53. See Appendix B for an annotated discussion of the cavalry in Chinese history.
54. The speed and mobility of the cavalry in all but the most impenetrable forests and marshes allowed the development of unorthodox tactics (ch'i) versus orthodox (cheng) methods. Although infantry forces can also be employed in unorthodox ways, an essential aspect of the unorthodox is its unexpectedness, its exploitation of surprise, for which the cavalry is ideally suited. Sun-tzu is generally credited with advancing the idea of the unorthodox, and it is extensively discussed and expanded in the Questions and Replies (based on actual employment by T'ang T'ai-tsung and General Li in decisive battles when they were struggling to establish the T'ang). The Six Secret Teachings also analyzes the relative methods for employing infantry, chariot, and cavalry forces.
55. Iron was used extensively for the agricultural implements-generally manufactured and distributed under government monopoly-during the Warring States period. The Japanese scholar Sekino Takeshi has advanced the idea that cheap, readily available, mass-produced iron swords provided Ch'in's conscripted infantry forces their great killing power. (Cf. Sekino Takeshi, "Chugoku shoki bunka no ikkosatsudotestsu katoki no kaimei ni yosete," Shigaku zasshi, Vol. 60, No. 10 [October 1951], pp. 867-907.) However, others strongly dispute his contention for a variety of reasons. First, the sword had always been a weapon of the nobility and was generally carried by officers rather than ordinary infantrymen. (Cf. Noel Barnard, "Did the Swords Exist," EC [1978-1979], pp. 62-63.) They would naturally have preferred the familiar elegance of the bronze weapon over the cruder iron sword. Second, bronze swords were probably still superior to early iron versions in the hands of the skilled warrior, and complex metal-working technology (such as layering with different alloys) produced very sharp, fine weapons. Third, few iron swords have been unearthed-even from the famous tombs of Ch'in Shih-Huang-ti, where most of the warriors are armed with bronze rather than iron weapons. (Cf. Noel Barnard, "Did the Swords Exist," p. 63; David N. Keightley, "Where Have All the Swords Gone?" EC2 [1976], pp. 31-34.) Thus several scholars have concluded that the Han era marks the true ascension of iron weapons, with the bronze sword becoming an anachronism thereafter. (For a dissenting view, see Li Xueqin, Eastern Zhou and Qin Civilizations, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1985, chapter entitled "Iron Objects," pp. 315-329, who notes that China had cast iron, wrought iron, and steel by the Warring States era, which suggests a long prehistory in the Spring and Autumn period.)
56. See Wu Ch'i's biography in the translator's introduction to the Wu-tzu translation.
57. The battle of Ma-ling is apparently the first recorded conflict in which crossbows were employed. (There are also different versions regarding who exercised ultimate command-Fang Chuan, who may have been killed at the earlier battle, or the imperial prince, who sallies forth with the home defense forces. General P'ang's character flaws and rashness were frequently cited by Chinese military analysts as evidence of the need for a constellation of virtues in any supreme commander.)
58. The complex process of analyzing language, concepts, and historical events to create a systematic textual chronology has been both complicated and simplified by the writings discovered in various tombs in recent decades. The detailed textual studies of Ch'ing dynasty scholars, although valuable for understanding the texts themselves, have led to conclusions that must now be reexamined and revised. Discussions of the provenance of the individual Seven Military Classics are found in each translator's introduction. For a general discussion, see Robin D. S. Yates, "New Light on Ancient Chinese Military Texts," TP 74 (1988), pp. 211-248.
T'ai Kung's Six Secret Teachings
Abbreviations of Frequently Cited Books
Notes to the Translator's Introduction
1. The tradition of Ch'i military studies requires a separate work; however, a brief discussion is found in the footnotes to the introductory section of the Ssu-ma Fa. (Also see T'ao Hsi-sheng, Ping-fa san-shu, Shih-huo ch'u-pan-she, Taipei, 1979, pp. 1-5, and "Chan-lueh yuan-li yu ko-ming fan-kung to tao-lu," in Ping-fa san-shu, pp. 1-9; Hsu Pei-ken, Chung-kuo kuo-fang ssu-hsiang-shih, Chung-yang wu-kung-ying-she, Taipei, 1983, pp. 282-284.)
