Traditional sources indicate that subsequently, King Wu married the T'ai Kung's daughter and that she became one of the ten great ministers of his reign. (See Wei Julin, Chung-kuo Ii-tai ming-chiang chi ch'i yung-ping ssu-hsiang, Chung-yang wen-wu kung-ying-she, Taipei, 1981, p. 2.)
22. The practice of traveling about to seek receptive rulers on whom to exercise one's persuasion is identified with the Warring States period and should be considered anachronistic. However, he may have traveled about in disguise, trying to perceive a single opportunity, or he may simply have been exceptional.
23. Mencius twice mentions that the T'ai Kung dwelled on the coast of the Eastern Sea to avoid King Chou (Mencius, IVA:14, VIIA:22) and also refers to him and San-i Sheng as having known King Wen (Mencius, VIIB:38). The Hsin shu mentions him "coming from the sea coast to give his allegiance" (Hsin shu, 10:9B).
24. Because the concept of unorthodox (ch'i) stratagems is attributed primarily to Sun-tzu, it is interesting to note the Shih chi's appraisal of the T'ai Kung's achievements in this regard. (This concept is discussed in the translator's introduction and notes to the Art of War translation.)
25. For a brief discussion of ch'uan, see the notes to the Art of War.
26. These conquests and alliances secured their base of operations and allowed them to expand toward the Shang domain. For further discussion, see Hsu and Linduff, Western Chou Civilization, pp. 89-92.
27. This very famous sentence is cited repeatedly by the T'ai Kung's detractors to support their contention that Virtue alone, rather than the T'ai Kung's despicable machinations, was enough to win the empire for the Chou.
28. Whether "Tsang-ssu" refers to a green, nine-headed river animal (originally based on a rhinoceros?) and is being invoked as a spirit to lend power to the oath or scare the men or refers to an officer for the boats is the subject of speculation.
29. The question has frequently been raised as to why King Wu did not immediately lead an attack on the Shang, particularly when they could have capitalized on the element of surprise. Various explanations have been offered, among them that King Wu felt his strength and preparations were still insufficient or that perhaps he had not expected such an overwhelming response and had neither supplies nor plans to support an attack. (Although concrete plans could have been formulated in the intervening two years, little more could have been done to dramatically alter the balance of forces.) Other suggestions include General Hsu's belief that the Chou did not bring their chariots to the assembly but concealed them for explosive use in the actual engagement and that this rally represented a sort of dress rehearsal. King Chou's minions certainly reported the events in detail, including King Wu's public acknowledgement-despite startling support to the contrary-that a subject should not attack his ruler. This sustained King Chou's complacency and arrogance-the Shang Annals indicate his disdain for any Chou threat to his power and his certainty that he would continue to enjoy the sanction of Heaven-and set the stage for the next meeting, which was then similarly regarded. King Wu thus was able to advance swiftly by an indirect southern route (fording the frozen river in an area supposedly well-known to the T'ai Kung who, according to one source, had sold rice there) and approach the capital before King Chou could muster all his forces and recall his expeditionary forces in the south. (See Hsu Pei-ken, Chung-kuo kuo-fang ssu-hsiang-shih, pp. 285-286, and Chung-kuo li-tai chang-cheng-shih, Vol. 1, pp. 74-76; and the statements attributed to King Chou in the "Shang Annals.")
30. The murder of Pi-kan and other events (such as the high officials fleeing to Chou with the sacrificial musical instruments) no doubt precipitated the king's decision to attack Shang.
The T'ai Kung's rejection of bad weather and ill portents is remarkable for an age obsessed with such beliefs. In his view, even though they claimed the Mandate of Heaven, how could the signs be auspicious for a ruler about to attack his sovereign? (Note that this incident, with additional dialogue, also appears in the Han-shih waichuan. See Hightower's translation, Han shih wai chuan, pp. 89-90.)
Although the T'ai Kung was obviously daring and resolute, some scholars have cited such statements as evidence that this material is fabricated because such pragmatic, unmystical views were not common until the Warring States period, when the military classics began to reject the influence of portents and signs. However, although there are serious doubts about the veracity of the details, this opinion perhaps too conveniently assumes a nonexistent homogeneity of thought and recklessly denies the possibility of the exceptional.
