92. Echoing Sun-tzu's concepts of the unending changes and transformations of the five notes in the Art of War, Chapter 5, "Strategic Military Power."
93. According to Sun-tzu in the Art of War, Chapter 9, "Maneuvering the Army," this would be a disadvantageous position.
94. Described in Chapter 31, "The Army's Equipment."
95. "Dispersing and assembling," or "dividing and combining," reappears as a key topic in Questions and Replies, where it is seen as essential to the execution of unorthodox strategies. The concept's significance was perhaps first realized by Sun-tzu (see the Art of War, Chapter 7, "Military Combat").
96. Sons adopted through marriage assumed their wive's surnames, thereby abandoning their own families, betraying their ancestral responsibilities, and generally violating common Confucian beliefs. Normally forced to take such drastic action because of lowly status and poverty, they would be especially motivated to escape their living ignominy by distinguishing themselves in combat.
97. A central concept in several of the military writings, including the Ssu-ma Fa, Wu-tzu, and Questions and Replies.
98. The Sung edition has "selected warriors" for "assimilate and become practiced."
99. The concept of training men by extending the teachings is seen in several other writings as well, including the Wu-tzu ("Controlling the Army") and Questions and Replies (Book II). In the latter the focus is on instructing the officers first, as appears to be the case here (see notes 84 and 85, Book II).
100. This chapter is significant for its unique discussion of the equivalency of various types of forces, which was possible only late in the Warring States period when all three types-chariots, infantry, and cavalry-were actively employed, although the role of chariots was increasingly diminished (cf. LT CS, pp. 199-202). Li Ching cites these equivalents in his discussions with T'ang T'ai-tsung in Questions and Replies.
101. A number of unusual terms are used in this chapter, whose precise position in a military hierarchy remains nebulous. Approximate functional equivalents have been used wherever possible.
102. Five feet seven inches tall in modern terms.
103. "Fatal terrain" is one of Sun-tzu's categories, advanced in "Nine Changes" and "Nine Terrains." Sun-tzu, Wu Ch'i, and others all discuss types of terrain and the tactics appropriate to them and to exploiting weaknesses in the enemy's condition.
104. Although the text states "terrain"-apparently in parallel with the ten deadly terrains described just above-seven of the eight simply characterize weaknesses in the enemy that can be exploited to advantage, as discussed earlier in the book and in other military writings. Whether sections have been inadvertently juxtaposed or the original lost and supplements provided is unknown.
105. Literally, "terrain."
106. Reflecting Sun-tzu's theory of striking the enemy when his spirit-his ch'ihas abated (see Art of War, Chapter 7, "Military Combat").
107. As most of the commentators have noted, only eight situations are described; two have apparently been lost over time.
108. Literally, "terrain."
109. "Heavenly Well" or "Heaven's Well" is among the deadly configurations of terrain Sun-tzu warns against in the Art of War, Chapter 9, "Maneuvering the Army."
The Methods of the Ssu-ma
Abbreviations of Frequently Cited Books
Notes to the Translator's Introduction
1. Determining exactly how far back the materials may date requires systematic study, including comparison with passages from the Spring and Autumn Annals and the Tso chuan. Some writers assert that the current book includes pre-Western Chou source material, but this seems doubtful unless the passages have been reworked into the style of the late Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods. (Cf. Chung-kuo Chun-shih-shih Pien-hsieh-tsu, Chung-kuo chun-shih-shih, Vol. 4: Ping-fa, Chiehfang-chun ch'u-pan-she, Peking, 1988, pp. 48-53.)
2. Liu Chung-p'ing cites Sun Hsing-yen in asserting that the thoughts and strategies of the Duke of Chou together with those of the T'ai Kung provide the basis for the book. SMF CCCY, p. 4 (of the introduction).
3. T'ien Shu, another of T'ien Wan's descendants, was granted the surname Sun by Duke Ching for his achievements. Sun Wu (the famous Sun-tzu) and thereafter Sun Pin were descendants and therefore were all members of the same clan as T'ien Jang-chu. (Cf. Li Hsueh-le's introduction, SMF CS, p. 1, and also pp. 16-17.)
