"According to Sun-tzu, employing spies is an inferior measure. I once prepared a discussion [of this subject] and at the end stated: `Water can float a boat, but it can also overturn the boat. Some use spies to be successful; others, relying on spies, are overturned and defeated.'
"If one braids his hair and serves the ruler, maintains a proper countenance in court, is loyal and pure, trustworthy and completely sincere-even if someone excels at spying, how can he be employed [to sow discord]? T'ang Chien is a minor matter. What doubts does your Majesty have?"
The T'ai-tsung said: "Truly, `without benevolence and righteousness one cannot employ spies.'129 How can the ordinary man do it? If the Duke of Chou, with his great righteousness, exterminated his relatives,13o how much the more so one emissary? Clearly, there is nothing to doubt."
The T'ai-tsung said: "The army values being the `host'; it does not value being a 'guest.'131 It values speed, not duration.132 Why?"
Li Ching said: "The army is employed only when there is no alternative,133 so what advantage is there in being a `guest' or fighting long? Sun-tzu says: `When provisions are transported far off, the common people are impover- ished.'13a This is the exhaustion of a `guest.' He also said: `The people should not be conscripted twice, provisions should not be transported thrice.'135 This [comes from] the experience of not being able to long endure. When I compare and weigh the strategic power [sbih] of host and guest, then there are tactics for changing the guest to host, changing the host to guest."
The T'ai-tsung said: "What do you mean?"
Li Ching said: "By foraging and capturing provisions from the enemy,136 you change a guest into a host. `If you can cause the sated to be famished and the rested to be tired,'137 it will change a host into a guest. Thus the army is not confined to being host or guest, slow or fast, but only focuses on its movements invariably attaining the constraints138 and thereby being appropriate."
The T'ai-tsung said: "Were there such cases among the ancients?"
Li Ching said: "In antiquity, Yueh attacked Wu with two armies-one to the left, the other to the right. When they blew the horns and beat the drums to advance, Wu divided its troops to oppose them. Then Yueh had its central army secretly ford the river. Without sounding their drums, they suddenly attacked and defeated Wu's army. This is a case of changing a guest into a host.
"When Shih Le did battle with Chi Chan,139 Chan's army came from a distance. Shih Le dispatched K'ung Ch'ang to act as an advance front and counterattack Chan's forces. K'ung Ch'ang withdrew, and Chan advanced to pursue him. Shih Le then employed his concealed forces to ambush him from both sides. Chan's army was badly defeated. This is an instance of changing the tired to the rested. The ancients had many cases like this."
The T'ai-tsung said: "Were the iron caltrops and chevaux-de-frise created by the T'ai Kung?"
Li Ching said: "They were. But they were for resisting the enemy, that is all! The army values compelling men and does not want to resist them. In the Six Secret Teachings the T'ai Kung discusses equipment for defending and repelling, not what would be used in offensives."
The T'ai-tsung said: "The T'ai Kung has stated: `When infantrymen engage chariots and cavalry in battle, they must take advantage of hillocks, funeral mounds, ravines, and defiles."" Moreover, Sun-tzu said: `Terrain that looks like fissures in the Heavens, hillocks, funeral mounds, and old fortifications should not be occupied by the army.'141 What about this [contradiction]?"
Li Ching said: "The successful employment of the masses lies in their being of one mind. Unification of mind lies in prohibiting omens and dispelling doubts. Should the commanding general have anything about which he is doubtful or fearful, their emotions will waver. When their emotions waver, the enemy will take advantage of the chink to attack. Thus when securing an encampment or occupying terrain, it should be convenient to human affairs, that is all! Terrain such as precipitous gorges, deep canyons, ravines, and passes with high sides, natural prisons, and heavily overgrown areas are not suitable for human activity. Thus military strategists avoid leading troops into them to prevent the enemy from gaining an advantage over us. Hillocks, funeral mounds, and old fortifications are not isolated terrain or places of danger. If we gain them it will be advantageous, so how would it be appropriate to turn around and abandon them? What the T'ai Kung discussed is the very essence of military affairs."
