Li Ching said: "I dare to say that the Sages created this ceremony together with the vegetarian fast at the ancestral temple in order to borrow awesomeness and spirituality from the spirits. Granting the yueh and fu axes together with pushing the hub were the means by which they entrusted them with authority. Today, whenever your Majesty is about to dispatch the army, you invariably hold deliberations and discussions with your high officials, announce it at the temple, and afterward dispatch them. This, then, is inviting the spirits to come forth. Whenever you have appointed a general, you have always ordered him to manage affairs as circumstances may dictate. This, then, is loaning him great authority. How does it differ from observing a vegetarian fast and pushing the hub? It completely harmonizes with the ancient ceremony, its meaning is identical. It is not necessary to consult together to decide [a new one]."
The ruler said "Excellent" and then ordered the nearby officials to record these two practices as a model for later ages.
The T'ai-tsung said: "Can the [divinatory] practices of yin and yang176 be abandoned?"
Li Ching said: "They cannot. The military is the Tao of deceit, so if we [apparently] put faith in yin and yang divinatory practices, we can manipulate the greedy and stupid. They cannot be abandoned."
The T'ai-tsung said: "You once said that selecting astrologically auspicious seasons and days are not methods of enlightened generals. Ignorant generals adhere to them, so it seems appropriate to abandon them."
Li Ching said: "King Chou perished on a day designated as chai-tzu; King Wu flourished on the same day. According to the astrologically auspicious seasons and days, chia-tzu is the first day. The Shang were in chaos, the Chou were well governed. Flourishing and perishing are different in this case. Moreover, Emperor Wu of the Sung mobilized his troops on a `going to perish day.'"' The army's officers all felt it to be impermissible, but the emperor said: `I will go forth and he will perish.' Indeed, he conquered them. Speaking with reference to these cases, it is clear that the practices can be abandoned. However, when T'ien Tan was surrounded by Yen, Tan ordered a man to impersonate a spirit. He bowed and prayed to him, and the spirit said Yen could be destroyed. Tan thereupon used fire oxen to go forth and attack Yen, greatly destroying them."' This is the deceitful Tao of military thinkers. The selection of astrologically auspicious seasons and days is similar to this."
The T'ai-tsung said: "T'ien Tan entrusted their fate to the supernatural and destroyed Yen, while the T'ai Kung burned the milfoil and tortoise shells yet went on to exterminate King Chou. How is it that these two affairs are contradictory?"
Li Ching said: "Their subtle motives were the same. One went contrary [to the practices] and seized [the enemy], one accorded with them and implemented [his plans].19
"In antiquity, when the T'ai Kung was assisting King Wu, they reached Mu-yeh where they encountered thunder and rain. The flags and drums were broken or destroyed. San I-sheng wanted to divine for an auspicious response before moving. This, then, is a case where because of doubts and fear within the army, he felt they must rely on divination to inquire of the spirits. [But] the T'ai Kung believed that rotted grass and dried-up bones were not worth asking. Moreover, in the case of a subject attacking his ruler, how could there be a second chance? Now I observe that San I-sheng expressed his motives at the beginning, but the T'ai Kung attained his subsequently. Even though one was contrary to and the other in accord with [divinatory practices], their reasons were identical. When I previously stated these techniques should not be abandoned, it was largely to preserve the vital point of ch'i before affairs have begun to manifest themselves.18' As for their being successful, it was a matter of human effort, that is all!"
The T'ai-tsung said: "At present there are only three real generals-Li Chi, Li Tao-tsung, and Hsueh Wan-ch'e. Apart from Li Tao-tsung, a relative, who can undertake great responsibility?"
Li Ching said: "Your Majesty once said that when employing the army, Li Chi and Li Tao-tsung will not achieve great victories, but neither will they suffer disastrous defeats, while if Wan-ch'e does not win a great victory, he will inevitably suffer a serious defeat. In my ignorance I have thought about your Sagely words. An army which does not seek great victory but also does not suffer serious defeat is constrained and disciplined. An army which may achieve great victory or suffer horrendous defeat relies upon good fortune to be successful. Thus Sun Wu said: `One who excels at warfare establishes himself in a position where he cannot be defeated while not losing [any opportunity] to defeat the enemy.'181 This says that constraint and discipline lie with us."
