7. For example, see Li Ling (Hsu Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao, pp. 1608-1613) and Ch'i Ssuho (Hsu Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao, pp. 1599-1602.) Ch'i asserts that the scope of warfare described in the Art of War, such as mobilizing one hundred thousand men and one thousand chariots for a single battle, did not occur until the middle of the Warring States period; protracted sieges were not known in the Spring and Autumn because cities were small and had little fortification, whereas in the Warring States they had become important, strongly fortified economic and strategic centers. It was not until the Warring States period that military offices became distinct from the normal hierarchy of nobility and personal command was relinquished by the ruler. Li Ling also avers (p. 1612) that deceit and the use of ch'i (unorthodox) tactics never characterized Spring and Autumn conflicts. Others have also pointed out that the forms of organization and the extensive emphasis on speed and mobility characterize infantry rather than chariot warfare and therefore reflect another transition that did not occur until the Warring States period. (Also see Chang Hsin-ch'eng, Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao, Vol. 2, pp. 797-801; and Ch'u Wan-li, Hsien-Ch'in wen-shih tzu-liao k'ao-pien, pp. 424-425.)
The contrary view is also held-namely, that this specialization, the growing use of infantry, and a new emphasis on speed all mark evolutions found in the last years of the Spring and Autumn period. (See, for example, Wu Ju-sung, STPF CS, pp. 8-12.) Tsun Hsin interprets these factors similarly: He feels speed is indicative of the growing use of infantry; assaults on cities were neither desirable nor sustainable because even in the developing economy of the late Spring and Autumn period, cities were not yet significantly profitable targets; and the bronze weapons of the era were designed for close combat and thus were inadequate to undertake sustained assaults against cities. Furthermore, state economies of that era could not sustain protracted campaigns; therefore, Sun-tzu emphasized speed, not duration. In contrast, the increased value of cities-which grew rapidly into major economic and strategic centers in the Warring States period-is witnessed in Sun Pin's treatise, which analyzes the types of cities and provides rudimentary tactics for both defending and besieging them. (See Tsun Hsin, "Sun-tzu ping-fa to tso-che chi ch'i shih-tai," WW 1974, No. 12, pp. 20-24. The Six Secret Teachings and the Wei Liao-tzu also consider the tactics of siege warfare, as does the Mo-tzu.)
8. See, for example, Cheng Liang-shu's analysis of the terms, concepts, and passages borrowed from Sun-tzu in two relatively early works, Sun Pin's Military Methods and the Wei Liao-tzu, in Hsu Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao, pp. 1617-1625.
9. Wu Ju-sung, in the introduction to his Ch'ien-shuo, briefly notes some important military events that historically predate Sun-tzu (see STPF CS p. 14). In the Art of War Sun-tzu also quotes from preexisting military works.
10. The question of the Art of War's placement within a fairly continuous evolution of written styles is also the subject of debate. For example, Li Ling (Hsu Wei-shu t'ungk'ao, pp. 1613-14) and Robin D.S. Yates ("New Light on Ancient Chinese Military Texts: Notes on Their Nature and Evolution, and the Development of Military Specialization in Warring States China," TP 74 [1988], pp. 218-219) view the text as somewhat advanced over the basic verbatim, summary format of the Analects, with some conjoined passages and a logical division of topics but less so than Sun Pin and far less than Hsun-tzu and other late Warring States-period philosophers. They note its similarities with the Mo-tzu's style, and Yates believes many of the connectives are later additions that were provided in an attempt to integrate the text. Yates suggests a date of approximately 453-403 B.c., with later additions, whereas Li Ling ascribes the book to a somewhat later date-roughly the middle of the Warring States period. (Yates also advances the thought that the military works were perhaps the first private books to appear in China.) However, Ch'i Ssu-ho and others-concurring with the general view that private books did not really appear until the Warring States periodobserve that Sun Wu should have been approximately contemporaneous with Confucius, but the language and presentation are more sophisticated than is apparently characteristic of this early period. Ch'i believes Lord Shang and Wu Ch'i initiated the first books, followed by Sun Pin and others, and that the Art of War represents the confluence of Confucius's theory of kingship, Lao-tzu's concepts of nonaction and unorthodox/orthodox, and Mo-tzu's defensive strategies. He therefore concludes that it is not the work of a single person but that it evolved over a considerable period and was composed in the middle to late Warring States period (see Ch'i Ssu-ho in Hsu Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao, pp. 1604-1605).