The T'ai-tsung said: "I think that among implements of violence, none is more terrible than the army.142 If mobilizing the army is advantageous to human affairs, how can one-for the sake of avoiding evil omens-be doubtful? If in the future any of the generals fails to take appropriate action because of yin and yang or other baleful indications, my lord should repeatedly upbraid and instruct them."
Li Ching bowed twice in acknowledgment, saying: "I recall the Wei Liaotzu states: `The Yellow Emperor preserved them with Virtue but attacked [the evil] with punishments. This refers to [actual] punishment and Virtue, not the selection and use of astrologically auspicious seasons and days.'143 Accordingly, through the `Tao of deceit' [the masses] should be made to follow them but should not be allowed to know this.144 In later ages ordinary generals have been mired in mystical techniques and for this reason have frequently suffered defeat. You cannot but admonish them. Your Majesty's sagely instructions should be disseminated to all the generals."
The T'ai-tsung said: "When the army divides and reassembles, in each case it is important that the actions be appropriate. Among the records of earlier ages, who excelled at this?"
Li Ching said: "Fu Chien commanded a mass of a million and was defeated at Fei River.14s This is what results when an army is able to unite but cannot divide. When Wu Han conducted a campaign of rectification against Kung-sun Shu, he split his forces with Lieutenant General Liu Shang, encamping about twenty li apart.146 Kung-sun Shu came forward and attacked Wu Han, whereupon Liu Shang advanced to unite with Wu Han in a counterattack, severely defeating Kung-sun Shu. This is the result that can be attained when an army divides and can reassemble. The T'ai Kung said: `[A force] which wants to divide but cannot is an entangled army; one which wants to reassemble but cannot is a solitary regiment.'14"
The T'ai-tsung said: "Yes. When Fu Chien first obtained Wang Meng,148 he truly knew how to employ the army and subsequently took the central plain. When Wang Meng died, Fu Chien was decisively defeated, so is this what is meant by an `entangled army'? When Wu Han was appointed by Emperor Kuang Wu, the army was not controlled from a distance, and the Han were able to pacify the Shu area. Does this not indicate that the army did not fall into the difficulty of what is referred to as being a `solitary regiment?' The historical records of gains and losses are sufficient to be a mirror for ten thousand generations."
The T'ai-tsung said: "I observe that the thousand chapters and ten thousand sentences [of the military teachings] do not go beyond `Use many methods to cause them to make errors,"" this single statement."
After a long while Li Ching said: "Truly, it is as you have wisely said. In ordinary situations involving the use of the military, if the enemy does not make an error in judgment, how can our army conquer them? It may be compared with chess where the two enemies [begin] equal in strength. As soon as someone makes a mistake, truly no one can rescue him. For this rea son, in both ancient and modern times, victory and defeat have proceeded from a single error, so how much more would this be the case with many mistakes?"
The T'ai-tsung said: "Are the two affairs of attacking and defending in reality one method? Sun-tzu said: `When one excels at attacking, the enemy does not know where to mount his defense. When one excels at defense, the enemy does not know where to attack.'150 He did not speak about the enemy coming forth to attack me and me also attacking the enemy. If we assume a defensive posture and the enemy also takes up a defensive position, if in attacking and defense our strengths are equal, what tactic should be employed?"
Li Ching said: "Cases such as this of mutual attack and mutual defense were, in previous ages, num
erous. They all said: `One defends when strength is insufficient, one attacks when strength is more than sufficient.i151 Thus they referred to insufficiency as being weakness and having an excess as strength. Apparently, they did not understand the methods for attack and defense. I recall Sun-tzu said: `One who cannot be victorious assumes a defensive posture; one who can be victorious attacks.'152 This indicates that when the enemy cannot yet be conquered, I must temporarily defend myself. When we have waited until the point when the enemy can be conquered, then we attack him. It is not a statement about strength and weakness. Later generations did not understand his meaning, so when they should attack they defend, and when they should defend they attack. The two stages are distinct, so the method cannot be a single one."
