The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China

by Ralph D Sawyer

  THE HORSE was domesticated in China in neolithic times but was not ridden. The indigenous breed, which had a distribution through the steppe region, was apparently rather small-especially compared with the mounts of the nomadic peoples who appeared on China's western borders around the fifth century B.C. (Creel dogmatically asserts that no evidence exists for mounted riders in China prior to about 300 B.C.,' but Shaughnessy suggests the Chinese were encountering mounted riders by the end of the Spring and Autumn period in 484 B.C.' Some traditional scholars, on the basis of scant archaeological evidence, have argued for a long indigenous development period and for the existence of riding and hunting as early as the Shang, but this view is largely discredited.' Others claim that a Tso chuan entry indicates that barbarians were waging mounted warfare by 664 B.C.4 Pulleyblanks and Yetts6 basically concur with Creel. However, there are historical references to the famous general Wu Ch'i [440?-361 B.C.] riding on horseback; a similar passage is found in the Wu-tzu [which is conveniently employed to discredit the work's authenticity]. Passages in the Six Secret Teachings that discuss the tactical employment of cavalry are also consigned to a late Warring States date on the basis of King Wu-ling's innovation in 307 B.C.7)

  Prior to the fifth century B.C. the nomads were still on foot and fought as infantry or employed chariots. In the fourth century the Hu peoples initiated the first mounted incursions against the northern border states of Chao and Yen. Their horses offered them the obvious advantages of speed, mobility, and freedom in targeting, immediately spreading the requirements of static defense over much larger areas. Consequently, King Wu-ling of Chao resolved to force his warriors to imitate the barbarian mode of dress (trousers and short )ackets) because he believed such attire was critical in unleashing the cavalry's power. Apparently, his intent was to increase the army's aggressive potential rather than simply to cope with the Hu, who were not particularly formidable, because he subsequently attempted to flank and invade Ch'in from the north.' Thereafter, the horse and cavalry grew in importance but until the Han dynasty, they remained a minor element in the army despite the tactics proposed by strategists such as Sun Pin and the T'ai Kung (of the Six Secret Teachings rather than the historical figure). According to their works, the cavalry provides mobility; frees the army from having its main assault weapon (hitherto the chariot) confined to level terrain; and permits the development of unorthodox maneuvers. Throughout the Warring States period, chariots remained more important than the cavalry (although in terms of power and numbers, the infantry came to play a greater role). Even the conquering Ch'in army, however, only included about ten percent cavalry. Liu Pang, founder of the Han, created an elite cavalry unit to turn the tide in his final battles with Hsiang Yu, but this still only amounted to twenty percent of his total forces.'

  Subsequently, Han Wu-ti, the great expansionist emperor of the Former Han-determined to secure the famous, superior horses from the distant nomads-dispatched major campaign armies into central Asia to subjugate recalcitrant peoples and seize the horses by force.10 One hundred thousand cavalry, accompanied by as many supply wagons, embarked on the campaign of 128 to 119 B.c. From this time on the chariot ceased to have any tactical fighting role (although there was an abortive attempt by Fang Kuan in the T'ang era to reconstruct and follow the antique ways). From perhaps the middle of the Former Han era, the cavalry became an independent battle element that provided focal power for orthodox tactics and flexibility for executing unorthodox tactics." With the invention of stirrups and the development of an effective saddle, heavy cavalry became possible, although it was displaced again by light cavalry with the approach of the T'ang. T'ang Tai-tsung made particularly effective use of the cavalry in wresting control of the empire and was famous for his horsemanship. He was perhaps of nomadic ancestry and well understood the effectiveness of cavalry (as is seen in the military work bearing his name and the accompanying translator's introduction).

