55. Material on siege techniques and city assault is cited as evidence of the lateness of the text, as noted below, because of precursors in Mo-tzu and Sun Pin's Military Methods.
56. As reported in the preface, the Seven Military Classics presently enjoy great popularity throughout Asia, often in readily accessible vernacular paperback translations and editions. Certain principles have also been consciously adopted by U.S. and European military planners, such as in the U.S. "Air-Land Battle 2000" doctrine (which emphasizes indirect assault); copies of Sun-tzu's Art of War were issued to U.S. marines serving in the 1991 Middle East conflict. However, deception and surprise have generally been neglected by the West in favor of frontal assault, attrition, and technological sophistication. For insightful discussions, see Ephraim Kam, Surprise Attack, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1988; and Michael Dewar, The Art of Deception in Warfare, David and Charles, New York, 1989.
57. Chang Lieh, "Liu-t'ao to ch'eng-shu chi ch'i nei-jung," p. 122.
58. The Han shu "Treatise on Literature" lists a work in the Confucian category entitled Chou-ship liu-t'ao, or Six Cases of Chou History. Although the meaning of the character t'ao in this title is also "bowcase," it is a completely different character from the t'ao in the Six Secret Teachings (see Karlgren, GSR, entry 1046C). Chang Lieh, among others, disagrees with Yen's identification of the two works as identical. (See "Liu-t'ao," p. 123; Ch'u Wan-li, Hsien-Ch'in wen-shih tzu-liao k'ao-pien, Lien-ching, Taipei, 1983, p. 479.)
59. Karlgren, GSR 1078G, defines it as "to wrap, cover," whereas Morohashi (entry 43189) and the Chung-wen ta-ts'u-tien (entry 44153) add the extended meanings of covering a bow or sword, bowcase and scabbard, and storing away. What is stored away, of course, is also concealed. (This character is apparently more recent than the one noted above, leading to the conclusion that the title could not have existed in the T'ai Kung's era.)
60. Okada Osamu, Rikuto, Sanryaku, Meitoku shuppansha, Tokyo, 1979, p. 7.
61. See Li Chiu-jui, Chung-kuo chun-shih ssu-hsiang-shih, Shun-hsien ch'u-pan kung-ssu, Taipei, 1978, p. 101. Modern scholarship generally reaches the same conclusion, but on systematic evidence. For example, Robin D. S. Yates notes the likely composition date as the late fourth to early third century B.C. ("New Light on Ancient Chinese Military Texts," p. 224).
62. For numerous examples of this view, see the passages collected on pages 791797 of the Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao (Chang Hsin-ch'eng, ed.), Shangwu yin-shu-kuan, Taipei, 1970 (reprint, original edition, 1939). Among them, only Ts'ui Shu points out that in antiquity, the civil and martial were balanced and were viewed as equally necessary and appropriate (p. 796). However, he still finds the concepts and language of the book inferior-unworthy of a figure such as the historical T'ai Kung, who is cast in the role of major adviser. (Also see Hsu Pei-ken, Liu-ta'o, pp. 17-18.)
63. This appears to be Hsu Pei-ken's position at various points in the introduction to his modern Chinese translation, T'ai Kung Liu-t'ao chin-chu chin-i (see pages 6-7, 18, and 31). Also see his Chung-kuo kuo-fang ssu-hsiang-shih, p. 283.