The T'ai-tsung said: "I can see that the concepts of surplus and insufficiency caused later generations to be confused about strength and weakness. They probably did not know that the essence of defensive strategy is to show the enemy an inadequacy. The essence of aggressive strategy lies in showing the enemy that you have a surplus. If you show the enemy an insufficiency, then they will certainly advance and attack. In this case `the enemy does not know where to attack.'153 If you show the enemy a surplus, then they will certainly take up defensive positions. In this case `the enemy does not know where to mount his defense.'IS" Attacking and defending are one method, but the enemy and I divide it into two matters. If I succeed in this matter, the enemy's affairs will be defeated. If the enemy is successful, then my aims will be defeated. Gaining and losing, success or failure-our aims and the ene my's are at odds, but attacking and defending are one! If you understand that they are one, then in a hundred battles you will be victorious a hundred times. Thus it is said: `If you know yourself and you know the enemy, in a hundred battles you will not be endangered.'155 This refers to the knowledge of this unity, does it not?"
Li Ching bowed twice and said: "Perfect indeed are the Sage's methods! Attacking is the pivotal point of defense, defending is the strategy for attack. They are both directed toward victory, that is all! If in attacking you do not understand defending, and in defending you do not understand attacking, but instead not only make them into two separate affairs, but also assign responsibility for them to separate offices, then even though the mouth recites the words of Sun-tzu and Wu-tzu, the mind has not thought about the mysterious subtleties of the discussion of the equality of attack and defense. How can the reality then be known?"
The T'ai-tsung said: "The Ssu-ma Fa states that `even though a state may be vast, those who love warfare will inevitably perish' and that `even though calm may prevail under Heaven, those who forget warfare will inevitably be endangered.' 156 Is this also one of the ways of attacking and defending?"
Li Ching said: "If one has a state and family, how could he not discuss attacking and defending? For attacking does not stop with just attacking their cities or attacking their formations. One must have techniques for attacking their minds. Defense does not end with just the completion of the walls and the realization of solid formations. One must also preserve spirit and be prepared to await the enemy. To speak of it in the largest terms, it means the Tao of rulership. To speak of it in smaller terms, it means the methods of the general. Now attacking their minds is what is referred to as `knowing them.' Preserving one's ch'i [spirit] is what is meant by `knowing yourself."'
The T'ai-tsung said: "True! When I was about to engage in battle, I first evaluated the enemy's mind by comparing it with my mind to determine who was more thoroughly prepared. Only after that could I know his situation. To evaluate the enemy's ch'i I compared it with our own to determine who was more controlled. Only then could I know myself. For this reason, `know them and know yourself' is the great essence of the military strategists. Contemporary generals, even if they do not know the enemy, ought to be able to know themselves, so how could they lose the advantage?"
Li Ching said: "What Sun-tzu meant by `first make yourself unconquerable"" is `know yourself.' `Waiting until the enemy can be conquered"" is `knowing them.' Moreover, he said that `being unconquerable lies with your self, while being conquerable lies with the enemy.'159 I have not dared to neglect this admonition even for a moment."
The T'ai-tsung said: "Sun-tzu spoke about strategies by which the ch'i of the Three Armies may be snatched away: `In the morning their ch'i is ardent; during the day their ch'i becomes indolent; and at dusk their ch'i is exhausted. One who excels at employing the army avoids their ardent ch'i and strikes when it is indolent or exhausted.'160 How is this?"
Li Ching said: "Whoever has life and a natural endowment of blood, if they die without a second thought when the drums are sounded to do battle, it is the ch'i which causes it to be so. Thus methods for employing the army require first investigating our own officers and troops, stimulating our ch'i for victory, and only then attacking the enemy. Among Wu Ch'i's four vital points, the vital point of ch'i is foremost.161 There is no other Tao. If one can cause his men themselves to want to fight, then no one will be able to oppose their ardor. What [Sun-tzu] meant by the ch'i being ardent in the morning is not limited to those hours alone. He used the beginning and end of the day as an analogy. In general, if the drum has been sounded three times but the enemy's ch'i has neither declined nor become depleted, then how can you cause it to invariably become indolent or exhausted? Probably, those who study the text merely recite the empty words and are misled by the enemy. If one could enlighten them with the principles for snatching away the ch'i, the army could be entrusted to them."