The T'ai-tsung said: "When two formations approach each other, should we not want to fight, how can we attain it?"
Li Ching said: "In antiquity the Chin army attacked Ch'in,182 engaged in battle with them, and then withdrew. The Ssu-ma Fa states: `Do not pursue a fleeing enemy too far nor follow a retreating army too closely.'183 I refer to those retreating as being under the control of the reins. If our army already is constrained and disciplined while the enemy's army is also in well-ordered rows and squads, how can [either side] lightly engage in combat? Thus when they [both] go forth, clash, and then withdraw without being pursued, each side is defending against loss and defeat. Sun-tzu said: `Do not attack wellregulated formations, do not intercept well-ordered flags.'184 When two formations embody equal strategic power [shih], should one lightly move he may create an opportunity for the enemy to gain the advantage and thereby suffer a great defeat. [Strategic] principles cause it to be thus. For this reason armies encounter situations in which they will not fight and those in which they must fight. Not engaging in battle lies with us; having to fight lies with the enemy."
The T'ai-tsung said: "What do you mean `not engaging in battle lies with us?' 51
Li Ching said: "Sun Wu has stated: `If I do not want to engage in battle, I will draw a line on the ground and defend it. They will not be able to engage us in battle because we thwart their movements.' 1115 If the enemy has [capable] men, the interval between the clash and retreat cannot yet be planned. Thus I said that not engaging in battle lies with us. As for having to fight lying with the enemy, Sun Wu has stated: `One who excels at moving the enemy deploys in a configuration to which the enemy must respond. He offers something which the enemy must seize. With profit he moves them; with his main force he awaits them.'186 If the enemy lacks talented officers, they will certainly come forth and fight. I then take advantage of the situation to destroy them. Thus I said that having to fight lies with the enemy."
The T'ai-tsung said: "Profound indeed! The constrained and disciplined army-when it realizes appropriate strategies-flourishes, but when it lacks them perishes. My lord, please compile and record the writings of those through the ages who excelled at constraint and discipline, provide diagrams, and submit them to me. I will select the quintessential ones to be transmitted to later ages."
[Li Ching said:187 "I previously submitted two diagrams of the Yellow Emperor's and T'ai Kung's dispositions together with the Ssu-ma Fa and Chuko Liang's strategies for the unorthodox and orthodox. They are already highly detailed. Numerous famous historical generals employed one or two of them and achieved success. But official historians have rarely understood military matters, so they were unable to properly record the substance of their achievements. Would I dare not accept your Majesty's order? I will prepare a compilation and narration for you."]
The T'ai-tsung said: "What is of greatest importance in military strategy?"
Li Ching said: "I once divided it into three levels to allow students to gradually advance into it. The first is termed the Tao, the second Heaven and Earth, and the third Methods of Generalship. As for the Tao, it is the most essential and subtle, what the I Ching refers to as `all-perceiving and allknowing, [allowing one to be] spiritual and martial without slaying.'188 Now what is discussed under Heaven is yin and yang; what is discussed under Earth is the narrow and easy. One who excels at employing the army is able to use the yin to snatch the yang, the narr
ow to attack the easy. It is what Mencius referred to as the `seasons of Heaven and advantages of Earth.'189 The Methods of Generalship discusses employing men and making the weapons advantageous-what the Three Strategies means by saying that one who gains the right officers will prosper, and the Kuan-tzu by saying that the weapons must be solid and sharp."
The T'ai-tsung said: "Yes. I have said that an army which can cause men to submit without fighting is the best; one that wins a hundred victories in a hundred battles is mediocre; and one that uses deep moats and high fortifications for its own defense is the lowest. If we use this as a standard for comparison, all three are fully present in Sun-tzu's writings."