2. The T'ang imperial family's military heritage was particularly strong, and the early emperors valued the martial as much as or perhaps more than the civil. Therefore, they sanctioned the creation of separate, increasingly professional military forces and the establishment of a state temple honoring the T'ai Kung as an exemplary military figure and the progenitor of military studies. Confucians, who tended to denigrate the T'ai Kung as merely a military man rather than recognizing him as a Sage like Confucius or the Duke of Chou (despite historical records attesting to his unremitting promotion of essentially Confucian virtues), continually opposed such efforts. In their view the civil-the li-and concepts of virtue are all that should be required to govern well and tranquilize the realm. (They repeatedly cited Confucius's statement that he never studied military affairs [Analects XV:1] but ignored his famous assertion [preserved in his Shih chi biography] that both the civil and martial are necessary.) Eventually, they succeeded in having the state cult dismantled, although the T'ai Kung unofficially continued to be a patron figure for centuries. This unrealistic outlook no doubt greatly contributed to China's military weakness throughout the centuries, despite the empire's vast resources, technological achievements, and powerful administrative organization. (For an extensive discussion, see D. L. McMullen, "The Cult of Ch'i T'aikung and T'ang Attitudes to the Military," T'ang Studies 7 [1989], pp. 59-103; and T'ao Hsi-sheng, Ping-fa san-shu, pp. 1-4.)
3. Hsu Pei-ken's introduction to his modern translation particularly emphasizes the "revolutionary confrontation" aspect rather than a clash between two states. See T'ai Kung Liu-t'ao chin-chu chin-i, Shangwu yin-shu-kuan, Taipei, 1976, pp. 14-16.
4. See Hsu Pei-ken, Chung-kuo kuo-fang ssu-hsiang-shih, pp. 291-293. The Chou dynasty ruled in part through its avowed policy of cultural acculturation, transforming the diverse people within its domain through gradual assimilation (while absorb ing and integrating new characteristics themselves). The concept of the Central States and the Hua-Hsia identity arose with them (although the surviving states in the Warring States period still retained distinctive regional personalities and characteristics). For a general discussion, see Cho-yun Hsu and Katheryn M. Linduff, Western Chou Civilization, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1988, Chapters 4-6.
5. Historical materials from the Chou period and thereafter, such as the Shih chi, were clearly influenced by the effective propaganda efforts of the Chou both prior and subsequent to the conquest. Their vile portrait of the evil Shang ruler was amplified by later writers-especially the Confucians-for didactic purposes, although not without an occasional dissenting voice (for example, Tzu Kung, Analects XIX:20). This is not to deny that the Shang oppressed the people or that King Chou of the Shang was not a villain. Rather, it should simply be understood that the Chou's self-portrait depicting the cause of Virtue as naturally attracting allies and politically dominating the realm was underpinned in actuality by extensive military achievements and persuasive power.
6. The Shang's triumph over King Chieh, the last evil ruler of the Hsia, was traditionally portrayed in terms similar to those describing the Chou's conquest of the Shang, but much simplified. King T'ang-the founder of the Shang dynasty-cultivated his Virtue, pursued benevolent policies, and garnered his strength on the fringe of the Hsia empire until finally engaging in a decisive battle. There was even a sagely counterpart to the T'ai Kung, the famous minister I Yin, who may have created the indirect striking tactics that proved successful for the Shang. (See Hsu Peiken et al., Chung-kuo li-tai chan-cheng-shih, 18 vols., Li-ming, Taipei, 1976, revised edition, Vol. 1, pp. 49-53, and also the early chapters of the Shang shu [Book of Documents]. The Shang shu also portrays Shang dynasty kings acting as strong supporters of virtue and as punitive agents against the unrighteous.)
7. Although the parameters of the dy
nastic cycle postulate an essentially continuous decline in the power of the imperial house, with allowances for temporary resurgences, recently discovered historical materials indicate that the Shang kings continued to be vigorous monarchs, mounting military expeditions and conducting tours of inspection throughout the years. Even though the last ruler-who is recorded as having been enthroned for more than sixty years-considerably debauched the image of the king, earlier kings, such as Wu Ting, were both effective and powerful.
8. The archetypal seductress played an extensive but tragic role throughout Chinese history, with several infamous examples bringing the imperial house to ruin. Even the less famous seductresses were constant sources of tension because the almighty emperors-despite having numerous consorts, concubines, and other ladies in waitingwere easily persuaded by their favorites to grant state favors and administrative or military power to their own relatives, thereby weakening the imperial house and creating sources of dissension. The displacement of an old consort by a new beauty or the replacement of an heir also caused interminable strife and intrigue.
