24. The spear was already extant in Shang times and no doubt dates back to the neolithic period. Shang spears boasted bronze spearheads (as well as those made of other materials, such as stone and bone), but with the development of iron technology, iron tips appeared by the Warring States period. In addition, the longer spears suited to use with the chariot (and thus also employed by infantry) in the Shang and Early Chou tended to be too unwieldy for infantrymen and consequently were shortened somewhat in the Warring States period. Conversely, the blades tended to become longer and sharper in the early Spring and Autumn period and continued to undergo similar modifications thereafter. For detailed discussions, in addition to references listed in the bibliography, see Chou Wei, Chung-kuo ping-ch'i ship-kao, pp. 98-102; and Hiyashi Minao, Chugoku In-Shu jidai no buki, pp. 97-130.
25. The bow was already a major part of the Shang warrior's arsenal and was generally carried by the chariot commander. Composite bows appeared early, increasing in complexity, size, and strength over the centuries with improvements in bonding and crafting technology. Various materials, including bamboo, were employed and were matched for greatest composite strength under tension. In the Shang era wooden shafted arrows generally mounted bronze points, although bone, stone, and other materials were also employed. However, bronze continued to prevail even after iron had generally appeared in the Warring States (refer to note 55 below). For an overview and detailed discussions, see Hiyashi Minao, Chugoku In-Sha jidai no buki, pp. 243-299 (on bows) and 321-374 (on arrows); Yoshida Mitsukuni (who also discusses crossbows), "Yumi to oyumi," Toyoshi kenkyu, Vol. 12, No. 3 (1953), pp. 82-92; and the classic report and analysis of Shih Chang-ju, "Hsiao-t'un Yin-tai to ch'eng-t'ao pingch'i," pp. 25-44 (on the bow) and 44-54 (on arrows).
26. See Appendix C for an annotated discussions of the development and history of armor in ancient China.
27. In recent years there have been a number of claims for widespread use of bronze swords in the Early Chou, such as Hsu and Linduff, Western Chou Civilization, p. 81. However, although the innovative horizon for many weapons and technological achievements continues to be pushed earlier and earlier with each new discovery, it would seem these would best be termed daggers rather than swords, both in length and function. See Appendix D for an annotated discussion of the sword's history and some of the issues surrounding it.
28. "Chien-hsuan," La-shih ch'un-ch'iu, CCCY edition, Shang-wu yin-shu-kuan, Taipei, 1985, p. 204. Although claims that the Hsia had chariots are generally discounted, such assertions continue to be made, including in the recent PRC publication Chung-kuo chun-shih-shih, Vol. 4 Ping-fa, p. 5.
29. See Appendix A for an annotated discussion of the introduction and history of the chariot in China.
30. See the discussion of military organization in Appendix E for further information and references.
31. The Ssu-ma Fa discusses the practice and objectives of holding such hunts, and they are mentioned in a number of the other Seven Military Classics as well as in the Tso chuan and the "Ta Ssu-ma" section of the Chou li. (See the translator's introduction and notes to thv Ssu-ma Fa translation for further information.) Also see Ping-fa, pp. 32-33; Yen I-p ing, "Yin Shang ping-chih," p. 40; and Hsu Hsi-ch'en, "Chou-tai ping-chih ch'u-lun," p. 10.
The difficulty in attaining the required chariot skills and their expense are cited by some historians as the critical factors that made the rise of infantry units inevitable. Conscripts, whatever their class origin, simply could not be trained in the time available. For example, see Yang K'uan, "Ch'un-ch'iu Chan-kuo-chien feng-chien to chunshih tsu-chih ho chan-cheng to pien-hua," Li-shih chiao-hsi eh 4 (1954), p. 12.
32. One tradition asserts that the Chou were descendants of the Hsia, whereas modern scholars such as K. C. Chang postulate that the peoples of the "Three Dynasties" were culturally and racially alike but politically distinct. (See K. C. Chang, "Sandai Archaeology and the Formation of States in Ancient China: Processual Aspects of the Origins of Chinese Civilization," in The Origins of Chinese Civilization [ed. David N. Keightley], pp. 495-521; and Chang, Shang Civilization, pp. 348-355.)
33. The Chou's "barbarian" origin was generally recognized in antiquity, and the Shih chi explicitly records Tan Fu-the Chou progenitor-as deliberately abandoning nomadic ways after his people resettled with him in the south to avoid conflict with other barbarians. (See the "Chou Annals." Further discussion is found in the translator's introduction to the translation of the Six Secret Teachings.)