Li Ching said: "We can also distinguish them if we scrutinize their writings and retrace their undertakings. For example, Chang Liang, Fan Li, and Sun Wu abandoned the world to withdraw into lofty isolation. No one knows where they went. If they had not penetrated the Tao, how could they have done it? Yueh I,190 Kuan Chung, and Chu-ko Liang were always victorious in battle and solid in defense. If they had not investigated and understood the seasons of Heaven and the advantages of Earth, how could they have succeeded? Next would be Wang Meng's preservation of Ch'in and Hsieh An's defense of Chin.191 If they had not employed [outstanding] generals and selected talented man, repaired and solidified their defenses, how could they have managed? Thus the study of military strategy must be from the lowest to middle and then from the middle to highest, so that they will gradually penetrate the depths of the teaching. If not, they will only be relying on empty words. Merely remembering and reciting them is not enough to succeed."
The T'ai-tsung said: "Taoists shun three generations [of a family] serving as generals.192 [Military teachings] should not be carelessly transmitted, yet should also not be not transmitted. Please pay careful attention to this matter."
Li Ching bowed twice and went out, and turned all his military books over to Li Chi.
THE ROLE and importance of chariots as well as the date of their introduction have been the subject of several articles in recent decades. Unquestionably, the chariot was introduced from the West through central Asia around the fourteenth century B.C., and then the transmission route was probably severed because subsequent major Western developments were never reflected in China. (Hayashi Minao confidently asserts that the Shang had chariots by 1300 B.C. and that they were used in hunting.' Edward L. Shaughnessy holds that the chariot's introduction should be dated to 1200 B.C.2) Support for the theory of diffusion rather than indigenous origin is seen in the absence of any precursor, such as oxen-pulled wagons or fourwheeled carts, although horses were domesticated prior to this period.3
Although the construction of the Chinese chariot was substantially the same as its Western prototype, the earliest chariots unearthed thus far have several distinctive characteristics: Each wheel has many more spokessometimes as many as forty-eight; wheel shape is conical; and the chariot box is rectangular and larger than is the case in the West and can accommodate three men standing in triangular formation.' (Some of these developments are also seen in an intermediate stage in the Trans-Caucasus versions discovered in this century.') No major alterations occur after its introduction, although there was a historical tendency toward stronger, heavier, swifter vehicles. Significant minor innovations and refinements naturally continued over the centuries, such as in the method of mounting the chariot box on the axle and in the yoking, with a continuing differentiation into types by use. (Even the Shang apparently had specialized chariots or carriages for ordinary transport, chariots designed for combat and the huntperhaps in limited numbers-and something similar to wagons for conveying goods.6)
In the Shang the chariot was a highly visible symbol of rank and power and was elaborately decorated, often being covered with imperial gifts of insignia. However, perhaps because of their greater numbers, chariots in the Chou were more pragmatic and functional, although they still conspicuously displayed marks of royal favor.' Finally, in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, highly specialized chariots and other wheeled vehicles were created to suit the requirements of siege warfare and other specialized assault tasks; they were equipped with large shields, towers, battering rams, movable ladders, and multiple arrow crossbows.8
Tradition holds that Hsi Chung-either as a minister under the Yellow Emperor or in the Hsia dynasty-created the chariot. The Shang reputedly employed either seventy or three hundred chariots to overthrow the Hsia, but this is improbable. The actual degree to which the Shang employed chariots remains somewhat controversial; some scholars find no evidence that the Shang employed chariots as a battle element,' whereas others-especially traditionally oriented experts such as Ku Chieh-kang-maintain qualified opposing views.10 However, certain facts are known. For example, even in the later years of the dynasty, Shang knights were apparently fighting on foot as infantrymen rather than from chariots. Some of their enemies, however, seem to have employed them in substantial numbers compared with their overall forces."