11. Skeptics abound from the Sung dynasty onward. Some, based on Tu Fu, accused Ts'ao Ts'ao (the first commentator) of butchering the text; others doubted Sun-tzu's existence or felt the work must be a later forgery (see citations in note 6, above). Their skepticism was based in part on the Han shu bibliographical notation of a Sun-tzu in eighty-two pien (sections, or chapters), despite the Shih chi reference to thirteen sections, which gave rise to the charges against Ts'ao Ts'ao. The discovery of the bamboo slip edition in the tomb at Lin-i in 1972, although it comprises only a third of the present edition, at least proves conclusively that the book existed in roughly its current form early in the Han dynasty. Ch'u Wan-li and others therefore suggest that the thirteen-section work had to be complete before Sun-tzu's interview with the king of Wu because the king mentions this number; the additional sections-if thirteen is not an outright error-probably consisted of materials such as those found at Lin-i, including further dialogues between the king and Sun-tzu (see Ch'u Wan-li, Hsien-Ch'in wenshih tzu-liao k'ao-pien, pp. 433-434). For further fragmentary materials, including possible evidence for a sixteen-section version of the text, see "Ta-t'ung Shang-sunchia chai Han-chien shih-wen," WW 1981, No. 2.) Later notations describe the Suntzu in three chuan, or rolls, indicating the difficulty of reconstructing textual lineages with such obscure materials.
Because of its realistic approach (employing spies and deception) designed to ensure the state's survival, the Art of War was also vehemently condemned by Confucian literati throughout late Chinese history (and by numerous Westerners early in this century who unfortunately displayed the same attitude as that of Secretary of State Stimson in his unimaginable quashing of code-breaking activities in a hostile world). Sun Wu's existence and role as well as the book itself accordingly were viewed as late fabrications, unworthy of consideration except by the morally reprehensible.
12. After studying both traditional and newly recovered materials, Cheng Liangshu concludes that the Shih chi account is basically accurate and that the Art of War was probably composed between 496 and 453 B.C. (see Hsu Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao, pp. 1617-1626).
13. See, for example, Ch'i Ssu-ho, who consigns it to the late Warring States period (Hsu Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao, pp. 1598-1605).
14. Yates, for example, accepts the view (which is based on internal evidence in comparison with historical events) that the text was composed between 453 and 403 B.C. (see "New Light," pp. 216-219).
15. Sun Pin, a descendant of Sun-tzu, was a brilliant strategist whose achievements have been dramatically preserved in the Shih chi and essentially corroborated by the Lin-i texts. His work, entitled Ping-fa, is best translated as Military Methods to distinguish it from Sun-tzu's work by the same name. Although early bibliographical data indicated the existence of these two distinct works, Sun Pin's book was apparently lost by the end of the Han, and confusion arose as to which Sun actually penned the traditionally transmitted text of the Art of War. (A separate, otherwise unknown chapter on cavalry has been preserved in the T'ung-tien.) Numerous modern Chinese and Japanese translations have already appeared; primary reports of the find appeared in Wen wu in 1974 and are largely contained in the articles cited in note 26, below.
16. Sun Wu and Sun Pin's connected biographies in the Shih chi, chuan 65, are translated by Griffith in his introduction (The Art of War, pp. 57-62).
17. Wu Tzu-hsu, who is largely credited with playing the major role in Wu's ascendancy, became the subject of a popular cult and numerous stor
ies because of his achievements and perverse execution. (See David Johnson, "The Wu Tzu-hsu Pienwen and Its Sources," Part I, HJAS 40.1 [June 1980], pp. 93-156, and Part II, HJAS 40.2 [December 1980], pp. 465-505.) The fact that Sun-tzu is not mentioned in the Tso chuan is sometimes justified by pointing out that Wu Tzu-hsu was such a dominant figure as well as Sun-tzu's direct superior-he simply eclipsed Sun-tzu when credit for Wu's military success was apportioned (cf. Wei Ju-lin, ST CCCY, p. 5).
18. According to most other writings, Sun Wu was actually a native of Ch'i, as is discussed below.
19. Ch'i Ssu-ho, among others, does not believe Sun-tzu would ever have been allowed to commandeer palace women to illustrate his theories of military discipline nor that the execution of the two captains would have been understood as having proved anything. He therefore views the entire episode as an exaggeration (see Hsu Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao, p. 1598). Wu Ju-sung believes that rather than being a lesson about discipline, the incident illustrates Sun-tzu's fundamental teaching that a general-once he is in command of the army-does not accept orders from the ruler; this is in accord with his particular understanding of Sun-tzu's major contribution as having been the isolation and characterization of the professional general (STPF CS, p. 3).
20. This and similarly worded phrases appear frequently in the Seven Military Classics as well as in the Art of War. Essentially a quotation from the Tao Te Ching, it is generally taken as evidence of Taoist influence on military thought. However, perhaps this single saying was simply adopted by various military strategists because of their sobering experience in actual warfare, without reference to or acceptance of any other aspects of philosophical Taoism.
