"When the Three Armies are already confused and doubtful, the danger of the feudal lords [taking advantage of the situation] arises. This is referred to as `a disordered army drawing another on to victory.'
"Thus there are five factors from which victory can be known:
"One who knows when he can fight, and when he cannot fight, will be victorious.
"One who recognizes40 how to employ large and small numbers will be victorious.
"One whose upper and lower ranks have the same desires will be victorious.
"One who, fully prepared, awaits the unprepared will be victorious.
"One whose general is capable and not interfered with by the ruler will be victorious.
"These five are the Way [Tao] to know victory.
"Thus it is said that one who knows the enemy and knows himself41 will not be endangered in a hundred engagements. One who does not know the enemy but knows himself will sometimes be victorious, sometimes meet with defeat. One who knows neither the enemy nor himself will invariably be defeated in every engagement."
Sun-tzu said:
"In antiquity those that excelled in warfare first made themselves uncon- querable43 in order to await [the moment when] the enemy could be conquered.
"Being unconquerable lies with yourself; being conquerable lies with the enemy.
"Thus one who excels in warfare44 is able to make himself unconquerable, but cannot necessarily cause the enemy to be conquerable.
"Thus it is said a strategy for conquering the enemy can be known but yet not possible to implement.
"One who cannot be victorious assumes a defensive posture; one who can be victorious attacks. In these circumstances by assuming a defensive posture, strength will be more than adequate, whereas in offensive actions it would be inadequate.4s
"Those who excel at defense bury themselves away below the lowest depths of Earth. Those who excel at offense46 move from above the greatest heights of Heaven. Thus they are able to preserve themselves and attain complete victory.
"Perceiving a victory that does not surpass what the masses could know is not the pinnacle of excellence. Wrestling victories for which All under Heaven proclaim your excellence is not the pinnacle of excellence.
"Thus lifting an autumn hair cannot be considered great strength; seeing the sun and moon cannot be considered acute vision; hearing the sound of thunder cannot be considered having sensitive ears.
"Those that the ancients47 referred to as excelling at warfare conquered those who were easy to conquer. Thus the victories of those that excelled in warfare were not marked by fame for wisdom or courageous achievement.48 Thus their victories were free from errors. One who is free from errors directs his measures toward [certain] victory, conquering those who are already defeated.
"Thus one who excels at warfare first establishes himself in a position where he cannot be defeated while not losing [any opportunity] to defeat the enemy.
"For this reason, the victorious army first realizes the conditions for victory, and then seeks to engage in battle. The vanquished army fights first, and then seeks victory.
"One49 who excels at employing the military cultivates the Tao50 and preserves the laws; therefore, he is able to be the regulator of victory and defeats"
"As for military methods52: the first is termed measurement; the second, estimation [of forces]; the third, calculation [of numbers of men]; the fourth, weighing [relative strength]; and the fifth, victory.
"Terrain gives birth to measurement;53 measurement produces the estimation [of forces]. S4 Estimation [of forces] gives rise to calculating [the numbers of men]. Calculating [the numbers of men] gives rise to weighing (strength]. Weighing [strength] gives birth to victory.
"Thus the victorious army is like a ton compared with an ounce, while the defeated army is like an ounce weighed against a ton! The combat of the vic- torious55 is like the sudden release of a pent-up torrent down a thousandfathom gorge. This is the strategic disposition of force [hsing]."56
Sun-tzu said:
"In general, commanding a large number is like commanding a few. It is a question of dividing up the numbers. Fighting with a large number is like fighting with a few. It is a question of configuration and designation.58
"What enable the masses of the Three Armies to invariably withstand the enemy without being defeated are the unorthodox [ch'i] and orthodox [cheng].59
"If wherever the army attacks it is like a whetstone thrown against an egg, it is due to the vacuous and substantial.60
"In general, in battle one engages with the orthodox and gains victory through the unorthodox. Thus one who excels at sending forth the unorthodox is as inexhaustible as Heaven,61 as unlimited as the Yangtze and Yellow rivers.62 What reach an end and begin again are the sun and moon. What die and are reborn63 are the four seasons.
"The notes do not exceed five, but the changes64 of the five notes can never be fully heard. The colors do not exceed five, but the changes of the five colors can never be completely seen. The flavors do not exceed five, but the changes of the five flavors can never be completely tasted. In warfare the strategic configurations of power [shih] do not exceed the unorthodox and orthodox, but the changes of the unorthodox and orthodox can never be completely exhausted. The unorthodox and orthodox mutually produce each other, just like an endless cycle.61 Who can exhaust them?
"The strategic configuration of power [ship] [is visible in] the onrush of pent-up66 water tumbling stones along. The [effect of] constraints67 [is visible in] the onrush68 of a bird of prey breaking the bones of its [target]. Thus the strategic configuration of power [shih] of those that excel in warfare is sharply focused, their constraints are precise.69 Their strategic configuration of power [shih] is like a fully drawn crossbow, their constraints like the release of the trigger.