The Chou are traditionally noted for increasing the horsepower of their assault chariots, using four rather than two horses. 'Z (Shang tombs also have chariots with four horses, but these may have been for funerary display rather than for actual use.) One explanation for the Chou's startling victory-apart from their superior Virtue and the support of the people-is the swiftness of their movement and their unexpected crossing of the Yellow River to the south, thereby avoiding Shang defenses to the west. (According to the Shih chi, the Shang ruler significantly furthered the Chou's efforts by consciously ignoring their approach until they were suddenly upon him.) In the actual battle three hundred chariots were probably employed, which matches the reported three thousand members of the Tiger Guard, assuming the ten-to-one ratio that is frequently suggested.13 The swiftness and ferocity of the assault surprised the Shang and might be attributed to the Chou's superior and perhaps first effective use of chariot power.
Significant clashes between the Chou and their steppe neighbors in which considerable numbers of chariots were employed apparently commenced in the first centuries of Chou rule; in one such encounter 130 enemy vehicles were reportedly captured.14 Massed chariot battles were occurring by the ninth century B.c. and continued throughout the Western Chou era and into the Spring and Autumn period. However, the effectiveness of the chariot under actual combat conditions has been questioned in recent decades by Creel15 and others. Although the chariot promised power, speed, and mobil ity-at least in contrast to foot movement-it may have been more symbolic and have served largely as a command platform rather than an overwhelming assault weapon. This is not to deny that chariot combat-often involving great numbers-took place. However, as Yang Hung has discussed, the chariot demanded a large area, and the warriors positioned on either side in the back (especially the one on the right who wielded the halberd) could only engage the enemy when the chariots passed each other perfectly-neither too far apart nor too head on.16 In addition, their stability and maneuvering ability-which were restricted by a fixed axle that rendered turning extremely difficult, especially at speed-were minimal, even on the flatest plain. (Imagine racing across a corn field without shock absorbers and attempting to fire a bow or strike a moving, equally unpredictable opponent with a shock weapon at the last instant.)
The failure of Wu and Yueh to adopt the chariot, despite explicit efforts to inculcate them in their use around 541 B.C., further indicates a realization of terrain-imposed limitations; both states were mountainous regions crisscrossed by rivers and streams and marked by lakes, ponds, and marshes." In response to these insurmountable constraints, Wu and Yueh stressed infantry and naval forces and developed weapons for close combat-such as the sword-to such a high degree that they were famous throughout the realm; when unearthed today, they still retain their surface and edge qualities."
Despite their inherent faults, chariots did permit the comparatively rapid conveyance of men, and under the direction of a skilled driver and reasonable conditions of terrain, t
hey could undoubtedly be formidable. The romantic image of courageous knights challenging each other from their glistening, leather armored chariots rings as true for China as the West, and the chariot was particularly suited to individuals valiantly racing out and provoking the enemy into hasty action. (However, Creel has observed that the Age of Chivalry did not begin until the Spring and Autumn period.19)
The difficulty of maintaining close formations required advancing at a measured pace (as edicted by King Wu in his prebattle instructions preserved in the Shih chi and Ssu-ma Fa) in order to coordinate not only chariots with chariots but also chariots with supporting infantry. The necessary imposition and observance of such constraints must have severely tempered an assault thrust's maximum speed and, insofar as the book reflects antique practices, no doubt underlies the Ssu-ma Fa's repeated stress on adhering to proper measures. (For further discussion, see the translator's introduction and the notes to the Ssu-ma Fa translation.) It was possible for coordinated infantry to take advantage of the chariot's difficulties and surround, overturn, or otherwise obstruct it; according to the Tso chuan, they also con stantly failed of their own accord-suffering broken axles, becoming mired, getting tangled in branches, and falling into unseen gullies. Perhaps because of these limitations, coupled with their cost and extensive training requirements, the only effective way for armies to expand was with infantrymen. However, the growth of infantry divisions obviously reflected changing social and political conditions as well as a number of other factors, and experts such as Yang Hung explicitly deny that the problems of chariot employment caused them to be replaced. 20
The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China Page 44