9. Shih chi, "Shang Annals," translated from Shih-chi chin-chu, Vol. 1, Shang-wu yin-shu-kuan, Taipei, 1979, p. 94.
10. Hou (ruler) Chi (millet) was one of the legendary deified figures traditionally credited with creating China's culture and civilization. He is identified particularly with agricultural developments, such as the domestication of wild grains, and is recorded in the "Chou Annals" as having been appointed minister of agriculture by Emperor Shun.
11. "Chou Annals," Shih-chi chin-chu, Vol. 1, p. 101. It should be noted that the Chou were already powerful before this confrontation with the other barbarians; therefore, the traditional account is obviously highly simplified.
12. Hsu Pei-ken, Chung-kuo kuo-fang ssu-hsiang-shih, pp. 274-275.
13. For further discussions of Shang-Chou relations, see Hsu and Linduff, Western Chou Civilization, pp. 41-49; and Herrlee G. Creel, The Origins of Statecraft in China, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1970, pp. 57-69.
King Wu Ting of the Shang is recorded as having conducted military campaigns against the Chou before they descended to the Wei River valley. Chi Li apparently acted on behalf of the Shang against troublesome tribes from the northwest quarter before being perceived as too great a threat himself. The fact that the Shang could command and imprison both Chi Li and King Wen is testimony of their regional power and the Chou's continued submission, even though Shang rulers could not completely control the outer quarters. Because both Chi Li and King Wen were married to Shang princesses and members of the Shang nobility also appear to have married women from the Chou royal house, marriage relations were another aspect of their political policies.
14. His detention is variously said to have lasted anywhere from one to six or seven years. During this period he reputedly devoted himself to serious contemplation, ordering the sixty-four hexagrams of the I ching and appending the Judgments-activities befitting a future cultural legend. (The texts for the individual hexagram lines are attributed to the Duke of Chou, one of his sons, and Confucius is closely identified with the book as well.) His reign, which began when he was fifty, is recorded in the Shih chi as having lasted fifty-five years; he died nine years after being released by the Shang. However, such great longevity (which he apparently shared with the T'ai Kung and the evil King Chou) is extremely problematic, particularly in an age in which people had short life expectancies. For discussions of the Shang and Chou chronologies, see, among others, David N. Keightley, "The Bamboo Annals and the Shang-Chou Chronology," HJAS, Vol. 38, No. 2 (1978), pp. 423-438; Edward J. Shaughnessy, "On the Authenticity of the Bamboo Annals," HJAS, Vol. 46, No. 1 (1986), pp. 149-180; Chou Fa-kao, "Chronology of the Western Chou Dynasty," Hsiang-kang Chung-wen Ta-hsueh Chung-kuo Wen-hua Yen-chiu-so hsueh-pao, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1971), pp. 173205; Ch'u Wan-li, "Shih-chi Yin-pen-chi chi ch'i-t'o chi-lu-chung so-tsai Yin-Shang shih-tai to shih-shih," Taiwan Ta-hsueh wen-shih-che hsueh-pao, Vol. 14, No. 11 (1965), pp. 87-118; Jung Meng-yuan, "Shih-t'an Hsi-Chou chi-nien," Chung-hua wen-shih lun-ts'ung 1980, No. 1, pp. 1-21; Ch'ii Wan-li, "Hsi-Chou shih-shih kaishu," BIHP 42 (1971), pp. 775-802; Tung Tso-pin, "Hsi-Chou nien-li-p'u," BIHP 23 (1951), pp. 681-760; and Ho Yu-ch'i, "Chou Wu-wang fa-Chou to nien-tai wen-t'i," Chung-shan to-hsueh hsueh-pao 1981, No. 1, pp. 64-70.
15. Several Chinese military historians have stressed the importance of the location because it exposed them to constant military challenges. Not only did the Chou train for and mount military campaigns against their enemies, but they were also forced to always be prepared to instantly ward off sudden incursions. Their leaders, including the king, personally supervised them in the fields and directed their responses to such military emergencies. This experience nurtured unity, a strong spirit, and an unflinching commitment to battle. It also symbolizes the farmer-soldier ideal later bureaucrats felt characterized the practices of antiquity and came to be frequently cited whenever they sought to disparage the need for professional military men and studies. (However, as discussed in the general introduction, it should be remembered that at this time the nobility rather than the peasants were the active members of the fighting forces.) See, for example, Hsu Pei-ken, Chung-kuo kuo-fang ssu-hsiang-ship, p. 276.