31. The "Shang Annals" records the manner of the king's death rather differently: "On chia-tzu King Chou's troops were defeated. King Chou raced back in and mounted the Deer Tower. He clothed himself in his treasures and jade, went into the fire and died. King Wu of the Chou subsequently chopped off Chou's head, hanging it up with a white pennon" (Ship-chi chin-chu, Vol. 1, p. 96). The I-Chou shu account in the "Shih-fu" chapter similarly records that King Chou immolated himself, whereas in the "Chou Annals" King Wu symbolically shoots King Chou with three arrows, then decapitates him.
32. The nine great bronze cauldrons symbolized imperial authority, and possessing them was deemed a matter of great consequence in establishing dynastic power and legitimacy.
33. An analysis and discussion of the battle of Mu-yeh merits a separate chapter. Among the many unresolved questions, perhaps the most important concerns the relative strength of the respective forces. According to the Shih chi and some other accounts, the Shang fielded seven hundred thousand men, whereas the Chou only had three hundred chariots, three thousand Tiger Guards, and forty-five thousand armored soldiers. The number for the Shang is extremely suspect and is subject to various explanations: It may be a general expression of size; an error for what should be seventy thousand or one hundred seventy thousand; or the total troops of the entire Shang forces, including all their allies-many of whom were already committed in other areas. The numbers for the Chou seem more reasonable but in fact may only refer to their core forces without including those of their allies. (Clearly, however, the forces of the Chou were vastly outnumbered by those of the Shang.) Depending on the source consulted, the actual battle either required little expenditure of forces-with the Shang troops offering minimal resistance to their king's morally superior enemy-or the carnage flooded the fields with blood. (Both the Shang shu and the Shih chi assert that the Shang troops "inverted their weapons" and otherwise offered little resistance.) The I-Chou shu lists 177,779 killed and 310,230 captured as a result of the entire campaign, which are astounding figures. (For brief discussions, see Edward L. Shaughnessy, "`New' Evidence on the Zhou Conquest," pp. 57-61.)
Notwithstanding the above evidence, the actual battle appears to have quickly turned into a rout and have ended within a few hours of the initial clash. Among the factors favoring the Chou was their commitment to the cause and consequent great fighting spirit, in contrast to the apparently reluctant, despondent Shang troops. The Chou forces were thoroughly trained and prepared, whereas the Shang were said to be deficient in both respects. The Chou unleashed an initial charge of one hundred elite stalwarts, headed by the T'ai Kung, and immediately followed with a chariot attack that moved swiftly across the plains. The combined effect both startled and terrified the Shang troops, who had not previously encountered massed chariot assaults. (Skeptics, however, such as Hsu and Linduff [Western Chou Civilization, pp. 81-88] believe superior infantry played the critical role and that the chariots were unimportant.) King Chou reportedly turned and fled, and his command immediately disintegrated. Because the Chou had strongly publicized (through charges possibly similar to those in the Shang shu) that King Chou-rather than the people-was the designated enemy, any compulsion to fight on the part of the Shang was seriously undermined. The battle and choice of battlefield were forced on the Shang because the Chou had crossed to the south-avoiding the bulwark of standing Shang defenses-and swiftly advanced. Finally, the Chou had prepared in secret, established a series of power bases, an
d either neutralized or gained the allegiance of states and peoples along the attack route and around the Shang. Although the Shang had obviously engineered their own self-destruction by alienating the people and eliminating effective administrators, the Chou may also have used many of the measures advocated in the Cultural Warfare chapter of the Six Secret Teachings to further subvert them. (For general discussions of these factors, see Chang Shao-sheng and Liu Wen- ch'an, eds., Chung-kuo ku-tai chan-cheng t'ung-lan, 2 vols., Ch'ang-cheng ch'u-pan- she, Peking, 1985, pp. 7-10; Li Chen, Chung-kuo li-tai chan-cheng ship-hua, Liming, Taipei, 1985, pp. 13-19; Hsu Pei-ken, Chung-kuo kuo-fang ssu-hsiang-shih, pp. 282-290, and Chung-kuo li-tai chan-cheng-shih, Vol. 1, pp. 71-84.)
34. Being in accord with local customs while still influencing the people is one of the keystones of the T'ai Kung's military thought and is consonant with postconquest Chou policies. Its wisdom was proven subsequently by numerous historical incidents, including military disasters.
35. These measures are all associated historically with the state of Ch'i and with its heritage of Legalist thought.
36. King Wu died about two years after the conquest, providing an opportunity for his brothers-in alliance with the Shang prince who was retained in heavily circumscribed, essentially symbolic power-to revolt. The Duke of Chou together with the Duke of Shao and possibly the T'ai Kung required three years to subdue the dissident peoples.