64. Most of the military writings cited in note 30 above adhere to this view (for example, Li Chiu-jui, Chung-kuo chun-shih ssu-hsiang-shih, pp. 101-102). The question of accretion and loss is too complex to be considered within the scope of a note. However, in his "Treatise on Literature" included in the dynastic history of the Former Han (written in the Later Han), Pan Ku noted three writings associated with the T'ai Kung: "Plans" in eighty-one sections; "Words," or "Sayings," in seventy-one sections; and "Military," or "Weapons," in eighty-five sections, for a very large total of two hundred thirty-seven sections. The present Six Secret Teachings only contains sixty sections or chapters, although many possible remnants are scattered about in other works. Even though a partial text has been recovered from a Han tomb, textual reduc tions and losses apparently continued after the Han dynasty as well. (Compare the Chun-shu chih-yao and also Wang Chung-min, Tun-huang ku-chi hsii-lu, Shang-wu yin-shu-kuan, Peking, 1958, p. 150. Also see Gustav Haloun, "Legalist Fragments, Part 1: Kuan-tsi 55 and Related Texts," AM NS, Vol. 2, No. 1 [1951-1952], pp. 85120.) Hsu Pei-ken, who studied the text extensively for at least two decades, has speculated about the possible fate of these books. First, the military writings perhaps formed the basis for the Six Secret Teachings, although some more general, historically oriented materials have been included. The chapters in "Plans" may have become the essence of the Yin-fu ching, another work associated with his name, which is traditionally thought to have been handed down eventually through Kuei Ku-tzu to Su Ch'in. Finally, the remaining work, "Words"-which may have been a record of his pronouncements while he was ruler of Ch'i-could have been preserved by Ch'i state historians and passed down within the state to ultimately comprise the basis of the Three Strategies of Huang-ship Kung. (This reconstruction is not generally accepted by Western scholars. For details, see Hsu Pei-ken, TKLT CCCY, pp. 27-31. )
65. See Ch'u Wan-li, Hsien-Ch'in wen-shih, p. 479; Chang Lieh, "Liu-t'ao," pp. 123-124. A number of reports have been published in Wen wu, among the earliest being Lo Fu-i, "Lin-i Han-chien kai-shu," pp. 32-33; and Hsu Ti, "Lueh-t'an Lin-i Yinchueh-shan Han-mu ch'u-t'u to ku-tai ping-shu ts'an-chien," WW 1974, No. 2, p. 29. K'ung Te-ch'i notes that an additional copy was recovered from another tomb in 1973 (LT CS, p. 11).
66. For examples, see the preface to LT CS, pp. 2-3, and examples cited in criticisms found in the Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao, pp. 792-797.
67. Numerous references to iron weapons that flourished only from the middle of the Warring States period, including arrowheads and iron caltrops, and to such sophisticated weapons as the multiple arrow repeating crossbow inevitably consign the text to the late Warring States period.
68. Although several chapters are held to be expansions of Sun-tzu's ideas, the most frequently cited source work is the Wu-tzu. Several other books are also mentioned as the origins for passages and concepts, including the Wei Liao-tzu, but serious study of their interrelationship has hardly begun. (Selected attributions are cited in notes to the individual chapters. See Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao, pp. 792-797.) The Three Strategies quotes from the Six Secret Teachings, or perhaps both quote from an earlier prototype text of the T'ai Kung's thought, such as the "Military" writings.
Among the more important so-called "borrowed" concepts are unorthodox tactics, mobility, the concept of a general, manipulating ch'i, and classifying terrains with appropriate tactics. Many passages in the various Military Classics are very similar and several even identical; however, the majority appear to represent discussions of essential topics in a common conceptual language, no doubt based on textual materials accessible to all these thinkers. Extensive comparative study is clearly required before the question of priorities and borrowing within the military writings can be even tentatively settled.
Conceptually, the Six Secret Teachings clearly falls into the late Warring States philosophical milieu. (An extended analysis is beyond the scope of this book; however, for brief discussions see LT CS, pp. 6-11; and Chang Lieh, "Liu-t'ao," pp. 124-126.) A Liu-t'ao sentence frequently cited by skeptics as proving the book's late Han or even T'ang dynasty composition is found in Chapter 13, "Opening Instructions," and in other chapters as well: "All under Heaven is not the property of one man but of All under Heaven." Because it also appears in the La-shih ch'un-ch'iu, an eclectic work that dates to the late third century B.C., critics claim the Liu-t'ao authors must have copied it. However, this is simply an assumption posited as fact, and there is no independent, concrete evidence for such an assertion. Instead, it seems likely that this was a saying commonly bandied about in the third century B.C. when such concepts were flourishing. Thus in our opinion, although it is correct to date the Six Secret Teachings to this period on both internal and contextual grounds, dogmatic assertions about the direction of borrowing are extremely suspect (cf. LT CS, pp. 9-10).
69. Ch'u Wan-li notes that because both the Wu-tzu and the Wei Liao-tzu are held to be forgeries, the
question of borrowing remains open. (Hsien-Ch'in wen-shih tzuliao k'ao-pien, p. 479. However, note that the Wei Liao-tzu was also recovered from the Han tomb, proving it, too, existed early in the Han, which is contrary to previous opinion.)
70. Also see the notes to the translator's introduction of the Three Strategies of Huang-shih Kung for further discussion in conjunction with the other writings attributed to the T'ai Kung.