  THE PRIMITIVE ARMOR of the predynastic neolithic period and the Hsia probably consisted of animal skins, including those of the fearsome tiger, with little alteration. From the Shang through the end of the Warring States, leather-generally fashioned from cowhide, although sometimes from rhino or buffalo-comprised the basic material. When employed in conjunction with large shields, leather armor apparently provided adequate protection against the bronze weapons of the period. Based on evidence from the Chou (and assuming essential continuity between the Shang and Chou), the mighty Shang warriors wore two-piece leather armor that covered the front and back as well as bronze helmets. As the scope and intensity of conflict increased in the early Chou, construction techniques changed dramaticallyshifting from two large pieces to multiple small rectangles strung into rows with leather thongs, the rows then being overlaid to create a lamellar tunic. The individual pieces were cut from leather that had been tanned, lacquered, and finally colored (frequently with red or black pigmented lacquer or perhaps decorated with fierce motifs). Due to the perishable nature of such materials, the exact course of their evolution remains indistinct, but such armor probably displaced two-piece models by the Spring and Autumn period.

  Armor was apparently specialized, suited to the warrior's function and his mode of fighting. For example, that for charioteers-who remained basically stationary once ensconced in their vehicle-was generally long and cumbersome, protecting the entire body while primarily leaving the arms free. However, the infantry-which was heavily dependent on agility and foot speed for both its survival and aggressiveness-obviously fought with shorter leather tunics, fewer restrictive leg protectors, and far less overall weight. When the cavalry developed, although they could easily sustain more weight than infantrymen, their legs had to be unrestricted (but protected against outside attacks), which accounts for the adoption of barbarian-style trousers and short tunics. Furthermore, until the invention of the stirrups, excess weight would also contribute further to the rider's instability. Thus heavy cavalry did not develop until the post-Han, only to be again displaced by swifter, lighter elements within a few centuries.

  Even after the development of iron and its application for agricultural implements and weapons, iron armor-which was necessary to withstand the greater firepower of the crossbow as well as perhaps stronger iron swordsdid not displace leather until well into the Han (coincident with the replacement of the bronze sword). Bronze armor may have existed in the early Chou, and the use of some combination of leather with perhaps a reinforcing bronze outer piece (particularly for the shield) is evident. However, until the advent of iron plates imitating the leather lamellar construction-thus ensuring flexibility and endurable weight-metal appears to have been extremely rare. Even in the Han and thereafter, leather never entirely disappeared, being employed in a supplementary fashion.

  Shields-an essential adjunct to every warrior's defensive equipmentwere generally constructed on a wooden frame over which lacquered leather or various lacquered cloth materials were stretched. All-wood shields as well as those made from reeds and rushes obviously existed in some regions and in different eras, although their history has yet to be reconstructed. But as with body armor, leather was the material of choice, sometimes with additional protective layers of bronze. With the rise of iron weapons and the crossbow, iron shields also appeared but apparently not in great numbers until late in the Warring States or the Han dynasty.

  Helmets were fashioned from bronze throughout the period, although iron helmets had appeared by the beginning of the Warring States. However, as with the iron sword and armor, they did not dominate until at least the Han.

  Chariots, which evolved little over the period, also used lacquered leather for reinforcement, as is noted in Wu Ch'i's initial interview with the king in the Wu-tzu. Protection for the horse-the prime target-was also considered important and may have originated late in the Warring States period. However, again it was not until the Han that equine armor became both massive and extensive, reflecting the newly dominant role of the cavalry and the need to p
rotect the valuable steeds. Outside stimuli from the mounted, highly mobile steppe peoples may have also contributed to the development of armor (and perhaps some weapons), but most developments were indigenous rather than imitative.

  ALTHOUGH THERE ARE a few dissenting voices and much controversy about the origin, evolution, and numbers of swords, it appears that the true sword-one with the blade more than double the length of the haft-did not really develop in China until late in the Spring and Autumn period.' Prior to this time warriors carried daggers, spear heads, and sometimes a short sword-all of which were fashioned from bronze? (However, based on recent archaeological evidence, some traditionally oriented scholars have deduced that Western Chou warriors carried bronze swords.' An occasional artifact from the Shang is also classified as a "sword" in the literature, but when its dimensions are considered, the blade rarely exceeds the length of the haft by much-consigning it instead to the category of short swords or long daggers.)