37. This charge appears in the Tso chuan. Cf. Legge, The Chinese Classics: The Ch'un Ts'ew with The Tso Chuen, Vol. 5, pp. 139-140.
38. "Expansive" should probably be understood as outgoing, energetic, active.
39. "The Hereditary House of Ch'i T'ai Kung," Shih chi, chuan 32, translated from Shih-chi chin-chu, Vol. 3, pp. 1502-1506, 1535.
40. The authenticity of Shang shu chapters is much debated; the consensus is that some portions may be early Chou material but that the bulk represents later composition.
41. See, for example, Edward L. Shaughnessy, "New' Evidence on the Zhou Conquest," pp. 60-61.
42. See Sarah Allan, "The Identities of Taigong Wang in Zhou and Han Literature," MS. 30 (1972-1973), pp. 57-99. Allan concludes that the T'ai Kung commanded the forces in the famous battles and was also accorded a special status in ritual affairs that was essentially equal to that of the royal clan members (p. 67). Her conclusion is based in part on early Book of Odes verses, which she notes as the only Western Chou references to the T'ai Kung (p. 59). However, Shaughnessy's article has proven the authenticity of the "Shih-fu" chapter of the I-Chou shu (which is not mentioned in Allan's article), and additional contemporary evidence shows that the T'ai Kung commanded troops and was entrusted with critical security operations. (See Shaughnessy, "`New' Evidence on the Zhou Conquest," pp. 57 and 67. Also see Ku Chieh-kang, "I-Choushu `Shih-fu' p'ien chiao-chu hsieh-ting yu p'ing-lun," Wen-ship 2 [1963], pp. 1-42. Ku similarly concludes that the "Shih-fu" chapter is an authentic record and provides glosses on the passage referring to the T'ai Kung on pages 6-7 of his article. It should also be noted that Allan's article states that the authentic historical material always refers to the T'ai Kung as "Shih Shang-fu" ("Taigong Wang," p. 60). However, in the I-Chou shu he is referred to as "T'ai Kung Wang," and in the first chapter of the recently discovered bamboo strips of the Six Secret Teachings he is called "La Shang." (See Lo Fu-i, "Lin-i Han-chien kai-shu," WW 1974, No. 2, p. 33.)
43. Allan, "Taigong Wang," pp. 68-72. The Chiang, as previously discussed, were allies of the Chou and furnished troops in the decisive battles. (Unfortunately, this explanation is not entirely satisfactory because it fails to account adequately for the Ta'i Kung's early, apparently menial status-one hardly befitting an important ally. Allan suggests that the motif of recognition may underlie these legends [see discussion, pp. 89-98], and it is an important theme in Chinese thought. For example, see Eric Henry, "The Motif of Recognition in Early China," HJAS, Vol. 47, No. 1 [1987], pp. 5-30; and Ralph D. Sawyer, Knowing Men, Kaofeng, Taipei, 1979. Henry only mentions the T'ai Kung in a footnote.)
44. It need hardly be mentioned that all of the contemporary military historians in both Taiwan and the People's Republic of China whose works have been cited in the notes above not only accept the fact of the T'ai Kung's existence but also attribute the major strategic and command role to him. Accordingly, they tend to see his thoughts as being largely preserved in the Six Secret Teachings, even though they have either been much revised over the centuries or were actually composed at a late date. (Western scholars, such as Hsu and Linduff, generally tend to ignore him altogether, although in his Origins of Statecraft [pp. 343-344] Creel posits his authenticity.)
References to the T'ai Kung are found throughout pre-Han writings-such as Mencius, Sun-tzu's Art of War, Hsun-tzu, Han Fei-tzu, Lu-shih ch'un-ch'iu, Huai-nan tzu, Kuo yu, and Shuo yiian. Extensive dialogues attributed to the T'ai Kung and King Wu also appear in the Shuo yiian, and several pages of quotations are preserved in the T'ung tien. That his historical authenticity has been doubted seems remarkable and perhaps symbolizes much about the nature of thought in China.
45. It is a fundamental Confucian teaching that without adequate material welfare, the development of moral behavior cannot be expected (see Mencius, 1A7, 3A3). Although the Legalists stressed enriching the state to make it powerful and nurturing a robust population that had the energy to fight, the military thinkers generally seem to represent a synthesis of both positions. (But see K'ung Te-ch'i's views on these policies as reflective of Legalist thought, LT CS, pp. 27, 64-65.)