16. Career military men turned historians, such as Hsu Pei-ken, see the long preparatory period as not just providing the time necessary to cultivate Virtue and slowly develop the economic basis for a power state with a satisfied populace but also as being the minimum interval required to create-in accord with the T'ai Kung's strategy-the revolutionary military weapons that would permit the Chou to effect radical new strategies against their vastly superior enemies. General Hsu is a particularly strong advocate of the chariot's decisive importance at Mu-yeh, the first battle in which it was employed en masse. Based on his estimates, the Chou could probably not have constructed more than a score of chariots per year-particularly armored ones-and at least three thousand horses had to be bred and trained. Charioteers also had to become practiced in the requisite individual skills and coordinated in integrated battle tactics. Furthermore, a large number of bronze weapons had to be manufactured; thus the Chou became more skilled in metalworking techniques and developed their own styles of weapons. (See Hsu Pei-ken, Chung-kuo kuo-fang ssu-hsiang-shih, pp. 284-286, and Tai Kung Liu-t'ao chin-chu chin-i, Shang-wu yin-shu-kuan, Taipei, 1976, pp. 1426.)
17. According to the Lu-shih Ch'un-ch'iu, he was a ship (lowest rank of noble) of the Eastern I people. Ch'iang people with the Chiang surname apparently were early allies of the Chou after an even earlier period of conflict.
Recent scholars have questioned the veracity of the T'ai Kung's eastern origin. Yang Yun-ju, for example, noting the Chiang clan's early marriage relations with the Chou, concludes that both the Chiang and the Chou were originally members of the northwest barbarian peoples and that the Chiang did not venture eastward until after the Chou conquest. (See "Chiang-hsing to min-tsu ho Chiang T'ai-kung to ku-shih," in Kushih pien [ed. Ku Chieh-kang], Vol. 2, Shang-hai ku-chi, Shanghai, 1982 [original copyright 1930], pp. 113-117.)
18. In all the stories about the T'ai Kung found in the various Warring States and later writings, he is invariably portrayed as old, retired, and poor. For example, the Shuo yuan frequently uses his late, meteoric rise to power after an undistinguished life to illustrate that talent and merit alone are inadequate unless one meets the proper moment. One passage states, "When La Wang was fifty he sold food in Chi-chin; when he was seventy he butchered cows in Chao-ko; so if when he was ninety he commanded the army for the Son of Heaven, it was because he met King Wen." (Shuo-yuan CCCY, p. 581, and an additional reference on p. 562.) His "lands were inadequate to repay the cost of the seeds, (the yield from) his fishing inadequate to repay the cost of the nets, but for governing All under Heaven he had more than enough wisdom." (Shuo-yuan CCCY, p. 569.) "He was an old fellow whose wife had put him out, who had worked as a butcher's assistant in Chao-ko and as an inn employee in Chi-chin
who welcomed guests." (Shuo-yuan CCCY, p. 234.) In the Han-shih wai-chuan he is laboring as a boatman when he encounters King Wen. (This incident is translated in James R. Hightower, Han shih wai chuan, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1952, pp. 140-142.)
19. The term "hegemon" does not appear until centuries after the events recorded in this biography, thus suggesting the dialogue is a late fabrication.
20. The story about how the T'ai Kung received his name is more than a little dubious; however, completely satisfactory explanations are lacking. He was apparently known by several names, perhaps depending on the recorder's perspective and location. "T'ai Kung" should refer to his enfeoffment as king of Ch'i and thus the state's official progenitor. "Lu" in "La Wang" probably refers to his place of origin, whereas Wang may have been his personal name; this is also the case for "Lu Shang." "Shih," in "Shih Shang-fu," perhaps referred to his command position, "T'ai Shih," rather than to his role as preceptor (shih) to Kings Wen and Wu (see note 21 below). "Shang-fu," or "Father Shang," may be an honorific referent from the two kings toward their army's commander in chief or perhaps their strategist-adviser. (See Yang Yun-ju, "Chiang- hsing," pp. 109-112.)
21. The Shih chi biography states he was appointed as a shih, which generally means "commander" but can also include didactic functions, as in "preceptor" or "teacher." Clearly, the T'ai Kung's role was far more encompassing and was related more to strategy than command. Historical references apart from the Shih chi do not record him as being commander in chief (normally a role the Chou king should personally have filled), but he seems to have commanded a force at the battle of Mu-yeh and led the initial charge to instigate the conflict. (See the "Chou Annals" in the Shih chi. Also note his superior role in the command of forces securing the area after the conquest in the I-Chou shu.)
The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China Page 48