The tradition of Ch'i military studies requires a separate extensive work as well as resolution of the thorny problems of verbal transmission and family specialization. Because the Han tomb containing the military works belonged to a person surnamed Ssuma, it has been suggested that this provides evidence of the continuity of Ch'i studies right into the Han. (Parts of the Ssu-ma Fa were also recovered, proving it could not have been a forgery of the Sui or T'ang dynasties.) Modern Western scholars, to a large degree following Ch'ing skeptics, vehemently deny the possibility that the T'ai Kung's or the Duke of Chou's thoughts provide the foundation of any of these works, if only because of the style and characteristics of the language. However, this ignores the possibility of gradual rephrasing over centuries of oral transmission. Further epigraphic materials will perhaps provide additional answers.
4. SMF WCCS, 1A. A more detailed description of the Great Ssu-ma's duties is found in the Chou Ii, under the "Offices of Summer" (chuan 7 and 8). Cf. Lin Yin, Chou li chin-chu chin-i, Shang-wu yin-shu-kuan, Taipei, 1972, pp. 297ff.
5. The Kuan-tzu is being translated by W. Allyn Rickert, Guanzi, Vol. 1, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1985.
6. King Wei, originally a member of the T'ien clan, is also noted in the Shih chi biography (translated below) as being related to Ssu-ma Jang-chu.
7. Chuan 62. The translation is based on the text found in the Shiki kaichu kosho, one-volume reprint, I-wen yin-shu-kuan, Taipei, 1972, pp. 840-842. Several other editions have also been consulted, including Ma Ch'ih-ying, Shih-chi chin-chu, Vol. 4, Shang-wu yin-shu-kuan, Taipei, 1979, pp. 2200-2202; and Han Ssu-ma, Hsin-chiao Shih-chi san-chia chu, Vol. 4, Shih-chieh shu-chu, Taipei, pp. 2157-2160.
8. T'ien Wan, who was originally surnamed Ch'en, had served Duke Huan of Ch'i and been enfeoffed for his contributions, taking the name T'ien. T'ien Jang-chu was a third- or fourth-generation collateral descendant of commoner status.
9. Ch'i declined precipitously after Duke Huan's hegemony, due primarily to a succession of debauched and incompetent rulers, becoming easy prey for the other feudal states. Duke Ching proved no exception to the other rulers and was saved from immediate doom only through the efforts of T'ien Wen-tzu and members of the Pao and Kao clans. T'ien Wen-tzu apparently practiced benevolent policies on behalf of the government, but the duke continued his dissolute ways until shaken by the appearance of a comet in the northwest, which presaged the invasion and collapse of Ch'i. (Cf. Ch'en Wu-t'ung and Su Shuang-pi, eds., Chung-kuo li-tai ming-chiang, Vol. 1, Honan jenmin ch'u-pan-she, Honan, 1987, p. 3.)
10. Some Shih chi commentaries identify P'in as a district rather than a city. Obviously, the surrounding territory as well as the cities would have been occupied. (The Shih-chi k'ao-cheng suggests that these place names did not exist at such an early period, thereby throwing into question the authenticity of the entire story or at least its association with Duke Ching.)
11. Literally, the area above the Yellow River.
12. At this time the supervisor apparently served just below the commander in chief and therefore above all other generals.
13. A staff set up to observe when the shadow of the sun was shortest and thus determine midday.
14. The commander would impose his rules for discipline, the measures for camp order, and the meaning of the various directions and commands.
15. One of the fragments of the Ssu-ma Fa is a three-character phrase: "Behead in order to instruct" (SMF CS, p. 132).
16. This statement-which appears in several of the Seven Military Classics-reflects the growing independence, professionalism, and power of t
he commanding generals and the realization that military campaigns were becoming so complex that the ruler-who previously, in the Shang and Early Chou, usually commanded in personshould not interfere. A similar story appears in Sun-tzu's biography. The Ssu-ma Fa fragments include the statements: "Affairs outside the gate (of the state's outer wall) are administered by the general" (No. 40, SMF CS, p. 131).
17. He apparently tested and evaluated the men in order to remove the weak and sick from the active ranks.
18. So as not to enter the state as an armed host, thereby keeping separate the martial and civil, as discussed in the text itself. He simultaneously defused any threat his loyal army might be seen as presenting to the political ruler.