  Swords in the Western Chou and Spring and Autumn periods were designed for piercing and thrusting, not for slashing and cutting attacks.4 With the advent of the infantry, weapons for close combat necessarily supplemented and then began to displace the halberd and other chariot-oriented war implements. In addition to the sword, the short or hand chi (speartipped halberd capable of thrusting attacks much like a spears) became very common among Warring States infantrymen-particularly in states where chariots were tactically unsuitable, such as Wu and Yueh.6

  Some scholars have coupled the final evolution and proliferation of the sword to the development of the cavalry in the late Warring States period and subsequently the Han dynasty.' Extremely long swords, especially double-edged ones, would be both dangerous and unwieldy for cavalrymen;8 therefore, the excessively long swords that developed in the late Warring States and early Han were probably exclusively for infantrymen or were simply ceremonial.

  Theories of origin range from imitation of steppe weapons to totally indigenous development without any nonmetalic precursors.' One theory holds that warriors in the Shang and Early Chou carried spearheads as a sort of short dagger and that from these-especially as the spearheads became longer and stronger-the short dagger with a handle and then the elongated sword, evolved.10 As the technology of metalworking progressed, improvements in shape, durability, sharpness, and appearance rapidly followed. However, whatever their origin, swords with slashing power and considerable length in comparison with the handle really only flourished in the late Warring States, Ch'in, and Han.' 1

  As the cavalry became the dominant battle element in the armed forces, the sword evolved to match its requirements. Thus from the Han onward, a single-edged sword with a ring handle-actually termed a "knife"-gradu- ally displaced the long swords of the Warring States. Thereafter, metalworking continually improved, especially layering and surface treatment; and two distinctive trends emerged-one toward higher-quality, shorter, functionaledged weapons; the other toward purely ceremonial and elaborately decorated symbolic swords. Steel "knives" became the sword of choice for both infantrymen and cavalrymen as the T'ang-the era of the last of the Seven Military Classics-approached.

  (Although this brief sketch is inadequate for any true understanding of the sword and its history, a more extensive consideration requires a separate book. Readers with a command of Asian languages should consult Hayashi Minao's detailed but somewhat dated work12 and similar writings in Chi- nese.13)

  MILITARY ORGANIZATION in all its aspects-such as the development of administrative districts, population registration, and universal military service obligations-requires a separate study. Opinions on many aspects-including fundamentals, questions of origin, and early history-are far from unanimous. However, because knowledge of the basic organizational methods and principles is helpful to understanding much of the Seven Military Classics, a brief overview is undertaken here.

  The critical problem in characterizing organization in the Shang dynasty is the uncertain role the chariot played because some scholars believe the chariot comprised the core element around which the company-the basic military unit-was formed. If chariots were insignificant or only played a transport role, this would obviously not be possible. Consequently, two theories must be considered: chariot-centered and clan-centered. In the former, the chariot-manned by three members of the nobility-would be accompanied by conscripted commoners, probably ten men per chariot.' Their function was strictly supportive; because they would be drawn from the state's farming and artisan populations as well as from each noble's personal retainersin an age when bronze weapons were expensive and limited in numbersthey were only minimally armed! Based on burial patterns, this line of thought holds that the chariots were organized into squads of five, with either three or five squads to a company. Each squad would be supported by a one-hundred-man infantry company with (in some views) a complement of twenty-five officers. A battalion composed of three or five squads with associated infantry would constitute an operational unit. (Conclusive evidence for these reconstructions is lacking.3)

  Another view-based on excavated tombs-suggests the total number per tsu, or company, was one hundred: three officers for the chariot and seventytwo infantry organized into three platoons, supported by a supply vehicle staffed by twenty-five. However, this conceptualization seems to derive from the later idealization found in the Chou li and more likely describes the state of affairs late in the Spring and Autumn.'