The T'ai-tsung said: "You once said that General Li Chi162 is capable in military strategy, but can he be employed indefinitely or not? If I am no longer around to control and direct him, [I fear] he cannot be used. In the future, how should the heir apparent direct him?"
Li Ching said: "If I were to plan on behalf of your Majesty, nothing would be better than [for you] to dismiss Li Chi and have the heir apparent reemploy him. Then he would certainly feel grateful and think how to repay him. In principle, is there any harm in this?"163
The T'ai-tsung said: "Excellent. I have no doubts about it."
The T'ai-tsung said: "If I order Li Shih-chi and Chang-sun Wu-chi164 to take the reigns of government together, what do you think?"
Li Ching said: "[Li] Chi is loyal and righteous. I can guarantee that he will uphold his duties. [Chang-sun] Wu-chi followed your commands and made great contributions. Because he is a relative, your Majesty has entrusted him with the office of Deputy Minister. But while in external demeanor he is deferential to other officials, within he is actually jealous of the Worthy. Thus Yu-chih Ching-te165 pointed out his shortcomings to his face and then retired. Hou Chun-chi hated him for forgetting old [friends], and as a result he revolted and turned against you.166 These were both brought about by Wuchi. Since you questioned me about this, I did not dare avoid discussing it."
The T'ai-tsung said: "Do not let it leak out. I will ponder how to settle it.,,
The T'ai-tsung said: "Emperor Han Kao-tsu was able to command his generals, but later on Han Hsin and P'eng Yueh were executed, and Hsiao Ho was imprisoned.167 What is the reason for this?"
Li Ching said: "I observe that neither Liu Pang nor Hsiang Yu were rulers capable of commanding generals.168 At the time of Ch'in's collapse, Chang Liang originally wanted to gain revenge for his [old state of] Han, while Ch'en P'ing and Han Hsin both resented Hsiang YU's failure to employ them.169 Therefore they availed themselves of Han's strategic power. Hsiao Ho, Ts'ao Ts'an, Fan K'uai, and Kuan Ying were all fleeing for their lives."' Han Kao-tsu gained All under Heaven through relying upon them. If he had caused the descendants of the Six States to be reestablished, all the people would have embraced their old states.171 Then even if he had the ability to command generals, who could the Han have employed? I have said that the Han gained the realm through Chang Liang borrowing [Kao-tsu's] chopsticks and Hsiao Ho's achievements in managing water transportation. From this standpoint, Han Hsin and P'eng Yueh being execut
ed and Fan Tseng not being used [by Hsiang Yu] are the same.17' I therefore refer to Liu Pang and Hsiang Yu as rulers incapable of commanding generals."
The T'ai-tsung said: "The Later Han Emperor Kuang-wu, who restored the dynasty, was thereafter able to preserve complete his meritorious generals and did not entrust them with civil affairs. Is this being good at commanding generals?"
Li Ching said: "Although Emperor Kuang-wu availed himself of the glories of the Former Han and easily attained success, still Wang Mang's strate gic power was not inferior to Hsiang Yu's, while [his generals] K'ou Hsun and Teng Yii17i never surpassed Hsiao Ho and Ts'ao Ts'an. He alone was able to extend his pure heart, employ a genial administration, and preserve complete his virtuous subjects, so he was far more worthy than Han Kaotsu. Based on this, if we discuss being able to command generals, then I would say that Emperor Kuang-wu attained it."
The T'ai-tsung said: "In ancient times when they dispatched the army and appointed the commanding general, [the ruler] would ritually prepare by observing a vegetarian regime for three days. He would then hand a yueh ax to the general, saying: `From this to Heaven above will be controlled by the General of the Army.' Moreover, he would give him a fu ax, saying: `From this to Earth below will be controlled by the General of the Army.i14 Then he would push the hub [on the general's chariot]175 and say: `Advancing and withdrawing should only be timely. When you are already on the march, those in the army will only obey the general's orders, not the ruler's commands.' I note that these rites have long been neglected. Today I would like to establish a ceremony with my lord for commissioning and sending off the general. What about it?"
The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China Page 43