"Intermixed and turbulent, the fighting appears chaotic, but they cannot be made disordered. In turmoil and confusion, their deployment is circular,70 and they cannot be defeated.
"[Simulated] chaos is given birth from control;71 [the illusion of] fear is given birth from courage; [feigned] weakness is given birth from strength. Order and disorder are a question of numbers; courage and fear are a question of the strategic configuration of power [shih]; strength and weakness are a question of the deployment [of forces (hsing)].
"Thus one who excels at moving the enemy deploys in a configuration ]hsing] to which the enemy must respond. He offers something which the enemy must seize. With profit he moves them, with the foundation72 he awaits them.
"Thus one who excels at warfare seeks [victory] through the strategic configuration of power [shih], not from reliance on men. Thus he is able to select men and employ strategic power [shih].73
"One who employs strategic power [shih] commands men in battle as if he were rolling logs and stones. The nature of wood and stone is to be quiet when stable but to move when on precipitous ground. If they are square they stop, if round they tend to move. Thus the strategic power [shih] of one who excels at employing men in warfare is comparable to rolling round boulders down a thousand-fathom mountain. Such is the strategic configuration of power [shih]."
Sun-tzu said:
"In general, whoever occupies the battleground first and awaits the enemy will be at ease; whoever occupies the battleground afterward and must race to the conflict will be fatigued. Thus one who excels at warfare compels men and is not compelled by other men.75
"In order to cause the enemy to come of their own volition, extend some [apparent] profit. In order to prevent the enemy from coming forth, show them [the potential] harm.
"Thus if the enemy is rested you can tire him; if he is well fed you can make him hungry; if he is at rest you can move him. Go forth to positions to which he must race.76 Race forth where he does not expect it.77
"To travel a thousand li without becoming fatigued, traverse unoccupied terrain. To ensure taking the objective in an attack, strike positions that are undefended. To be certain of an impregnab
le defense, secure positions which the enemy will not attack. 78
"Thus when someone excels in attacking, the enemy does not know where to mount his defense; when someone excels at defense, the enemy does not know where to attack. Subtle! Subtle! It approaches the formless.79 Spiritual! Spiritual! It attains the soundless. Thus he can be the enemy's Master of Fate.
"To effect an unhampered80 advance, strike their vacuities. To effect a retreat that cannot be overtaken, employ unmatchable speed.81 Thus if I want to engage in combat, even though the enemy has high ramparts and deep moats, he cannot avoid doing battle because I attack objectives he must rescue.
"If I do not want to engage in combat, even though I merely draw a line on the ground and defend it, he will not be able to engage me in battle because we thwart his movements.
"Thus if I determine the enemy's disposition of forces [hsing] while I have no perceptible form,82 I can concentrate [my forces] while the enemy is fragmented. If we are concentrated into a single force while he is fragmented into ten, then we attack him with ten times his strength. Thus we are many and the enemy is few. If we can attack his few with our many, those who we engage in battle will be severely constrained.
"The location where we will engage the enemy must not become known to them. If it is not known, then the positions which they must prepare to defend will be numerous. If the positions the enemy prepares to defend are numerous, then the forces we will engage will be few. Thus if they prepare to defend the front, to the rear there will be few men. If they defend the rear, in.. the front there will be few. If they prepare to defend the left flank, then on the right there will be few men. If they prepare to defend the right flank, then on the left there will be few men. If there is no position left undefended, then there will not be any place with more than a few. The few [are the ones] who prepare against others; the many [are the ones] who make others prepare against them. 83
"Thus if one knows the field of battle and knows the day of battle, he can traverse a thousand li and assemble to engage in combat.84 If he does not know the field of battle nor know the day for battle, then the left flank cannot aid the right nor the right flank aid the left; the front cannot aid the rear nor the rear aid the front.85 How much more so when the distant are some tens of li away and the near several li apart? As I analyze it, even though Yueh's army is numerous, of what great advantage is it to them for attaining victory?86 Thus I say victory can be achieved.87 Even though the enemy is more numerous, they can be forced not to fight.
"Thus critically analyze them to know the estimations for gain and loss. Stimulate them to know the patterns of their movement and stopping. Determine their disposition of force [hsing] to know the tenable and fatal terrain. Probe them to know where they have an excess, where an insufficiency.
"Thus the pinnacle of military deployment approaches the formless. If it is formless, then even the deepest spy cannot discern it or the wise make plans against it.