34. King Chou of the Shang was persuaded by opulent bribes not only to release the future King Wen from detainment but also to name him "Lord of the West." Under this title he was entrusted with responsibility for defending Shang's flank and thereby afforded an excellent pretext for developing and exercising his own military powers. (See the translator's introduction to the translation of the Six Secret Teachings for additional information.)
35. It is generally thought that speed, mobility, and surprise marked the Chou campaign, with the chariot playing a key role. However, there are dissenting views, such as Hsu and Linduff (Western Chou Civilization, p. 88), who consider other factors more important (such as the effective deployment of infantry, longer swords, and superior armor [see Hsu and Linduff, p. 81 ] ). For further discussion, see the translator's introduction to the Six Secret Teachings and Appendix A.
36. According to the Shih chi, the Shang had a one-hundred-thousand-man campaign army in the south, which could have amounted to a third or more of their total available forces and perhaps included some of their best units. King Chou of the Shang compounded his difficulties by ignoring repeated warnings about the potential danger posed by the Chou and notice of their actual advance. (Numbers from this period are extremely unreliable and should only be understood as indicative of comparative size.)
37. Because the antiquity of the Six Secret Teachings is almost universally denied, it seems possible that this revolutionary impulse may have been directed toward the imperial Ch'in by writers very late in the Warring States period. Their hatred of the brutal Ch'in would account for the ferocity of the policies, with such fervor being envisioned in the heroes of the ancient Chou as they gambled everything to overturn the vile despot. Whether the combatants observed any civilizing rites (such as in the early Spring and Autumn period) in the centuries prior to the battle at Mu-yeh is doubtful, but the traditional view assumes that they did. (This is discussed further in the translator's introduction to the translation of the Six Secret Teachings.)
38. See Edward L. Shaughnessy, "New' Evidence on the Zhou Conquest," pp. 6667.
39. Herrlee G. Creel's classic work, The Origins of Statecraft in China, still contains the most extensive reconstruction and discussion of these measures as well as of the Chou military. However, also see Hsu and Linduff, Western Chou Civilization.
40. See Hsu and Linduff, Western Chou Civilization, pp. 113-119; and Tu Chengsheng, "Lueh-lun Yin i-min to tsao-yu yo ti-wei," BIHP, Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 1982), pp. 661-709.
41. For a discussion of the meaning of "army" in this period, see Appendix E.
42. See Cho-yiin Hsu's extensive analysis, Ancient China in Transition, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1965.
43. See the translator's introduction and notes to the Ssu-ma Fa translation. The emphasis on discipline and concerted action evident throughout the Seven Military Classics reflects this shift from the noble days of chariot warfare. (For additional discussion of the code of chivalry and its inevitable decline, see Frank A. Kierman, Jr., "Phases and Modes of Combat in Early China," in Chinese Ways in Warfare [ed. Franz A. Kierman, Jr., and John K. Fairbank], Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1974, pp. 27-66.)
44. This incident, as recorded in the Tso chuan for the first year of Duke Chao, has historical importance because it shows the "barbarian" enemy fighting solely as infantrymen rather than mounted on horses or from chariots. In addition, the Chou's realization of the limitations of chariot warfare is clearly shown by the necessity they fe
lt to abandon their own chariots and engage the enemy in confined valley terrain. The reluctance of at least one high official to relinquish his honored position as a charioteer and descend to the state of a foot soldier (for which he was summarily executed) also illustrates the prevailing attitude even this late in the Spring and Autumn period. (See Legge's translation of the incident, The Chinese Classics: Volume V, The Ch'un Ts'ew with the Tso Chuen, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1872 [reprinted Chinhsueh shu-chu, Taipei, 1968], p. 579.) Wei Shu initiated the conversion and formulated a plan whose effectiveness was augmented by its deceptiveness. To confuse the enemy he deployed the combined chariot and accompanying infantry forces in an unusual, unbalanced formation, provoking the enemy's laughter and ridicule-until the Chin forces sprang into action and routed them. "Be deceptive" was a dictum clearly in the minds of commanders in this era, a century or two before Sun-tzu's Art of War. (For further discussion and analysis, see Ping-fa, p. 36, and the Wu-pei-chih 53, pp. 22B- 24B.) As the infantry expanded, officers from the nobility were assigned to command them, and rank was granted to everyone-regardless of status-for military achievement. Consequently, the status of the foot soldier improved dramatically, and although the old attitudes (which disdained foot assignment against the prestige of being assigned to the chariot) were never completely erased, their amelioration marked a significant change (see Ping-fa, p. 58).