  Considerable textual evidence suggests that the clan composed the basic organizational unit, with the tsu (a different character than that above) again numbering one hundred men.' The members would all be from the nobility, under the command of the clan chief-who would normally also be the king, an important vassal, or a local feudal lord. Thus organized, they probably fought as infantry units, although chariots could also have been integrated for transport and command purposes. (According to Hsu Cho-yun, clan units [tsu] still actively participated in the pitched battles of the Spring and Autumn.') Ten such companies probably comprised a shih, which was basically an army of one thousand men; in fact, the term ship should be considered synonymous with "army" in this period.' The word normally translated as "army"-chun-does not appear until the Spring and Autumn.'

  Early Western Chou military organization would have been essentially the same, but with the units definitely chariot-centered. As discussed in a footnote to the translation of the Six Secret Teachings, the three thousand famous Tiger Warriors at the epoch-making battle of Mu-yeh would appropriately work out to a ratio of ten men per chariot. Thereafter, the infantry expanded as the number associated with each chariot gradually increased, until by the early Spring and Autumn the ratio was perhaps twenty, twentytwo, or even thirty foot soldiers per vehicle.' In the Spring and Autumn period-the classic age of chariot warfare depicted in the Tso chuan-the systematic grouping of men into squads of five, with a vertical hierarchy mapped out on multiples of five, seems to have developed and become preva- lent.10 This is the period described by passages in several of the Military Classics and the Chou li, during which seventy-two infantrymen accompanied each chariot, deployed in three platoons characterized as left, center, and right. (These designations were nominal; actual positioning depended on their function. For example, on easy terrain the center platoon would follow the chariot, whereas on difficult terrain it would precede it-both as a defensive measure and to clear obstacles. )1) Whether the officers were included among the one hundred also seems to be a matter of debate.l2

  From the Chou Ii and some of the military writings, the following chart can be constructed, with rough Western equivalents as indicated:

  The Western equivalents are relative; their definition depends on the era and country of organization.13 The columns represent a set of alternatives, so that if regiment is used for lii, then brigade (or perhaps division) should be used for shih. The term lii is an ancient one; it was originally used by the Shang to designate a military unit that reportedly expanded to ten thousand for one campaign, but it al
so may have referred to the standing army.14 Subsequently, in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, it was combined with the character for army-chun-as chun-lu to indicate the army or military units in general. In its original meaning, it apparently referred to "men serving under a flag."

  As already noted, the term for army-chun-appeared only in the Spring and Autumn and then only in the central states because the peripheral states, such as Ch'u, had their own distinct forms of organization."S The term "Three Armies" (san chun) encountered throughout the military texts normally refers to the army in general, not just to three units of army strength according to the above chart.16 Early Chou theory asserted that the king alone had the right to maintain six armies (shih); a great feudal lord, three armies; lesser lords, two armies; and the least of them, one army. All of the vassal armies could and would be called on to supplement the royal forces and support the dynasty in the military campaigns that were generally mounted to suppress either rebellious states or nomadic peoples. With the rise of the hegemons in the Spring and Autumn period, states such as Chin simply disregarded both the Chou house and its prerogatives, eventually fielding as many as six armies.17

  In the earliest stage of the Shang and Chou, force size was apparently irregular; it was enumerated, constituted, and organized to meet the situation and the demand. However, with the vastly augmented scope of conflict in the Warring States and the imposition of universal service obligations, military hierarchy and discipline became essential, as is evident from the emphasis on them in the Seven Military Classics. Actual service demands made on the newly registered populace also increased from the Spring and Autumn into the Warring States; at first, only a single male in each family was required to serve, then all males were so required. This mirrored early Chou trends when all the people who dwelled within the state (kuo) trained and were obligated to fight but were universally mobilized in only the most dire circumstances.18 With the creation and imposition of hierarchical administrative systems for the populace (both variants-the village and district-began late in the Spring and Autumn in Chin and Ch'u, perhaps originating with Kuan Chung), the male population could be quickly summoned for active duty. The village and district groups of five and twenty-five were immediately translated into squads and platoons. Local officials at all levels would immediately become officers at the respective unit level, although there were professional military personnel for the higher ranks and a standing army to form the army's core.19 This meant that the total qualified populace could be mobilized for military campaigns, and that virtually an entire country could go to war.20