19. They were the powers behind the throne of the dissolute ruler and thus enjoyed his confidence.
20. A Ssu-ma Jang-chu is also mentioned in the Chan-kuo ts'e as holding power under King Min of Ch'i (reigned 300 to 284 B.c.) and refusing to countenance his overthrow. (Cf. Yang Chia-lo, ed., Chan-kuo ts'e, Vol. 1, Shih-chieh shu-chu, Taipei, 1967, p. 243 [chuan 13, Book 6 of the state of Ch'i].)
21. One hundred fifty-five represents the total number of sections collected, perhaps before collation and elimination of duplicates. Although much has undoubtedly been lost, if the sections were fairly brief, their rearrangement might reduce the number considerably without any actual sacrifice of material.
22. Cf. note 1, above; SMF CCCY, p. 4. Also note the general discussion, pp. 4-22, and the conclusion, p. 22, in SMF CS.
23. Notwithstanding, each chapter is organized around an ostensible theme.
24. The Chou li discusses the offices and duties of the Chou dynasty in great detail. Although it paints a very idealized, systematic portrait, it no doubt has a substantial basis-one that is being confirmed with each new archaeological and epigraphic discovery. The fragments collected by Ch'ing scholars-collated and further analyzed in the SMF CS-contain extensive material on military organization not found in the present text. With their inclusion, the ancient book would become an even better candidate for classification under the li (cf. SMF CS, pp. 6-12). Liu Chung-p'ing (SMF CCCY, p. 2) asserts that the title should not contain the word "ping," or military, because it should be considered a book of laws or standards rather than a book of strategy, or "methods of war."
25. SMF CS, pp. 17-18.
26. This is expressed despite their emphasis on benevolence as the foundation of the state and thus as the basis of citizen support, which is therefore synonymous with power. Note also the last paragraph of Chapter 3, where the parallel imposition of strong measures-the law-occurs in the absence of proper obedience: "When upright methods do not prove effective, then centralized control of affairs [must be undertaken]. [If the people] do not submit [to Virtue], then laws must be imposed."
27. The recognition, even advocacy of employing force to stop force, war to halt war, is not unique to this text. Mencius was a strong advocate of military activism, and such eclectic texts as the Kuan-tzu contain similar materials. One of the Ssu-ma Fa fragments states: "If men, for a reason, kill men, killing them is permissible" (SMF CS, p. 136).
28. Leaders in the very early years were still confronted with rebellion, barbarian challenges, and the problems of consolidation, but under the first few rulers the state enjoyed relative stability and tranquility.
29. Part of this passage is also repeated at the start of Chapter 2.
30. The danger of martial values predominating, affecting individuals who pursue their own paths and wield power, is also raised in Chapter 2 under the subject of "excessive awesomeness."
31. "In antiquity they did not pursue a fleeing enemy too far nor follow a retreating army too closely. By not pursuing them too far it was difficult to draw them into a trap; by not pursuing so closely as to catch up it was hard to ambush them. They regarded the li as their basic strength" (Chapter 2).
32. The commentators suggest it can be explained by concern for the cold that would affect the men. Campaigns in antiquity, although generally of short duration, were initiated after the fall harvest and could easily extend into the winter.
33. This contradicts the policy of having the army forage for food and the Ssu-ma Fa's advocacy of confiscating rations from the enemy. For example, "To increase material resources rely on [seizing them from] the enemy" and "take advantage of [the enemy's] material resources" (Chapter 3).
34. A list of concrete justifications for undertaking a campaign of rectification is found at the end of Chapter 1.
35. These formalities are described in the middle of Chapter 1.
36. This does not imply that the general commands simply at the whim of his soldiers or that he is a passive element. Rather, through preparatory activities-such as education, drills, and training-he must ensure that their spirit is disciplined, that their martial capabilities are fully honed. However, in particular circumstances they may still not be prepared, or they may be confronted by situations beyond their skill and spirit. The astute commander must accurately discern these difficulties and react accordingly, such as by whipping up the army's enthusiasm or employing delaying tactics.