It should be noted that chariots were not employed at this time in such peripheral southeastern states as Wu and Yueh. Initially, this might have been because of ignorance and unsuitable terrain, but even after they were taught the skills of chariot driving and the tactics of warfare deployment, these and several other states fielded only infantry units. (For further discussion, see Appendix A and also Tu Cheng-sheng, "Chou-tai feng-chien chieh-t'i-hou to chun-cheng hsin-chih-hsii," BIHP, Vol. 55, No. 1 [1984], pp. 74-75, 82-89; Ping-fa, p. 58; Yang K'uan, "Ch'un-ch'iu Chan-kuochien," p. 11; and Yang Hung, Chung-kuo ku-ping-ch'i, p. 126.)
45. Another weapon, the chi, probably began to appear in some numbers around this time. The chi, or "spear-tipped dagger-ax," differed from the dagger-ax in one formidable aspect: It had a metal point at the top of the shaft to allow thrusting and stabbing. With the addition of this spear tip, the weapon could be used for an initial stabbing thrust, but if the target were missed, it could be pulled back or swung to catch the enemy with the knife-like horizontal blade. In the early stages it was probably made from two separate bronze parts, which were secured to a pole; this has prompted some archaeologists to argue that the chi has a longer history than is generally acknowledged. (After the wooden shaft had completely disintegrated, the two parts, which would be found separately, would be misinterpreted as having come from two weapons-a dagger-ax and a spear-rather than being parts of an integrated, composite one.) However, it appears that the chi was primarily a foot soldier's weapon, perhaps developed to better equip them to attack chariots; thus it grew in popularity as infantry forces were augmented. In Shang tombs only ko (halberds, dagger-axes) are found, whereas Han excavations yield only chi, or spear-tipped dagger-axes. In the thousand years between the demise of the Shang and the flourishing of the Han, chi were probably created in the early Chou or Spring and Autumn periods, gradually becoming more popular until proliferating in the Warring States era. For detailed discussions, see Kuo Pao-chun, "Ko chi yu-lun," pp. 313-326; Kuo Mo-jo, Yin Chou ch'ing-t'ung-ch'i ming-wen yen-chiu, Jenmin ch'u-pan-she, Shanghai, 1954, pp. 172-186; Ma Heng, "Ko chi chih yen-chiu," pp. 745-753; Chou Wei, Chung-kuo ping-ch'i shih-kao, pp. 8 8-98; and Hayashi Minao, Chagoku In-Shu jidai no buki, pp. 10-13 and 78-96.
In an article examining a multiple-blade chi excavated from a Warring States tomb, Sun Chi concludes that this sort of weapon was probably wielded by charioteers against foot soldiers and thus represented a response to the growth of infantry forces and their mounting threat to the chariot. (The attachment of knife blades to the wheel hubs served a similar function, as his article discusses on p. 83.) This implies further questions about the evolution of the chi-whether it was developed for infantrymen or for chariot-mounted warriors contending with other chariots or infantrymen-to which answers are unavailable. See Sun Chi, "Yu-jen ch'e-wei yu to-ko-chi," WW 1980, No. 12, pp. 83-85.
46. See Appendix D for details and also note 55 below.
47. Some of these qualifications are recorded in Hsiin-tzu and itemized in the Six Secret Teachings; further discussion is found in the footnotes to the translations.
48. The Seven Strong States at the start of the Warring States period, as identified by Liu Hsiang's classic list, were Ch'i, Yen, the Three Chin (Han, Chao, Wei), and the newly powerful, originally peripheral states of Ch'u and Ch'in. Wu and Yueh, two other so-called barbarian states, also emerged as significant forces.
49. The Ssu-ma Fa discusses the distinctions that mark the form and spirit of the civilian and military realms and advises against their becoming confused or intermixed. Most of the Seven Military Classics discuss the qualifications necessary for generalship, reflecting the rising concern with professionalism and a turning away from the preoccupation with moral qualifications found in the Tso chuan. Ironically, in earlier times the Shang and Chou kings as well as the local vassal lords not only governed their respective realms but also commanded the army and exercised supreme military power. Over time they became divorced from the complexities of battle.
