility, benevolence, courage, and strictness.
"The laws [for military organization and discipline] encompass organization and regulations, the Tao of command, and the management of logistics.8
"There are no generals who have not heard of these five. Those who understand them will be victorious; those who do not understand them will not be victorious.
"Thus when making a comparative evaluation through estimations, seeking out its true nature, ask:
Which ruler has the Tao?
Which general has greater ability?
Who has gained [the advantages of] Heaven and Earth?
Whose laws and orders are more thoroughly implemented?
Whose forces9 are stronger?
Whose officers and troops are better trained?
Whose rewards and punishments are clearer?
"From these I will know victory and defeat!
"If a general follows my [methods for] estimation and you employ him, he will certainly be victorious and should be retained. If a general does not follow my [methods for] estimation and you employ him, he will certainly be defeated, so dismiss him.'o
"After estimating the advantages in accord with what you have heard, put it into effect with strategic power [shih]" supplemented by field tactics which respond to external factors."Z As for strategic power, [it is] controlling the tactical imbalance of power [ch'uan] in accord with the gains to be realized."
"Warfare is the Way [Tao] of deception.14 Thus although [you are] capable, display incapability to them. When committed to employing your forces, feign inactivity. When [your objective] is nearby, make it appear as if distant; when far away, create the illusion of being nearby.'S
"Display profits to entice them. Create disorder [in their forces] and take them.16
"If they are substantial," prepare for them; if they are strong, avoid them.
"If they are angry, perturb them;18 be deferential to foster their arro- gance.19
"If they are rested, force them to exert themselves.
"If they are united, cause them to be separated.
"Attack where they are unprepared.
"Go forth where they will not expect it.
"These are the ways military strategists are victorious. They cannot be spoken of in advance.20
"Before the engagement, one who determines in the ancestral temple that he will be victorious has found that the majority of factors are in his favor. Before the engagement one who determines in the ancestral temple that he will not be victorious has found few factors are in his favor.
"If one who finds that the majority of factors favor him will be victorious while one who has found few factors favor him will be defeated, what about someone who finds no factors in his favor?"
"If I observe it from this perspective, victory and defeat will be apparent."
Sun-tzu said:
"In general, the strategy for employing the military [is this]:22 If there are one thousand four-horse attack chariots, one thousand leather-armored support chariots, one hundred thousand mailed troops, and provisions are transported one thousand li, then the domestic and external campaign expenses, the expenditures for advisers and guests, materials such as glue and lacquer, and providing chariots and armor will be one thousand pieces of gold per day. Only then can an army of one hundred thousand be mobilized.
"When employing them in battle, a victory that is long in coming will blunt their weapons and dampen their ardor.23 If you attack cities, their strength will be exhausted.24 If you expose the army to a prolonged campaign, the state's resources will be inadequate.
"When the weapons have grown dull and spirits depressed, when our strength has been expended and resources consumed, then the feudal lords will take advantage of our exhaustion to arise. Even though you have wise generals, they will not be able to achieve a good result.
"Thus in military campaigns I have heard of awkward speed but have never seen any skill in lengthy campaigns. No country has ever profited from protracted warfare. Those who do not thoroughly comprehend the dangers inherent in employing the army are incapable of truly knowing the potential advantages of military actions.
"One who excels in employing the military does not conscript the people twice or transport provisions a third time. If you obtain your equipment 25 from within the state and rely on seizing provisions from the enemy, then the army's foodstuffs will be sufficient.
"The state is impoverished by the army when it transports provisions far off. When provisions are transported far off, the hundred surnames26 are impoverished.
"Those in proximity to the army will sell their goods expensively.21 When goods are expensive, the hundred surname's wealth will be exhausted. When their wealth is exhausted, they will be extremely hard pressed [to supply] their village's military impositions.28
"When their strength has been expended and their wealth depleted, then the houses in the central plains will be empty.29 The expenses of the hundred surnames will be some seven-tenths30 of whatever they have. The ruler's irrecoverable expenditures-such as ruined chariots, exhausted horses, armor, helmets, arrows and crossbows, halberd-tipped and spear-tipped [large, movable] protective shields, strong oxen,31 and large wagons-will consume six-tenths of his resources.
"Thus the wise general will concentrate on securing provisions from the enemy. One bushel of the enemy's foodstuffs is worth twenty of ours; one picul of fodder is worth twenty of ours.
"Thus what [motivates men] to slay the enemy is anger; what [stimulates them] to seize profits32 from the enemy is material goods. Thus in chariot encounters, when ten or more chariots are captured, reward the first to get one. Change their flags and pennants to ours; intermix and employ them with our own chariots. Treat the captured soldiers well in order to nurture them [for our use]. This is referred to as `conquering the enemy and growing stronger.'
"Thus the army values being victorious; it does not value prolonged warfare. Therefore, a general who understands warfare is Master of Fate for the people, ruler of the state's security or endangerment."
Sun-tzu said:
"In general, the method for employing the military is this: Preserving the [enemy's] state capital is best, destroying their state capital second-best.33 Preserving their army is best, destroying their army second-best.34 Preserving their battalions is best, destroying their battalions second-best. Preserving their companies is best, destroying their companies second-best. Preserving their squads is best, destroying their squads second-best. For this reason attaining one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the pinnacle of excellence. Subjugating the enemy's army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence.
"Thus the highest realization of warfare is to attack the enemy's plans; next is to attack their alliances; next to attack their army; and the lowest is to attack their fortified cities.
"This tactic of attacking fortified cities is adopted only when unavoidable. Preparing large movable protective shields, armored assault wagons, and other equipment and devices will require three months. Building earth- works3S will require another three months to complete. If the general cannot overcome his impatience but instead launches an assault wherein his men swarm over the walls like ants, he will kill one-third of his officers and troops, and the city will still not be taken. This is the disaster
that results from attacking [fortified cities].
"Thus one who excels at employing the military subjugates other people's armies without engaging in battle, captures other people's fortified cities without attacking them, and destroys others people's states without prolonged fighting. He must fight under Heaven with the paramount aim of `preservation.'36 Thus his weapons will not become dull, and the gains can be preserved. This is the strategy for planning offensives.
"In general, the strategy for employing the military is this: If your strength is ten times theirs, surround them; if five, then attack them; if double, then divide your forces.31 If you are equal in strength to the enemy, you can engage him. If fewer, you can circumvent him. If outmatched, you can avoid him. Thus a small enemy that acts inflexibly38 will become the captives of a large enemy.
"The general is the supporting pillar of state. If his talents are all-encompassing, the state will invariably be strong. If the supporting pillar is marked by fissures, the state will invariably grow weak.
"Thus there are three ways by which an army is put into difficulty by a ruler:
"He does not know that the Three Armies should not advance but instructs them to advance or does not know that the Three Armies should not withdraw and orders a retreat. This is termed 'entangling the army.'
"He does not understand the Three Armies' military affairs but [directs them] in the same way as his [civil] administration.39 Then the officers will become confused.
"He does not understand the Three Armies' tactical balance of power [ch'uan] but undertakes responsibility for command. Then the officers will be doubtful.
The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China Page 20