46. The intent of these introductory sections is simply to provide convenient summaries of the main thoughts and principles that may act as guides in reading the text. No abstracted quotations are provided because the issues should be readily apparent in the translated material. Occasional footnotes raise additional contextual issues, but in general the introduction and explication of philosophical thought and its relationship to the material found in the Seven Military Classics must be left for separate works.
47. The attainment of this idealized objective is synonymous with concretely embodying Virtue. Some states will revere the aspect of Virtue; others will respect the military power it entails and therefore refrain from aggressive actions. (Unmentioned and apparently inconceivable is the possibility that yet others will greedily plot the subjugation and seizure of such a rich objective with a well-ordered populace.)
48. The universal implementation of punishments is a hallmark of Legalist thought-much in contrast to the oft-cited, simplistic reduction of the Confucian position on the idea that punishments should not extend up to men of rank nor the li (forms of propriety) down to the common man (see Book I of the Li chi). However, Lord Shang's draconian spirit is markedly absent from the Six Secret Teachings-evidence that, as Chang Lieh suggests, the work is an amalgamation of Confucian, Taoist, Legalist, and other viewpoints. (Cf. "Liu-t'ao to ch'eng-shu chi ch'i nei-jung," Li-shih yen-chin 3 [1981], pp. 125-126.)
49. Such preparedness especially reflects the preoccupation of sedentary, agrarian civilizations with sudden incursions by highly mobile, mounted, nomadic steppe peoples as well as the standing threat of surprise invasions by belligerent states. It also mirrors the Chou's original position in the midst of barbarian territory, perhaps contributing to the heritage of Ch'i military thought and possibly being the remote origin of this view.
50. Wu Ju-sung, in his preface to the LT CS, and K'ung Te-ch'i view the initial secret teachings of the civil and martial as measures designed to concretely realize Sun-tzu's dictum to attack and thwart the enemy's plans, to achieve victory without fighting. This objective can best be attained by strengthening the state and the military through the measures discussed in the Civil and Martial Secret Teachings and integrating them into the state's grand strategy. Accordingly, the policies and practices for which orthodox Confucians condemned the Six Secret Teachings are necessary steps in defeating an enemy without suffering serious losses and even in making it practical to attack a superio
r foe. (K'ung believes this reflects the historical background of the Chou-Shang conflict.) (See LT CS, Preface [pp. 1-3], and pp. 25-27, 82-86.)
51. The text thus reflects the rise of the professional general as a totally independent field commander, as discussed in the general introduction. In this regard the general's appointment ceremony can therefore be seen as the culmination of a concept first articulated by Sun-tzu and considered in varying degrees in the other Seven Military Classics.
52. K'ung Te-ch'i points out that according to the Six Secret Teachings, the principal quality required for a general was loyalty, which differs significantly from previous formulations that stressed courage or wisdom. He believes this reflects the late Warring States composition date of the text, an epoch in which war had become extremely complex-using many different weapons and tactics-and generals had become extraordinarily powerful. In a world of spies, intrigue, and massive forces, a disloyal general could easily seize the rulership for himself or equally doom the state to extinction (see LT CS, pp. 118-120).
53. Chapter 18, "The King's Wings," is the first exposition of a detailed military organization with specialized functions. This chapter reflects the highly advanced nature of combat in the late Warring States.
54. Attempts to objectively classify battlefield situations, analyze the enemy, and predict the outcome of engagements assuredly began with the rise of organized combat in antiquity. The first recorded systematic efforts are found in Sun-tzu's characterizations, but the other Seven Military Classics also contain similar situational descriptions and tactical suggestions. However, those found in the Six Secret Teachings are not only far more extensive and detailed but also differ fundamentally in reflecting the complexities of large-scale mobile warfare. Particularly noteworthy are the exposition and application of separate principles for the three types of forces-cavalry, infantry, and chariot-depending on terrain, battlefield conditions, and composition of the enemy. Mobility and the use of ch'i (unorthodox) tactics are particularly emphasized and as K'ung Te-ch'i notes, probably reflect the results of significant battles that occurred in the fourth and third centuries B.C. wherein smaller numbers and weaker forces decisively defeated superior opposition (see LT CS, pp. 172-180). Clearly, the period in which armies first deployed then engaged in either individual or massed combat had long passed.
The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China Page 49