37. The repeated emphasis on measure, control, and quiet is seen as indicating material describing-or at least based on-antique forms of warfare wherein the chariots and accompanying infantry had to be closely coordinated because gaps or disorder (which would be induced by haste) would doom the army to defeat. Cf. Ping-fa, pp. 48-49. (Please refer to the passage notes for further historical observations.)
38. T'ien Hsu-tung stresses this point (cf. SMF CS, p. 72).
39. "If their masses are beset by uncertainty, you should take advantage of it." [5] "Mount a sudden strike on their doubts. Attack their haste.... Capitalize on their fears." [5]
40. As discussed in the first third of Chapter 4.
41. That is, the prospect of life, of being spared when they would normally be executed for dereliction of duty or desertion.
Notes to the Text
1. This contrasts sharply with the idealized view that a Sage King need only cultivate his Virtue to achieve rulership of the world, as discussed in the translator's introduction.
2. Such as by imposing corvee labor duties or mounting military campaigns during the prime agricultural seasons. Military actions in themselves would also violate the natural cycle of growth if undertaken during spring and summer, the period when yang is ascending and peaking.
3. The "Great Peace" or "Great joy," apparently a triumphant musical performance that included dance, was held to welcome the victorious troops who had just pacified the realm and to simultaneously redirect the people's anger-the emotional basis of warfare-into happiness and joy (SMF WCHC 3:4-5A). Thereafter, to remain vigilant against the necessity of reluctantly employing the army against external enemies, the emperor held great hunts in the spring and fall, which the feudal lords were mandated to attend. In the early Chou, these not only provided opportunities to reinforce feudal bonds and secure a considerable meat supply but were also the chance to instill organization, practice command, and exercise the feudal members in wielding arms. Because the nobility made up the military class, even with their retainers and servants there would not be more than a few thousand participants.
In the spring the participants would be led back in "good order" and then dismissed, whereas in the fall, after training, they would embark on military campaigns if necessary (cf. SMF CCCY, notes to pp. 8-9).
One of the collected fragments describes how the various feudal lords would be ordered to pay court on a seasonal basis, with the intent and objective of each season varying (cf. SMF CS, p. 107). Another seems to reflect archaic remnants, correlating seasons with directions and military activities: "In the spring do not conduct campaigns of rectification in the east; in the fall do not undertake attacks in the west. If there is a lunar eclipse withdraw the army. In this way one is cautious (or reduces) warfare" (SMF CS, p. 99).
4. The li, the forms of proper behavior (also frequent
ly translated as "rites"), evolved and became detailed systematically much later than the idealized period being portrayed. However, the code of chivalry ostensibly governing combat should be well noted because it disappears with the rise of infantry armies and the maturation of large-scale warfare. (The Chung-kuo chun-shih-ship notes that at the battle of Han Yuan in 645 B.C., the commander felt the correct execution of the li took precedence over capitalizing on a tactical opportunity to attack an enemy that had not yet formally deployed in battle lines. In 638 B.C. the same scrupulous observation of the li resulted not in a glorious victory suffused with an aura of righteousness but in ignominious defeat. Thereafter, the turn toward realism accelerated, until by the end of the Spring and Autumn period-when ironically the li were becoming more important in all aspects of life and were later given theoretical foundation by early Confucians-such self-imposed restraint became a mark of idiocy (cf. Ping-fa, pp. 49-50).
5. In contrast with the Warring States period, when rank and rewards were based on the number of heads taken, and prisoners were routinely killed. (Unmentioned is the historical fact that prisoners were generally enslaved in the ancient period, including the Shang, and were often sacrificed.)
6. Offices were established to control and supervise productive activities, such as farming and the skilled crafts.
7. With a view to eliminating differences and harmonizing practices among all the states.
8. This includes relations among the ranks, standards of the state, observances of the realm.
9. Initiating activities in disharmony with the natural tendencies, such as executing in spring, the season of growth; holding military drills or hunts in summer; or perhaps wearing black in summer, when red or yellow would be appropriate.
10. Throughout the Seven Military Classics the importance of announcing military plans in the ancestral temple, before the spirits and before the ancient kings, is constantly emphasized.
The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China Page 52