"In accord with the enemy's disposition [hsing] we impose measures on the masses that produce victory, but the masses are unable to fathom them. Men all know the disposition [hsing] by which we attain victory, but no one knows the configuration Ihsingl through which we control the victory. Thus a victorious battle [strategy] is not repeated, the configurations [hsing] of response [to the enemy] are inexhaustible.88
"Now the army's disposition of force [hsing] is like water. Water's configuration [hsing]89 avoids heights and races downward. The army's disposition of force [hsing]90 avoids the substantial and strikes the vacuous. Water configures [hsing] its flow91 in accord with the terrain; the army controls its victory in accord with the enemy. Thus the army does not maintain any con- stant92 strategic configuration of power [shih]; water93 has no constant shape [hsing]. One who is able to change and transform in accord with the enemy and wrest victory is termed spiritual!94 Thus [none of] the five phases constantly dominates; the four seasons do not have constant positions; the sun shines for longer and shorter periods; and the moon wanes and waxes."95
Sun-tzu said:
"In general, the strategy for employing the army is this: [From the time] the general receives his commands from the ruler, unites the armies, and as sembles the masses, to confronting the enemy and encamping, there is nothing more difficult than military combat. In military combat what is most difficult is turning the circuitous into the straight, turning adversity into advantage.
"Thus if you make the enemy's path circuitous and entice them with profit, although you set out after them you will arrive before them. This results from knowing the tactics97 of the circuitous and the direct.
"Thus combat between armies is advantageous; combat between masses is dangerous.98 If the entire army contends for advantage, you will not arrive in time. If you reduce the army's size to contend for advantage, your baggage and heavy equipment will suffer losses.
"For this reason if you abandon your armor [and heavy equipment]99 to race forward day and night without encamping, covering two days normal distance at a time, marching forward a hundred li to contend for gain, the Three Armies' generals will be captured. The strong will be first to arrive, while the exhausted will follow. With such tactics only one in ten will reach [the battle site]. If one contends for gain fifty li away, it will cause the general of the Upper Army to stumble, and by following such tactics half the men will reach [the objective]. If you contend for gain at thirty li, then two-thirds of the army will reach [the objective].
"Accordingly, if the army does not have baggage and heavy equipment it will be lost; if it does not have provisions it will be lost; if it does not have stores it will be lost.
Thus one who does not know the plans of the feudal lords cannot prepare alliances beforehand. Someone unfamiliar with the mountains and forests, gorges and defiles, the shape of marshes and wetlands cannot advance the army. One who does not employ local guides cannot gain advantages of terrain.
"Thus the army is established by deceit, moves for advantage, and changes through segmenting and reuniting. Thus its speed is like the wind, its slowness like the forest; its invasion and plundering like a fire;10° unmoving, it is like the mountains. It is as difficult to know as the darkness; in movement it is like thunder.
"When you plunder a district, divide the wealth among your troops. When you enlarge your territory, divide the profits. Take control of the strategic balance of power [ch'uian] and move. The one who first understands the tactics of the circuitous and the direct will be victorious. This is the strategy for military combat.
"The Military Administration states: `Because they could not hear each other they made gongs and drums; because they could not see each other they made pennants and flags.' Gongs, drums, pennants, and flags are the means to unify the men's ears and eyes. When the men have been unified the courageous will not be able to advance alone, the fearful will not be able to retreat alone. This is the method for employing large numbers.
"Thus in night battles make the fires and drums numerous, and in daylight battles make the flags and pennants numerous in order to change the men's ears and eyes.101
"The ch'i of the Three Armies can be snatched away; the commanding general's mind can be seized. For this reason in the morning their ch'i is ardent; during the day their ch'i becomes indolent; at dusk their ch'i is exhaust- ed.102 Thus one who excels at employing the army avoids their ardent ch'i and strikes when it is indolent or exhausted. This is the way to manipulate ch'i.
"In order await the disordered; in tranquility await the clamorous. This is the way to control the mind.
"With the near await the distant; with the rested await the fatigued; with the sated await the hungry. This is the way to control strength.
"Do not intercept well-ordered flags; do not attack well-regulated forma- tions.103 This is the way to control changes.
"Thus the strategy for employing the military: Do not approach high mountains; do not confront104 those who have hills behind them. Do not pursue feigned retreats. Do not att
ack animated troops. Do not swallow an army acting as bait. Do not obstruct an army retreating homeward. If you besiege an army you must leave an outlet.105 Do not press an exhausted invader. These are the strategies for employing the military."'06
Sun-tzu said:
"In general, the strategy for employing the military is this. After the general has received his commands from the ruler, united the armies, and assembled the masses:108
"Do not encamp on entrapping terrain.109
"Unite with your allies on focal terrain.110
"Do not remain on isolated terrain.
"Make strategic plans for encircled terrain.
"On fatal terrain you must do battle.111
"There are roads that are not12 followed.
"There are armies that are not attacked.
"There are fortified cities that are not assaulted.
"There is terrain for which one does not contend. 113
"There are commands from the ruler which are not accepted-' 14
"Thus the general who has a penetrating understanding of the advantages of the nine changes knows how to employ the army. If a general does not have a penetrating understanding of the advantages of the nine changes, even though he is familiar with the topography, he will not be able to realize the advantages of terrain.
The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China Page 21