21. Yang Chia-lo, ed., Wu Yueh ch'un-ch'iu, chuan 4, "Ho-h! nei-chuan." The translation follows the 1967 SPKY edition reprinted as Wu Yueh ch'un-ch'iu, 2 vols., Shih-chieh shu-chu, Taipei, 1980, Vol. 1, pp. 91-95. The biography continues with Sun-tzu advising the king not to press the attack against Ch'u because the people are already exhausted. Although his name is mentioned several more times in the chapter, except in a single case where he briefly offers tactical advice, it is always coupled with that of Wu Tzu-hsu. Insofar as the Wu Yueh ch'un-ch'iu is attributed to the first century A.D., nearly two centuries after the Shih chi, it is not considered reliable evidence for Sun-tzu's activities. However, recent PRC popular military histories frequently contain biographies of Sun-tzu that are based on such remote material (including many writings from the late Warring States and Ch'in periods) reconstructed in some detail. For example, see Ch'en Wu-t'ung and Su Shuang-pi, eds., Chung-kuo li-tai ming-chiang, 2 vols., Honan jen-min ch'u-pan-she, Honan, 1987, Vol. 1, pp. 13-18. Virtually every modern edition and translation cites the Shih chi biography and assumes Sun-tzu's authenticity, although the Chung-kuo ku-tai chang-cheng t'ung-lan (Chang Shao-sheng and Liu Wen-ch'an, eds., Ch'ang-cheng ch'u-pan-she, Peking, 1988, Vol. 1, pp. 74-81) nevers even mentions his name in its account of the war between Wu and Yueh.
22. Based on the Shih chi account, Wu Ju-sung believes-despite intrigues and treachery-the historical Sun-tzu was active in Wu for roughly thirty years, from 512 to 482 B.C. (see STPF CS, p. 4). Chan Li-po suggests a more limited period, 512 to 496 ("Lueh-t'an Lin-i Han-mu chu-chien Sun-tzu ping-fa," WW 1974, No. 12, p. 15).
23. Later reconstructions of Sun-tzu's life trace his lineage back to the T'ien clan, which had risen to power in Ch'i after the period of Duke Huan, the first hegemon. Sun Wu's grandfather, as a reward for military achievement in a campaign against Lu, was granted the surname Sun. Although the T'ien lineage was among the four major ones contending energetically for power in Ch'i, they were largely successful, and skeptics thus question why Sun-tzu would have ventured into Wu and then remained unknown for some period-during which he befriended Wu Tzu-hsu. Clearly, his family background in military studies would have provided him with expertise that would have been equally useful to his lineage, which was immersed in Ch'i's turmoil.
24. The monumental issue of the relationship between Taoist and military thought in antiquity-including questions of origins, modification of concepts, and direction of influence-obviously requires a voluminous study in itself. Many secondary works in Chinese contain at least brief ruminations on the subject, but almost all of them tend to treat it simplistically and ineffectually. (Hsu Wen-chu's chapter "Sun-tzu ho Lao-tzu ssu-hsiang pi-chiao," found in his book Sun-tzu yen-chin [Kuang-tung ch'u-pan-she, Taipei, 1980, pp. 192-208] is an exception.) In the West, Christopher C. Rand has initiated the analytical effort with an intriguing, if complex, article that provides a conceptual framework for dissecting the various approaches to certain felt problems. (See "Chinese Military Thought and Philosophical Taoism," MS 34 [1979-1980], pp. 171218, and "Li Ch'uan and Chinese Military Thought," HJAS, Vol. 39, No. 1 [June 19791, pp. 107-137.) Insofar as it is impossible to compress a meaningful, comparative presentation of Taoist ideas and military thought into a few pages of closely packed notes, we have opted to introduce appropriate comments at relevant points in the translations and other introductory material. (Ch'en Ch'i-t'ien's Sun-tzu ping-fa chiao-shih [Chung-hua shu-chu, Taipei, 1955 (reprint of 1944 edition)] contains a succinct analysis of the major philosophical schools' attitudes toward warfare that corrects some general misimpressions found throughout Chinese history [see pp. 231251]. Kagakuraoka Masatoshi's article "Sonsi to Roshi" [Toho shukyo 37 (April 1971), pp. 39-50] also initiates specialist studies of this nature.)