50. Strategic points, such as passes and major road intersections, were increasingly guarded and fortified. The northern states, such as Yen and Chao, sought to diminish the mobility of mounted nomadic forces by creating static defense systems ("walls") along their lengthy, exposed borders. See Yang K'uan, "Ch'un-ch'iu Chan-kuo-chien feng-chien to chun-shih tsu-chih ho chan-cheng to pien-hua," p. 12. Also note Arthur Waldron's work on "walls"; "The Problem of the Great Wall of China," HJAS, Vol. 43, No. 2 (1983), pp. 643-663; and The Great Wall of China: From History to Myth, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990.
51. See Yang Hung, Chung-kuo ku-ping-ch'i, pp. 140-141; and Ping-fa, pp. 7889. The Mohists were famous for their doctrine of not making distinctions in one's love for his fellow man. Under the direction of Mo-tzu (fl. 479-438 B.C.)-their founder and leader-they actively practiced their doctrine of opposing warfare, rushing to aid the defense of the besieged. See Robin D. S. Yates, "Siege Engines and Late Zhou Military Technology," in Explorations in the History of Science and Technology in China (ed. Li Guohao et al.), Shanghai Chinese Classics Publishing House, Shanghai, 1982, pp. 409-451, fora discussion of the technology that appeared in this period. For the medieval period, which includes the T'ang (the era of the Questions and Replies), see Herbert Franke, "Siege and Defense of Towns in Medieval China," in Chinese Ways in Warfare, pp. 151-194.
52. Although early Chinese compound bows were extremely powerful, crossbows provided dramatically more formidable firepower; their strength and effective killing range generally increased over the centuries as their mechanisms were perfected. The earliest type was probably hand-cocked, using only arm strength. More powerful versions required leg strength, and the strongest used a rope attached to the waist to pull the sling back. (See Hsu Chung-shu, "I-she yo nu," pp. 435-438.) By the end of the Warring States period, crossbows had come into extensive use, although their strategic value was probably not exploited fully until the Han dynasty. Hand-held crossbows, which fired two bolts simultaneously, and repeating models (as well as repeating double-bolt models) dating from the Warring States period have now been excavated, reflecting the crossbow's technological sophistication and importance. (See Ch'en Yueh- chun, "Chiang-ling Ch'u-mu ch'u-t'u shuang-shih ping-she lien-fa-nu yen-chiu," WW 1990, No. 5, pp. 89-96.) Larger, winch-powered models mounted on chariots or carriages, also capable of shooting multiple bolts, are described in the Six Secret Teachings and are discussed in the translation. (Also see Robin D. S. Yates, "Siege Engines and Late Zhou Military Technology," pp. 432-443.)
Tradition holds that the Yellow Emperor invented the c
rossbow, and Hsu Chungshu, analyzing linguistic evidence, strongly believes that both the bow and crossbow are indigenous developments dating from pre-Shang times. (See Hsu Chung-shu, "Ishe yu nu chih su-yuan chi kuan-yu tz'u-lei ming-wu chih k'ao-shih," pp. 417-418 and 438.) However, Hsu's classic view not withstanding, based on textual references and other linguistic evidence it appears the crossbow probably originated outside the central states area of China, perhaps in Ch'u or the southwest. (See Jerry Norman and Tsu-lin Mei, "The Austroasiatics in Ancient South China: Some Lexical Evidence," MS 32 [1976], pp. 293-294; Yang Hung, Ku-ping-ch'i, pp. 143-144; and Ch'en Ytieh- chun, "Lien-fa-nu," p. 96.) Remnants of crossbows with bronze trigger mechanisms have been found in tombs from the middle Warring States period, prompting scholars such as Kao Chih-hsi to argue for a much earlier (indigenous) invention-probably in the Spring and Autumn period-using wooden components. (See Kao Chih-hsi, "Chi Ch'ang-sha, Ch'ang-te ch'u-t'u nu-chi to Chan-kuo-mu-chien-t'an yu-kuan nu-chi, kung-shih to chi-ke wen-t'i," WW 1964, No. 6, pp. 41-44. Also see Ch'en Yueh-chun, "Lien-fa-nu," p. 96. Note that as of this writing, no pre-Warring States crossbows have been discovered. See Hayashi's Minao's extensive, although dated, summary, Chagoku In-Sha jidai no buki, pp. 301-330.) The first recorded tactical use appears to have been at the battle of Ma-ling in 341 a.c., as depicted in the Shih-chi and the text of the Sun Pin's Ping-fa. The Spring and Autumn Annals of Wu and Yueh also contain numerous references to crossbows, but truly extensive employment probably began with the Han, who exploited their superior firepower and range.
The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China Page 47