71. Chang Lieh is the most visible proponent of this view. See "Liu-t'ao to ch'engshu chi ch'i nei-jung," p. 124, and his brief section in Cheng Liang-shu, ed., Hsu Weishu t'ung-k'ao, Hsiieh-sheng shu-chu, Taipei, 1984, pp. 1595-1597. In contrast, Hsu Pei-ken (TKLT CCCY, pp. 29-31) believes the Three Strategies was in fact the work passed along to Chang Liang and that it crystalized his intentions to overthrow the Ch'in rather than just seek personal revenge.
72. For example, see Hsu Pei-ken, Liu-t'ao, pp. 16-19. However, K'ung Te-ch'i classifies the first three together because they focus on planning for warfare, whereas only the last three fall under the rubric of tactical discussions (see LT CS, p. 152). K'ung offers extensive analyses of each of the various teachings, although with no speculation as to the significance of the last four names. Useful but brief overviews are also provided in Ping-fa, pp. 104-107.
73. This is seen by some contemporary historians as expounding a concrete program for attaining Sun-tzu's nebulous objective of unifying the people with the ruler (Ping-fa, p. 104).
74. See note 50 above.
Notes to the Text
1. Emended from Sage Emperor Yu to Sage Emperor Shun, based on history and Liu Yin's correction (LTCC WCCS, I:3A).
2. The chun-tzu, translated here as "True Man of Worth," which reflects the Confucian concept of the "perfected man" as embodying the dimensions of the ideal-including the moral and political ideal. (Originally, chun-tzu referred to a ruler's son and eventually designated any "gentleman" of aristocratic birth; but Confucius preempted it as a vehicle for concretely expressing the critical virtues, and it underwent further sophisticated philosophical expansion thereafter. As thus understood, the passage obviously postdates the early Confucians.)
3. Fishing maybe understood as an analogy for weighing, reflecting the primary use of the term "ch'uan"-to weigh or balance (translated as "authority" in this passage). Depending on the size of the bait, the fisherman can entice and control larger fish.
4. Chun-tzu, "True Men of Worth,"should not form parties or cliques, according to Confucian orthodoxy. However, when the world is in turmoil, they spontaneously gather together out of sympathy for All under Heaven, and thus the enterprise of revolution may be born.
5. Jen, without doubt one of the two defining virtues of Confucianism, has been variously translated as "benevolence," "true humanity," and "human-ness."
6. Perhaps an echo of Sun-tzu's "Vacuity (emptiness) and Substance."
7. Although the passage appears to discuss Yao's personal practices, all of which express the spirit and ideals found in many sections of the Tao Te Ching, by implication, of themselves the populace equally embraced these values and customs. Thus, the passage could well be translated more generally-"they did not adorn themselves"-as some contemporary Chinese translators have done.
8.Or possibly, "tranquilized their hearts."
9. The sentence in brackets has dropped out of the Ming edition and is restored from the Sung version.
10. The li-"forms of etiquette," or "forms of propriety"-were one of the cornerstones of Confucian thought and the foundation for hierarchical social organization and interaction. Far more than simply ritual forms or practices of etiquette, they both defined and reflected human relationships and directed as well as constrained the expression of human emotions.
11. By effectively confining each of the three treasures to its own area, its members were less likely to be distracted and contaminated by external stimuli and thus were not tempted to abandon their own occupations. (From the Legalist perspective, they would also be easier to monitor and control.)
12. This dictum is closely associated with Legalist thinkers but is commonly found in eclectic works as well as in the military writings. Normally, the "handles of state" are rewards and punishments, the means by which to wield authority and control power.
13. The concept of material goods being critical to the establishment and maintenance of family relations represents an extension of the generally acknowledged Confucian idea that attaining morality and harmony becomes difficult without minimal material sustenance.
14. This is the military corollary to not loaning the handles of state to other men.
IS. Out of the darkness and secrecy, overt (yang) actions to overthrow the government suddenly manifest themselves. However, for the enterprise to prove effective, a true leader must appear to direct it along the proper path. (The history of China constantly witnessed the unfolding of such tragic dramas, with few centuries ever enjoying the tranquility associated with its glorious history.)
16. Several commentators understand this sentence as referring to those the ruler employs, but the scope clearly includes the entire populace. (Cf. TKLT CCCY, p. 72; LT CS, p. 53; and Okada Osamu, Rikuto, Sanryaku, Meitoku shuppansha, Tokyo, 1979, p. 45.)