25. The Art of War is classified by the Han shu under the subcategory "ping ch'Uan mou," roughly "military (imbalance of) power and planning." (See notes 39 and 37 for further discussion of ch'iian and concepts of shih, to which it is closely related.) Ch'uan is frequently identified with expediency, with military measures that stress volatile tactics, swiftness, and indirection to achieve their aims. Books in this category are aptly described as follows: "(Experts in) ch'uan and mou preserve the state with the orthodox (cheng, the upright) and employ the army with the unorthodox (ch'i). Only after first estimating (the prospects for victory) do they engage in warfare. They unite the disposition of troops (hsing) and strategic power (shih), embrace yin and yang, and utilize (those skilled in) technology and the crafts." (A similar partial statement is found in Verse 57 of the Tao Te Ching: "Govern the state with the orthodox, employ the army with the unorthodox.") Other works found in this section are Sun Pin's Military Methods and the Wu-tzu; books by Lord Shang and the T'ai Kung were deleted from the original Ch'i lueh listing (cf. Yates, "New Light," pp. 214-224).
26. The bamboo slip edition discovered at Lin-i constitutes slightly more than onethird of the present Art of War arranged in thirteen sections with many chapter headings identical to those in the current text. Although some discrepancies in extant versions (such as those found in the Ten Commentaries edition and the Seven Military Classics edition) have long been noted, they are essentially the same as-although more extensive than-the Lin-i reconstructed text. Additional material uncovered in the tomb, including a brief conversation recorded between the king of Wu and Sun-tzu (which is generally felt to be a reasonably authentic record of their initial interview), sustains the opinion that the original form of the Art of War was in thirteen sections, as recorded in the Shih chi, and suggests that Ssu-ma Ch'ien drew on materials now lost when writing the Suns's biography. (The bamboo slip edition, of course, only proves that this particular version existed prior to-or at least early in-the Han dynasty. Scholars continue to argue about the further implications, including whether the section now entitled "Interview with the King of Wu" provides evidence for Sun Wu's existence and the early origin of the text. See, for example, Li Ling, Hsu Wei-shu t'ungk'ao, pp. 1606-8.) For a brief English overview, see Yates, "New Light," pp. 211-220.
Among the most important original reports are the following: Shantung Sheng Powu-kuan Lin-i Wen-wu-tsu, "Shantung Lin-i Hsi-Han-mu fa-hsien Sun-tzu ping-fa ho Sun Pin ping-fa teng chu-chien to chien-pao," WW 1974, No. 2, pp. 15-21; Hsu Ti, "Lueh-t'an Lin-i Yin-chueh-shan Han-mu ch'u-t'u t
o ku-tai ping-shu ts'an-chien," WW 1974, No. 2, pp. 27-31; Lo Fu-i, "Lin-i Han-chien kai-shu," WW 1974, No. 2, pp. 32-35; and Chan Li-po, "Lueh-t'an Lin-i Han-mu chu-chien Sun-tzu ping-fa," WW 1974, No. 12, pp. 13-19. (Chan Li-po points out several instances in which the bamboo slip edition's reading is completely opposite that of the present text. In some sentences this radically alters the meaning, resolving otherwise contorted and opaque constructions. These and other views, such as those of Chu Chun, are cited in the notes to the translation.) Also see Li Ling's summary reprinted in Hsu Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao, pp. 1605-1608. (Li concludes that the discovery is not adequate evidence to revise a much later dating that has been derived from internal evidence.)
27. D. C. Lau, in a rather critical review of Griffith's translation, has discussed several of the main ideas and problems of the text. See "Some Notes on the Sun Tzu," BSOAS 28 (1965), pp. 317-335. (Lau's views, although preliminary, are important to understanding the text and are taken into account in the translation.)
28. Wu Ju-sung emphasizes Sun-tzu's dictum that warfare is the greatest affair of state, as distinguished from the Shang-Chou tradition, which identifies both sacrifice and warfare as equally important matters. Wu feels that Sun-tzu's view reflects the new reality emerging late in the Spring and Autumn period and the clash of economic interests between the newly landed class and the old nobility, which had monopolized military power and authority (see STPF CS, pp. 9-12).
29. The Art of War, although expressing the basic view found throughout the Seven Military Classics that the state must always be prepared for warfare and must nurture adequate material welfare, advocates keeping the people essentially ignorant and manipulating them in battle as though they were sheep. Accordingly, PRC scholars in particular have concluded that the author lived after the rise of early Legalist thought because such measures were characteristic of that approach, and they even termed him a Legalist strategist. See, for example, Tsun Hsin, "Sun-tzu ping-fa to tso-che chi ch'i shih-tai," pp. 22-24; Ch'i Ssu-ho in Hsu Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao, p. 1603;,Li Ling in Hsu Wei-shu t'ung-k'ao, p. 1613; and Chan Li-po, "Lueh-t'an Lin-i Han-mu chu-chien Sun-tzu ping-fa," pp. 14-15. (Keeping the people simple and ignorant is also a pronounced doctrine in the Tao Te Ching. However, also see note 173 of the translation.)
The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China Page 54