17. Bravados, or "knights-errant," gradually appeared in the Warring States period; they became a socially and politically disruptive factor but also captured the imagination of the populace and furnished the material from which numerous romantic stories came to be fashioned. (For background, see James Liu, The Chinese Knighterrant, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1967.) Their mention further attests to the Warring States composition of the text.
18. The concept of ch'i, integral to discussions in many spheres-including philosophy, medicine, metaphysics, and science-is fundamental to the enterprise of military action. Ch'i-often identified with and translated as "spirit" or "morale"--is in fact the basis of both, being the essential energy of life, the "pneuma" or "vital breath" that circulates within the body. The military thinkers understood the difficulty of forcing men to enter battle and engage in combat, of compelling them to kill other men, and identified ch'i as the component whose development and surge made such actions possible. Sun-tzu, whose work follows the Six Secret Teachings in our chosen translation sequence, was apparently the first to realize and describe the critical role of spirit and courage in combat; he described the danger in terms of the ebb and flow, of ch'i. The other military classics all consider ways to develop, manipulate, and ensure the proper combative spirit, the ch'i of their men and armies. Among the philosophers, Mencius is especially known for the cultivation of overflowing ch'i, although his conception differed significantly from that of the military thinkers.
The definitions, dimensions, and dynamics of ch'i are quite complex, entailing both metaphysical and psychological aspects. Although there are subordinate discussions in the secondary literature, the only two monographs that seriously consider the history and nature of the concept are both in Japanese: Onozawa Seiichi, Fukunaga Mitsuji, and Yamanoi Yu, eds., Ki no shiso, Tokyo Daigaku shuppansha, Tokyo, 1978; and Kuroda Yoshiko, Ki no kenkyu, Tokyo Bijustsu, Tokyo, 1977.
19. The concept of name and reality matching each other is associated primarily with the great Legalist synthesis propounded by Han Fei-tzu, a late Warring States philosopher, but it apparently originated with Shen Pu-hai. (For background, see Herrlee G. Creel, Shen Pu-hai, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1974, and "The Meaning of Hsing-ming," in Soren Egerod and Else Glahn International Booksellers, Studia Serica Bernhard Karlgren Dedicata, Copenhagen, 1959, pp. 199-211.)
20. Hsu Pei-ken (TKLT CCCY) places this chapter at the start of the Martial Secret Teaching as Chapter 12.
21. The "subtle" (as discussed in Questions and Replies), or the "vital point," as employed by Wu Ch'i in the Wu-tzu, rather than just "opportune time" or "opportunity." (See note 32, Book I, Questions and Replies.)
22. All tactics advocated by Sun-tzu in the Art of War.
23. Another fa
mous tactical principle from Sun-tzu (Art of War, Chapter 6, "Vacuity and Substance.")
24. An image common to and perhaps borrowed from Chapter 11, "Nine Terrains," of the Art of War.
25. The translation follows Liu Yin's understanding of "from" in parallel for each political level; otherwise, the sentences would become contradictory. Thus the ruler who does not take "from" the people, the state, or All under Heaven gains the support of these respective polities and thus "takes" them. (See LTCC WCCS, 1:38; and compare TKLT CCCY, p. 84, and LT CS, pp. 70 and 72.)
26. An image common to Sun-tzu, Art of War, Chapter 5, "Strategic Military Power."
27. Emending the text according to the Sung edition, as Liu Yin's commentary indicates it to be correct.
28. This sentence and the passage in general reflect several concepts central to the Tao Te Ching, especially those expressed in Chapters 2, 7, and 51.
29. As long as the state imposes few burdens, the people will prosper. However, it is also possible to understand this as "the ruler does not give anything to the people, yet they are enriched of themselves." Because the general context of these chapters discusses the ruler providing food and clothes to the people to gather them in, both readings seem possible.
30. The civil, as distinguished from the "martial," consisted of diplomatic measures as well as political programs that clearly encompassed psychological warfare, disinformation, spying, and the creation of dissension. As noted in the translator's introduction, these measures were widely condemned by orthodox scholars, including Liu Yin, because they could not imagine that such historical paragons of Virtue as Kings Wen and Wu would need them-especially when presumably they had already gained the willing allegiance of two-thirds of the realm.
The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China Page 50
